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This study is intended as a contribution to the
integration of modern economic analysis of general equilib.
rium into a conceivable system of praxiology enoompassing
the broad field of the social sciences. It happens that
the specific problem of economic organization, which is
customarily studied as welfare economics, is so strategically
situated as to constitute a central subject upon which to
concentrate analytical attention throughout this investi.
gation. The object of this dissertation is to trace from
their philosophical roots the value judgments required for
the deduction of the conditions of optimum stable equilib-
rium of economic action. The thesis starts from a phenon
menological conception of consciousness as a manifestation
of the intentionality of a subject in relation to an object,
and proceeds by way of a theory of action as a normative
process of orientation of social conduct from an initial
situation to a desired end. From the application of this
theory of social action to economic processes, the conclu-
sion emerges that an economic system, whether national or
international, and static as well as dynamic, as long as
it is considered a form of social activity and not a pure
mechanism, cannot reach a uniquely given optimum position
or path of equilibrium in the absence of explicit or impli-
cit assumptions concerning the politically determined and
juridically implemented ethical decisions on the ultimate
ends of the economic action in question. This theory is
finally translated into policy, and a minimum set of such
ethical decisions is proposed as a general but sufficiently
inclusive basis for possible, effective and adequate, inter-
national economic organization of national efforts towards
economic expansion, stability, and peace,
il
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Statement of thesis
1. The problem. This study attempts positively to ana-
lyze the problem arising from the conflict between conflict-
ing economic ideologies of national sovereignties and the
general interest of the international community towards
economic stability and peace.
2. The assumption. It assumes that nations are generally
interested in achieving order in their international economic
relations, but that such coincidence of interests does not
always indicate willingness or ability of governments nation-
ally to implement the specific measures that the international
situation requires.
3. The solution. Finally, this study examines the pos-w
sibility of a normative solution in independent sovereign
states spontaneously agreeing to create and support an effec-
tive and adequate international economic organization capable
to make and execute a.legal norm for international economic
action.
B. Development of thesis
1. It was characteristic of the classical doctrine of
international economic relations the belief in the harmony
of the market economy as stemming from a divine, natural or
rational order, and thus being good, right and just. This
doctrine was found inadequate by the end of the nineteenth
century, and was replaced by the modern doctrine which affirms
that international economic relations are created, maintained
or discontinued by human will. The natural, automatic order
became a deliberate," artificial organization, and the tre-
mendous moral responsibility of taking economic decisions
was thrown upon the half-willing shoulders of the state. In
the absence of rules directly flowing from nature, God or
reason, and requiring no official vigilance or conscious ef-
fort for their realization, "every action became permissible"
in Dostoevskits phrase, that is, the state found itself con-
demned to freedom, and was confronted with the arduous task
of setting its rules for national and foreign economic policy.
Governments everywhere faced the problem of moral authority
of having to justify its measures not only in terms of right
and wrong but also in terms of good and evil.
2. The international economic organizations which exist
or have existed were created by consensus of national sover-
eignties on the necessity of international cooperation and
consultation for the attainment of harmony in international
economic relations. This consensus occasioned freely agreed
norms for national economic conduct that constitute the treaty
upon which were built each one of these international eco-
nomic agencies. Sovereign states pledge observance to those
3rules in the moment their governments ratify the basic
treaties, and their membership in each organization. The
existence of a ratified agreement regulating the international
economic conduct of sovereign states proves that there is a
coincidence of national views as to the necessity of obtain-
ing a more satisfactory state of international economic
affairs, as well as that there is such coincidence as regards
the appropriate norms for national economic behavior in pur-
suing the common objective. The reconciliation of national
sovereignty and international authority was even made possible
by the wide acceptance of the doctrine of original agreement
by which the state may consent to the future operation upon
itself by majority vote of international authority, and even
coercion. It might go so far as voluntarily to surrender
its entire sovereignty without violating the doctrine of
sovereignty.
3. To that extent there is no conflict. The conflict
arises when general norms are to be applied to specific,
crucial instances of national economic reality. Such rules
are juristic, not factual, that is, they designate social
norms which are the aims of social action, they do not speoi-
fy concrete facts of the existent economic systems. In-
ternally, a conflict of applicability of the law is solved
by legal interpretation and coercion, but since the norma-
tive authority of international economic organizations is
based rather upon the evidence of the necessity for inter-
national cooperation than upon a coercive power or an inter-
pretative capacity that they do not possess, both their ef-
fectiveness and adequacy depend upon the ability or willing-
ness of member governments domestically to implement specific
recommendations issued by these organizations. Although the
observance of the norm is technically, and even sincerely,
warranted with the member government's ratification of the
terms of agreement, a specific recommendation of the organ-
ization may not in all cases be internally applied by the
member government if it does not conform with the national
economic ideology of the country concerned.
4. Then, either international economic organizations
pronounce their recommendations in conformity with national
economic systems of member countries, and they will lose in
normative effectiveness to the same extent that they gain in
positive adequacy, betraying consequently the very objectives
for the fulfilment of which they were created, or they main-
tain their integrity as normative organisms, and recommend
in authoritative mood, but may not be obeyed. Either they
operate improperly, and their success is measured by their
failure, or they run the risk of not operating at all.
5. Assuming that nations have a preference for inter-
national economic harmony, but that this preference does not
imply willingness or capacity of member governments to
5implement exotic measures, the only possibility for inter-
national economic organizations to perform effective, ade-
quate, normative international economic action in a world
of independent, but interdependent, sovereign states is seen
in sovereign nations internationally agreeing to a set of
economic presuppositions
a) not based exclusively upon the assumptions of
a particular national economic ideology, but
large enough to include at least some of the in.
stitutions and doctrines of the major economic
systems;
b) precise enough to permit the norms derived from
these presuppositions to be specifically applied
by national economic policies, in such a way
that their acceptance or rejection be not based
upon imposition or necessity, but upon free in-
spection and choice;
c) and, finally, verifiable enough for them not to
constitute a simple compromise but to serve as
a foundation and basis for passing dispassionate
judgment upon the value of national economic
policies which are incompatible with the pursuo*
ance of a stable and peaceful international
economic order.
66. It is the final task of this investigation to examine
the possibility of realization of a solution in these terms
as well as to appraise the available means to create a func-
tional international economic organization to be built upon
an international contract embodying in a juristic instrument
such presuppositions and derived norms.
7II. FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF ANALYSIS
A. Theory and reality
1. Definition of tbeory. Etymologically the term theory
comes from the Greek noun "theoria," derived from the verb
'theorein which means to look at something (from a distance).
"Theoria' meant, for Plato, a contemplation of an essence,
that is, the contemplation of the hypothetical universal
aspect of anything, and, for Aristotle, a pure knowledge as
opposed to practical, or a systematically organized know-
ledge of relatively high generality.1 The criteria implied
in these two definitions are hoth subjective, but neverthe-
less violently contrast the two extreme philosophical posi-
tions of idealism and realism with regard to the nature of
reality. In order not to commit ourselves to one of these
two subjective positions at the exclusion of the other, we
shall adopt an operational2 definition of theory, based on
its etymological meaning, and suggesting theori as being a
structure of human action consisting of an observer, his
3intention, preoccupation or dissatisfaction, and an object
The Dictionarrof Philosopb, ed. Dagobert D. Runnes,
2nd. edition, Philosophical Library, New York, 1942, 'Theory.'
2P. W. Bridgman, Loixic of Modern Physics, Macmillan Co.,
New York, 1927, pp. 5-6.
3
"Sorge" as in Martin Heidegger, Bein und Zeit, 1st. vol.,
Halle, 1929, pp. 48-49.
8the nature of which confronts the observer as a riddle. This
object of intent scrutiny, which may be an idea, an illusion,
a physical event, a Kantian phenomenon or noumenon,4 will be
called fact. By fact, therefore, we shall hereafter under-
stand that which is intended by an observer, a conceptual
statement about what is given.5 Theoretical inquiry, then,
starts always with an intention of an observer in face of
the problem given him by reality, i.e., by facts. Inquiry
is oriented by a method towards the explanation of these
facts in a system of logically interrelated concepts of em-
6
pirical reference. It aims at prediction of future occur-
7
rences, which, if verified, will reassure the observer in his
8
predisposition at the initiation of the inquiry.
2. A classification of concepts. The definition of fact
as the object of preoccupation of a subject, that which is
4 lmmanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Macmillan Co.,
London, 1933, chap. III, p. 265.
5L. J. Henderson, "An Approximate Definition of Fact,,"
University of California Studies in Philosophy, passim,.
6Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action, The
Free Press, Glencoe, Ill., 1949, p. 6.
?Bertrand Russell, Religion and Science, Oxford University
Press, Oxford, 1947, p. 8.
8J. A. Froude, The Lives of the Saints as cited by
H. L. Mencken, A New Dictionary .o.Quotations, Alfred A. Knopf,
1942, "Theory. "
9intended by an inquirer, always subjective, relative, pro-
positional, a statement of a conceptual scheme, point out to
a classification of concepts as facts, in accordance with
their intended aspect. 1 0
5. Concepts as synonymous with facts are perceived and
apprehended out of something. It is something to which a
meaning has been assigned. Concepts fall into different
types according to the different sources of their meaning.
There are two major ways in which this assignment can be made.
This something out of which concepts or facts are extracted
will here be called pure reality, and it will mean simply the
assumption, proposition, belief or judgment that something
exists, a continuum, a substance, an order, a divine ground
in which the sensorial perception and the conceptual appre-
hension of the observer sculpts that which is perceived as
the pure facts of empirical reality, and the otherwise mean--
ingless term which may be associated denotatively with some
datum or set of data which is given immediately as pure fact
of empirical reality will here be called concept br indul3i"_.
Pure facts, or facts of empirical reality, matters of fact,
9 Consciousness as intentionality, as in Marvin Farber,
The Foundation of Phenomenology, Harvard University Press,Cambridge, Mass., 1943, pp. llff., 227ff., and passim.
10F. 8. 0. Northrop The Logic of Sciences and4 the
Humanities, Macmillan 6g., New York, 1948, pp. 39-57, ?77-1~00.
9
10
actual occurrences, brute events which are simply there,
regardless of their value, are called concepts by induction:
they are patches of color, zonesof smell, etc., space-time
sensorial representation of pure reality. Described facts
or apprehended facts are already, tacitly or explicitly, a
statement involving a conceptual scheme by postulation, a
state of affairs having categorial, syntactical structure,
sense and value. These described facts shall here be called
concepts by postulation, or, since described facts are the
only facts that will concern us in this study, described
facts, or facts. When the term fact is mentioned it will
mean, unless otherwise stated, inpure, described, postulated
fact or concept.
4. Tentatively classified in accordance with their in-
tended aspect described facts or concepts by postulation may
be grouped into (a) facts which are semantic concepts of an
already reflective knowledge of that which is given by em-
pirical reality, signs, modes of signifying: "the sun,"
"le soleil, WN 0osolI into which that patch of dazzling yellow
light turns out to be, after some months of social life, to
the American, French or Brazilian child; or then the individ-
ual So-and-So which is given to "my" senses as a spatial
l lM.erleau-Ponty, Ph~nomenologie de la Perception,
Librairie Gallimard, Paris, 1945, chap. 1. Charles Morris,
Signs, _Language and Behavior, Prentice-Hall, Inc., New York,
1946, chaps. I and III.
11
configuration having temporal permanence; (b) facts which
are empirically described conceptual essences artistically
12
arranged by a temperament: Hamlet', Mona Lisa, Beethoven t s
Fifth, Cellini's Perseus, etc.; (c) facts which are inferred
concepts of positive theoretical knowledge of what is given
by empirical reality: that three dimensional spherical
celestial mass, which is subject matter of astronomy, which
in everyday life is called "the sun'; or that manifestation
of a Freudian inferiority complex, which is the subject matter
of psychiatry, and who is known to "me" as Mr. So-and-So;
(d) facts which are the postulated concepts of technology, or
ideology, which say how action should be oriented towards
given ends, that is, which are norms indicating a procedure
to transform what is given by empirical reality into what
ought to be given by empirical reality at some future date: 13
the production function for economically harnessing the solar
12hippolyte Taine's definition of art as "nature seen
through a temperament, Philosophie do l'Art, Paris, 1880.
Clive Bell, A, Frederick A. Stokes, New York, s.n., chap. I.
Otto Rank, Art and Artist, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1932,
chaps. II and III. Northrop's definition of aesthetic con-
cept as a concept by intuition is valid only for certain
forms of art. It may be noted here that this classification
of concepts essentially differs from the classification he
proposes.
137or the technological meaning of normativenoss s00
H. Carnap, Philosophiy and Logical _Syntax, Routledge, London,
1935, pp. 22ff.
12
energy, or the legal norm which is imposed upon So-and-So in
order to condition his social behavior in a Fascist State;
(e) facts which are also postulated concepts of positive
ethical theory making possible the formulation of a system
of ethics with independent validity, but endowed with the
potentiality of application to concrete situations: the "rule
of reason" for interpreting the Sherman Act, or the imperative
"do not kill," therefore, So-and-So should not kill;14 (f)
facts which are postulated concepts of social ideologies,
Paretian "residues" of existent ethical or social systems,
which give them public validity and recognition: So-and-So
should be a successful business man, or a dutiful commissar,
or a contemplative yogi, or an "honnete homme," or a Prussian
officer,15 etc.; or the sun should be worshipped instead of
commercially exploited, or should be avoided at midday in
summer time; (g) finally, at the extreme, facts which are
the result of an essentially irrational choice, and which
near when a no longer theoretical decision is taken by the
1 4 Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State Harvard
University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1949, p. 45. toscoe
Pound, "Rule of Law," Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences,
Macmillan Co., Chicago, Ill., Vol. 13.
1 5 Vilfredo Pareto, Mind and Society, Harcourt Brace,
New York, Vol. 1, pp. 3-60. Aldous Huxley, Ends and Means,
Harper Bros., New York, 1937, p. 2. Levin L. SchUcking,
Tbhe Sociolo~gy of _Literary Taste, Oxford University Press,
Oxford, 1944, chap. 1.
13
observer in relation to the nature of pure reality, a reli.
gious, dogmatic, categorial, absolute decision which captures
pure reality as rational order, as God operating on suffi-
dient reasons, as a togetherness to be understood by mathe-
matical. means, Spinoza's Substance, Aristotle's Unmoved
Mover, Whiteheadts pluralistic Eternal Objects, Santayana's
Essences, etc. Thus it is seen how one and the same pure
fact may be apprehended by many of its aspects. The division
of knowledge into sciences, art, religions, etc., is nothing
more than a didactical device for exploring pure reality.
5. But how, among this bewildering multiplicity of as-
pects, shall the observer navigate? Theory has been defined
as the action of theorizing, and, implicitly, every action
seems to be a sort of theorization. Scientific theory is
nothing but cognitive action, a direction in search of orien-
tation. Pure reality behind empirical reality 'makes no
sense" because it is inconceivable by the relational essence
of reason. That there must be something, God or Nothingness,
is only an ineffable object of mystical intuition, urge for
Unity, 'Angst," medieval Accidia, or Baudelarian Ennui. It
is an assumption never to be empirically verified, since it
is proposed after someone's "five senses" have already par-o
ticularized the universe, irretrievably, and imposed a pattern
to that chaos. But even after the senses, at this plan of
immediate existence, everything is sudden, in congruous,
14
fortuitous. It is reflexion that which elevates us to levels
where intelligibilities appear. Abstraction, selection of
facts, and then the imposition of logical correlations between
these facts are the two most elementary stages of the inquiry
to be followed by verification leading to prediction, which
are the final stages. By these means the direction of the
speculative action has found its orientation in a norm for
speculation, or a method.16
6. Positive and normative cognitive actions. As in the
definition of fact, the definition of theory points to an
operational definition of scientific method as a norm of
orientation for cognitive action, Previous conceptualization
and reflexion are its necessary, though insufficient, condi-
tions. Scientific theory is never made by those who start
17
with an open mind, or, in our own terms, those who are un-
intentioned. In order to find something we must look for it,
and in some way anticipate the solution of the problem before
18
solving the problem. This guessing has been called the
intentionality19 of the inquiring consciousness. It guides
1 6 References for scientific method see P. Duhem, La Theorie
Physique, _son Object et sa Structure_, Paris, 1906.
1 7 Morris R. Cohen Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences,
Macmillan Co., 1948, iScientific Method.A
1 8Bertrand Russell, The Principles of Mathematics,
W. W. Norton, New Yr, 1948, Introduction to the Second
Edition,
19 Etymologically the term intentionality comes from the
Latin noun intentlo, and verb intendere, to stretch, to reach
for something.
15
the observer to the selection, by induction, of those relevant
facts to be hypothetically generalized. Scientific guessibg
is distinguished from dogma or creed by its being recognized
as a guess, and by the organized way of testing, through
20
systematic doubt, its chances of being true. This method-
ical doubt takes care, explicitly, of the influence upon the
theoretical system of those facts which were left out of
21
account as residual, and it tries to correct the natural
fallacy of selection which consists in taking the sample as
characteristic of the class rather than of some unrecognized
22
variety. From this Cartesian notion of scientific method
we may define theory as an organic structure of the cognitive
action of an agent who recognizes his condition of radical
subjectivity, but who, by questioning his own propositions,
strives for neutral objectivity in order to attain publio
validity of explanation, verification, and prediction.
7. We have seen intentionality of consciousness as the
essence of speculative theoretical action, how it guides the
20. J. Chevalier, Descartes, Textes Choisis, gloff,
Fribourg, 1944, pp. 65~4.
2 t Talcott Parsons, gg. cit., pp. 18ff.
22 M. H. Cohen and E. Nagel, An Introduction to Logic and
the Scientific Method, Harcourt Brace, New York, 1934,
pp. 382-390.
25 Max Weber, The Methodology of the Social Sciences, The
Free Prs, Glencoe, Ill., 1949, chap. I, where the expres-
sion is "ethical neutrality."
16
inquirer to the discovery of relevancy in facts, and how facts
are apprehended by their intended aspect. Now we make inten-
tionality itself the object of inquiry, and we apprehend it
as the preoccupation of an agent confronted by empirical
reality. Facts, then, will appear to the agent, in accord-
ance with his way of looking at them, as what is given him
by empirical reality (a) when he intends to forecast what
will supervene if the predictable trends of the situation are
allowed to take their course without active intervention, or
(b) when he intends to know how action should be oriented,
or what means should be chosen, in order to realize or apl-
proach a predetermined state of affairs which differs in whole
or in part from that which will probably occur without active
intervention. Cognitive action is thus characterized, on
one extreme, by a positive speculative attitude of mind of the
observer, and, at the other extreme, by a normative (tech-
nological or teleological) prescriptive attitude of man "in
24
the ordinary business of life." As this study is concerned
with the analysis of the international conflict of economic
ideologies, our mental position will consistently try to be
that of the positive, objective inquirer, whereas that of our
object of investigation will consistently be maintained as
normative and subjective. This norm of objectivity, which
is required by the scientific character of this thesis,
24A. Marshall, Principles of Economics, Macmillan, 1948,
p. 1.
17
operating within a frame of subjectivity, which is required
by the social nature of this investigation, necessitates a
careful definition of basic concepts, as well as a detailed
description of the adopted method.
B. Method and basic concepts
1. Scientific methods. By scientific method we mean,
within the conceptual frame of this thesis, a norm for the
orientation of the cognitive action. Positive theory being
defined as speculative theoretical action methodology will
mean the normative prescriptive theory of positive scientific
speculation. The elements of speculative action are the
25following: (a) an agent, i.e., the scientist; (b) a problem-
atic situation, confronting the scientist, and analyzable into
conditions, that is, those elements of the problematic situa-
tion which the scientist cannot alter, or prevent from being
altered, and to the examination of which he has to limit
26
himself to bare observation; and means, or those elements
over which he has control of experimentation; and (c) an end,
which has been variously defined as the correlation of the
logical consequences of hypotheses with the consequences of
the interaction of external objects, or the adaptation of
2 5Talcott Parsons, op. cit., pp. 44ff.
26.Wolf, Textbook of Logic, Allen and Unwin, London,
1948, p. 151.
27heinrich H. Hertz, Principles of Mechanics, Methuen,
London, 1899, p. 1.
18
thought to facts,28 or the construction of a symbolical tran-
scendent reality:29 there has been, however, a general
opinion that the ultimate goal of speculative theoretical
30
action is the prediction of events.
31
2. There are two principal types of scientific method
(a) technical methods, or research techniques of manipulation
and measurement of phenomena, which are very numerous and pe-
culiar to every science, and with which this study is not
concerned; and (b) logical methods, or methods of drawing in-
ference from conditions under which the phenomena investigated
occur, so as to interpret them as accurately as possible. Of
the few logical methods we shall be concerned here with the
inductive-deductive variety only, This inductive-deductive
logical scientific method is characterized by the following
sequence of mental activities:
2 8 Ernst Mach, Erkenntnis und Irrtum, Hoepffner, Leipzig,
1905, p. 12, and Die Wechanik in ihrer Entwicklung, Hoepffner,
Leipzig, 1908, Introduction.
29Henri Poincar&, La Science et l'Hypothise, Calmann Levy,
Paris, 1903, Preface.
30 P. W. Bridgman, The Nature of Physical Theory, Dover
Publications, New York, s.d., p. 16.
31A. Wolf, "Scientific Method," Encyclopaedia Britannica,
Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., Chicago, Ill., 1946.
32.S. Mill, A System of Logic, Routledge, London, 1936,
vol. 1, book 1II.
19
a) initiation of inquiri. Inquiry starts, as we
have already seen, with an intention, preoccupa-
tion, or dissatisfaction of the observer. The
problem appears as nothing but a feeling, a
state of mind. The apprehension of the problem
is already its clarification, its statement.
The problem, then, becomes a fact, an object of
observation, the ensemble of things and events,
their attributes and concrete relationships,
within a problematic situation;
b) inductive inference:
(1) analysis or formation of concepts: the
aspect of the problematic situation is
already the problem broken down into seizs-
ble blocks. Cartesian dissection34 is then
applied which reduces the parts and aspects
of the problematic situation to their
easiest and simplest fragments, which are
the raw material from which conceptualiza-
tion starts. This conceptualization pro-
33F. 8. 0. Northrop, op. cit., pp. 1-19. John Dewy,
Logic: Th& Theory of Inquiry, H. Molt Co., New York, 1958,
passim. Morris H. Cohen, Reason and Nature: o
Meaning of Scientific Method, Harcourt Brace or 1 ,
passim. The initiation of inquiry as intentlbonality of pre-
occupation is suggested by Martin Heidegger, on. cit., pp. 34ff.
3 4 E. J. Chevalier, op. cit., pp. 149-152.
20
cess consists in the choice of a frame of
reference within which concepts may be
postulated. As an example of conceptualiza-
tion at three distinct frames of reference
we may point out35 (a) the dissection of
the three-dimensional spatial reality into
single partial bodies, each forming an in-
tuitive, spatially isolated, relatively
constant unit; (b) the conception of an in-
tutively experienced event as a spatio-
temporal coincidence of several single phe-
nomena; (c) the classification of similar
things, the subordination of groups to
ideal-types, which are concepts by postula--
tion, and finally the hypostatization of
frequencies of appearances;
(2) synthesis or formation of hypotheses: the
reduction of groups, by imagination, to
concepts by postulation, or to limiting types
is already a process of hypostatization which
consists in concepts by postulation or ideal-
types being synthetized in some kind of sup-.
posed order or body of propositions; this
35Uermann Weyl, Philosophy of Mathematics and Natural
Science, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N. J., 1949,
pp. 145--146.
21
is similar to the drawing of equations from
interrelations between variables;
c) deductive.Inference: formation of tboory, From
these hypotheses, and by formal implication, their
logical consequences and interrelations are de-
duced in such a way that concepts are organized
in a structural system in which the principles
of symbolic construction are carried through com-
37
pletely. - The result is a logically closed theo.
retical system where each proposition, though in-
dependent, finds its statement in another proposi-
tion of the system. The typical example of a
closed theoretical system is a determinate system
of simultaneous equations where there are as many
independent, though interdependent, equations as
38
there are independent variables;
d) verification of theory. Coupled with the aprioris-
tic construction of a logically closed system we
must have experience and its analysis by experiment.
56Tlbomas tiobbes, English Works, VII, pp. 183ff. as cited
by lermann Weyl, op. cit., p. 151.
57Dingler, Die Grundlagien derPkhysik, 1923, p. 155, as
also cited by Ibid.
38Talcott Parsons, op. ciZt., pp. 9-10. On the comput a-
tional difficulties occurring in solving a large number of
linear equations see V. Bargmann, D. Montgomery and J. von
Neumann, Solution of Linear Systems .of high Order, Princeton
University Press) Princeton, N. J., 1946, passim.
22
The scientist should not be satisfied with the
mere counting of equations and variables, since
the essential function of theory consists in the
guidance it affords to new observations by which
the conjectural picture is either confirmed, re-
futed or modified. This regulation of scientific
imagination by experience is the most difficult
task of methodology.
3. The verification of theory leading to new inquiries
hints at a dialectical hypothesis of theoretical evolution.
The testing of theorems extends the verified explanation to
other facts, not included among those initially selected by
induction, and which, if not fitting the newly formulated
theory, will require the reconstruction of the whole system
upon more inclusive hypotheses. Traditional beliefs are
39
found inadequate to take care of the facts of actual evidence,
or innovations of a theoretical character may uncover new facts
which crack the old theoretical structure. A problem appears
urging for a solution. Someone proposes new assumptions giv-
ing prominence to hitherto neglected facts, or connects al-
ready known facts in more inclusive hypotheses thereby inte-
grating reality in a new theoretical structure which becomes
a doctrine, school of thought or sentiment. After some years
39Francis Bacon, Novum Organum, and Rend'Descartes,
Discourse on Method, as cited by F. S. C. Northrop, op. cit.,
pp. 5'-9.
23
or some centuries the brilliant new idea loses in "charis-
matic"40 charm, is routinized into a method, a ritual, a
olichi, becomes tradition, falls behind evolution, decays
until it is again clear that it no longer fits conditions,
and a sense of intellectual insecurity starts a new inquiry
which may give a new specific content to the doctrinal
41
function.
4. The logical method of the social sciences. The above
described sequence of mental activities finds its most chirac-
teristic example in the logical method of the natural sci-
ences. In the social sciences, however, it may not be thor-
oughly followed. The superficial reasons for that are obvious:
the social investigation is not amenable to laboratory treat-
sent under which physical experiments are made, controlled
and repeated; basic concepts of social analysis cannot be
quantified, and are apt to be given by introspection, instead
of inspection; social phenomena depend upon a larger number
of more intricately interrelated variables; historical time,
for instance, cannot be reduced, without mutilation, to a
dimension of space, etc. As far as we can see these diffi-
culties originate from the fact that ih the social sciences
the agent of cognitive action, i.e., the social scientist is
Max Weber The Theory of Social and Economic Organisa-
t;ion, William lodge, London, 1947, pp. 96ff, 334-342.
4 1o. J. Keyser, "The Nature of the Doctrinal Function and
itsa Role in Rat ional T hought ,' Yale Law Journal, March, 1932.
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to a much larger and deeper extent caught or engaged into
the means and conditions of the problematic situation than
the physical scientist. The sociologist, or the economist,
must pursue, at the same time, two divergent courses of cog-
nitive action: (a) he must keep the positive scientific status
of his investigation by struggling for ethical neutrality in
his attempt to discover, by observation and reasoning based
upon it, particular facts about society, and then laws connect-
ing those facts and making possible to predict future occur-
rences;42 and (b) in striving for objectivity he must also
go beyond mere description of empirical facts, and for that,
sooner or later, he will assume that events are connected in
certain ways, and this means an avowed or tacit theory of
43-
social causation. At one extreme the sociologist, like the
physicist, attains the peak of positive speculative cognitive
action in mystical, perfectly objective, ineffable contempla-
tion. At the other extreme both scientists also reach the
deep of normative prescriptive cognitive action in artistic,
perfectly subjective and communicable expression. At both
extremes of cognitive action the social scientist as well as
the physical scientist will lose scientific knowledge to ac-
quire religious or artistic insight. Theoretical statement
of concepts and hypotheses as well as direct experimental or
differential observation will tell the physicist when is
42Bertrand Russell, Science and Religion, loc. cit.
4Morris Rt. Cohen, "Scientific Method," loc. cit.
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appropriate for him to exercise restraint in his design to
44draft a model for nature, Verification of theory by experi-
ment is the indicator that tells the physicist where is that
margin in which positiveness and normativeness overlap each
other and attain theoretical validity by epistemological
45
correlation. It will tell him where is that narrow strip
in which is both possible to predict what will be the future
aspect of a certain situation under certain conditions, as
well as to determine what technological recipe should be chosen
in order to select alternative means towards a theoretically
possible, and scientifically advisable end.
5. It is evident that the social scientist must also
theorize. Theory is synonymous with cognitive action. The
social scientist must recognize that theorization is not elimi-
nated, nor his investigation made more objective and ethically
neutral, by his making theorization tacit or unconscious.
Therefore, the first step to initiate fruitful social inquiry
will be for the sociologist clearly to analyze the problematic
situation by including himself in it, that is, by recognize
ing that it is the way he regards facts that determines which
4 48uggested by Goethe's sonnet Natur und Kunst.
45F S. C. Northrop, op. cit., p. 119, defines an 'epis-
t emic corre lat ion' as 'a rel at ion joining an unobserved com-
pone nt o f any thing de signat ed by a concept by postulat ion toe
its directly inspected component denoted by a concept by
intuition.'
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are, for him, the leading and most significant ones. He must
begin by frankly confessing that when he initiates inquiry
he has himself already, that is, he has already a preconceived
idea of social causation, and that this preconception is un-
avoidable. After so confessing, and if he persists in aiming
at objectivity, then he must face the methodological question
of when he must begin to distrust pure theory, that is, when
he must stop introducing himself in his theory as an example
of general theory, when he must reject a basic concept of
analysis because he is generalizing too much a trait which
is peculiar to him, to his friends, to his social class, or
to his country. This is indeed an unavoidably philosophical
problem to the social scientist, a problem which his colleagae
of the physics department does not have to face as a scientist.
But before examining in wrat consists this particular problem
of the social scientist, we must note here in which way the
logical method of the social sciences differs from that em-
ployed in the natural sciences.
6. We have already seen that both the sociologist as the
physicist, to the measure that they act qua scientists, at-
tempt (a) to make the chaotic diversity of their sense experi-
ence correspond to a logically uniform system of thought;
and then (b) they attempt to correlate, within the system,
the theoretical structure to their sense experience in such
a way that the resulting correlation is unique and con-
vincing.46 The same inductive-deductive logical method may
be employed in both types of investigations, the difference
in procedure residing rather in the sequence of mental activ-
ities at the stage of the formation of concepts, and at that
of the verification of the theory. Both scientists face
reality as a riddle, but whereas from the apprehended prob-
lematic situation the physicist extracts, bz inspection, the
concepts by induction, such as color, form, etc., upon whioh
he will base his analysis of the problem, the sociologist, or
economist, confronted by a social or economic problem, will
extract from it, by i ntrospection, the basic intuitive con-
cepts of analysis, such as, for instance, the subjectively
introspected concept of utility, upon which he will base his
47
theory of economic value. The formation of theory, by de-
ductive inference, is similar in the two cognitive processes,
but they again differ at the stage of verification. There the
economist or the sociologist identifies the postulates of his
4 6 Albert Einstein "Considerations Concerning the Funda-
ments of Theoretical khysics," Science, 1940, n.91, pp. 487-
489. Einstein's definition of science is "operational and
emphasizes that "it is by means of epistemic correlations
that unobservable entities and relations designated by con-
cepts by postulation take on an operational meaning and
thereby become capable of being put to an experimental test,'
F. S. C. Northrop, op. cit., pp.1 2 2 -123, also in Albert Einstein,
The World as I See It, Covici Friede, New York, 1934, p. 60.
-
47 Lionel Bobbins, An Essay on the Nature and Significance
of Economic Science, Macmillan Co., London, 1946, chap. IT.
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deductively formulated theory with his primitive intuitive
concepts by introspection, and having declared that this cor-
relation is evident generically he proceeds to declare that
the logical consequences of these postulates, to the measure
that they are correctly deduced, must also be true. The physi-
cist, on the other hand, establishes his hypotheses, deduces
their consequences by formal implication, and then he demon-
strates the validity of his theory by checking its theorems
against directly observable external entities and relations, or,
in the terminology of this study, by showing that the immedi-
ately given correlates of those theorems do not differ from
what is experimentally observed. This simple description of
the two procedures shows how much more easily the physicist
attains public validity for his theories. He makes generic
the material which has been given him by his senses, which
are a much more easy means of intersubjective transmission.
Moreover, in order to make this communication still more easy
he quantifies his data, whereas the social scientist has made
generic what may not be more than specific. He assumes that
human nature is what is given him by his nature. He declares
himself a prototype of human being, and therey precludes all
possibilities of agreement between himself and those who do
not partake of the same qualitatively given initial basic
theoretical concepts by induction.
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7. At this point, aware of the ideological conflict he
has started, the social scientist is apt to perceive that
his theory was based upon the unconsciously assumed postulate
of a deterministic social order, lie repeats the reasoning
of the nineteenth century theoretical physicist. If it is
assumed, with Leibnitz,48 that there is a preo-established
.harmony which justifies the opinion, not immediately evident
to the senses, that the world is far more accurate than it
appears, or even that it is absolutely accurate, then what
is required in the social sciences to make them exact is the
perfect knowledge of the number of the variables involved as
well as of the interrelationships existing between them.
The social world is reduceable to a closed theoretical system,
a determinate system of simultaneous equations. However, in
order absolutely to ascertain the nature and degree of this
universal harmony, the observer should have to wait to the-
advent of static equilibrium at the end of time. This, for
instance, is the philosophical assumption upon which is based
the Walrasian general equilibrium system. Short of verificap-
tion at the threshold of divine omniscience, the social scien-
tist may turn away from Leibniz, and suppose, with Hume,49
48 Hermann Weyl, so.cit., pp. 142-143. Die Philosophischen
Bchriften von L, W. Leibniz, ed. 0. J. Gerhardt, Halls, vol.
VII, p. 87.
49 David Same, Treatise of Human Nature, Everyman's i-
brary, J. I. Dent, London, s.d., Book I, Part II, Section 1.
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that the world may be no more accurate than it appears, and
then he will fall, in practice, in an statistical observation
of behavior, which consists of observing similar groups of
people at different times and under different circumstances,
and declare, tentatively, that the change in circumstances
50
has caused the change in behavior. This will be again a
new way of tacitly presupposing a social causation of some
kind. And the old dilemma again emerges: either the social
scientist, in order to establish a criterion for human motiva-
tion, introspects deeply and may come up with an evidence
which is only valid for himself and perhaps for those whose
conditions are similar to his, and which may seem to others
who do not partake of the same insight as worth of serious
attention as any insane construction; or, in trying to avoid
asserting himself unduly, he may stare at facts, and limit
himself to the observation of decisions after they are taken,
and even to arrange these behavioristic manifestations in
statistical time series, but then he must be prepared not to
be capable of answering those who challenge his work as fal-
lacious, since its theoretical causation has not been pre-
viously proposed as true.
8. Positive and normative social theories. -The broadest
classification of scientific theories divides them into (a)
50Kenneth E., Boulding, Economic Analysis, Harper and Bros.,
Ne w York) 1941, pp. 12-13.
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"model" theories, which imply an imagined hidden mechanism
explaining the observable phenomena, and (b) abstractive
theories, wfch make use of relations abstracted from the
51
phenomena actually observable. Both types have been applied
to the natural sciences and to the social sciences. In the
social sciences the "model" theories imply an essence, a
meaning, an ideal-type witnh the object of observation.
Following the Platonic definition of theory model theories
when applied to the social sciences will be called idealistic.
kbstractive theories may also be applied to the social sci-
ences by implying inquiry about the appearances of social
phenomena and their relationships. According to the
Aristotelian definition of theory they will then be called
realistic. Both the idealistic as well as the realistic social
theories may be subdivided into normative and positive in
accordance with the intended purpose of investigation. In
order to study this classification in detail it is convenient
to summarize the argument of this thesis in regard to the
concept of theory.
9. By defining consciousness as intentionality theory
has been understood as a cognitive action consisting of an
51Morris R. Cohen and E. Nagel, op. cit., pp. 397-399.
Edwin F. A. Seligman, "What are the Social Sciences?", nc-
clopaedia of Social Sciences, Macmillan Co., New York, 1948,
Vol. 1, Introduction to the Development of Social Thought and
Institutions. Auguste Comte, Cours de Philosophie Positive, ed.
P. Lafitte, Paris, 1830-1842, passim., and 2nd. ed. with preface
by B. Littre on the classification of s ciences.
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observer, his situation or standpoint for observation, in-
volving conditions and means of which his intention of inquiry
is the dynamic element, and an intended object of observation
(II,A,1). Aside from other forms of action, such as the vege-
tative, the instinctive, the affective, etc., scientific
theory has been envisaged as cognitive action resulting in a
closed theoretical system the formation of which follows defi-
nite mental patterns in the observation of facts, and the dis-
covery of laws connecting them with one another (II,B,2,c).
Since facts and their relationships have been defined as
synonymous to concepts (II,A,2), i.e., as that which emerges
for the observer when his cognitive interest is focused upon
that particular aspect of reality, two types of cognitive
theoretical actions have been distinguished in accordance with
the intention of the inquirer (II,A,6), the positive and the
normative cognitive theoretical actions, the definitions of
which we are now in a position to present in more formal terms.
10. By positive scientific theory we mean the cognitive
action of a scientist who speculates about a problematic situa-
tion by trying to detect the systematic relationships connect-
ing variables, under well defined parameters, in order ac-
curately to predict the aspect of that system at any given
moment in the future. By normative theory we mean the cogni-
tive action of a scientist who, by applying his positive know-
ledge to a specific situation, tries to prescribe, under well
:3
defined conditions, the appropriate restrictions to be placed
upon controllable means in order deliberately to obtain a
previously selected state of affairs at a certain moment in
the future. As already pointed out purely positive, specula-
tive action is mystical insight, impersonal, objective con-
templation into the nature of pure reality. It has also been
stressed that purely normative, prescriptive action is artistic
performance, personal, subjective expression concerning what
pure reality ought to be. Between these two extreme positions,
scientific cognitive action is that scalar space where theory
is verifiable by reference to the epistemological correlation
of thought to experience. Within this margin positive as
well as normative theories may be applied to both the natural
sciences as to the social sciences. Theoretical physics and
mathematical economics are instances of positiveness in physics
and economics. In the same way a cooking recipe, an indus-
trial technique, an ordnance rule, a legal norm, or a divine
commandment are instances of normativeness in the applied
natural or social sciences of cooking, technology, balistios,
jurisprudence, policy, and catechism. The scientific, positive,
speculative theorist is concerned with determining what is
given him by empirical reality in order correctly to forecast
what will be given him, under ce rtain circumst ances, by em-
pirical reality in the future. His investigation is character-
ized by a desire correctly to predict what will be verified
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by epistemological correlation in the future provided there
is no external intervention, that is, no introduction of
variables without additional independent equations, in his
isolated, closed, systematically arranged problematic situa-
tion. The scientific, normative, prescriptive theorist is
concerned with applying positive theory to specific situations,
and, by working backwards from a given solution, correctly
to prescribe a norm for selecting the appropriate means which,
under -explicit conditions, will realize at some given moment
in the future the previously chosen final end. His investi-
gation is characterized by a desire correctly to select the
appropriate means for the realization of a given, final, state
of affairs which would not have occurred but for this deliber-
ate, external, selective intervention into the structure of
the system. It must be noted forthwith that a scientific
normative theory, no less than its positive counterpart, must
form a closed system in order to be logically determinate.
Thus, the normative intervention consists in giving specific
teleological content to the Nempty" positive theoretical system
by predetermining its future state of affairs, and then in
going back to ascertain what means will bring it up at the
predetermined future moment. This end, as an already given.
future state of affairs, must be understood as final in the
specific, closed system of normative theoretical action in
which it is proposed as an end. It must not be regarded as a
means towards a further end in the same system. To the ex-
tent that an end is not final, within the specific theoretical
system in which it occurs, its choice or selection may always
be. scientifically or logically ascertainable as a choice among
possible means towards a further, final end in the particular
system of cognitive action under consideration. As for the
appropriate selection of a final end among possible and eli-
gible final ends, which is the central problem of ethics,
our belief is that a final end of a certain system is scien-
tifically or logically ascertainable to the extent that it
may be integrated as a possible and eligible means in a broader
system which will include this final end and other final ends
of a narrower system as positively interdependent, specifically
determinate eleinents. As for final metaphysical ends it is
our belief that science: as long as it remains scientific and
does not wish to become art or religion cannot tell Good from
Evil. Science can tell what is true and What is false within
a given conceptual scheme, and- only metaphorically can it be
said that something false is also bad, or to equate by con-
vention a certain true end with a desirable end, without leav-
ing the theoretical system within which that evaluation occurs.
T hus, f or instance, unemployment which may not be bad within
the system of preferences of a lazy individual, may become
bad at a governmental level when the aim of policy is to pro-
vent social unrest, and this may again be a desirable state of
affairs for revolutionary purposes.
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11. Positiveness and normativeness may be applied to
the social sciences within a realistic or an idealistic frame
of reference. The field of science has been traditionally
divided between the study of physical nature and that of the
52
phenomena of mind. The natural sciences deal with the
phenomena of matter, including those taking place in the human
body. The social sciences study the phenomena of mind in man
as an isolated individual or as a member of a group. This
division by reference to the nature of the subject matter is
unsatisfactory not only for obvious psychophysiological rea-
sons but also for the less obvious Protagorean reason that
"man is the measure of all things,"53 that is, all phenomena
are, strictly speaking, phenomena of mind. The distinction,
however, is didactically useful, and may perhaps be maintained
upon firmer grounds by a slightly different interpretation
of the Protagorean doctrine "each- man is the measure of all
things." The reference now is to the degree of engagement
the inquirer feels he is tied to, or dependent upon, his sub-
ject of inquiry. In dealing with the objects in the physical
world the physicist, chemist, or biologist mavchoose to limit
his observations to abstracted uniformities and regularities,
54
as did Ostwald, Duhem, and Rankine, or he may imagine an
52Edwin R. A, Beligman, op.~ cit.
and3Bertrand Russell, A Histr ofWsenPhilosophy, Simon
54.J. M. Rankine, Miscellaneous Scientific Papers, ed.
E. Tait, Scottish Press, Edinburgh, 1881, p. 210.
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inner mechanism, a model' or an essence to explain the ob-
servable phenomena, as did Lord Kelvin, Faraday, Lodge, and
55
Maxwell. In the first, abstractive choice of a theoretical
frame of reference, the scientist has chosen realistically
to abstract his self, other people's selves, as well as the
hidden essence of things from his analytical frame of refer-
ence, whereas the latter, existential choice, the scientist
has chosen idealistically to look for essences, and meaning,
to look for concepts by postulation and not exclusively for
concepts by induction of appearances, and relations among
'raw" facts. The idealistic observer must, then, imagine
hidden mechanism by postulating his own self as an absolutely
given existent the essence of which is to be intended towards
an inquiry, to be scientifically interested in a problem,
or a riddle. The choice of a frame of reference is not as
significative or pregnant with limiting effects in the natural
sciences as in the social sciences. Matter can be quantified
or reduced without serious structural mutilations to the
categories of space, whereas the 'essence' of mind, its hid**,
den mechanism, is organic meaning, is motivation, wants,
interests, or qualities, not quantities. But even in the
natural sciences, where this subjective influence is negli-
gible, research techniques have been devised to correct per-
sonal distortions in the observation of the phenomena of
55M. E. Cohen and E. Nagel, op. cit., loc. cil.
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matter. And even in the applied natural sciences this influ-
ence is already sensible and may become a serious obstacle
in the way of cognitive action oriented towards technological
norms, as the biographies of innovators demonstrate. As for
the social sciences the dependence of subject on object is
generally recognized as very strong, and two norms have been
advocated to remedy the situation. The first norm advocates
that the social scientist should imitate the realistic or ab-
stractive method of the physicist, and limit his observations
to the inspection of appearances of social phenomena dealing
56
with human beings as if they exhibit all their relevant
motivations, intentions, and interests, externally, through
unmistakably patent decisions reduceable to indexes. As we
have already seen the only obstacle in the way of complete
objectivity is that, in order to be able to read the meaning
of these indexes and signs, the social scientist must finish by
having to postulate some mechanical law of causation, thereby
losing his detachment in implicit, often unconscious, fallacy
57
of misplaced concreteness. The second methodological norm
advises that the social scientist should look for meanings,
intentions, and motivations in mental life of man, that is,
56H. Vaihinger, The Philosophy of "As If, Kegan, Trench,
Trubner and Co,,, London, 1935, pp. 78-1434.
5 ?Alfred N. Whitehead, Process and Realit y, Social Science
Publishers, New York, 1941, p. 11.
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he must explicitly postulate a law of social causation, an
essence for human nature, which essence he must find nowhere
but within his self, through the immediate, Cartesian evidence
of the introspected "cogito." The trouble is, then, that he
must finish by having to hypostatize flfl which he capttares
by introspection as the hidden mechanism of individual and
soCial behavior. The moment the social scientist wishes to
investigate beyond appearances and into human motivation he
must primarily postulate his 'ego" as immediately and abso-
lutely evident to himself. And the problem is to determine
wbether and to what extent this evidence is valid for other
people.
12. This epistemological problem of a subject inquiring
about an object, which has been already placed in subject i
terms by both Plato and Aristotle in their respectively
idealistic and realistic definitions of theory, Is again
placed in subjective terms by modern psychology. The subjeo-
tive point of view is the one that is adopted throughout in
this study by our close adhesion to the phenomenological
method, which envisages the epistemological problem of ob-
jectivity and subjectivity as a problem of vectorial orienta-
tion. When 'I' say that "this chair or that man is real" it
is meant either, idealistically interpreted, thy prediction
of a multitude of discordant impressions expected in response
to certain intentions of will, or, realistically interpreted,
40
the statement or concept that a thing exists which stands in
a certain epistemological correlation to the given chair or
58
man phenomenon. The problem may also be couched in geo-
metrical terms by stating that, the idealistic observer
assumes that *I" is the absolute basis for the coordinate
system in which objective reality is determined: the
Schopenhaurian 'the world is my idea," or the Cartesian
"cogito" assign to the reality of the "IN a precedence in
principle over the reality of the external world, including
the "thou." The methodological decision of the realist ob-
server is that of eliminating the "I," of striving directly
for public validity in his judgments upon facts unbiased by
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personal feelings, and of considering only appearances,
not essences, as open to his investigation. For the realist
observer object and subject, the "I" and the "thou," the
"ego" and the "alter ego" belong for him to the same world
of phenomena. In fact, as we have already seen, the postula-
tion of the Nego," the "alter ego" and the external world is
without influence, or at least seriously disturbing influence,
upon the knowledge of what is given by empirical reality in
the relationships between phenomena of matter. And to the
extent that the social scientist reduces motivations, values,
meanings, life and death, suffering and joy, his own and those
58liermann Weyl, op. cit., p. 122.
59Karl Pearson, The Grammar of Science, Everyman's Library,
J. M4. Dent, London, s.d., p. 11.
of his fellow men, to the geometrical categories of objective
space and time, time itself being reduced to a dimension of
space, that postulation is not required. It does not matter
for the realist observer whether the object of his observation
is really what it actually-ppars to be. What is essential
for him is the hope that the frequency of appearances be such
that he fails to find in experience any elements intrinsically
60
incapable of exhibition as examples of general theory. But
once he chooses to adopt the idealist attitude in order not
only to penetrate into hidden meanings but also to prescribe
appropriateness to choices it does matter, indeed, for the
scientist to know whether that gas is poisonous, or that law
contrary to the interests of his country, Since the social
sciences are concerned with objects that are also subjects
in their own systems of individual preferences, involving
meaning and value,, the social scientist who attempts to under-
stand them must necessarily do so by means of categories which
in turn depend on his own values and meanings.61 The ambiguity
of the social sciences, which afflict so much the geometri-
clans lost among the finesses of the mind, is that the social
60 Alfred N. Whitehead, n.LCit. p. 67.
6 1 Louis Wirth, Preface to Karl Mannheim, Ideol1gyA
Utp, Harcourt Brace, New York, 1949 pp. fl-XIY. V. F.
lverton, Introuction to The Making of Man, The Modern Li-
brary, 1937, pp. VII.-XI, 1-Il, and also in "The Compulsive
Basis of Social Thought, " American Journal of Soo~iolosi, XXXVI,
5, 1931, pp. 689-720.
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scientist is bound to be concerned with qualities perhaps
more than with quantities, with truth and falsehood as well
as with good and evil. And in order to perform that double-
edged function he is condemned to the teleological freedom
of having to set, by postulated bias, that which shall be the
example of general theory,
13. By combining these two methodological norms for the
application of the scientific method to the social sciences
with the already defined distinct orientations of cognitive
action as positive and normative, a classification of social
theories based, firstly, upon the scientist's choice of a
frame of reference, and, secondly, upon his intention in in-
quiring, may be suggested as follows:
a) he chooses a realistic frame of reference, and
thereby eliminates his self, other people's
selves and the absolute existence of the external
world from his analysis; he looks for appearances
and relationships among appearances;
(1) his intention is to be positive, to pro-
duce a positive, realistic social theory;
like the mathematical economist or the
theoretically "pure" jurist he starts with
concepts by induction, which are (a) intui-
tine concepts by introspection, which the
social scientist, explicitly, or more often
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implicitly, hypostatizes as generic con-
cepts by postulation from which he infers
by deduction a logically closed system
which he tries to adapt to reality by an
ever unsuccessful process of "successive
approximations": as examples of this type
of theory we may cite the Walrasian general
equilibrium theory, the Austrian and
Jevonian marginal utility theory, the
sociological positivism of Coute, Pareto,
and Durkheim; and (b) where the concepts
by induction are intuitive concepts by in-
spection we have the extreme type of theory
which is exemplified by the Hicks-Allen
indifference-preference analysis, and the
statistical behaviorism of Wesley 0.
Mitchell and his group;
(2) or his intention is to produce a normative,
realistic social theory which we shall call
62
an utopian2 social theory; given a
62We shall, in this context, qualify as utopian every
normative, realistic social theory resulting from the pre-
scription of a norm for seleCting means towards a realistically
and positively deduced, "purely" theoretical, future state of
affairs. This definition of utopian social theory may be
idealistically interpreted either in the Mars-Engels sense
as naive, unhistorical. an& anti-scientific, or as revolution-
ary wish-dreams, inspiring the collective action of opposition
groups which aim at affecting an entire transformation of a
certain society, as in Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia,
Harcourt, Brace, London, 1949, pp. 13, 176177.
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positive theory as a "doctrinal function"6 3
the normative realist places universally
valid constraints upon its variables (a)
either by postulating that the social order
is atomistic, that human nature is instinc-
tively oriented towards the maximization
of individual satisfaction, and, to the
extent that these satisfactions are left
unspecified, that individual ends are
random, independent, but interdependently
circumscribed by constant scarcities; i.e.,
that the economic system is regulated by
Mperfect competition"; then the social
scientist prescribes the utopian norm of
laissez-faire the "natural order" of the
social system which will automatically pick
up the most appropriate means for social or
economic action; (b) or by postulating that,
although the social order is atomis tic and
63 By"doctrinal function" we mean a "theory" as struc-
turally consistin1 of a manifold of interrelated propositional
functions called postulates," with all the consequences fol-
lowing from them called "theorems." A "doctrine" is a doc-
trinal function tith specific content. See Cassius J. Keyser
and H. D. Carmichael as cited by Alfred Korzybski, Science
and Sanity, International Non-Aristotelian Library, Lakeville,
Oonn., 1948, p. 144.
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individualistic, individual action is en-
tirely rational, that is, to be completely
exhausted by scientific explanation, and
scientifically grounded ethics, discrepancies
from rationality being explained by ignorance
and error, any departures from stable equi-
librium being theoretically followed by its
immediate restoration, delays being explained
by the existence of "friction"; i.e., that
the economic system is regulated by "pure
competition"; then he prescribes the utopian
norm of effective competition, mild state
intervention in the choice of means, and
simple, quasi-mechanistic "rules of the
game"; (c) or, finally, by postulating that
human nature, although not entirely rational,
and may be not inherently rational, can be
socially oriented through the manipulation
of conditions by an authotity which'is
sovereign in respect to the individual, that
is, capable of implementing, through coer-
cion, its final ends, however they might
have been chosen, and which knows "better
than the individual" which choice is better
"for the individual"; i.e., that the economic
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system is no longer an order but a deliber-
ately controlled organization; then the
social scientist prescribes the utopian norm
of "collective welfare," which is ultimately
based on the postulate that human nature,
specially the nature of moral authority
"gets better all the time," i.e., the ethical
direction points towards moral progress by
historical, scientific, and economic deter,-
minism towards "a better future," and that
this is the law of social causation which
ties the independent, final ends selected
by authority into a closed system of mutually
interdependent final ends, where postulated,
not inherently rational individual ends are
translated into social means oriented towards
an authority chosen, deliberate, planned,
closed system of ends;
b) or the social scientist chooses an idealistic frame
of reference; he begins his investigation by postu-
lating the absolute existence of his own self;
then, instead of inferring, as does the realist
social observer, the existence of his "ego" and of
"alter ego" as only possible objectively, within
the mundane sphere where both are compossible and
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coexistent, and the 'alter ego" becomes manifest
for the 'ego' through concordant behavior, communi-
cation, expression, etc., the idealist social ob-
server infers the possibility of a coexisting 'alter
ego" constituted within and by the activities of
64
the ego;
(1) if his intention is to be positive, to pro-
duce a positive, idealistic social theory he
will, like the institutionalist economist
or the organicistsociologist, start with
concepts by induction which, contrarily to
the positive realist observer, he does not
hypostatize as generic concepts by postula-
tion but as historical concepts by postula-
tion, i.e., specific, historical, not abso-
lute but relative, 'emanations' or 'expres-
sions" of ideals, social embodiments of
64 See for a condensed presentation of the idealist point of
view as here defined, Herbert Marcuse, 'Existentialism: Remarks
on Jean-Paul Sartre's L'ttre et le Neant,' Philosophy and Phe-
nomenological Research, Vol. VIII, pp. 309-326, also, Aifret
Schuetz, Ksartrets Theory of the Alter Ego', jjiosphylan4
Phenomenological Research, Vol. IX, pp. 181-199, and 'Scheler' s
Theory of Intersubjectivity and the General Thesis of the Alter
Ego', ibid., Vol. II, pp. 323-342. See also as general refer-
ence: Georges Gurvitch, Las Tendencias Actuales de la Filosofia
Alemana, Editorial Losada, S. A., Buenos Aires, 1943, passim.;
Jose Ferrater Mora, Unamuno, Editorial Losada, EBienos Aires,
1944, passim., but specially pp. 119.-155; also Ortega y Gasset,
La Rebelion de las Massas. Arnold J1. Toynbee's 'challenge and
response" in Study of History, 0. Spengler's 'cultural physiog-
nosy" in Decline of the West, Max Scheler's 'sociology of know-
ledge" in ie Wissensformen und die Gesellscbaft, eto.
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meanings; in other words, the positive
idealist social observer feels free to pre-
sent his own categories to which he attaches
values and meanings, and which, in order to
reach general scientific recognition, he
also relates in a closed system, based, then,
on postulates the validity of which is
"dated" and dependent for verification upon
test, by epistemological correlation, to
the biographical, factual situation of its
author within the problematic situation:
as examples of such positive, idealistic
attitude of observation we may cite the
social and economic works of Max Weber;
(2) he may also intend to produce a normative,
idealistic social theory which we shall call
665
an ideological6 social theory; given a
65We shall here qualify as ideological every normative,
idealistic social theory resulting from the application to a
national reality of an utopian social theory. This definition
of ideology may be realisticallZ interpreted, either in the
Marx-Engels sense of those aspects of the social reality which
are open to scientific scrutiny through a law of social cau-
sality, such as historical materialism, or economic determinism,
or in the Napoleonic derogatory, but idealistic, sense of those
philosophies whose influence was republican, or even as a
mental fiction, whose function is to veil the true nature of a
given society, and which originate unconsciously in the minds
of the members of those groups who seek to stabilize a social
order, as in Karl Mannheim, op. ,cit., pp. 111ff, ,278 and passim.
See also Vilfredo Pareto, Traite de Sociologie Generale,
Lausanne and Paris, two vols., 1917-1919, and Lees Syetbmes
Socialistes, M4. Giard, Paris, 1926, two vole.
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normative, positive social theory as a
social doctrine the normative idealist places
nationally valid constraints upon its vari-
ables, that is, prescribes norms for select-
ing means conducive to the realization of
existentially given, socially accepted or
embraced, or imposed, historical, national-
ideologies which define the state of affairs
not yet realized, rather than the de facto
character of existent social organization:
as examples of such national ideologies we
may mention Stalinism, American New-&Dealism,
British Labor socialism, German Nazism,
Italian Fascism, Latin American Militaristic
Caudillism, etc., as well as Anglo-Amerioan
laissez-faire capitalistic democracy,
Roman Catholic Christianism, etc., which-
are characterized by the fact that they
cannot be completely in accord with existent
governmental organizations, since by defini-
tion they are ends of the social action,
rather than means or conditions of the actual
political or economic situation.
14. Idealistic, normative economic theories, or national
economic ideologies may be applied internationally- the moment
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a general preference of the international community manifests
Itself towards a definite, final end for international economic
action. It is assumed, in this thesis, that a preference for
peaceful and stable national economic action is implied in
every national economic ideology, and that this national pref-
erence has manifested itself, repeatedly, throughout history,
in various attempts towards bilateral, oligolateral, or multi-
lateral international economic cooperation. We believe that
it is scientifically impossible to justify the reason why
economic peace and stability have always been considered, by
such otherwise divergent social thinkers as Isaiah, St. Augustine,
Thomas Hobbes, Burke, Lamartine, Karl Marx, Lenin, and Justice
Holmes as the national, if not international, economic summum
bonum. We, however, believe that it is feasible scientifically
to prove that it was the taking of national economic ends as
final ends that made such consensus at the national level
often result in international conflict and instability, and
that, the moment there is a generally manifested desire for
international economic stability and peace it becomes ipso
facto scientifically possible, by translating national ideo-
logical ends into means towards a further and broader inter-.
national ideological end, to work out a set of norms to which
national ideological ends may be made adaptable, and by which
other-national ideological ends may be judged as to their
validity towards the selected final end for international
economic action.
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C. Formal restatement of thesis
1. Theoretical purpose of inquiry. The theory here
exposed is not committed to any one of the above sketched
types of socio-economic theories at the exclusion of the
others. It attempts (a) from a realistic point of view to
integrate, and not merely to juxtapose, a positive theory
of international economic order and conflict, and a norma-
tive theory of international economic organization, within
what might perhaps have been called an outline of a
monopolistic competition theory of international welfare
economies; and then (b) from an idealistic point of view
to apply this theory to an international economic pattern
consisting of certain well defined types of national economic
ideologies the economic interactions of which may be seen
as a sequence of "war" and "contract" 6 6 leading to new norms
and "recontract," in order to investigate the possibility
of a norm or set of norms conducive to a peaceful and
stable organization of international trade and capital move-
ments.
2. The shifting over from an Aristotelian or realistic
to a Platonic or idealistic point of view does not imply a
66Then the agent acts without, or with, the consent of
others affected by his actions we call the first species
of action agx; the second, contract, as in Francis Y.
Edgeworth, Mathematical Psychics, C. Kegan Paul & Co.,
London, 1881, p. 17.
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change from an objective to a subjective frame of reference.
The subjective frame of reference is consistently adhered
to thoroughout this study by the phenomenological method 6 7
here adopted from the very beginning, and the shift means
nothing else than a methodological device separating two
successive phases of the same anproximation to the solution
of the problematic situation presented by contemnorary inter-
national economic order as it is given us by our intended
inquiry in that direction. This unfamiliar frame of
reference of subjective action was chosen because we do not
see any other mental position from which it would have been
possible to integrate within a theoretical unity the double-
edged, positive-normative purpose of this inquiry. It
seems, indeed, that there is no other mental attitude with
which to undertake both the causal, functional analysis,
which is necessitated by the deterministic, mechanistic,
utopian view of international order and conflict, as well
as the symbolic, meaningful synthesIs of the idealistic
investigation which is so essential to the voluntaristic
development of an ideological, international organization.
The subjective frame of action is simoly a common
6 70n the phenomenological method see Marvin Farber,
op. cit., pp. 521-538, and also Dorion CaIrns, "An Approach
to Phenomenology," in Philosophical Essays in Memory of
Edmund Husserl, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.,
1945, loc. cit.
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foundation, as the spatiotemnoral framework of classical
mechanics, upon which it becomes possible to shift, purpose-
ly and explicitly, from a realistic to an idealistic
standpoint in such a way that the resultant theory becomes
an operational epistemological articulation of static to
dynamic analysis, of positiveness to normativeness, of a
Kantian "pure' emphasis on the cognition of systematic rela-
tionships between phenomena to a no less Kantian "practical"
emphasis on the intuition of total, noumenal, system of
meanings.
3. Static and dynamic, subjective theory of action.
Figuratively speaking the performance of an action, for
instance, a dramatic action, may be seen from two, and only
two, mutually exclusive viewooints: that of the spectator,
and that of the actor himself. The former is the objective
point of view; the latter, the subjective. But both
spectator and actor may choose, when confronted by the
dramatic action, to take either the realistic or the ideal-
istic framework, or both in succession, simply by watching
or acting detachedly or sympathetically. Exeluded from the
objective attitude of mind by the closely vital nature of
our subject we are undertaking the cognitive action of this
thesis definitely from the actor's standpoint by observing
realistically and idealistically the play of modern con-
flict in which we serve. We have already seen that the
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epistemological problem of a subject inquiring about an
object has been placed in subjective terms by both Plato
and Aristotle (II,B,1?). After three centuries of mis-
placed Baconian empiricism modern science again placed the
problem in subjective terms, as two orientations of the
intentionality of the inquiring consciousness.
4. In order to clarify this often mentioned concept
of action as an intentional experience, we must sketch in
a few words what Husserlian phenomenology6 8 regards as the
characteristic of the psychological experience and the
psychical data it provides. To discover what is given in
any immediate exoerience we must revert the ordinary out-
wardly turned attitude of inspection, and concentrate our
attention in the act of experience itself in which empirical
facts of our environment, thoughts, and values of the moment
are apprehended or appear. The nature of values, goals,
utilities, etc., is to be a consciousness of these values,
goals, and utilities, real or unreal as they may be. This
character of reference of consciousness has been called
intentionality. All consciousness of an observer as to his
situation, and as to the goal to which he aims, is
intentional, and all his acts are intentional experiences.
68For an excellent summary of the phenomenological
movement in philosophy see Edmund Russerl, "Phenomenology,"
Encyclopaedia Britannica, EncyclopaedIa Britannica, Inc.,
Chicago, Ill., 1946, vol. XVII.
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The elements of an act, such as its situation, end, and
orientation or norm, are given to the agent, or to the
subject of an action, as an integrated, conceptually unm
breakable, subjective unity which is his action as seen,
as it were, from the closed, determined system of his
"cogito" which is the immediate experience of his self.
Conceptually, however, an action may be seen as an orgeni 69
summation of acts, and each unit act may be analysable into
a situation, consisting of conditions and means, an end,
and a norm connecting the end to the means.
5. Moreover, unit acts may be seen as ooerating in
different levels of psychical existence in the world of
empirical reality, 70 and according to the nature of these
levels unit acts may be classified into five pure types:
(a) the vegetative act 7 1 is characterized by the absence
of a freely chosen final end, as well as of controllable
means, and a norm; the act is an all inclusive biological
condition, such as sleeping, digesting, breathing, etc.;
(b) the instinctive act is also characterized by the ab-
sence of a freely chosen final end, as well as controllable
means, but it already possesses a norm, an orientation, a
89An important term to be defined later.
7cOrax Scheler, Die Stellung des MLenschen in Kosmos,
Danmstadt, 1928, chap. I.
711bid., pp. 18ff.
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rhythmical, innate, hereditary singling of specific sensa-
tions and perceptions out of diffuse comolexes of experiences; 72
(c) the associative memory act 73 is characterized by the
presence of a specific, individual, final end Irrationally
chosen by the actor, and which manifests itself to the
observer as random in the special statistical sense of a
numerical measure of probability in sampling; 7 4 the fre-
quency of "hits" in this random choice of ends as means to
further ends is the basis of habit formation, and perhaps,
as the essence of ancestral exrerience, of logical reasoning
and methods; 7 5 (d) the "practical" act in the Rantian sense
of the intelligent act is characterized by the rational
application of experience to the choice of ends as means
to further ends through implied insight into the "together-
ness"76 or "interconnectedness of empirical phenomena" 7 7
in space and in time; (e) the intentional act 7 8 is
characterized by the presence of the conceptual elements
of the unit act Dlug the relational meaning that gives it
72 1bid., p. 24ff.
73Ibid.,p. 31ff.
74Harold Jeffreys, Theory of Probability, Clarendon
Press, Oxford, 1939, p. 48.
7 5 As in Felix LeDantec's definition of intuition as
ancestral eroerience.
76As in Alfred N. Whitehead, Process and _Reality, gg.
cit., passim.
7axScheler, oph. cit., p. 39ff.
78Ibd.,p. 44ff.
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a value, as an action, to its agent, i.e., the agent's
intuitive perception of the essence of his action as inter-
est, preoccupation, love, repentance, awe, etc., the
self..constituted integration of acts, where an unit act,
or a summation of unit acts becomes an action, and the
actor, or agent, a person. 7 9
6. At these inextricably interconnected five levels
the action of an individual appears to him as an organic
whole, not as a mere summation by addition of discrete,
fictional, abstract unit acts 8 0 operating at different
levels of consciousness, but as a unity which is a matter
of immediate evidence for him. Thus, the WI do" of a
person must be sharply distinguished from the action of an
agent', in the same way that a concept by induction was
distinguished from a concept by postulation (IT,A,3). The
immediately experienced "I do" is the result of an imma-
nent act which cannot be objectified. Thus, other people
79Ibid., p. 58ff.
8 0The definition of an organic whole is a totality
within which the relations between the parts determine
the properties of these parts, as in Talcott Parsons, gp.
cift., p. 31-32. The classical statement of a rart of an
organic whole is that of Aristotle, that a hand separated
from the living body is no longer a hand "except ini an
equliVOCal sense, as we would speak of a stone hand, " as
cited by Talcott Parsons, Inc. cit. The same definition
of an organic whole is given by 3T. Loeb, Comparative Ph yst..
olopg;of theBrain_ andComparatjivePsxeholo , The;
0rganism as a Whole, and also by H. Pi 4ron, Thought and
the Brain, and 0. 3T. Herrick, Neurological Foundations off
Animal Behavior.
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are not objectifiable in so far as their persons are in
question. Being merely the locus of acts the totality of
which co-determines each single act, a oerson is accessi-
ble only for another person by co-achieving these acts, by
thinking with, feeling with, willing with the other. 8 1
The "I do" of Mr. So-and-So can only be exoerienced by "me"
through my performing that action in the same way as the
pure fact of "the sun" as given me by my senses can never
be exhausted by analytical, scientific description, but
which can be silently "described" by me through my oointing
towards it there. So when "I" describe an action of "mine"
"I" am presenting a described fact that was given me by
the immediate evidence of its organic totality, and which
"I" have to break down at least into logical, syntactical
elements. In the same way the belief in the existence of
other people's selves is constituted in the "ego" (II,B,13,
b) not by acts of theoretical cognition, or by "practical"
acts, but by intentional acts of love, hate, will, etc.,
which cannot be expressed scientifically, in terms of blood
pressure, for instance, without having their meaningful
totality broken down to concepts by postulation, and there-
by losing their organic meaning and value to acquire
mechanical expression as an object located in space and in
81Alf red Schuetz, "Schueler's Theory of Intersubjectivity
and the General Thesis of the Alter Ego," loc. cit., p. 325.
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time. When realistically describing either the actions of
other people or our own actions, in scientific terms, we
must break down the organic integrity of the action into
an explanatory system acts. But we must have in mind that
neither positively nor negatively does this methodological
device exhaust the significant subjective elements of
action. It is with this reservation in mind that we now
turn our attention to the formal definition of the cona-
cepts of action, act, and its elements.
7. Static elements of action. An action, , sub-
jectively defined as an intentional experience of an
individual or a collective agent, may operationally or
conceptually be decomposable into one or more hypothetical
unit acts. An act, a, is a concept by postulation, a
hypothetical fiction, which may be operationally defined
by a description of its structural elements: a situation,
a, and an ultimate or final end, g. The situation is
analyzable into conditions, S, over which the actor has no
control, and means, I, over which he has such control.
Connecting, in an act, the means and the conditions of the
situation to the final end there is a normative selective
standard of evaluation of alternative means to the given
final end, and this is called the norm, n, of the act.82
82Talcott Parsons, ap.±sjt., p. 44 and note B, pp. 77?-
79.
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The most general symbolical formulation of the concept of
act is, therefore,
a=a(s(m;c); n, e), where m=m(s;c), (1)
and where the following closed, determinate system of three
'variables": a, _, and m; three *parameters": e x, and n
and three implicit relationships or 'equations' obtain:
f s(a, ;e) = 0 (2)
f2(s,m; c) =0 (3)
f3(a, m; n) =0 (4)
and A may be introduced as
A=alxa 2 -a 3 +... 4 ar(5)
where, of course,
A= f (a) da, approximat ely. (6)
8.4 The situation is the state of affairs presented by
the complex body-environment, as it appears to the actor,
revealed by his intention in acting, as a combination of
circumstances consisting of the conditions of action and
the means for that action. The conditions of action
are a series of restrictions placed upon the actor by
physical, mental, social, and cultural elements, which he
cannot alter, or prevent from being alter ed, in order to
make the state of affairs of the situation conform to the
state of affairs at the desired end. The means for action
are those element s of the situation which are subj ect to
the control of the actor, and among which may be select ed
the only appropriate means, or the correct set of means,
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such that, in organic combination with the set of conditions,
will occasion, at a certain moment in the future, that state
of affairs which is desired as the end. The situation mdy
be classified in accordance with the relative importance of
conditions and means within it: (a) the situation is all
condition: that is the combination of circumstances known
as "state of grace" in mystical contemplation, where there
is not even the possibility of a choice between accepting
God's visitation or closing your soul at His face; this
situation is also present whenever circumstances are abso-
lute, such as under a "state of war," or suspension of
civil rights due to a national emergency, or even normally,
under absolute monarchy, or party dictatorship, where
individual freedom is completely suppressed; at the oppo-
site extreme (b) the situation is all means: this is the
state of affairs of absolute freedom of expression, in
"artistic inspiration," for instance, which culminates into
"pure expression" of streams of consciousness, such as
poetic "dada" and plastic surrealism, or, politically, into
the anarchism of the Hobbesian 'natural state," where the
cho ice of means is completely random, leading to randomly
cho sen ends, and the life of man is " solitary, poor, nasty,
brutish and short";83 this situation, of course, at the
8 3Thomas Hobbes, The Leviathan, Everyman' a Library, 3.
1!. Dent and Son, London, s. d. , p. 85.
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limit is indistinguishable from that in which the situation
is all condition; 8 4 between these two limiting examples
conditions and means co-exist, and then either (c) the
situation is dominated by the conditions: this is the
state of affairs under determinism based upon rationalism,
utilitarianism, evolutionism, and whenever a law of causa-
tion is stated a priori, such as when human nature is
postulated to be rational, or hedonistic, or molded by
environment, etc., but where there is the possibility of
making mistakes in the choice of alternative means through
error, ignorance, aberration, etc.; this state of affairs
prevails in the sciences, as when the physicist creates,
artificially, a laboratory situation where conditions domi-
nate in order to discover the relationships between these
conditions; a pertinent example is found in the economic
theory of perfect or of pure competition; (d) or, finally,
the situation is dominated by the means: this is the state
of affairs which will prevail whenever the possibility of
"free" choice is recognized, whenever qualities, values,
meanings, preferences are introduced in the system of
action, whenever the agent, as a body functioning as a pure
mechanism according to the laws of nature, becomes a person
84That is the "utilitarian dilemma": either the agent
is absolutely independent, and his chotce of means becomes
pointless, i.e., meaningless, or the agent is absolutely
dependent and his determined choice becomeos meaningless.
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who knows by direct introspection thet he is directing the
motions of his body and takes full responsibility for them, 8 5
wheoever the organic system of decision closes around a
hard core of free choice where simple reaction flowers into
action, and the final choice is random in the sense that
it is never absolutely predictable in a scientific sense,
but it may be approximately predicted on the basis of
statistical observation or physiogomic intuition, as when
we say, for instance, that Mr. So-and-So never did such an
action in a certain way, and does not "look" like as if he
ever will, but then comes along Mr. So-and-So and breaks
the label by demonstrating his freedom from the laws of
nature through an intrinsically irrational, Socratically
free choice of means.
9. On the basis of this last consideration the element
of preference as to the means, pm, and as to the norm, Pn,
must be introduced into the symbolical formulation of an
act:
a = s(C + M + (Pm)) + n(pn) + e (7)
which may be illustrated by a simple geometrical puzzle:
suppose we are confronted by the "state of affairs" denoted
by configuration a. and the problem is to transform this
configuration into an equilateral oblong parallelogram, the
8 5Erwin Schrndinger, That is Life?, Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, 1945, pp. 87-88.
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condition being that equilateral triangles c' and c" be
maintained in the same position in relation to each other.
In accordance with the different ways, or norms, for com..
bining
-3
m\
e" 
\ \.M
m5
/M6
the means, i, m 2 , m3 , ... there are many different valid
solutions, which satisfy the end in view,. ni, ne...nr
Let us suppose that we prefer, for aesthetic motives, or
because we have ulterior purposes in mind, to combine the
means in accordance to the norm indicated by the arrows,
and that we try to justify this choice in terms of (a)
publicly valid arguments of Euclidean geometry; (b) pri
vately valid rationalization correctly formulated from our
belief that this is the only scientific way of attaining
the end in view, of correctly deduced from "cubistic"
tastes; and, moreover, (c) that this choice of ours de-
velops into a mania and is recorded by our psychoanalyst
in terms of statistically random frecuencies of behavior.
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This simple illustration shows that the elements of the
situation and the norm, thus subjectively defined, become
outwardly manifested by the expression of the actor (a) in
terms of scientifically valid theories, t; (b) of individual
rationalizations or collective ideologies correctly formu-
lated from unscientific elements, It, such as errors
purporting to be scientific facts, fallacies, ignorance,
etc., and (c) in terms of statistical frequency of an
88
essentially random choice. The complete formulation of
of an unit act may be presented as follows:
a=s( c(t,t'r)+ m(t,t',r)+ pM(tt',r)) + n(t,tr,r'pn)+ e (8)
where r is the statistically manifested frequency of be
havior in relation to the elements of the situation and the
norm. The general formulation of an individual action, Ai,
and a collective action, Ac, may be denoted as follows?
A1  (a1 + a2 + aa + .. , + ar) + Ki (9)
and
AC " (Al + A2+ + .. + Ar) +K (10)
where Ki and Kc are, respectively, the physiognomic effect
of the totality of discrete acts in an individual action,
and collective, group or national, historical character of
a community action. Of course, individual or collective
88This operatiional description of an unit act was sug-
gested by Talcott Parsons, op, cit., loc. cit.
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action may form a biographical or historical system of
actions such as the following:
A = (A( + A + A% + . .+ A ) + K( )
and
A = (A1 + A + A% +3...+ A ) + Kh (12)
bh
where Ri and Kc are, respectively, the organic effects of
the biographical and the historical systems.
10. Dynamic elements of action. The choice of a norm
is the dynamic element of an act. We must now supplement
our previous, static, definition of norm as the way means
are selected when an end is given, with a more elaborate,
dynamic, definition of norm. 8 7 The term norm has been em-
ployed in this thesis to indicate the way to arrive at the
solution of positive problems; we have used the special
term method to qualify this type of norm (I,A,5). Also
the term norm has been used to denote the solution, or a
solution satisfactory to the end in view, of a normative
problem, that is, the set of rules indicating how action
should be oriented, or how and what means should be chosen
to realize a predetemined state of affairs (II,A,7). This
definition is entirely satisfactory within a static notion
8 7 What is here called "norm," "end" and "conditions"
is the same as it is called, respectively, "solution,"
" inputation" and "physical background" !n JTohn von Neumann
and O skar Mo rgenste rn, T heo ry of Game s and Ec onomice Be-
havior, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N. J., 1947,
pp. 31-45.
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of act, but we must qualify it extensively to make it fit
into a dynamic structure of action. Two main qualifications
are particularly urgent. In the first place, we must repeat
what has already been said (II,B,10) about the finality of
ends. An end is here taken as given and final only within
the system of the unit act in which it occurs. Going
"downstream" in the current of actions it is always con-
ceptually possible to translate a final end of an act into
a unit, mean or condition, within the situation of the
next act; rational planning is nothing but such a deliberate
correlation of intentions. Moreover, it may be called
attention now, although this point will be elaborated later,
that as "all roads lead to Rome" so also many norms lead
to the same end, and that the development of a norm for the
evaluation of norms must be an essential part of this in-
vestigation. In the second place, we must stress the fact
that, among the elements of e situation confronting an
actor, there are his expectations concerning the probable
actions of others. Rational planning of action by an
individual is always built on the hope that these expecta-
tions will be realized, and, as rational planning, it must
include not only the expectation of rational behavior of
others but also the probebility of their irrational conduct.
If, through excessive optimism that others will behave
rationality in every occasion, the actor is punished by not
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being able to realize his desideratum, then his norm should
be modified, and the possible superiority of others should
be eliminated by the setting of the end at the level of the
worst possible result. A norm, therefore, is not only a
prescription on how to select the appropriate means to a
final end, but it is also a prescription on how to select
the most appropriate norm among all possible norms to that
end. As, by definition, an action is an organic system of
acts, the above stated concept of norm may be generalized
to a set of rules for each agent which tell him how to be-
have in every situation which may conceivably appear in a
stream of action.
11. This concept of norm, although dynamic, is only
applicable to one subject of action. In order to be ap-
plicable to collective action it needs further qualification.
This because individual preferences as to the desirability
of certain norms over other alternative ones may not
coincide. With the possibility of coalitions within a
group the problem of development of a norm for group be-
havior becomes somewhat more complex. Thus, for instance,
a norm for multilaterality in international trade should
exclude the possibility for some participants to get
greater advantages through autarky or bilateralism. If,
therefore, a norm for a certain collective action does not
dominate all other nossible alternative norms to the same
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end, there is always the possibility of the formation of a
sufficiently influential group within the community which,
by giving allegiance to another more advantageous norm,
will subvert the prescribed rule, and bring about a dynamic
evolution of cyclical dominations. This points out to a
third definition of norm as a prescription on how to choose
among actually possible final ends that system of ends,
which, as elements of the immediately future situation,
does not contain within itself the possibility of another,
more advantageous choice of a different system of ends.
It is the central task of this thesis to inveotigate whether
such a norm is possible in international economic action,
and, if it is possible, whether it shall prescribe a unique
set of rules as a standard for international economic
behavior.
12. Outline of inquiry. This study claims to be an
approach to a positive theory of the conflict between con-
flicting national economic idiologies, and the general
attempt towards international normative economic action
ideologically oriented towards the objective of avoiding
international economic friction and the international pro-
pagation of business cycles. As such the real world will
be seen neither as one enormous economic unit nor as a
congeries of closed systems, but as a very complex inter-
relation of economic actions of individnak and groups. We
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shall approach this reality by mnans of the technique of
successive approximations converging towards the structural
analysis of the international economic order. Starting
from cahos, total war, and no trade, with individuals hypo-
thetically acting atomistically towards random ends, we
shall figure how trade was ever-considered advantageous,
with the appearance of some ends in common. Then we shall
see how these societies were integrated into states po-
ssessing sovereignty or power to make independent, national'
decisions. The elements of conflict will emerge within the
international order. These elements will be traced down to
their roots in the structure of action. This will lead to
the principles which define "rational behavior" for an
international economy, to the abstract, "empty" doctrinal
function which will then be apolied to a world of concrete,
passionate nations bent to nreserve the individuality of
their own economic cultures, divided not only by categories
of space, but also by time, by economic power, by meaning
and values of their own, desiring international economic
peace and stability but politically responsive only to
divergent policies as determined by widely dissimilar
physical and social situations, national norms and interests.
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III. THE THEORY AND STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL ACTION
A. Systematic theory of action
1. The act. The most generalized static formulation
of a unit act is as follows;
a=n-,(m,)s -+e (=e') (10)
where the end, e, is the future state of the present situation,
a, after a norm, n, has been chosen to select the appropriate
means, m, which, in combination with the conditions, a, will
result in the realization of the desired end, et. A sue-
cessful act, or an act of which theNvalue" is 'good' for its
actor, is that in which thedesired end coincides, at the
expected future moment, with the obtained end. The most
generalized dynamic formulation of a sequence of acts (Seq. a)
is as follows:
Seq. a r .. n ( ... i (el = 2 ~((e2 83)-
(e. '4)- ... ) -,e (met) (14)
where a norm is chosen to select the means leading to an end
as means to a further end. We have already seen (II,0,11)
that this norm, in order to be stable, and, therefore, valid
as a norm, must prescribe a choice of means such that no
other more advantageous arrangement is possible. Each unit
act in a sequence of acto is an occasion for a choioe oon-
cerning the appropriate means to be selected. A norm is
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valid when, at each act, the adopted choice is the best of
all possible remaining choices. Such a valid norm is here
called an order. When the norm is not valid as a solution
for attaining the ultimate end of the sequence conflict may
arise in the precedence between which of the intermediary
ends, el'e 2, ,ea ... is to be fulfilled at the next act.
The deliberate implementation by the actor of a valid norm
is called organization. We now turn our attention to a
clarification of the meaning of these terms.
2. We have already seen also (IIC,,5) that unit acts
may be classified into five pure types, in accordance with
the level of consciousness in which they operate. We are
now in a position more precisely to qualify these types.
a) The vegetative act is characterized by the
absence of a freely chosen end, as well as of
controllable means, and a deliberate norm.
The order is biological, the situation is all
conditions, conflict is pathological, and the
result, e, is fully determined by merely allow-
ing the trends of the situation to work out
their course without active intervention. It
may be formulated as follows:
a"g. s(c) -r e (15)
1This conceptualization has been inspired by the termin-
ology of games as described in John von Neumann and Oskar
Morgenstern, op. cit. p. 49, but the analogy between "order,
"act" and "organization," and "game," #movelanld "strategy"
should not be taken too far.
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and a (cyclical) sequence of such acts:
Seq. aveg. = - 5- 8, el = 2-Fe2 = 5a ... (16)
such as sleeping-"waking, eating-digesting, etc.
b) The instinctive act is characterized also by the
absence of a freely chosen end, as well as of
controllable means, but it already exhibits a
physical, hereditary-environmental, foundation
which, although not freely chosen by the actor,
belongs fatalistically to him, and to no one else
(nj)w Such are the automatic reactions to
stimuli, which may be conditioned from the outside,
by scientific manipulation of the situation of
the actor. Behavioristic experiments on dogs
are examples of such conditioning of reflexes 2
The formulation of an instinctive act may be the
following:
4Lins. = ai- 0() 0 -- 1, e (17)
and a (discontinuous) sequence of such acts:
Seq. ains. = ni * ( .... s-)e, s2~e 2...) (18)
in which the actor is "provoked' to react rather
than to act.
c) The intuitive act, or the act of associative
memory, is still characterized by the absence of
2 J. B. Watson. Behaviorism, Norton, New york, 1925,
passim.
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a freely chosen end. Its situation, however,
consists not only of physical but also of social
conditions, and by the presence of alternative
means the choice between which (or the abstention
from choice) is governed by chance, that is, by
the norm of random choice, not of free choice
(nr)' This is seen whenever the actor cannot
explain his decision to pursue a certain end,
and not any other end, in logical or rational
terms, but only in terms of "having tossed a coin,'
or of "having acted by hunch," etc. This type of
irrational act may be represented by the following
expression:
aint, =nr--(mo)s-,e ( e') (19)
and a (statistic) sequence of such acts:
Seq. aint. = nrr(... is-,ei ( e'll)
2 re2 (e2 e'2) --- (20)
a formulation which expresses that the coincidence
between the obtained result, e, and the "desired"
result chosen at random, e', is a matter of "luck.
d) The positive, cognitive act is characterized (a)
by the absence of an ultimate end which is freely
chosen by the actor, and (b) by the actor's use
Arandom choice is a meaningless choice.
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of the scientific method as a notr for the pur-
suance of that given end. The ultimate end of
a positive act is the attainment of publio recog-
nition of its validity through verification of
prediction or coincidence, by epistemological
correlation, between expected results and obtained
results. The social counterpart of laboratory
verification is the actorre attainment of socially,
or culturally imposed aims for effort, such as
prestige, fame, wealth, etc. Thus, the positive,
cognitive acts may be subdivided into 'purely
soientifio" acts and 'practical' or 'ideological'
acts. In acting scientifically or ideologically
the actor adopts, without the awareness of risk
which is involved in every deliberate choioe,
modes of procedure, standards of behavior, a
professional or methodological ethios which are
imposed upon him by the society in which he
lives, by the culture from which he draws his
scientific knowledge, or by the religion or ritual
which gives him a ready made pattern of conduct.
The actor is then the embodiment of a function,
he is not a person but a scientist, a bureaucrat,
an entrepreneur, etc. Once the end is so adopted
the actor acts rationally, that is, tries to
76
discover, by using a norm of rationality, how
to fulfill his function under the established
order, how to organize or to plan his choices in
the selection of the most appropriate means, which,
in combination with the conditions, will realise,
in the future, the predetermined state of affairs.
We may now precisely define a positive, cognitive
act as that in which, when a certain ultimate end
is given as desirable, a rational norm is followed
as a solution for the problematic situation, such
that, when publicly applied, i.e., when applied
by other actors similarly situated, results auto-
matically in a coincidence, by epistemological
correlation, of prediction or expectation to ex-
perimental result. It does not matter for the
rationality of the adopted norm whether the actor
assumes, as postulates, his own "affections,'
sentiments, beliefs, intuitions, etc., that is,
whether he starts out with scientific premisses,
5
or ideological premisses. The most general
4Vilfredo Pareto, Traitd de Sociologie Ggngrale, ed. by
Pierre Boven, Payot et Cie., Paris, 19171919, pp. 149-169.
5Pareto's "sentiments" manifested as *residues" or pri-
vately valid postulates, from which 'derivations" or theorems
are correctly deduced, which are the verbal expressions ex-
plaining the "sentiments" or states of mind. See Vilfredo
Pareto, op. cit. pp. 161-162. The notation is that employed
(continued)
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formulation of a positive, cognitive act is as
follows:
apos= n(t(fr1),tI(f'.l',g)) -i(ttr),ct~t')9s..*
er(t,t') (re) (21)
where t is the scientifically valid knowledge
held by the actor, consisting of concepts, f, and
logically correct deductions from then, 1; t'
denotes explanations of the act which have not
yet been verified, based upon statements, f',
which, though purporting to be scientifically valid
facts, have not yet been confirmed as such; logical
fallacies, l', and ignoranes g that is, elements
which are objectively knowable but without sub-
jective manifestation. The ideal type of "soien-
tific1' positive, cognitive act is the theoretical
model of the natural sciences; the ideal type of
"ideological," positive, cognitive act is the
theoretical model of the social sciences. A se--
quence of positive acts may be denoted as follows:
Seq. apos. n r-> s( ... m1 c 1 e1=a 2 'c 2 -r 2-
= m3, )-*3 '''we) (22)
by Taloott Parsons, o.i.,note 8. pp. 177-179. See also
for a brief sketch oP Paeo's sociology, F. S. C. Northrop,
op.ci.,pp. 264-272. Some other more complete references
X67?Pareto'se work: Max Ascoli, "Pareto's Sociology,' Social
Research, Vol. III, February, 1936; Andrew Bongiornoj"Afludy
of Pareto's Treatise of General Sociology," American Journal
oftSocilo Vol. XXXVI, November) 1930, pp. 349--370; MndM rris Gin b rg, "pareto's G neral Socio ogy," S ciological
Review, Vol. XXVIII, July, 1936, pp. 221-245.
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where, when the sequence is valid, the predicted
results, el, coincides with the obtained results,
e, and both are tied to the situation by a law of
causation which, under certain conditions, con-
nects the state of affairs of the present situation,
s, to the future state of affairs, e.
e) The normative, cognitive act is characterized by
the presence of an ultimate end which is freely
chosen by the agent, and involving a deliberate
intervention by the agent in the trends of the
situation so that the end be realized. It is at
this level that the act attains its full, human,
intentional constitution, and acquires meaning.
For an observer, who observes positively, an act
may always be 'thought away' on physiological,
biological, statistical, economic, social, politicat
etc., criteria. But this explanation exhausts
the content of an act only ex-post-decisione,
that is, only after a choice is made, the act is
done, the trigger is pulled, and the recession
is reached. Then, and only then, the act appears
as having been a priori determined by some kind
of causality law, the exceptions being explained
as interferences of another, hitherto unexplained
law. A normative act may be represented as follows:
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nor. = i(1e)(tt',r)-n(t,t',r)-(m(t,t r),
0( ttt t,r)) s.--Pe (23)
where ie is the verbal description of the ideal
element, I, of the act, that is, what intention,
interest, preference, mania, etc., which lies at
the bottom of every subjective understanding of a
situation, a desire, an expectation of the actor
to realize a certain state of affairs. This ideal
element is of a great variety but category is
always that of setting a goal for effort. The
setting of this goal is a personal matter, and,
of course, it is conditioned to a great extent by
physiological, biological, social and logical
determinism, but there is a point at which it
unmistakenly becomes personal, and this is where
the actor begins to see risk, and to accept
responsibility for his act, that is, where he
recognizes that he could have acted otherwise if
he so wished. But even for the actor, once the
ultimate end is decided upon by him, his decision
becomes as if objectified, and his motivation
becomes explainable in terms of intuition, scien-
tific theory, rationalization, etc. The moment
of decision is always a silent moment, to be pre-
ceded by words at the stage of hesitation, and
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followed by words at the stage of explanation.
After a decision is taken concerning the ultimate
end the actor falls back to rationality, or even
to irrationality, in order to implement his deci-
sion by a plan or a norm with which to go through
the positive act or sequence ofr positive acts
linking the situation to the ultimate end in a
normative act. There cannot be a sequence of
normative acts, since the intermediary links in
the means-end chain of relationships would con-
sist in one act or a sequence of non-normative
acts. Normative acts can only be arranged in
sets where they are structurally interrelated in
systems of ultimate ends. Thus, a normative act
is always teleological, and not positive, specu-
lative, heuristic. Its norm is always a tech-
nological, selective standard of orientation,
regulating the choice of means to the already
chosen end. Thus, for instance, St. Ignatius of
Loyola's Spiritual Exercises is nothing but a
technique for mystical contemplation, which should
be carefully followed by the young Jesuit novice,
after he had decided to devote his life to God.
a. We may now try to sum up the above mentioned obser-
vations concerning the dynamic struoture of a unit act. We
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call that structure dynamic because it will be described in
6terms of chronologically arranged mental operations.
Statically, objectively, and behavioristically an act may be
defined as the external manifestation of a choice between
various alternatives. But the choice cbaraoterizing an act
may be a free choice, as well as determined, and random. A
choice, to be meaningful, must be free, since a random choice
is a purposeless mental or physical agitation, and a deter-
mined choice is a contradiction in terms. An act acquires
meaning with the emergence within its structure of the element
of decision regarding its ultimate objective. Thus, dy-.
namically and subjectively defined every act is a normative
act, i.e., the specific, meaningful manifestation of the
intention of an actor. The dynamic structure of an act may
be represented as follows:
ai = d(n -rs(ann)) -te (=e) (24)
where; (1) the act, ai, is that specific attitude or
activity which is picked up, among all possible alternative
attitudes or activities, to be the object of the intentional
consciousness of the actor; (2) the decision, 4, is that
mental operation by which the actor's interest defines the
act as intentional, gives a destination to it, addresses it
to an objective; (5) the end, e, is the actor's specification
6
"Dated" mental operations. Bee for that definition of
dynamics J. R. Hicks, Value and Oapital, Olarendon Press,
Oxford, -1946, p. 115.
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of the nature of the act as cognitive, affective, social,
political, economic, etc.; (4) the norm, n, is the orienta-
tion of the act, the way to select the means or to plan the
operations conducive to the end in view; (5) the situation, s,
is that element of the act consisting in all possible, cor-
rect or faulty, sequences of vegetative, instinctive, intui-
tive, cognitive, non-normative acts, arranged as a set of
variables the variation in the technical selection of which
completely describes the conduct of the actor in acting;
(6) and, finally, a single, non-normative act, ann, repre-
sentirig the set of variables which is the linear sequence
of technical acts chosen by the norm.
4. The elements of an act are organically integrated
within the dynamic structure of the unit act. The order of
an act is that regulation of intentionality or normativeness
by which the act acquires meaning. It is the result of the
mental process by waich the actor rules which of his wants
are to be "repressed," which he will try to satisfy, and
wnat shall be the hierarchy of value of those worthy of
satisfaction. This essentially.'political" way of establish-
ing order by authority may be abortive when the actor cannot
reach a decision concerning the grading of his interests,
or, in other words, reaches ephemerous, unstable orders
only. Then, there is a conflict of psychological sovereign-
ty whenever the actor is unable to impose his will, and
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hesitates, like Hamlet, between the various alternative
wants and interests loudly claiming for preferential satis-
faction. The actor, however, may reach a decision on the
gradation of ultimate ends. Then, the order is said to be
8
legitimate. The legitimacy of an order, like the inten-
tionality of a consciousness, goes from a minimum of deliber-
ateness, at the biological level of the act, to a maximum
of intensity of free will at the normative level (IIIA,2).
The legitimacy of an order is, at first, arbitrarj, i.e.,
imposed upon the actor by dictatorial conditions. Then it
becomes traditional, when it is socially determined, and
ideological, when it results from the rational, logico-
transcendental necessity of social, political, moral, and
religious doctrines. Finally, the legitimacy of an order
attains its upper extreme at the private, mythioal, and sym-
bolical level of validity of conviction, belief, and faith.
7 This psychological, or, again, *political" conflict
becomes most conspicuous when there are two, three, or few
preferences requesting attention. When the number of con-
flicting tendencies becomes really great the personality
collapses into insanity. But even then there is the possi-
bility of partial psychic integration into conflicting
complexes. Psychoanalytic treatmient consists of the re-
ineaon of the personality back to its former or to a
better value order. politically the process may be compared
to a civil war fought around the adoption or rejection of a
constitutional ultimate end.
8Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organisa-
tion, W. Hedge, Lonidon, 1947, p. 113.
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The order of an act may be graphically represented as
follows:
e'In On
e e
M M
(25)
e t1 10
k kek
where lo' denotes the actor's legitimate order; Mtk' l'
--- g'n, the actor's ultimate ends arranged according to his
criterion; lo denotes the legitimate order of the physical
and social, hereditary-environmental milieu where the actor
acts; and ek, el, .. en, are the external ultimate ends,
more or less divergent from those of the actor.
5. As the legitimate order of an act is the scale of
evaluation of its possible ends, the organization of an act
is the scale of evaluation of its possible norms, that is,
the possible modes by which the actor may accomplish the
ends enrolled in tre order. After deciding about the order
his ends are to be satisfied the actor faces the problem of
choosing between the various ways to attain these ultimate
ends. He begins by 'censoring" some of these processes to
overcome resistences, as immoral, illicit, illegal, ineffi-
cient, etc. Then the problem becomes essentially 'economic":
that of allocating disposable, but scarce, means between
various ultimate ends. The actor faces two sets of constraints
with which his organization must conform: coherence with
the adopted order, and adaptability to the 'resistences' as
posed by the conditions of the situation. Another type of
conflict may, then, appear, a conflict between alternative,
equally valid, or intrinsically uncomparable criteria to
9
attain the ultimate ends of the adopted order. When the
actor cannot solve that problem, or when his solution is
unstable, his efforts to establish an organization for acting
are called incompetent. An organization is incompetent when
there is a conflict, not between ends eager for satisfaction,
but between different modes of conduct anxious to 'lobby'
their own ends. This simile between conflicting specific
norms and competing pressure groups must not veil the essen-
tial difference between the "power" or "political" conflict
of clashing ultimate ends, and the 'econoaic" conflict of
clashing normative competences, as for instance between
technical, and economic efficiency, legal conformity, etc.
But when the actor is capable to translate his set of ultimate
ends or values into a code of procedure we shall say that
the organization is competent. The competence of an organi-
9 This conflict outstandingly appears, for instance, when
the problem-is not only one of allocation of resources
between different ends of tkhe ese individual, but also
between those of different individuals. See Talcott Parsons,
op. cit., p. 235.
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zation, like the legitimacy of an order (IIIA,4) or the
intentionality of individual consciousness (III,A,2) goes
also all the way from biological determinism to normative
voluntarism. At the minimum level of deliberateness it is
an automatic organization of sensorial perceptions. Then it
becomes habitual until it attains a positive level where the
organization is rationalized under criteria of efficiency,
empirical adaptation, moral conformity, ritual observance,
etc. Then, finally, the organization also attains an ideal
level corresponding to the utopian level of the order. The
organization for an act may be graphically represented as
follows:
etk n
k k
e n
e lm ,c (26 )
11e IM notn
lo' [not'
e rn nn
where no' denotes a competent organization of the actor's
norms for acting.
6. Again, as the legitimate order is the stable norm
for ultimate ends, and the competent organization is the stable
noria for specific norms) the srecific norm of an act is a plan
of operations, a prescription as how to select means at each
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occasion for such choice at each non-normative act compound-
ing the intermediary means-end chain of relationships between
the initial situation and the ultimate.end. This norm is
essentially "technological," and the most conspicuous ex-
ample of it is a "production function' in economic theory.
The specific norm may be adeqjuate or inadequate. A specific
norm is adequate when the actor can implement it, and it is
inadequate in the contrary case. An adequate specific norm
is also effective when its plan does not contain inner in-
consistencies or contradictions, and it is ineffective when
it contains such inuousistencies and contradictions that
make it unstable. The adequate specific norm may be graphi-
cally represented as follows:
et(=ek) (27)
where straight line cek denotes the adequate norm when also
effective; the dots, the available means; and the other
"ways" connecting the conditions to the ultimate end, the
ineffective, though adequate, specific norms.
7. With these preliminary observations in mind we shall
now turn to the consideration of the question as of how
meaningful acts such as these, being individualistic, and
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atomistic, and having their ultimate ends decided on the
basis of the free choice of isolated actors, can ever be
made a part of an action or a system of actions, without con-
tinualy breaking down into general conflict and war.
8. The action. The dynamic structure of a unit act was
outlined above (III,A,l-7) in analytical isolation from a
system of acts) or an action. We have called action any
numan attitude or activity, inward or overt, active or pas-
sive, when arid in so far as the agent or agents associate a
subjective meaning10 to it. We have called actor, through-
out this study, the subject of an act, and agent, the sub-
ject of an action. These two terms must always be dis-
tinguished, at the same level of generality. An agent does
always include more than one actor, but an agent may be con-
sidered as an actor when he acts in a collectivity of agents,
in the same way as an actor may be considered as a colleo-
tion of non-normative actors, or wants, interests, tenden-
cies, etc. forming a personality. Thus, a person, when in
action, that is, during a certain period of his life, faces
many occasions for normative acting, in the social, economic,
political, religious, etc., realms, and may be considered,
therefore, as a group of actors each one of which performs
one specific normative act in which many non-normative acts
1That is, intentionality, understanding, subjective
understanding, interpretation in subjective terms, etc.,
"Verstohen" as in Max Weber, p. cit., pp. 79, footnote, 80.
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are telescoped in its intermediary means-end chain of rela-
tionships. For the action of this person to be meaningful,
or coherent, it is necessary that the group of non-normative
actors be integrated within each normative act of a unit
actor, and the grouping of these unit actors to be integrated,
by their ultimate end-values to the order or personality
11
system of the agent. In the same way, a group of physical
persons, when integrated in an association, church, govern-
ment, nation, etc., that is, when acting in consonance with
12
a certain collective consoiousness of having characteristics
in common, may also be conceived as a body of individual
actors, each one of which, although having their own systems
of non-normative acts, delegate their normative sovereignty
to the group as a body which then acts, for instance, eco-
nomically, as a corporation, or socially, as a club, or
politically, as a party or a nation, etc., upon the basis
of maximising the attainment of some common interests suck
as profits, social pleasure, political power, or national
income. In accordance, therefore, with the level of gener-
ality where the act or action takes place, the terms actor
ll~atintegration, of course, being never complete or
total in a concrete person who only assymptotically approaches
the ideal. limit of perfect coherence of action, or sanity.
12As in Purkheim's "conscience collective," but trying
to avoid the moral undertone of translating "conscience'
into conscience.
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or agent may denote either a tendency, a want or an interest
acting within and dependent exclusively on the actor's or
agent's end value order scheme; or a physical person perform-
ing an isolated action, that is, in the exclusive control of
his means; or that same physical person when acting within,
and under the dependence of other agent or agents, that is,
having his means partly controlled by other people, of which
he accepts the dominance, and even delegates some of his
normative sovereignty; or, finally, a group, as a juridical
person, acting similarly within a broader group. This device
simplifies the scheme of action without mutilating its in-
herent complexity.
9. In formulation (9) we have described the structure
of action, statically, as an organic totality of unit acts.
Now we shall define action dynamically, as a set of "dated"
decisions or normative acts. The dynamic structure of an
action consists in the individual or collective agent who,
(a) having a psychological criteria of indifference or pref-
erence to certain interests and wants at all, and (b) being
aware of his situation, i.e., possessing some kind of infor-
mation about his conditions and means, faces three distinct
1We may now say a word about the agent's knowledge of
his situation. The choice of adequate organization and an
effective norm depends on that knowledge, part of this pro-
cess is automatic and instinctive, but a greater part is
deliberate. This information regarding the past actions of
others is twice restricted: (a) by the order itself which
(continued)
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but transitively dependent types of problems the solution
of which successively define his action: (1) the "political"
problem of deciding the legitimate order for action, (2) the
"economic" problem of establishing a competent organization
for action, and, finally, (3) the "technological" problem
of planning the adequate, and effective, norm for each one
of his normative acts. The dynamic structure of an action
may be formulated as follows:
n chx
n
n a
a - 1 (28)
chk1e
no'Oh
n n
where chA, c , ... ci, denotes the choices made at each
non-normative act of which the conoatenation means-end in
each normative act consists. And a system of actions may be
may conceal the actions of some of its .most important agents;
and (b) by the agents themselves who may conceal their
actions or manifest them fraudulently, by explaining them
erroneously on purpose, or spreading knowledge in order that
other agents will relay them, guiding or misguiding those
who are interested in them. This matter shall be more ex-
tensively appreciated later on in the course of this dis-
sertation.
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graphically represented as follows:
no,' lo'
no 
'2
5 LO
(29)
NO lo t
no lo'tI
where LO is the legitimate order of the system of action, and
NO is the competent organization of the same system.
10. Such dynamic structures of action or action systems
may be classified into two oroad types: (a) the non-social
structure of action, which obtains whenever the individual
or collective agent thinks he is not effected in his present
action by past, present, or future actions of another agent
or agents,, and, therefore, that the achievement of his ends
depends exclusively upon the legitimacy of his order, the
competence of his organization, and the adequacy, and effi-
cience of his specific norms; and (b) the social structure
of action, which is characterized by the agent'e recognition
of his dependence, in the achievement of his ends, upon
past, present, and future actions of others. We shall study,
in detail, the nature of this dependence.
ll. In conclusion of this systematic presentation of
the theory of action, we shall now refer to the precise
93
meaning of legitimacy of an order, competence of an organiza-
tion, and adequacy, and efficiency, of a specific norm, as
well as the meaning of political, economic and technological
conflict. We have already seen (II,0,10) that the concept of
norm had to be extensively qualified to fit into a dynamio
conception of action. In the light of the definitions of
non-social as well as social actions (II.A,10) we may briefly
point out that: (a) in non-social action, (1) the order is
legitimate whenever it enrolls ends in such an order of pref-
erence that the ordering possesses transitivity, that is
end pk is preferred to end el, and end e is preferred to
end e, and also end is preferred to end e ; and, moreover,
every other ultimate end, such as ej, not contained in lo'
must be so placed that those named shall always be preferred
ahead of it; in other words, the agent shall tackle his ends
14
by order of preference, and shall never leave a work unfinished;
(2) the organization is competent whenever its norms are
similarly arranged in order of transitive preference, and
15
also that every Lajnot contained in no' is dominated by
a norm njk contained in it: that is, the agent must know
himself thoroughly so that norms shall be adopted in an order
14In psychoanalytic terminology: the action mus t be com-
pleted without frustration.
16A term used by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern,
cit.pp. Z7 Cf. These requirements for legitimacy,
COMPetence, etc., are these authors' requirements for a valid
solution of a game.
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that never violates his own intimate set of values; (3) the
specific norms are adequate and effective whenever the choices
concerning the selection of means in each of the non-
normative act linking the initial situation to the ultimate
end must conform to a technological transitive gradation of
appropriateness, and that thIs arrangement is the best of
all possible arrangements leading to the end in view. In
(b) social action, (1) the order is legitimate whenever the
order is transitive and free from inner contradictions, and
wnenever it can be used to discredit, to upset, or to domi-
nate any non-oonformIng, order; these same two rules must be
verified in (2) a competent organization, and in (3) adequate
and effective norms.
12. This may be summarized as followas In general we
may say, in broad terms, that order means the rules of an
action: biological, institutional, rational, ethical, etc.
Every specific instance of action, when there is a free choice
of an end, is called normative act. Organization is the
translation of the order to specific actions as a bundle of
normative decisions. Within each of these normative acts
there may exist many occasions for choice of means conducive
to intermediary ends as means to further ends. A non-
normative act is such an occasion for choice. The plan for
such choices is called the specific norm of an act. Any
action involves, therefore, the following hierarchy of norms:
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order, organization, specific norm. An order is legitimate,
an organization is competent, and a specific norm is effee-
tive when they fulfil the two following necessary and suf-
ficient requirements for legitimacy, competence, and offi-
cacy: (a) no end en, or norm n, or choice Oki, contained
in an lo', no', or n is dominated by, or inferior to any end
!m' or choice 2t4 contained in lo', no', and n: that is,
a norm to be legitimate, an organization to be-competent,
and a specific norm to be effioient must be free from inner
contradictions; and (b) every end !n, or norm nn, or choice
oh1 not contained in lot, not, or n, must be dominated by or
inferior to some end em, or norm n, or choice ch oontained
in lot, not, and n: that is, when a norm is legitimate, an
organization competent, and a norm efficient they can be
used to discredit, upset, or dominate any other non-conforming
arrangement of ultimate ends, specific norms, and non-
normative choices. These two very important postulates do
not, however, imply: (a) that a legitimate order, a compe-
tent organization, or an efficient norm can never be dis-
credited, upset, or dominated by another order, organization
or specific norm, but that, if that is the case, the cibal-
lenge must have come from outside the legitimate order, the
competent organization or the efficient norm, which, when
so discredited, upset, or dominated lose their legitimacy,
competence, and efficiency in favor of the dominating order,
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organization, or norm. Legitimacy, competence, and adequacy
and efficiency are manifestations of inner stability in an
order, organization, or specific norm; and (b) that a
legitimate order, a competent organization, or an efficient
specific norm are unique solutions to the problem of the
agent's conduct in action; that is, given the same situation,
different legitimate order, competent organizations, and
efficient norms, possessing inner stability, but mutually
contradictory, may be devised, chosen and accepted by those
agents acting under their constraint.
B. Order, conflict, and organization
1. Social action. As the intentionality of individual
consciousness, the legitimacy of an order, the competence
of an organization, and the efficacy of specific norms, so
the socialness of an action is also a matter of gradation
of the agent's dependence upon the actions of other agents.
The range of this gradation straddles from the automatism
of instinctive reactions to the free will of normative deci-
sions. If we define social act as that act in the perform-
ance of which the actor acts under the dependence of other
actor's acts, then we may include under the classification
of social act such extremely opposite forms of act as the
physiologically motivated vegetative act of a person's
stomach peristaltically digesting food produced by other
people, as well as the distinctly ncramative act of someone
who has annihilated in mystical contemplation or realized
in artistic expression a self born from man and woman. There
is, in fact, a common social condition in every conceivable
act, resulting from the unescapable ontological dependence
of the actor's own existence upon the elements of the sit-
uation among which there always are at least some impression
of other people's lives, if not their present influence, or
their expected future effects.
2. This, however, is not the definition of social action
that we have in mind. We mean by social act that which con-
comitantly fulfills the following two necessary and suffi-
cient requirements for socialness of action: it is a norma-
tive, meaningful, intentional act (IIIA,2e) and it is an
act in the successful performance of which the actor takes
account of his real or imaginary dependence upon someone
16
else's decisions and choices. The influence of others
may be recognized either as affecting directly the attain-
ment of the ultimate desired end of the normative act, or
as affecting directly the proper execution of any one of
its component non-normative acts, or as affecting both the
end and the means. We define social act as that normative
act not performed in subjective isolation by its individual
1 6By "someone else" we mean actor1 actors, or agents
specifically known to the actor, or indefinitely known to
him as a plurality, or entirely unknown to him as indi-
viduals; see Max Weber, op. cit., p. 102.
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actor) and as non-social act that normative act performed
in such subjective isolation. Thus, for instance, a burglar
who carefully plans and accomplishes his burglary by taking
account of all possible human encroachments is acting socially
in accordance with our definition; on the other hand, mys-
tical contemplation or pure artistic expression are normative
acts which are non-social acts; also, non-normative acts,
such as the gastric act of digestion, and the instinctive
act of avoiding an oncoming car, even when performed in a
collectivity, as during a banquet or amid urban traffic,
shall not be considered as social acts. We define social
action as that system of normative acts where there are at
least two subjectively interdependent actors. A non-social
action, contrariwise, denotes a system of normative acts
where each one of which is performed in subjective isolations
Finally, a system of social actions is that system of action
consisting of at least two subjective interdependent agents,
and a system of non-social actions is that in which every
agent acts in subjective isolation from every other par-
ticipating agent. We shall now characterize and exemplify
each one of these various types of act, action, and system
of action.
3. The non-social act is an isolated, normative act.
The prototype of normative, isolated, non-social acter is
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Robinson Crusoe. Crusoe's non-social acting may be repre-
sented as follows:
n n
int ins
nrat exi
d-n. ny 
- nor (30)
eont
eind euti e
where the ends, e, are classified into ontological, individu-
alistic) utilitarian, gositive, and normative; and the norms,
n, are classified into existential, instinctive, intuitive,
rational, and Axbolical, in accordance with the level of
consciousness in which each one non-normative act and the
final normative act operate. Crusoe's acting is then seen
as a struggle towards normativeness, deliberateness or indX-
vidual sovereignty, by a gradual adaptation of himself to
his situation. After the traumatic passage into isolation,
and the occasional landing at some island, Crusoe recaptures
1 7 Defoe's Crusoe, not that pure essence of subjective
utility which is called Crusoe in economic analysis. The
dis tinction is pertinent. By Crusoe we mean here Defoe's
description of a specific, historical individual in tsola-
tion, a detailed account or Alexander Selkirk ts activities,
thoughts, "fits of conscience," remorse, etc., of a 17th
century middle class protestant Scottish sailor, marooned
by request at Juan Fernandez Island, and who never los t con-
s ciousness of belonging to a specific religious and national
group of human beings, a quite different animaJltfrom the
celebrated "economic man" fully entertained in the slightly
depraved pleasure of allocating the picking of strawberries
against leisure in a spaceless, timeless, close economic
paradise.
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himself as existing in an entirely new and peculiar situation.
His first non-normative act is, therefore, existential; it
takes place at'the vegetative level of consciousness, and
results in Crusoe'sontologicafy feeling himself alive. By
recontacting his own existence Crusoe regains possession of
his previous, inherited and acquired, identity as the his-
torical individual named Robinson Crusoe. From that stand-
point, then, his sensorial perceptions carve out of pure
reality a number of "facts" of a surrounding Nnature" which
he intuitively interprets as the elements of a problematic
situation, Crusoe reacquires some of his former rational
uprightness by confronting this problematic situation as an
object of inquiry. At this positive stage he explores his
conditions, and probes potential means. So far he has been
guided, not by his free volition, but by the invisible hand
of self-preservation, from non-normative end to a further
non-normative end. An exceptionally intelligent anthropoid
18
ape, like Gossen's Crusoe, would have been able to keep
19
pace with him. But once "profane" needs were met, and the
18 For the mental capacity of the anthropoid ape see
W. Koehler, The Mentality of Apes, Kegan Paul, Trench,
Trutner and Co., London, 1925, passim.; and as for the
assignment to Gossen of' paternity for the "economic Crusoe"
see W. Stark, The Ideal Foundations of Economic Thought,
Routledge, London,~ 1948, p. 159.k--
As in Durkheim's "le travail est profane par excel-
lence."
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positive end of gaining a living bad become a means to some
further end, then Crusoe faced the extremely intricate
problem of formulating his first free decision regarding
what he ought to do with himself. The problem Crusoe faced,
in his isolation, until he finds his man Friday, Is simply
that of recreating social constraints for his leisure.
Realizing the gratuitousness of his life, its lack of en-
gagement, he fetched obligations in order to be able to
accept them, or to fight against them. He faced the fol-
lowing ethical problem: he had to decide what he would not
do, in order to be free to do what he should do. In aztruly
Hamletian mood he even considered whether he should oommit
suicide or not, and discovered that this too was at the reach
of his decision. Defoe's literary solution for his char-
acterts problem was to send him back to his Bible as a code
of legitimate order. By so doing Defoe has characterized
Crusoe as the ideal type of normative-non-social actor. In
order for the non-social act to be accomplished at all,
i.e., to become meaningful, the actor must decide between
a variety of legitimate orders which are capable of reali-
zation. Self-preservation is an intermediary end to some
further ultimate end, since it leaves unanswered the ques-
tion: what for? To the extent that a number of non-social
actors, although acting in a collectivity, do not recognize
the possibility of influence upon each one'rs freely chosen
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legitimate order of other actors will and intention to en-
force their own individual legitimate orders, the action of
wnich consists this colleciAon of non-social acts remains
non-social. To the extent that Crusoe did not recognize in
his man Friday more than a passive means to his own ends,
and to the extent that Friday freely accepted the white
man's authority- as the manifestation of an impersonal order
of legitimate ends to which Crusoe himself was submitted,
i.e., to the extent that each one treats the other as a
passive means to his own freely chosen ends the mutual action
remains non-social. Crusoe's coercion of Friday's will, or
Friday's sensing illegitimacy for himself in Crusoe's
legitimate order of ultimate ends would have transformed
their mutually exclusive, isolated, non-social acts into a
social action resulting in a political conflict.
4. The non-social action is, therefore, a system of
isolated, normative, non-social actors eaon one of which
treats everyone else as a passive means to his own ultimate,
normative end, while believing that everyone is subject to
the same legitimate order. The slightest suspicion of in-
equality or favoritism upsets this social general equilibrium
system. If someone starts loving, or hating, or trying to
overpower someone else then the non-social action becomes
social, by the introduction of political conflict. As.
Defoe's account of Crusoe's activities up to Friday's
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appearance into the incipient social scene was an example
of isolated, individual, normative, non-social act, Jokanm
Wyss' Swiss Family Robinson20 is the ideal type of isolated,
collective, non-social action. As long as each one in that
family treats everyone else as a passive means to his own
ultimate end of devoting his efforts, with perfect unselfish-
ness, to the welfare of the group the action is stable as a
non-social action. The moment, however, someone's authority
is felt tne system of action becomes social,- and, in order
for it to be stable as a social system, then, the dominating
authority must be recognized as a legitimate order not only
by itself, in order to have'moral authority, but also by
everybody else who could upset it by not conforming to it.
In this case not only a political conflict would develop
between two equally legitimate authorities, but an economic
conflict would also appear, in the wake of the political
conflict, around the problem of the distribution of means
between these two alternative and equally valid ultimate
ends. As for a -system of non-social actions it may be con-
spicuously exemplified in some "anarchistic" religious
orders, such as that of the Franciscans or of the Vedanta
Swamis, in which every participant, while striving to realize
the system of ends which is most legitimate for himself,
20Johanni Wyss, Per Schweiterische Robinson, f irst
translated into Englitl180
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such as the contemplative, the active, or the "jnana, " the
"karma," the "bhakti," or the "raja" yogas, subordinates,
or dedicatts., his individual action to the accomplishment
of a supreme legitimate order. As seen from the outside,
or from an observerts point of view, both the non-social
action as well as the system of non-social actions have al-
ready been formulated above in (28) and (29).
5. Before proceeding to the examination of the concept
of social action, we shall endeavor precisely and concisely
to summarize the schema of an isolated, normative, non-
social act as it has been above formulated (21,22,30), and
exemplified (III,B,3). A graDh of such an act may be as
follows:
1 2  a 3
p ch chK mO-t:5 (31)
--- O---ann(v+1)
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where the following characteristics are symbolically
represented: (1) where a real or imaginary situation A
involving possible or impossible choices of some undefined
actor is narrowed down to a specific situation in time and
space where an existent, isolated, normative actor faces
some conditions and has at his disposal some means, a and
a; (2) the non-social act appears as a non-social aotion
of which the actors are 'nature" and "CrusoeN" "nature'
includes the normative actor's hereditary and environmental
conditions, and its choices, from a subjective point of
view, manifest themselves to an observer as chance or
random choices, ohr, within an area, r, where the proba-
bility of the 'nature"'s choice increases towards the
center; TCrusoe" includes all voluntary choices of the
actor, i.e., his rational choices be they logico~o
experimental or logico-transcendental, t or ti (IIIA,2,d);
(Z) the nonk.social act takes place in time which is divided
into periods by the set of possible choices as they may
conceivably appear to someone who is better informed about
these possibilities than the actor himself: i.e., an
almost unlimited set of both possible and impossible
choices1 A, is firstly narrowed down to an area of possi-
bilities, s, which is subdivided into time-subpartitions,
ann(k), k I ... _v, v+l, circumscribing choices that are,
then, possible; (4) the random choices within the area of
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conditions are picked up on the basis of different proba-
bilities, and chri is, therefore, picked up within the
subset a of _ann(l); but, within the subset m, inann(2),
the actor does not know everything: he knows only tt'2'
of which he thinks that only the area tS'2 is applicable,
but of which, in fact, only area t2 is valid since the
knowledge it contains coincides with the knowledge of the
neutral observer, i.e., is scientifically, publicly valid
knowledge; (5) the actor chooses right within m of Iin( 2 ),
since he picked up the alternative ht2 which is inside
subset 2 ojt 2 ; (6) the various choices along the means-'end
chain of non-normative acts are made out either at random,
with known probabilities, or by voluntary, valid, both
effective and adequate choices of the actor when selecting
his means to an end as means to a further end; (7) this
picture of an isolated, normative, non-social act may be
further simplified by making the actor start his act
with a norm or a plan, for then, instead of making his
decision concerning the means as the necessity for it
arises, he makes up his mind for all possible contingencies:
he is no longer satisfied by deciding about a normative
end for his effort, but also he tries to organize, compe-
tently, in order to proceed with technical adequacy and
efficiency towards his goal: he chooses a norm and
submxits it to the test of verification; (8) the value
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of the normative act is a function of this ultimate
onoice.
6. Such a non-social act becomes, for its actor, a
social act the moment he recognizes, with or without
grounds for doing so, that it may be influenced, either
favorably or unfavorably, by someone else's choices or
decisions about which he does not possess full knowledge
and information. The change that socialness introduces
into formalation (31) is easily visualized: when con-
fronting a situation the actor's knowledge of it may be
already outmoded, in such a way that although his choice
be entirely rational it may no longer be applicable or
valid in the new pattern of information of "someone who
knows better" than the actor 'what is good for him" at
that special moment. The moment, therefore, an otherwise
isolated, non-social actor suspects that his act may be
either upheld or upset by somebody else 's non-normative
choices regarding means and normative decisions concerning
ultimate ends, there, then, the isolated, non-social actor
ceases to be non-social and becomes a social actor. This
unilateral recognition of dependence is) however, not
sufficient to transform a general equilibrium system of
isolated) non-social acts into a social action. It takes
at least two subjectively interdependent, though perhaps
no less independent, actors to transform a non-social
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action into a social action. Recognition of dependence,
as long as there is no coercion by force, would not make
each actor's individual sovereignty less sovereign or free
to make its own decisions regarding ultimate ends. But
then, the potentiality of mutual interaction being recog-4
nized or suspected, the question arises as to how the
terms of social relationships are settled. In other words,
once at least two non-social acts have been integrated,
through subjective interdependence of their actors, in an
action system, the problem comes up as to know whether
the resulting common social order is stable or unstable,
that is, whether the resulting social action is a system
of conflict or a system of organization and contract.
When non-social acts are brought together by their actors'
mutual recognition of interdependence, but their ultimate
ends, whatever they may be, remain uncorrelated, and
individualistically compartimentalized, a social act of
conflict will result from the former non-social order of
subjective isolation. Or, then, at the other extreme, the
actors, by recognizing interdependence, cease to exert
sovereign power any longer, and then, with this last free
decision, which then must be unanimous, the core of
normativeness will be forever abolished, and the resulting
social action will cease to be social in order to become
an endless process of adaptation, a long waiting for
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further initiative, a pointless preservation of movement
for the movement's sake. Either the non-social action
becomes Hobbesian in the transformation into a social
action, or it becomes Kantian:21 it is "a war of all
against afl"or it is 'an eternal peace." Reality, of
course, is neither.
7. Let us go back to the extraordinary fertility of
Crusoe's example. We have already pointed out (III,A,9)
that Crusoe, when acting in social isolation, faced three
major problems, which we have represented graphically, in
a summary (30), and in a more detailed way (31). These
problems were: (a) a 'psychological' problem: Crusoe
had to make up his mind as for the ultimate end to choose
and pursue: we saw (III,B,3) how Crusoe kept shifting
his end to a further and further end, at first quite ir'-.
rationally, and then voluntarily, until he found in
"salvation"22 a sufficiently remote end to be called
ultimate without danger of ever finding out that it might
be a means to a more remote goal; (b) an "economic"
21To qualify it as Lockean would have been more accu-
rate, philosophically speaking, since Kant entitled his
little essay on peace as "To eternal peace" having in mind
the peace of death. See C. J. Friedrich, Inevitable peace,
Harvard University Press, Ccabridge, Mass.,.1948, p. 244tG.
22
"But now I began to exercise myself with nev thoughts;
I daily read the Word of God and applied all the comforts
of it to my present state." See Daniel Defoe, Robinson
Crusoe and A Journal of the Plague Year, Random Houses The
Modern Library, New York, 1948, p. 1Z5
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problem: Crusoe had to decide about the allocation of his
means between these graded ends, the distribution, for
instance, of his leisure time between Bible reading and
more earthly occupations, i.e., in other words, how to re-
place a "natural order" of successive choices, or partial
norms, such as the instinctive, intuitive, rational, etc.,
(30) by a deliberate, organizational norm (III,B,5) in-
volving the- statistically predictable trends of his
hereditary-environmental "nature" or conditions, as well
as a plan of choices in the intermediary means-end chain
of non-normative acts; and, finally, (c) a "technological"
problem: Crusoe had to apply this norm in such a way that
the normative end should be maximized, or approached as
close as possible, as a target, within the conditions imp-'
posed by nature, since the "value," for Crusoe, of his
normative act was a function of the adequacy and efficiency
of this norm. These three major problems remained invari-
able for Crusoe, after Fridayrs arrival, and as long as
there was a non-social action consisting of two isolated,
normative, non-social actors; Crusoe, who had not yet
recognized Friday's influence in his own Bible oriented
"way of life," tut used Fridayts services as a matter of
course, and as a no less predictable event of his natural
surroundings than the reappearance of the sun every
morning; and Friday who "used" Crusoe as a "manifestation"
of a higher power, a no less controllable means in his own
totem oriented, logico-transcendental chain of symbolical
meanings in his isolated, normative, non-social way of
life. This non-social action conceivably persisted until
one of its actors, Crusoe, for instance, begun to suspect
that Friday was something more than merely a passive ob.
ject, and might be capable of active partnership in the
pursuance of Crusoe's own ultimate end, or of active
resistance to Crusoe's attainment of that ultimate end.
At this moment, when Crusoe senses that Friday is also
in a position to enforce his own totemic, normative de--
cisions, Crusoets non-social act became, for Crusoe, a
social act. But this, however, was not sufficient to
transform their collective, non-social action into a social
action. Crusoe's change of attitude had to arise Fridayts
suspicion that Crusoe might very well be something more
than a passive instrument to a higher, invisible "hand,1
or powerful WlawN and that, therefore, his conduct could
be directed entirely by magical incantation. The moment
Friday recognized Crusoe as &n extremely unreliable means
to be counted upon as adequate to his own ends, then
Friday is " theory" o f Crusoe's behavior, or the norm he
had adopted towards Crusoe, was not verified: uncertainty
arose together with risk, in Friday's mind. The mutual
action was no longer to be pursued under the assumption
112
of belief that complete or perfect information was avail-
able to both Crusoe as well as Friday. When each one saw
in the other a possibility of unallegiance, or disrespect,
for one's own convictions concerning ultimate values, or
a threat to the stability of those convictions, then, the
"psychological" ordering of ends of each isolated act
gave place to a "political" ordering of ends by contract,
persuasion or coercion, or to a conflict of power. Thus,
a social act is characterized by (a) the presence within
the schema of action of at least two normative actors;
(b) a scarcity of those means which are needed by different
actors for alternative ends or uses; (c) a consciousness
by the actors of not having complete information about the
means effectively at their disposal; and (d) a political
restriction placed upon the psychological freedom of de-
cision concerning ultimate ends. A social action may be
diagrammatically represented as follows:
Note on the grafical presentation. Configurations
(32a) and (32b) are simple translations into diagrammatical
terms of the Von Neumann-Morgenstern geheral formal descrip-
tion of games of strategy. The sets have been arbitrarily
chosen as rectangular sets, and in so doing we followed the
suggestion of Oskar Morgenstern, .On the Accuracy of Economic
Observations, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J.
I9570,figT, p. 31. This graphical presentation may be
further elaborated to take care of very complex situations,
and a good draftsman may devise ways by which the information
to be conveyed becomes immediately self-evident by simple
inspection of the diagrammatical sketch.
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8. The graphical representation of a social action,
even when involving few participants, seems to lead to
complicated diagrams. 2 3 The configuration (32a) combines
three actors, K = 1, ... 3, in a social action within a
group, 'g and, as formulation (31) was a development of
formulations (21, 22, and 30), so formulation (31a) is a
development of formulations (28 and 29). Suppose that j
is a set of all possible choices and decisions occurring
within the limits of a certain space during a certain period
of time. In order to make some headway towards the central
subject of this thesis, let us assume that j is the set
of all political, economic, social, etc., choices and de.
cisions to take place internationally, during a year.
This perfectly general and undefined international action
consists of a system of national actions where the agents
are nations, the limits of the set are political boundaries,
and the time of the action is a fraction of a year, say,
a month. Denote by A this partition in I, i.e., every
nation in N is a subset of I, and j is a system of pair-.
wise disjunct sets as national units of action.24 Every
I3n the description that follows we have attempted
to reinterpret, in terms of action, the description of
games of strategy as it appears in John von Neumann and
Oskar Morgenstern, op. cit., pp. 68-84.
245ee Garrett Birkhoff. Lattice Theorx, John Wiley and
Sons, New York, 1940, chap. VIII.
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nation, in its turn, may be conceived as a system of
economic, political, social, cultural, etc., actions in
which the agents are groups of individuals. Denote by g
that system of group actions one of which, ', involves a
particular group of three actors with the social action
of which we are now concerned. Suppose that this action
is initiated and concluded within a day, and that it may
be divided into four periods, k = 1, *.. 4, including an
initial period, two successive intermediary periods, and
a final period. The set Is and the system of sets N, G
and jp each one of which is a partition in the preceding
one conceivably represents a body of unspecified informa-
tion I which gradually becomes narrower and narrower, more
and more specific or concentrated around an otherwise un-
determined element of I. As an illustration visualize that
at j we are at the vertex of a cone of light, and that we
are blinded by its brightness, and quite unable to see
more than great masses of objects surrounding us. As we
go further and further away from that source of light we
become more and more capable to see even specks of dust
in suspension as well as every minute detail of the
illumined surface. In formal, logistic terms we may say
that each set is the actual information that came out as
a result of the preceding set,25 so that the tree denoted
250n the subject of sets and partitions, see John von
Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, op. cit., pp. 60-66, and
also Alfred Tarski, Introduction to Logic, Oxford University
Press, New York, 1946, p. 155ff.
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by configuration (32b) pictures a sequence of continually
increasing specification of patterns of information. Note,
for instance, how a social action thus represented re-i
sembles the methodological development of a scientific
theory: each stage in it, j,It ., g, , and the periods in
£, is like an announcement which states how much informs
tion will be provided later concerning an otherwise unknovn
element of I. Thus, if I is understood as a situation
where nations internationally act, and j, as a situation
where groups nationally act) and g, as a situation where
individuals act socially within groups) then, the partiou-
lar group whose action is represented above (32a, 32b) may
be conceived as a situation within which the three actors
act socially1 i.e., it may be further subdivided into
conditions and means. In order to simplify the exposition,
we have considered the conditions as a sort of natural,
hereditary-environmental actor controlling those means
which are uncontrolled by the normative actors involved
in the social action. This schema of social action (32a,
32b) may, of course, equally well be applied to any one
of the upper types of social action, between groups within
a nation, and between nations in the international society.
9. The notation employed in ($2a, 32b) is as follows:
a) 1, jj, j, and j are, as already explained above,
sets of telescoping partitions denoting actions
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at the international level, where the actors
are nations; at the national level, where they
are groups of individuals; at the group level)
where they are individual, as in the action
examined,26 and so forth9  In £ there are
three actors, KA= 1, .,, 3, and "nature," and
the action takes four periods from initiation
to conclusion, k = 1, ... 4.
b) This particular jroup action we are consider-
ing consists of these three normative actors
controlling together a set of means: M(KL k'
and acting in this pattern of act assignment
from the top to the bocttom of both diagrams:
m(.L}1, m(2 )k, m(lk which are also the actual
assignment from non-normative act to non-
normative act of the same actor within his own
chain of action, as follows: ml) m l 2
m(1}5.
c) Anni, Ann2, Ans, Ann4 denote the non-
normative actions the chronological sequence
of which brings the action from its unspecified
initiation, where there is only intentionality
27The series, of course, could be pursued further on
by considering the individual as a system of emotions,
drives, tendencies, preferences, interests, etc.
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of consolousness from the part of the actors
to its conclusion where there are only the
results of the concluded action.
d) The "fourth' actor, i.e., the natural condi-
tions of the social action, involving internal,
hereditary, as well as external, environmental
circumstances, is denoted by mcj, and may
occur at any non-normative stage of the action
except at its very inception where the actors
decide so to act (this is not shown in the dia*-*
gram, but is a necessary and sufficient condition
for the existence of I, j, , and £ as denoting
actions at all); m(kcl therefore, denotes
those manifestations which are irrational in
every action, and may be represented by the
statistical probabilities of certain "choices"
that will be selected by the physical and
physiobiological 'nature," or environmental
circumstances conditioning the action.
e) In the first, non-normative action, Ann1 , are
included only such irrational or chance "choices."
We are, then, within the non-normative act
wQc~j where the significant data are: the three
groups of alt ernatives r~fl 1 , rt21,1 , r(3)1 , for
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each one of the three actors, 2 7 i.e., they are
constant within each square grouping, but they
may vary fron one to another, as in reality
personal conditions vary from individual to
individual, but may be considered as constant
within each individual during a sufficiently
short period of time.
f) Within each one of these groups of alternatives,
r(l) 1 , r(2), and r(3), there is a number of
possible choices, one of which, ch( 1 (in 32b)
is chosen by actor K = lr5 hereditary-environ-.
mental "nature" to initiate his action, they
are those circumstances which involved him in
that particular action. This system of "nature"'s
choices is denoted by _hicj in (32a). Note,
once more, that the statistical probabilities
of the choice is only confirmed by the choice
itself: until then it is only a matter of
conjecture, of "mathematical expectation":
ex-ante--decisione we only know that the proba-
bility of a certain choice is that it will be
chosen when that probtbility is greater than
27These alternatives may conceivably be represented
by their probabilities of occurrence, which may depend
upon the information embodied in 191
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zero, or that it will not be chosen, when the
probability is equal to zero. The sum extended
over all ch(cQ of Ch(q) is equal to unity, i.e.,
it is by definition the unit choice that
characterizes the act.
g) The intermediary non-normative actions, Ann2,
and Anas, involve rational ohoices by the actors.
We are now within any one a(Kjk and the act
being rational, we must specify the state of
information of the actor A there, and the
specific choice he is going to pick up. The
pattern of K's information we have denoted,
following formulation (31) as t'( or the
area of choice circumscribed within
and the actual information of K at _(K(k as
t(Kjk -As A's information must be a
part of the total information available at
that stage, the particular alternative about
which K may have some knowledge may lie outside
of the area of actual information. In other
words, he may not know everything that
happened previously: preliminarity does not
then imply anteriority. The information may
be either erroneous or insufficient. Denoting
the zone of truthful information about
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previous choices by other actors as Tk we see
that t(K)k may either be greater, smaller or
coicident with Tk. In reality, at m (Klk,the
range of valid choices are narrowed to the
square set Tk, but the actor K may not know as
much, since as far as he is concerned the
action is merely within a set t(K)k of t'(K)k*
He makes choices within the range of Ch(Klk
but if the actual choice ch(Kk does not fall
within jk it will not be transferred or com-i
muted to the next action Annk+1-
h) Thus, the information embodied in Annk+1 ob
tains from that emoodied in Annk by adding to
it the value of its m(Klk, i.e., by super-
imposing every Tk in Annk with every ch(Kk
of Ch(K)k and throwing away the empty sets.
In flilk- AQnk+1 coincides with Ch(c k' This
transposition is shown in formulation (32b)
where we have restrained ourselves to connect
by straight lines, which are the paths of
action, acme of the innumerous possibilities
within which the action may have occurred.
i) Finally1 g(fl is one of the various possible
results of Krs action. This is, of course, a
function of the various choices ch(Kll,2,a,4
I23
lying on the particular path of action which
happened to have been followed by the actor
during the social action. We may denote this
sequence of choices as the action itself, a
partition in a, or simply as 4Cff.nor. the out-.
come of which is F()_ = F A(Knor
10. This term "normative" and everything that it should
by now imply to the reader of this thesis roints towards
a simplification of this rather complex schema of social
action. In fact, many of these paths of action cannot be
trod by the actor without incurring in social penalties or
sanctions, imposed upon him by a certain social or legal
order. A social action is like a river whtch springs from
irrational impulses at its fountainhead, and afterwards
follows rational gradients but always constrained by its
own rising banks, down to the sea. The possibility gradi-
ents are reduced by the sanctions of the rising ground in
such a way that the stream always fetches a Tallweg path
consisting of a succession of points, at different
geological sections of the ground, where altitude is
minimum and basin cavity is maximum as altitude of its
228
I8n other words, there is a "saddle point," a point
where the altitude is minimum of all latitude maxima, and
it is maximum of all longitude minima. See Yohn von
Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, on. cit., pp. 93-.95.
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represent all possibilities but only actualities of stream
courses, so our representation of social action may be
simplified to a representation of those lines of conduct
which are permissible within an established. social order.
Thus, in making non-normative choices along his own means-
end chain of non-normative acts in a normative act of a
normative action, the actor may proceed, consciously or
unconsciously, in accordance with some plan or rule of
procedure which may consist of some line of conduct oursued
by habit, by tradition, by education, by logico-experimental
or logico-transeendental reasoning, etc., however he might
have acquired it. In formal terms:
a) we call thet plan of the actor his specific
norm for action, i.e., the norm specifying
what choices he should make, in every vossible
contingency, for every possible actual informa-
tion he my possess at that moment, in
conformity with the rules of the established,
legitimate order under which he lives; and
b) the specific norm of an actor in a social action
is determined: (1) by the pattern of "nature"' s
choices, that is, ch(e% belonging to Ch(chl
which is, in m(clk, a subset of X.k; and (')
by E' s actual information, t(E4, within his
own pattern of information, i.e., t'CJik, in
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m(_Qk of M * If a norm is adopted, and the
trend of the conditions is verified, then, these
data determine the result of the action for each
actor.
11. This means that, from our formulations (32a, 32b\
we are brought back to its primitive, simplest description
(28,29). Translating all this in terms of scientific
methodology (II,B,l-3) we may say that each actor in a
social action acts as if he had a "theory" about what he is
doing. That this is always the case in a subjective action
as an intentionality of consciousness follows from the
concept of action as developed in this study. The outcome
of the act for each actor is the "verification" of his
"theory." In other words, for an actor engaged in a social
action his ultimate end is a function of the validity of
the norm he adopts for acting within a social order. The
complex formulations (3?a and 3?b) may now be represented
as follows:
a(K)
sn(K)
aro -+o( ) + h K + (a(z)nor;)
1'6
where each actor, Z = 1 ... n, including "nature," c,
instead of making chance, ch(c)., or voluntary, ch(K)k,
choices along the means-end secuence of non-normative
acts, mc)k and (lk linking the situation, g. to the
obtained end, F makes un his mind for all nossible
contingencies, i.e., acts with a norm or a "theory" about
what he is doing. Of course, the norm for nature is simply
an epistemologically verified scientific theory. What is
meant here by the norm for nature's behavior is nothing
else than the most probable trend of events within the
conditions of a situation. It is, then, rerfectly legiti-
mate to replace the intermediary non-normative "nature"'s
chance choices by the biological, ohysiological, meteoro-
logical, etc., theories about the probable trend of -the
situation of the social action in ouention. As for the
normative actors involved in the social action, their
adopted norms, in order to be both effective and adeouate,
must determine, at all possible non-normative acts m(K) 1,
what choice to select, i.e., what chtlk to pick up among
all possible choices, Ch(L , within Y's actual information,
t(l).k, as included in his pattern of information t'(lK)k
Two precise definitions are possible at this roint:
a) the specific norm, sn, for the actor K = 1
...j, is defined for every petiod of the
act ion, ja : 1 ... z, and for every actual
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information of K at that moment, t3jl of
t'(K)k; and the value of this specific norm at
the non-normative action Anna is chCIk;
b) the trend of the conditi , or the specific
norm of "nature" is similarly defined for every
period of the action,. .k 1 v ... , and for
every r(K)k of Ann which is a subset of m.Lsa:
and the value of this specific norm of "nature,"
i.e., of the trend of the conditions, or the
statistical probability of this trend (III,B,8,
f) is ch(c_)- of Ch(c)_.
12. Once specific norms are adopted and the trends of
the conditions are known the action is determined at the
same time that its results are verified for each actor:
in (32b) a certain path of action will be followed by each
actor in such a way that, at the end of the action, the
diagram, instead of showing all nossible paths that might
have been taken, shows only the paths of the individual
acts that actually took place. This is shown in the left
side of diagram (33). Consider there actor I. After
having decided to act in order to attain a certain goal,-
[ is given by the circumstances within which he lives a
set of possible norms jlj, j, = I ... uj, which are assigned
to him as S!tKEj(K) - Now consider also all possible
trends that may be contained in the conditions of that
/
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particular situation g. The conditions may develop along
many possibilities j(o), denoted by their probabilities
J = p *.. p(j). A definite choice, sn(K), amid all possi-
ble norms 8n(K), for every actor, and the probable trend
of the conditions determine the outcome of his normative
act when the action is a non-social action, so that
a(K)nor.= F(K) sn(K), sn(c) , (34)
and the problem is one of simple maximization. In a social
action, however, the problem becomes much more complicated,
since the result of the action for each actor does not
only depend upon the adequacy of his chosen norm but also
upon the adequacy of the norms chosen by others, and the
degree his expectation of those choices is verified, Of
course, in a social action each actor chooses his norm for
action without precise information concerning the choice
of others, although he may have valid conjectures about
what those choices are going to be. Anyhow, his informa-
tion must be within his t(Klk. As for the trends of the
conditions, his judgment may be valuably guided by
mathematical expectations regarding natural events. In
summary, in a social action
F(K) (a(K)nor)= A(K)nor( sn(l) ... sn(n) (35)
which is the symbolical representation of a legitimate
action order for K: K'se result from the social action
&nor. depends not only on the adequacy and effectiveness
of his own adopted specific norm but also on the specific
norms for action adopted by others; and if K accepts that
state of affairs the order of norms under which he acts is
legitimate order, i.e., if they can discredit that order
as legitimate, then their own order may conflict with the
established order, and if they can, by acting together,
enforce their own order, then, the legitimate order for the
coalition is said to dominate the legitimate order of the
action.
13. In formulption (30) we have tried to represent an
isolated, normative, non-social act. We have seen that
this type of act involves a maximization problem with no
inherent difficulty of solution: everything must be sub-
ordinated to the normative end, the full attainment of which
determines the "value" of the act either for the individual
as well as for the collective actor. This formulation has
been developed in detail in diagram (31) and combined in
a schema of social action (32a and 32b) in order to show
the role of subjective interdenendence within such action.
It is evident that this social action cannot admit a simple
maximization solution, but a solution which depends, for
each one participant, in overlaoping variables within the
action schema. In order to simolify this complex picture
we h-ave shifted our focus of interest from the intricate
sequences of choices as partially represented in
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conformation (32b) to the specific norms guiding those
choices. We have, thus, described social action no longer
in an extensive form as an interconnection of isolated
choices, but, by going closer to reality, in terms of
social constraints placed upon the selection of socially
sanctioned norms by social habits, modes, traditions,
experimental and symbolical rules of reasoning, etc. So
we were able to reduce our problem from its immense combi-
natorial complexity to a simnle renresentation (37) of an
organization of norms within a social order. But at least
one major problem remains to be clarified in the realm of
social action: how is it rossible that an actor will ever
accept constraints to his own act? how is it possible for
a social order to be legitimate at allo Our next objective
is to determine under which conditions there will be
stability of order, organization and norm. In order to do
this, we must re-examine our concents of legitimate order,
competent organization, and adequate norm in the light of
the schema of social action.
14. We call social order the narticular, established,
arrangement of ultimate ends in a social action. We call
social organization the particular arrangement of specific
norms approved by the order. We call snPecific social
nrg~ those rules of nrocedure adonted by the actor when
performing a social action. We have already seen (III,A,l )
1
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that an order, an organization, and a norm may be stable
or unstable. If an order is a set of ultimate ends, 'an
organization is a set of norms, and a norm a set of non-
normative choices, then the three systems are stable when-
ever the following two conditions are met (III,A,11):
(a) no element of the set is to be preferred by a group
of actos to any other element of the set; (b) at least
one element within the set is to be nreferred to any other
alternative outside the set. From these postulates the
following corollaries may be deduced: (a) an element
outside the set may be preferred to an element of the set;
(b) there can be more than one order, organization or
specific norm for action; (c) an element is said to be
preferred to another when some of the actors involved in
the social action have in collusion greater gains from
acting together, and can implement that preference. The
last corollary endangers the whole construction. How is
it possible to avoid perpetual social conflict? Within
the concept of stable order, organization and norm, we must
introduce the notion of legitimacy, competence and ade-
quacy (III,A,ll).
15. The legitimacy of an order, the competence of an
organization, and the adequacy of a svecific norm are a
matter of gradation, .which goes through five levels of
13 2P
intentionality of social conscinusness, 2 9 from geographical
adherance to utopian solidarity. This oroblem as of how
legitimacy is ever to be assigned to an order by someone
living under it is a rather philosonhical and comolicated
one. In fact, how is it possible, within the utilitarian
premises, to explain how it comes that a person freely re-
strains his freedom of volition in order to act socially.
This basic difficulty of exrlanation has customarily been
referred to in sociology as the "utilitarian dilemma."
We have already mentioned it (TT,f,7), and now we return
to it as the contradiction lying at the kernel of all
utilitarian and positivistic exlanations of the foundation
of legitimacy. The "utilitarian dilemma"7 0 may be stated
as follows: either individuals establish the ultimate
ends for their actions upon individual nreferences and
tastes, and, in this case, it remains to be explained how
a perpetual social conflict of clashing interests can be
avoided by something else than the crude coercion of the
weaker by the stronger; or individuals do not set after
all the ultimate ends for their actions, but have those
ends imposed upon them-from outside, by an external body
2 9Emile Durkheim, De la Divisinn du TravailSocial,
F. Alcan, Paris, 1393, Book IT, Chap. II.
30Ibid., Book I, Chan. VII. Also Emnile Dlurkheim,
Reglsel hodeSo~ciologioue, F. Alcan, Paris, 1919,
p.i 6ff., Pref. 2nd Bdition, o. XTVff. Ibid., o. 20ff.
of intractable conditions in relation to which the only
rational attitude is that of scientific observation, de-
duction of their laws of behavior, followed by adaptation
of the individual conduct to their external, sovereign
reality. This means, in our own terms, that either the
individual reduces by force, cleverness, fraud, and
persuasion, everyone else's decision concerning ultimate
ends to the role of passive means to his own ultimate
ends; or, then, the individual is dominated by someone
else, and the only rational way to live in subordination
is to adapt one's own ultimate ends to the master's will,
and to repress one's own rreferences and tastes that do
not conform to the master's pattern of legitimate order.
Either normativeness of action is maintained and then
social order becomes a perpetual latent or overt conflict
of interests and struggle for rower where the equilibrium
of contract can never be achieved; or contract is recog-
nized as an immediate data of empirical reality, but then
the introspected certitude of freedom of volition as well
as the immediate evidence of normativeness in acting must
be relaxed as a support for social order. The dilemma
has been solved in many ways: Ca) it has been suggested
that such a thing as a meeting of free minds does not in
fact exist: there is never an absolute equality of power
in both sides so that always one party "finds the other
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out" and gets an advantage by so doing; (b) it has been
suggested that although the meeting minds are free but not
equal in power all parties concerned accent the rules of
procedure of a greater order than theirs, but then the
question emerges as of whether this is a steble solution,
since non-conformists may achieve a greater gain by not
observing the rules of the order. It is to the discussion
of the foundation for such a belief that we must now turn
our attention. We have already suggested (III,B,4) that
the "utilitarian dilemma" may be solved by differentiating
independence of action from interderendence of action, and
how the two necessary and sufficient reouirements for
stability may subsist together without need either of
maintaining normativeness at the cost of the order, or
vice-versa. This may now be restated in terms of social
action as follows: (a) the individuals engaged in social
action instead of making choices about means as the occa-
sions for such choices occur during the course of the
action, establish from the bpginning a rule of nrocedure
with which to meet all nossible situations that may arise
along the non-normative sequence of means andi ends linking
the initial situation to the desired ultimate end (TII,B,
11); (b) once the ultimate end is decided unon by the
individual the best norm that he could adont is that in
which all choices regarding norms by other actors are
dpm
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predicted with a maximum of certitude, that is, the best
norm is that which will successfully consider every other
norm as a most reliable constant: once the law of behavior
of others is discovered, then it will be both easy and
advantageous to treat others as conditions within which the
individual's own ultimate end could then be maximized in
non-social fashion; (c) this, however, may result in losses
for the other actors who, then, will strive to krow the
secret of the success of the actor concerned, who, in his
turn, will try to maintain it secret by confusing his
pattern of behavior: if, however, in spite of his efforts,
his formula for success is found out by others imitation
will follow resulting in routinization, loss of distinction,
etc., a phase which is subverted by someone else's ini-
tiating another action upon another norm;31 in order to
prevent these disastrous effects the successful actor may
ask the assistance of the order itself in granting him for
the duration of the action a monopoly right over his
specific norm; (d) stability, then, is achieved (1) by
everybody minding "his own business," i.e., acting upon
the basis of their exclusive individual preferences, and,
by acting irrationally, to find equilibrium at a
31Example: the "Scharenweise" or "clustering" effects
of entrepreneurial skill as in .Toseph Schumpeter, Theor
of Economic Development, Harvard University Press, 4aige,
Mass., p. 214ff.
I
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statistically deternined "spddle point": the strict re-
quirement then is for everybody not to know himself what
his own decision is going to be: this solution for social
equilibrium is most emohatically rejected by the concept
of nornativeness of action adorted in this dissertation;
(2) or stability of social order is achieved because actors
are not ecually endowed with the snme nower to develon P.de-
quate specific norms for their actions, either because they
are different in intelligence or discernment, or because
they are protected from imitation by the established, legi-
timate order: we adopt this noint of view in trying to
solve the "utilitarian dilemma."
16. The acceptance that makes a social order a legiti-
mate order for those living under its ruling springs from
many sources. In the first rlace, there is at the very
foundation of legitimacy, or acceptance of an order, a
spatial, geographical motive. This simply states the often
forgotten tautology that someone must exist somewhere in
order to consider a social order legitimete at all. In
other words, there is no a priori given legitimate social
order. Before it is at all nossible to affirm whether a
certain social order is or has been legitimate or not some-
one must exist or have existed who feel or has felt towards
that norm a sense of moral obligation.' A social order is
EmYile Durkheim, La__Division dui Trn~vailSocial, loc._
cit.
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a value system that cannot prescind from an evaluative
subject in order to acquire legitimacy. As such, it is
always relational, and can only be formulated meaningfully
with reference to the position of the actor who finds it
legitimate. There is no social legitimacy in an order
which is independent of a historically and socially set
of meanirigs, and, as such, it must operate not in an a
priori categorial social setup, but in a definite social
milieu. Moreover, legitimacy also needs temporal coordi-
nates. This tmporal source of legitimacy simply trans-
lates in terms of historical time what has been said above
with regard to legitimacy in a social space. That
legitimacy must be historically determined is another often
forgotten common place. What has been often forgotten or
abstracted, or perhaps more frequently ignored in this
score is that the assignment of legitimacy to an order at
a so diffuse range of individual deliberatedness may very
well simply be the result of social environmental stimuli
acting in a statistically randomized way or being be-
havioristically controlled by the masters of the social
o rder it self . When re due ed to thi s spac ic-tempo ral
category of acceptance or recentivity by repetit ion, daily
routine, etc., the mind of the legitimating actor may
become so dormant, so uncritical, so responsive to condi-
tioning, that his assignment of legitimacy to a social
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order may represent nothing more than a reflex of the
order's propaganda, advertisement, ritual, etc. Both the
spatial as well as the temporal sources of legitimacy shade
into an institutional motivation according to which legiti-
macy is assigned to the social order by the actor through
the mechanism of habit. This range of social order is
characterized by conditions of psychic environment backed
by sanctions, an acceptance in the part of the actor of
certain social standards of behavior as immune from
rational criticism. At this state, the actors accepts the
order as legitimate because he intuitively thinks that
it is so without attempting to place that belief upon
firmer grounds. The element of this acceptance is usage,
and it works in spite of the actor's conscious intentions.
The most peculiar example of such an institutional
assignment of legitimacy to an order is the acceptance of
34
marriage as a legitimate institution. Thus the norms
for social action have been chosen as a matter of
usage whenever it has involved uniformities of
33Max Weber, Theory of Social and Economic Organization,
William Hodge and Co., London, 1947, p. 105.
3 4 Ferdinand Tonnies, Gemeinshaft und Gesellsohaft,
H. Reisland, Leipzig, 1887, pasim, for his definition of
"Gemeinshaft" and "Gesellschaft" and their relation to
marital relationships.
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actual practice3 5 in the orientation of the social action
towards certain approved ends. As such, it may be subordi-
nated to group norms of "good" or "bad" taste, which norms
are enforced through diffuse sanctions of disapproval, but
which are not legally binding. It is, for instance,
considered bad taste for a certain type of New Yorker to
adopt a norm of living in the West side of their city, but
no legal sanction is attached to its contravention. 3  Usage
in the choice of a nom applies not only to matters of
food, dress, daily personal habits, but also to sexual
behavior, to art, recreation, etc.37  Seen from a very
broad point of view, the choice of norms by usage implies
a solidarity of interests, a sharing of the same conditions3 8
and so it may be fully internreted as a traditional mott.
vation for acceptance of an order as legitimate. The
characteristic of this traditional constraint is its lack
of specific purposes in the adherents to its observance as
35As in Weber's "Brauch" Op.cit., p. 110.
3 6Another curious example of usage, as norm dictated
by custom, is seen in the habit of carving bird snares among
the ancient Mao ri of New Zealand, which carving has no rele-
vance to the efficiency of the snare in catching birds
(Talcott Parsons, op. cit., p. 679).
37For instance, in the establishment of a literary school
upon a certain technique of writing.
38As in Tonnies' "Schicksal" or community of f~ii, gp..
II
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a norm. Marriage, again, is a trnditional norm in that
sense. Generally it is very difficult to answer the
question as to why one marries in the usual teleological
or technological sense with which one describes one's enter-
ing into a store to buy a package of cigarettes. Traditional
obligations are unspecified and unlimited, although not
lacking in control but only relative to attitudes and not
to specific acts. Gossip, for instance, is such a control
of traditional usage. Religion Is another exemle of tradi-
tional usage in the choice of norms, so long a~s it is
ritual or a mode of expression of attitudes.
17. When, thus, broadly interoreted usage covers
traditional norms for action or modes of expression from
the almost automatic domain of habit, through tastes, and
art techniques, to the verge where tradition becomes
convention involving coercion by a soecially authorized
agency of enforcement. At this point, the choice of the
appropriate norm for action leaves the purely social realm
and enters the region of political action. The attitude
of the agent towards convention and law is no longer
similar to his attitude towards usage and tradition. Now
his uniformity of action, or his choice of a norm for
action, is determined most conspicuously by his rational
inspection of the situation in his own self-interest. We
call that the ideological motivation for acceotance of an
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order as legitimate. This is characterized by the actor
recognizing a plurality of valid, or legal, ends for action,
as well as a scale of positive imoortance between them.
He recognizes, moreover, his dependence in the attainment
of those ends upon the actions of the other actors in-
volved in the same social action. The actor, w'hen so
choosing his norm for action, will be intensely interested
in the outcome of his action, in the sense that he will
assign legitimacy to that order which will not contradict
or upset his arpropriate, snecific norm for action. 5 9
Positive or "pure" economics, as well as nositive social
theory confine their attention exclusively to that segment
of legitimacy of a social order. Naturally, the transi-
tion from the traditional motivation where the norms of
usage are not binding to the ideological motivation where
norms have legal validity is gradual. There is, for in-
stance, in marriage the traditional as well as the
ideological motivation: a blanket obligation to help in
whatever contingency that may arise, and a legal sanction
in case of desertion or non-support. The nons for action
chosen under an ideological motivation are characterized
by their rationality, by the actor's obedience to self-
interest and his expectations as for the behavior of others.
3axWeber, or. cit., n. 105, where he calls the
ideological motivation for legitimacy assignment by the
actor as "Zweckrational" imnlied by a "Verantvortungsethik."
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It oresupooses a Certain social, institutional, and legal
background as ohysical conditinns for action, as well as
a plurality of ways to combine the pvailpble means towrards
lerful ends. Ideological norms are eminently "practical"
in the sense that, from the subjective standroirt of the
agent they are the most efficient and adecuate standards
of conduct to his ultimate ends. We have already seen
(III,B,15) how this may involve participants endowed with
equal power, 4 0 or an interaction of authority of one
participant over the other. In any case, it involves a
relationship of compromise in a orecisely defined area of
interests within a framework of rules dictated by the
legitimate order. A typical example of such a meeting of
minds is the closure of a valid, legally enforceable
contract. The ideological motivntinn takes for granted
the existence of an order to which legitimacy is assigned
because the existence of the order is convenient for the
interests of the acting individual. Rut the actor may
assign legitimacy to a social order, not because it is a
traditional, institutional, or convenient order, but be-
cause he thinks that it is ethically valid in absolute
terms. The norm for action is then chosen because it leads
to salvation, or social reform, etc. We call that the
40As in classic economic theory where the yardstick
for legitimacy is the maximization of utility for the
consumer, and of profits, for the producer.
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utopian motivation for the assignment of legitimacy to an
order. Success, then, is not even essential: the ultimate
ends in the utopian action are such that the actor should
only try to fulfill them, and end in martyrdom if necessary,
the norm to select means being only a secondary ingredient
of the action which justifies itself. Even the fruits of
such action are to be looked upon with "holy indifference." 41
They are inexpressive, though, perhaps crucially important
towards the highest good embodied in the ultimate end. 42
18. In summary, there are five different types of
motivations for an actor to accept a social order as legiti-
mate:
a) the ontological motivation: in order to assign
legitimacy to an order the actor must be in
existence. The actor must exist in the first
place, in order, then, to assign legitimacy to
a social order in which he thinks that he will
be able to realize his Dossibilities as a
human being. As there is no such &-thing as
a fixed, absolute, categorial pattern for human
realization, then, legitimate orders are as
41sin Saint Frangois de Sales' "sacr4 indifference
pour les fruits de l'action," Trait6 de l'amour de Dien,
Guillaume Bud4, Paris, 193?, Vol. IV, Book I, Sec. 1.
42Max Weber, op. cit., lbc_._cit.., "W1ertrational" as
implied by "Gesinnungsethik."
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numerous as there are human beings in existence.
This is another way of affirming the inherent
normativeness of human action besed unon in-
tentionality of consciousness. It must be
stressed that the legitimacy of a social order
is a quality imputed to the order by those
acting in relation to it. Next there is
b) the historical motivation: within the infinite
number of possibilities of human realization
the existent actor is restricted by the histori-
cal circumstances in which he lives to a much
narrower set of nossibilities in which his
human beingness would not be degraded or
wasted. There are historical epochs in which
the individual faces only ready made destinies.
When traditional, ecclesiastical or aristocratic,
dogmatism prevails, man is completely determined
in some blueprint. In times of social mobility
when many divergent conceptions of man coexist
within the same emnirical reality, such as
during the Athenian democracy or the Re-
naissance, the actor faces the ordeal of
choosing how he wishes himself to be. These
historical nossibilities the existence of which
would be known to someone endowed with nerfect
145
information about the actual situation is
further narrowed to the set of possibilities
for a choice of a norm of conduct which reach
the actual knowledge of the actor. Thus,
c) the traditional motivation further restricts
the choice of a norm to those which are ap-
proved by the group within which the action
is going to take place. To someone born in the
slums of Manchester a hundred years ago, or
in the slums of Rome nineteen centuries ago,
the possibilities of a choice of a norm of con-
duct was very narrow, indeed. Moreover, the
quantity of information that may reach the
actor about the possibilities of realization,
or norms of conduct that are opened to him may
be manipulated, or falsified, or restricted by
the order itself in such a way that it acquires
legitimacy from those living under it in a
manner that does not exrose the true situation
of the actor. Thus, for instance, for the
Roman galley slave or for the Manchester worker
there was no information available about a
better destiny than that to which they were
subjected. There is no perceptible dividing
line between the traditional and the institutional
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motivation. On the other hand, legal sanction
demarcates the field of the traditional or
institutional from that of
d) the ideological motivation where the actor, when
choosing a norm for action is in the privileged
position of having the chance to choose between
a number of alternatives that which is better
for his self-interest. The criteria for the
choice of the norm are rationalistic and posi-
tivistic. In this stsge of legitimacy the actor
is exhaustively exrlainable by the simole scheme
of mechanics. Final success in reaching the
end justifies the means taken towards that
realization. Legitimacy is then assigned by
the actor to that order which favors the un-
restrained satisfaction of his desires, including
that urge for rower and domination, economic or
political. This is the region of Darwinian
sociology, of "cut-throat" free enterorise,
etc. The ideological motivation, however, is
not final. Being extremely intentional that
motivation for the acceptance of an order always
asks for some form of payment, in wealth, in
rolitical power, in security of office, etc.
The ultimate motivation for legitimacy is
147
e) the utoianmo tivation. As the verification was
seen as the dynamic element in the theoretical
evolutinn of cognitive action (I1,B,7), and the
norm was seen as the dynamic element of the
unit act (II,C,10) so, now, the concert of legi-
timate order is seen as the dynamic element of
social change. The utooian message, when it
overthrows the established ideology, undergoes
itself a fundamental change. When an utopia is
risen into office, it has to become institu-
tionalized. This process of change of the
legitimate order, from a revolutionary order to
a legally valid order, may develop into one of
two directions: it becomes institutionalized
when a system of rules carries legitimacy from
one phase to the other in the evolution of the
order, such as in hereditary succession or
constitutional substitution of the leader; and
it becomes rationalized when it ossifies and
routinizes into a system of rules of office.
The essential point to emphasize here is that
the legitimacy of an order springs from re-
spect towards an ectablished order, and that
this legitimate order, once established gains
legality by apostolic succession, revealed law,
I divine right or general will and consent.
148
19. Having shown the scheme of social action, its order,
and organization, its inherent stabi'ity based upon morel
codes, and having shown, in detail, the foundations of legi-
timacy which lies at the core of social stability, we now
turn to the consideration of two characteristic Problems
arising within the framework of social action: the exami-
nation of political action, and economic action. Politice1
action gravitetes around the cupotion of hor and to whom
the means shoiuld be distributed in a social Ption. The
economic action deals with the nroduction, the consumntion
and the exchange of the rosults of social pctirm. There
two problems a~re treliminary to the detailed study of
international economic action.
C. The social action function
1. Axiomatic summary of argument. Tt is nerhans
convenient to head this section with a summary of our
argument as it has been develored to this stage. In order
for this summry to be as brief as noc-sible we shall
present it in axiomatic form,
a) A normative act is a set of non-normative acts.
An action is a set of normative acts. A system
of action is ae set of non-normative actions
subpartitioned into non-normative acts as sub-
sets of the component actions leading to
normative ultimate ends.
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(1) The order of an act is the normative
deliberateness by which the ultimate
end is decided by the actor. The organ.
ization of an act is the particular
ordering of non-normative acts linking
the initial situation to the desired
end. The norm of an act is the imple-
mentation of its organization in
technological form.
(2) The order of an action is the ordering
of its ultimate ends. The organization
of an action is the ordering of the
specific norms of its normative acts.
The specific norm of a normative act
is the predetermined plan for all non..
normative choices occuring during the
normative act.
(3) The order of a system of action is the
ordering of the subsets of the ultimate
ends belonging to each of its component
actions. The organization of a system
of action is the ordering of the subsets
of the specif ic norm pertaining to each
of its component actions. The general
norm of a system of action is the
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ordering of the subsets of the specific
norms belonging to each of its compo..
nent actions.
b) An order, an organization, and a norm will be
stable when they fulfill the following two
necessary and sufficient requirements: no ele-
ment of the set dominates any other element of
the set; any point outside the set must be
dominated by at least one element within the
set.
c) The norm of an act, the specific norms of an
action, and the general norm of a system of
action may be either
(1) non-social, when the actor, o r the agent
does not recognize the subjective inter-
dependence of his act or action and the
act or action of others; or
(2) social, when the actor or agent does so
recognize subjective interdependence
of action.
2. We shall now characterize the principal types of
social norms. We have seen (III,A,10-12) that
d) the social order of an action is the ordering
of its accepted ends for action; that the
social organization of an action is the ordering
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of the specific social norms of its normative
acts; and that the specific social norm of a
normative social act is the plan for the non-
normative choices of means occurring during
the act.
3. Specific social norms, as a subset of specific
norms, may be sub-partitioned into two classes of specific
social norms: oolitical, and economic. The political
order of a social action is called legislative order, and
as such it is essentially normative. The political organ-
ization of a social action is called executive organization,
and as such it is essentially administrative. The specific
political norms of a social action is called ju4LsaLl norm,
and as such it is essentially technical, and Juridical.
The economic order of a social action is distributive of
purchasing power, and as such it is subordinated to the
political order which is distributive of coercive power.
The economic organization of a social action deals with the
production and consumption of purchasable or exchangeable
means for action. The specific economic norm of a social
action is the exchange of those means for action. Politi-
cal norms are based on values as ultimate ends. Nconomic
norms are based on tastes as intermediary ends to a further,
ultimate end.
f
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4.Thepoical athe economic normj of soc
action. We have also seen that the result of every norma-
tive action depends upon the solution of three successively
interdependent problems (III,A,9). The non-social, isolated,
normative, individual or collective actor faces, firstly,
the problem of arranging his ultimate ends in an order of
priority of attention in accordance to preference. This is
the 'psychological" problem of determining one's own map
of interests, wants, values, etc., the nroblem of "making
up one's mind." Once this "psychological" problem is un-
ambiguously solved, and hesitation is overcome by decision,
the "economic " problem of allocating scarce means between
various potential uses as alternative ends claiming
satisfaction is also partly solved, since these means
should then be allocated according to the adopted ordering
of ends: then costs, as "sacrifice," are particularly
considered by the isolated, non-social actor or agent.
Moreover, the third problem, the "technological" problem,
is also partly solved, since it becomes an inherently simple
efficiency problem of maximization of ultimate end attain-
ment with a minimum of cost or "sacrifice." We have also
seen (III,B,3) how these three problems increase in
complexity, and importance, in a social action schema.
The social, normative, individual actor or agent faces,
firstly, the "political" problem of placing his claims over
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disposable, scarce means towards his own non-socially de-
cided ends. Once the social actor has set his "psychological'
problem, or has "made up hi s mind'" on the proper ends to
pursue, he may think either that if he tries to realize his
own ends under the conditions given the satisfactory re-
sult will follow automatically, i.e., he may abstract the
possibility of the encroaching influence of others: or he
may take account of those actions. In the first alternative
others may or may not do the same in relation to his actions.
If they do the action will be a non-social action. If they
do not, as it will be the case specially when, in the
pursuance of his own ends the actor will encroach upon the
action of others, then, his behavior will provoke re-
sistances, and he will be obliged to recognize the
interdependence of his action upon the actions of others,
and then his action becomes social. In this case he will
naturally consider employing the coercive means at his
disposal to push his own claims to command over resources
and services at the expense of identical claims of others.
Once the possibility of employing coercion is introduced
into the social action schema, a number of power rela.
tionships appear therein, such as force, fraud, exercise
of authority, advantage of a better situation, greater
shrewdness and foresight in securing voluntary agreements
to exchange goods and services, etc. Then his action not
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only becomes social, through subjective recognition of
dependence, but it also becomes 'political." We may define
political action as a social action in which coercive
means is used by at least one participant in the social
action. We shall call political order that social order
in which coercive power is distributed by legislative
action, organized by executive action, and normalized by
judiciary action. We shall denominate political norm the
social norm of legal coercion.
5. We have already examined (III,B,16-19) the nature
of the constraining social forces which control the
exercise of coercive power by any one actor acting so-
cially under a social order. Those constraining forces
of usage, tradition, ideology, "charismatie" authority,
etc., which translate a social order of ends or values,
into a social organization as a set of possible, or ap-
proved, norms of conduct for the individual actor, will
restrict his choice of specific norms in a way that the
actor either takes these constraints as a morally neutral
background for his action, i.e., as conditions to which he
must adapt his action technically, or his attitude may be
a moral one of acceptance of the order, and hence an
obligation to live up to its standards, or of rejection,
and hence a co rresponding obligation to combat it. Anyhow,
once it is decided by coercive means a certain allocation
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of resources as well as the conditions under which that
allocation is to take place, the next problem that the
actor or agent must solve is that of the distribution of
the scarce means that were in one way or another allocated
to him between his own alternative ends. In a social action
this allocation of means by the actor between his alterna-
tive ends is pursued with close consideration of cost
sacrifice or "price." This "economic" problem to be faced
by the social actor is simply that of choosing, among all
possible ways of acting, the most efficient and adequate
specific norm for selecting those disposable means towards
ends as means to further ends in the non-normative chain
of acts linking the situation to the desired end. Thus,
after the economic order of the distribution of means is
politically settled and economically recognized, production
and consumption of utilities will be taken care of by
economic action without inclusion of force, or other forms
of coercion, since the economic action takes place under
a social order and organization which are taken as given
at the economic range of the social action, In summary:
a framework of social constraints being accepted as the
established or legitimate rules of behavior, the political
system of power relationships is translated into a legal
mechanism whereby a relatively stable settlement of those
relationships is attained, making possible the functioning
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of an economic system. Then, and only then, the social
actor faces the "technological" problem of the implementa-
tion or execution of the adopted norm which has been
sanctioned as viable by the social organization of specific
norms under which it will become effective. Once an economic
system is thus made possible then there will be opportunity
for the development of the division of labor, i.e., after
the coercive means have been limited, and a legal machinery
has been set up to enforce these limitations, then, and
only then, stable and regular processes of exchange are
possible. It must never be forgotten that the solutions of
the "political,' the 'economic," and the "technological'
problem establish a hierarchy of norms of conduct whereby
the social norm motivates the political norm without which
it is not possible to develop an economic norm. The
"technological' problem is a problem and not a specific
norm: it may appear as jurisprudence at the political
range of action, and as exchange at the economic range of
action. Without subjective recognition of interdependence
no political action is conceptually possible, and the
alteration of the political process of distribution have
immensely important consequences for concrete processes
and techniques of exchange such as money, banking, credit,
etc., through the alteration of the legal norms presiding
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the social action in its economic form.43
6. These three problems which are faced with an in-
creasing degree of complexity, by the actor in isolation,
and then by the social actor within a group, are faced also
by the agent as a group of actors, as a unit of action
within a society. By society we mean a comunity of indi-
vidual or collective agents which, in living and working
together, recognize their mutual interdependence of action
towards the attainment of their ends. This social action
will be political when coercive means are used in action.
The 'political' problem becomes particularly acute when
the social action of groups is considered. Again, the
group of actors may try to realize its own ends under
conditions given, or may use the coercive means available
to it. The first type of action would have presupposed
that the ultimate ends of the individuals composing the
group, as well as the ultimate ends of the group itself
in relation to other groups are set upon the exclusive
basis of random, irrational, individualistic preferences
and tastes: in this case there is, as an absolute condi-
tion for the order of action, the necessity to introduce
into the analysis an external controlling ageney, Reason,
431t is impossible specifically to acknowledge our
debt to the work of Hans Kelsen in this score. See Hans
Kelsen, Gerl~lr~~tn tt, Harvard University
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God, or the State, as "deus ex machina," standing in
sovereign isolation outside the social action in question,
and to which the social actor must adapt his action. The
second type of behavior, that in which the actor or agent
uses the coercive means at his disposal to attain his ulti-
mate ends, would have presupposed that this norm for
action is sanctioned by the order under which the action
takes place, and, therefore, that the actor or agent is
integrated within a common system which controls his use
of coercive means and is recognized by the actor as au-
thorized, competent, or legitimate, to exert that restrictive
function. This postulate of the social actor's or agent's
obedience to a certain social order that he deems as
legitimate is based upon the philosophical premise of
intentionality of consciousness which lies at the theoreti-
cal core of this thesis. One corollary of this premise is
that, if action itself is normative, the ultimate ends for
action are not decided by the actor or agent in an abso-
lutely arbitrary or chance way. This means that the
individual system of ultimate ends in a group action, as
well as the collective system of ultimate ends in the
action of a group within a society is necessarily a part
of the organic totality of the action. Social action is,
therefore, understood as "immanent,"44 that is, founded
44As frequently used by Prof. P. A. Sorokin.
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upon the character of the society in which it takes place,
or, in other words, every group action must conform, as
protagonist or antagonist, to that set of norms of conduct
that binds the group together, and which, in its turn,
must regard the social order of the broader group of which
it is a part either as morally neutral, or to be accepted
as legitimate, or to be opposed as illegitimate. As in
the case of the social actor, once this 'politic&l problem
is solved either as a social relationship of conflict,4 5
or solidarity, 4 6 once more the "economic' problem will
follow in the wake of the political action. If the politi-
cal problem is solved as conflict, i.e., when the acting
agent orients his action intentionally to carrying out his
will against the resistance of other groups, 4 7 then the
economic problem of production and consumption will be
circumscribed to the group itself, and, in accordance with
the degree of social cohesion of the group, it will either
break up into intestinal conflict, or, again, it will
develop into contract to carry out the norm of the group.
In this case, the narrower group will become either iso-
lated within the broader group and its action will resolve
itself into non-socialness and collectitistic autarky, or
45Max Weber's "Kampf.'
4 6And "Vergemeinschaftung* or "Vergesellechaftung."
47Max Weber, op. cit'., pp. 121-124.
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it will be a focus of revolution and subversion within the
broader group upon whose order it will try to impose its
own legitimate order. In accordance with the economic
system that will be established by the solution given by
the group to its economic problem, the "technological'
problem of the application of the adopted economic norm
will be solved either as technological isolation, and self-
sufficiency, technological aggression or imperialism, or,
finally, as technological cooperation and division of labor
within the larger group in which the action takes place.
We shall now examine in detail these two types of social
action, the political, and the economic.
7. Structural elements of political action. A social
action becomes a politieglly oriented action when (a)
though primarily pursuing ends which are not that of
coercive power, takes account and uses coercive means as
a chosen norm; (b) or when, although primarily directed
to the attainment of coercive power makes use of physical
force as a means to attain that objective. We wish to
eliminate the use of force as a political means: the use
of physical force shall be limited within the scope of this
thesis to military action. As such, in a narrower ac.
ceptation, we shall define a political action, then, as a
specific type of social action in which the individual or
collective agent makes peaceful use of coercive power over
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the actions of others as a means to attain or maintain the
use of that coercive power as an ultimate end for the
action.48 Political action, then, may appear in the action
schema of ary group of actors or agents. We have already
shown (III,A,4) how "political" action manifests itself as
"psychological" action even within the individual actor,
as for instance when a person controls the impulses of his
collective "ego" by means of the coercive power of the
sovereign authority of his "super-ego," which, in sanity,
is considered as a legitimate order of action. When there
is a group, of course, the psychological problem is taken
as solved when it manifests itself as political action of
certain participants over others. This political action
may beextended to social or juridical persons such as
families, corporations, and national states. Within all
these groups political action plays a more or less important
role. It would be an interesting matter, and a distinct
contribution to economic and social thought to examine the
"internal politics" of labor unions, of business manage-
ment, of religious congregations, as well as of congresses
and parliaments, etc. But we must focus our attention in
this thesis to the political action as it appears in the
schema of international economic action. And so we must
4axWeber, op. cit., sec. 32-38. Talcott Parsons,
op. cit., footnote 1, p. 240. Karl Mannheim, op. cit.,
chap. III.
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restrict ourselves to a brief approach to a treatment of
political action within a national government.
8. We have defined society (III,C,6) as a group of
persons who recognize the mutual interdependence of their
actions when pursuing their individual ends. Theoretically,
if this recognition of interdependence is extended to the
totality of human beings, there is no reason why mankind
should not be considered as one society in which, as John
Donne has so beautifully expressed, "whenever bells toll
they toll for thee." In practice, however, we find that
human beings, when acting in ordinary life, consciously
conceive their mutual interaction as much narrower. In
fact, human beings can only easily recognize interde-
pendence when there is a mutually valid structure of social
action. It rarely occurs that these different structures
may be interrelated between themselves, and, therefore,
people living under each one of them are mutually inter-
dependent. When, of course, interaction is recognized
at the ontological level we may have a legitimate world
order, such as that of an universal church, but usually,
the social framework for action specifies a certain bio-
logical, traditional, institutional, and national setup
thereby circumscribing narrower and narrower sets of
rational, psychological, linguistic, political, usual, etc.,
uniformities of elements. Within these sets of social
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relationships, when, not only interdependence is recognized,
but also coercive power is regulated and used, we shall
say that the society has been politically integrated. When
the society in question is nationally integrated in a
state, the supreme coercive power is then called national
ago-tgreigt, and the special collective agent which
operates the national sovereignty in the name of the state
is called Bovernment.49  We shall now turn to the examina-
tion of the concept of sovereignty.
9. The essential point about sovereignty is that it
is always possible to localize it as the established au.-
thority.50 There is an accepted authority whenever there
is action. But we must sometimes distinguish between the
established authority under which an action takes place,
and the agent or actor of an action. Within the social
action schema we may interpret sovereignty as the social
condition for action. Sovereignty connects conceptually
the political action of the individual or collective agent
to the exercise of legitimate authority. Sovereignty is
the integrative factor by which the agent's system of
norms for action becomes socially possible under a certain
49nthe problem of sovereignty see Harold 3. Laski,
The State in Theyyy and Practics, The Viking Press, New
York, 1947, chap. I, and also Harold 3. Laski, Studije in
the Problem of Sovereignty, 1937, Oxford University Press,
passimi.
50Max Weber, op. cit., chap. III.
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legitimate order. Sovereignty may be conceived, at the
individual level, as the Freudian "super-ego," or as the
Christian "conscience," or as the Confucian "yen"; or, at
the family level, as the authority of the father, or that
of the mother, or even that of the elders; or, at the corpo-
ration level, as the authority of ownership or management.
In the state sovereignty may shift from one branch of the
government to the other. In other words, sovereignty ac-
quires different seats in different groups. It shifts in
accordance with a certain trend of social change and
historical evolution, 5 1 but it is always possible to identify
it with the established authority. This identification,
however, is not so easy as it sounds to be. In the case
of national groups, for instance, sovereignty may be de-
fined as the authority of the state in deciding about the
means and ends for national action. At this level the
matter becomes subject to confusion because the established
authority is also the agent of the action. The state,
which is the supreme authority endowed with sovereignty,
is also the agent which decides the ultimate ends for
national action, the distribution of political power and
of economic power, under form of coercive and purchasing
capacity. But since the state itself is nothing but a
51trames Burnham, Th MaaeiLRvllif, .ohn Day
Co., New York, 1941, chap. V.
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concept by postulation in political theory, sovereignty
can only act by means of a human agent,, that is, through
existent actors or persons. We have already seen (II,C,8)
that the body of persons which administer the affairs of
the state is called the government. As such, the exercise
of the supreme authority called sovereignty is circum.
scribed, in a state, to its government, and, within the
government, to its branches. By thus defining government
as the detentor of political power in the national level
of action, i.e., as that body of persons whose function is
to define, regulate, and distribute the use of coercive
means in a national group, we are able theoretically to
split the exercise of sovereignty between the legislative,
the executive, and the judiciary. The letgisLat ij body
would be entitled to deal with ultimate political ends of
national action, i.e., to define the political order of a
particular national society. The legislative deals with
those events which are still in the process of becoming,
in which, in individual cases, decisions have to be made
about new andR unique situations: it is the "irrational
matrix of sove re ignty. T he executi e bo dy, o r the adminis--
tration, deals with the organization of norms to which the
politically defined social order gives rise, i.e., with
those socio-political events which have acquired a set
pattern and occur regularly, the "laufendes Staatsleben,'
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the routine affairs of the state: the case in hand is to
be disposed of in a manner similar to precedents that already
exists: 52  it is the rationalized structure of sovereignty.
The .udiciary body deals with the implementation of those
specific norms which, having been defined by the legisla..
tive, were promulgated by the executive: it is the
"technological" matrix of sovereignty, if we have in mind
that the legal technique is not exclusively logicom
experimental or "scientific" but that it is also logico-
transcendental or symbolical, i.e., "unscientific" if
compared, for instance, to engineering technology:
jurisprudence is a stereotype of traditionalism as well as
of rationalism. The legislative, the executive, and the
judiciary exert sovereign power in the name of the state.
They are agents, or groups of actors, acting within the
broader group called government.
10. It is a trend in political theory to place
sovereignty upon the executive. This shift of the locus
of sovereignty from the legislative to the executive is
frequently explained by modern political thinkers53 as a
manifestation of the generalized tendency towards
52 Karl Mannheim, op, cit., p. 100. See also A.
Schiffle, "Ueber den wissenschaftlichen Begriff der
Politik," Zeitscrf a i ~at t~sisnchafq
Vol. 53, 1897.
53The "managerial" political thinkers.
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rationalization of processes. At the limit, in dictator-
ships, the legislative is abolished altogether. For our
own purposes here we must keep in mind that, wherever it
may be placed within government, sovereignty never shifts
over to the state itself, since this is only a concept
which cannot act. So, the established authority in a state
can never be distinguished in practice from the agent of
state action. There is, of course, a theoretical dis-.
tinction between the state and its government. In fact,
in every state where legal rule has replaced arbitrary
discretion as the basis for political action, the state
must be distinguished from its government by the limitation
placed upon the latter so to act that it pay proper respect
to the ends for the accompliskment of which the state
exists. Since, by definition, individuals live in society
for the satisfaction of their values, tastes, interests,
etc., and that society has been somehow integrated into a
political order as a state, it has sometimes been said that
the end of political action, that is, of state action is
to accomplish "the greatest possible good for the greatest
possible number." This, unhappily, cannot be achieved,
since, as it seems, the proposition is based upon a mis-
understanding. Political philosophers simply took j~lj
lettre a political slogan which cannot be either Justified
or executed scientifically. They generalized for society
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the special maximum problem of the non-social, isolated
action of Robinson Crusoe. They did not see that even in
the case of the isolated individual there is a "political"
problem of the allocation of coercive power preceding the
"economic" problem of the allocation of resources. Crusoe
must make up his mind as to the legitimate authority of
certain values over other values before falling back to the
inherently simple question of the maximization of satis-
faction with scarce and "resistant" resources. The
political thinkers abstracted from their theory two very
important variables in political action: subjective
interdependence, and imperfection of information. It is
precisely by these two variables that political action is
most characteristically defined, as every politician clearly
realizes since the time of Gorgias. From this point of
view we may distinguish the function of the state as mani-
fested in governmental action as distributive (a) of
coercive power between citizens in order to attain maximum
social utility for the collectivity, 5 4 and, then, (b) of
purchasing power between citizens in order to increase the
individual utility of each member of the collectivitt. 5 5
Politically, the end of state action, i.e., of government
5 4 vilfredo Pareto, Traitd de Sociologie Gondrale, ed.
by Pierre Boven, Payot et Cie., Paris, 1917-19, pp. 2128-48.
55Ibid., and Vilfedo Pareto, Manuel d'tconomie Poli-
ticrut, Marcel Giard, Paris, 1927, pp. 617ff.
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action is not the maximization of satisfaction of the
"tastes" of all and each one of its citizens, but to select,
for approval, those "values" which agree with the society's
ideology. A written constitution, a bill of rights, the
separation of power are "empty sets" as long as they are
not filled up with those words which will change them into
political instruments expressing the will of the state.
But this expression is an act of a government, and it must
be interpreted by a government, and by a government it will
be regulated and implemented. The selection of "values"
for acceptance is made by persons, and not by an exogenous
authority external to society itself. And in that selection
those persons cannot help but put themselves in it: they
are included in the situation presented by the political
problem of selection of values for adoption by legal
sanction. The will of the state is in its laws, but it is
government that gives substance and effect to their con-
tent. In a democracy government is responsible for the
commission of acts beyond its allotted power: the coercive
power of government is in its turn conditioned by the
limits of the law, and it is the consent over whoa govern-
ment rules which, through voting, gives government the
power to hare its laws obeyed. This consent is the
theoretical source of moral authOrity, i.e., of legitimacy
oLflL.r as it has been called in this thesis. This means
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that the state never acts, but is acted for by those who
have become competent to determine its policies.56We
have already examined the various motives (III,B,16-18)
that may impel an actor who is a citizen to assign legiti-
macy to an order. Except when there is a voluntary or
involuntary, but perfect, and complete, coincidence of
motivation, or will, interests, value judgments, and ulti-
mate ends among all citizens of a national state, the only
circumstance in which it is possible to maximize, at the
same time, the social utility for a collectivity as well
as the individual utility of each one of its members,
there must be, and there will be latent or overt conflict
of political values in a community. This conflict is
peacefully settled by voting whereby a number of citizens
will have their values sacrificed in order that the col
]ectivityts ultimate ends or values be maximized. The
government's competence then, i.e., the competence of its
legal organization consists in the government's ability to
operate successfully its coercive power. This means that
some wants must go unsatisfied, and, then, that the
successful operation of sovereignty is measured by the
government's ability to coerce the opponents of the govern-
ment, to dominate over their desired imputations, to break
56Harold .T. Laski, The Problem of Sovereignty, op. cit.,
pp. 27ff.
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their will, to compel them to submission, either by the
threat of force, or by the magesty of its moral authority,
or simply by persuading those who were excluded from
satisfaction that their 'welfare" is better served by this
exclusion.5 7 This power of coercion, by force or persua-
sion, is a guarantee of the legitimacy of the established
order against those individual orders that may attempt to
discredit the established standards of behavior.
11. The problem of the justification of the established
order in rational, logieo-transcendental, or logico-
experimental, terms is the critical problem that is being
faced by modern governments throughout the world. The
deistic, Platonic, rationalistic justifications for the
legitimacy of the automatism of the market place, the
neutrality of the laws, the sanctity of authority has been
discredited by the doctrine of intentionality of con-
sciousness in its philosophical, sociological, political,
and economic form. 5 8 Every human action is "interested,"
and there is no mechanical automatism in the realm of
human affairs.. If the social order cannot be upheld by
the deterministic law of causality, then it is because the
57Harold 3. Laski, The State in Theory and Practice,
op. cit., p. 13.
58That is, "existential" or "phenomenological" philoso-
phy; of "Soziologie des Wissenls": of Marxist
"Klassenbewusstseil"; of the economic "partial equilibrium
theory of value."
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human will is free even to act in disharmony with its
interests, values, etc. In terms of political theory this
simply shifts sovereignty as the power to take decisions
from the external authority of a State, or a Church, to the
internal, specific authority of a body of men composing a
government. If every human action is "interested" or in-
tentional, then governmental actions are also intentional
and "interested," and if that is the case, then why should
government favor a group of citizens by disfavoring other
groups. As long as discrimination was imposed from outside
it was thought that it was the necessary result of some
original sin or error that mankind itself had to bear the
consequences. The moment that it was perceived not only
that discrimination was man-made, but also that those who
were discriminated could implement another order of things,
then the problem of the justification of governmental
action became particularly acute, and necessary. To inter-
vene or not to intervene? To socialize monopolies, to
control foreign trade, or to liberalize the market, to
make merely the anti-trust gesture, and to drop those im-
port licenses? The pros and contras are equally rational,
therefore, epistemologically valid. There are always at
least two different types of political action, two types
of moral, one of which must be enforced, at the exclusion
of the other, and hesitation cannot be prolonged beyond a
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certain limit of human endurance. One action addresses
itself to individuals: it aims at the hedonic satisfaction
of their atomistically given, individual tastes; it is the
solution of the liberal-democratic bourgeois thought, of
classical economics, the libertarian, utilitarian, cap.-
talistic solution. The other action is directed to the
community; it aims at the maximization of social utility
within a predetermined set of values; it is the egalitarian
solution of the socialist-communist conception. In a
democracy the issue should be set by voting, but then how
should the citizen vote? If he votes in accordance to his
own self-interest he must know that interest perfectly
well, i.e., he must have complete information about his
situation, because, if not, it may turn out that, by voting
in accordance with his interests, the elector may very well
be going against them. Democratic election is based upon
the same type of fallacy as perfect competition. Indeed,
how should the citizen vote? Religion points towards
brotherly love, charity, self-sacrifice. But who should
the citizen love? -"What is he to Recuba or Recuba to him
that he should weep for her?" To a government this is very
clear. A government should favor those who will vote for
the maintenance of that administration in power of office.
Is that the monopolist, the farmer, the miner, the foreign
exporter, the foreign producer, the foreign unemployed
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worker? If foreigners are automatically excluded from the
national ballot, then, to be consistent, the national
economy should be closed to outside influences. What is
the greatest utility for the collectivity as a whole?
Which decision is most justifiable? The one that is vague,
directed to a whole or to some symbol, or the one that is
precise, and directed to a specific individual or group
within the community? The Kantian moral will say never
to treat a person as a means but always as an end. Thus,
if government chooses not to crack on monopolies it is
treating monopolies as an end and the rest of the com-
munity as a means. If, contrarywise, it protects the
consumer, or labor, it is treating the consumer, or labor,
as an end, and the producer, or management, as a means.
Finally, the elector decides, or government itself decides,
not even as a body of persons, and much less as the
majority's opinion, but on the basis of the interests,
sentiments, preferences, intuitions, of one or few indi-
viduals which then act as the agent of political action.
But, in this case, who can ever forecast with precision
the outcome of a political action? The particular person
who will act as the leader, as the agent of that political
action may be localized within a government or even out-
side of it, but even if he is so localized, who can figure
out, a priori, the vatut of his sentiments, preferences,
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etc.? The statesman can only say that he loves his brother
farmer after helping to pass a bill granting parity prices
to farmers. The value of his affection is defined by the
act that defines it. There are, of course, other modes of
orientation of political action. The statesman may not
have an opinion before he votes in favor or against a
certain proposed measure, and then, after voting he may
construct his theory or organize his sentiments accordingly.
Or he may take counsel from his economist adviser, or his
political expert, but the moment he chooses whom to consult
he has already the answer he is willing to hear.
12. In summary, we may say that, in the realm of po-
litical action, the changes in the values of the variables
are such that they favor the interests of some individuals
and injure that of others.59 Such differences of treat-
ment are sanctioned by the acts of public authority which
enforces them by coercion, based upon force and persuasion.
However, in order to acquire legitimacy, government must
justify its acts in terms that it is "good' for the com-.
munity, although it may be detrimental to the interests of
some of its members. By force or persuasion, or both, a
government mast always dominate over any possible non-
conformist coalision of those that have been sacrificed,
59Vilfredio Pareto, ov. cit., loc.cit. Political action
is a " zero sum game' in .Tohn von Neumann and Oskar
Morgenstern, op. cit, p. 504, footnote 1.
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and are able to implement the coalision in an effective
Way; it must dominate by "charismatic" magesty, by power
of persuasion, or by police enforcement. The political
acts of a government must conform with the distributive
standards in terms of which the authority is operating.
To the scientific observer they appear arbitrary, and
randomized. But an empirical society could not subsist
upon such basis. In fact, unscientific considerations
exist that render more or less homogeneous the individual
organizations of norms of behavior. These unscientific
considerations are the common system of ultimate ends that
a society, as a unity, pursues as a sui generia organic
entity endowed with historical or physiogomic meaning.
This has certain important implications for the ultimate
end systems of the individuals who are the participants in
the actions of that society, for once the concept of end
is understood as a subjective category, the end of a
society can only mean the system of ends that is common
to the members of the society in question. This gives a
key to the meaning of expressions such as distributivt
.ustice., legitimate authorit Y, ensgf, etc., in the inte-
gration of these individual organizations of norms within
an established, existent, factual social order. Except,
of course, in some limiting cases, social integration is
never complete, i.e., conflict of interests is always
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latent or overt. The point that should be emphasized in
this summary is that political action can never be exo-
haustively analyzed by the observation of the behavior of
its member actors in social isolation. There must always
be a social order to make the resultant political action a
determinate system, in the same way that there must exist
a political organization to determine a specific economic
system operating within it in a stable way.
13. Institutional elements of economic action. In
the actions or activities of everyday life we need, or be-
lieve we need, particular goods and services as means to
our ultimate ends. Thus, our intentions permit us to
capture the meaning of goods and services as something use-
ful, as utilities. 6 0  From the subjective point of view,
then, usefulness is not only a characteristic of utilities,
but their very essence. To a Trobriand Islander a radio
is many things, except, perhaps, what it is to an expert
radioman, but this does not prevent the radio to be useful
to the Trobriander, as an idol, for instance, for only when
we use a good or a service, or when we believe we know how
to use a good or a service, do we perceive an utility in
the object or persons that happen to be merely present.
Thus a piece of yellowish, greasy paste becomes butter on
6 0 For this philosophical interpretation of economic
utility see Alberto Wagner de Heyns, La Ontologia 1undA-
mental de Hei4egger, Editorial Losada, 8. A., Buenos Aires,
1939, chap. 10.
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our breakfast table, and that man there, who may happen to
be our brother, is captured by our consciousness as a
skilled plumber repairing our kitchen sink. By utility,
therefore, we shall understand a particular and concrete,
real or imaginary advantage the necessity of which is
estimated, and the satisfaction of the desire for which
is sought, as a means for present or future use, by one or
more acting individuals.6 1  The controllable elements of a
situation, that is, its means, acquire an economic aspect,
that is, economic utility, when, by having been made,
through scarcity, an object of desire, they have been
chosen or selected as useful to the attainment of a certain
end among other alternative, not indifferent, ends. Thus,
any action, social or non-social, political, military,
affective, cognitive, positive or normative, technological
as well as teleological, become economically orientefd when
(a), though primarily pursuing non-economic advantages,
takes account of the necessity for economic prudence in
the choice of scarce means capable of alterative, not not
indifferent, applications; or (b) when, although primarily
directed to the acquisition of economic utilities, makes
use of force or coercion as a means to attain that ob-
jective.fi2 We wish to eliminate the use of force from
1axWeber, op. cit., pp. 145, 151.
62Ibid., pp. 135, 146. Lionel Robbins, An3Essay..on(Continued)
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economic action. We shall however reserve the term
economic action to designate the peaceful use of the agent's
control over means, involving a conscious, primary orienta-
tion to economic considerations. Thus, the achievement of
a program of armaments, although being a projected exercise
of force, will be understood as an economic action insofar
as it involves a peaceful provision for the means, and
aims at success as an economic organization for war. On
the other hand, the act of a burglar, in obtaining by
threat of death the victim's purse, shall not be called an
economic action but at most a military action economically
oriented. As political action involved legislative, exe-
cutive, and judiciary acts, or political order, organization,
and technique (III,0,9), so economic action involves an
economic order of distribution of purchasing power, an
economic organization -of production and consumption, and
an economic technique of exchange. The theoretical study
of economic action, i.e., economic analysis, tt"es as given
the results of the political action. An economic order,
or the distribution of purchasing power, is determined by
the social, political, legal, and institutional framework
under which the economic order operates. This economic
the atue ad Sinifcane o Ecoomi Scenc, Macmillan
and Co., London, 1946, p. 14. And part II of this thesis,
where the definitions of positive as well as normative
science is examined more closely.
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order, in its turn, determines the distribution of the
economic means for production and consumption, that is,
the economic organization to prevail in the economic system.
Finally, the economic organization, by defining the
schedules of supply and demand, constrains by the imposi-
tion of a cost the domain of exchange, i.e., determines
the relative rates of exchange between which technological
choices are economically possible. Thus, the range of
economic studies is delimited at one extreme by political
variables taken as parameters, and at the other extreme
by technical variables selected by considerations of cost.
The proper field of normative economicg, also called
theory of economic policy, or, more broadly, political
economy, is the study of the economic effects of political
decisions upon the distribution, production and consumption,
and exchange of utilities as goods and services. Normative
economics are only possible if we have some kind of
economic theory by which it is possible to grasp the
economic meaning of the concrete facts of empirical reality.
This body of abstract, theoretical propositions is called
"pure" or psitive economics which, then, may be defined
as the study of the laws of casuality linking the empiri-
cal phenomena of an economic reality into a theoretically
closed economic system. Positive economics aims at fore-
casting what will supervene if the predictable trends of a
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certain situation are allowed to take their course without
active intervention, and normative economica aims at de-
termining what will happen as a result if active inter-
vention is allowed to manipulate the variables of the
economic system presented by the initial situation. Both
are rational and theoretical, and both are ideological,
but the economic system studied by positive economics is
autonomous, whereas that which is the proper field of
normative economics is heteronomous. Positive economics
takes the economic system as a given economic order
established as if upon the authority of the collective
economic agent who pursues the economic action. Normative
economics takes the economic system as an economic organ
ization under the authority of outsiders. ADjLId
economica takes as given not only a certain economic
organization but also an economic order. It aims at know-
ing how action should be oriented, or what means should be
chosen, in order to realize or approach a predetermined
state of affairs which differs, in whole or in part, from
that which will probably occur without active intervention.
Applied economics may also be called economic planning,
or, more broadly, tconomic technology. Its proper fields
are the various techniques of central banking, rationing,
taxation, labo r legislation, commodity agreements, col-
lective bargaining, anti-trust legislation and measures,
etc.
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14. The political superstructure of social action de.-
termines the basic parameters of the economic system to be
adopted in the economic range of the social action function.
The legal system, as enforced by the state, is one of the
main constraints placed upon the economic system by the
political system. In order to visualize this structure of
hieranchical actions it is perhaps convenient to illustrate
the concept of economic action as subordinate to a po-
litical action structure by means of a brief examination
of one of the two typical, rigid systems of normative
economics: capitalism, and socialism. Let us extricate
from the enormous volume of data (a) the political, and
juridic constants that are placed upon the economic order
of capitalism; (b) then, let us examine, statically and
dynamically, the operation of the positive system working
under these normative constraints; (c) let us circumscribe
the results of this economic system operating under these
political and legal parameters; (d) finally, let us ap-
praise the theory of anti-trust policy as a normative
measure of applied economics, or a legal norm for effective
competition.
15. Capitalism, as a system of economic policy, is
upheld (a) by an interpretation of history based on pro-
gress; (b) by the juridical doctrine of 'natural rights,"
and private property; (c) by the ideology of individual
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responsibility based on the philosophical notion of utili-
tarianism and private initiative; (d) by the political
institution of the sovereign national state; (e) and by
the economic principles of production for profit, of con-
sumption for utility, and of exchange based upon division
of labor.63  It is assumed that (a) if the individual
citizen obeys, in action, exclusively to impulses of
personal interest; (b) if the pursuance of personal inter-
ests guides the individual to the maximization of his
satisfaction through attainment of his ends with a minimum
of effort or sacrifice; (c) and if the social value of
production is proportional to the social utility of the
product; then the individual spontaneously directs his
economic activity towards the obtention of the maximam
social utility for the product, and thereby provides for
society at the same time that he best attends to his own
interests. This closes the system by making it realize,
simultaneously, the maximum satisfaction of the individual
and the maximum social utility for the collectivity. We
have already seen (II,0,10) that, except in perfectly
well integrated communities, such as the Calvinists of
Geneva in Calvin's own time, this coincidence does not
6 3Btienne Antonelli, L'lconomi&Ynri dai Capitalis,
Marcel Riviere et Cie., Paris, 1939, pp. 73-83, 271-387.
.Toseph A. Schumpeter, Capjtalism. Socialism, and Democracr,
Harper and Bros., New York, 1947, chap. II.
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obtain. But the legal system of the capitalistic society,
enforced by the state, maintained this general economic
structure as corresponding, in the economic range of social
action, to that of distributive justice in the political
realm: it was a matter of simple justice that the indi-
vidual, as the atom of the social group, be considered
responsible for the efficacy and adequacy of his economic
activity; it is also a matter of justice that the individual,
who gives utility, not merely work, to society, be able to
take from society advantages which are proportional to his
contribution in utility. Thus, in the capitalistic so-
ciety, distributive justice and private property, were
exhaustively justified by private responsibility. And
thus, a political structure based upon individual responsi-
bility, private property, and power equivalence in exchange,
determined unambiguously a stable economic structure cor-
responding to perfect competition.
16. The moment, however, than an obstacle was placed
in such a way that it prevented the normal work of at
least one of this fundamental principles, the whole me-
chanism would become jammed. These "impurities" could be
inequality of personal capacities, disequilibrium of
economic power, uneven political power relationships,
social position, ignorance, immobility of factors, de-
creasing costs, etc. And under "impure" competition the
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individual could not longer, with justice, be considered
responsible for acts which were not his acts. The moment,
for instance, that private property originated from other
sources than the individual contribution of utility to
society, i.e., once property could be acquired by violence,
coercion, fraud, or any other extra-market activity, static
equilibrium could not be obtained upon the basis of the
declared, theoretical, economic order. Equivalence of
power in exchange requires the fulfilment of some essential
conditions: the participants must command over a certain
amount of purchasing power in order that their demand for
commodities be effective; the individual must dispose of
means to satisfy his own needs; and commodities must be
scarce to have exchange value, i.e., to command over a
price. Finally, it is assumed that the individuals who are
parties in an exchange be juridically free, that is, not
subject to mutual coercion of any kind, and, indeed, of no
influence of one over the other. This last condition is
simply a denial of the definition of economic action as a
social action which is proposed in this thesis.
17. These are the ideological foundations of capi-
talism as seen from a static point of view. We shall now
extend our illustration of the political constraints
placed upon economic action in a certain typical system
of economic policy, by considering these interrelations
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from a dynamic point of view. Here, again, individualism
is basic: the economic actor is responsible for the
economic activity of the society in which he is living.
In economic statics it is the institution of private
property, defined as the right to dispose of property le-
gally acquired, that results from the principle of
individual responsibility. In economic dynamics it is
also the juridical institution of private property that
expresses the individualistic principle, but now through
a new characteristic: that of perpetuity of property. 6 4
Private property is not only absolute, but it is also per-
petual, i.e., the power of alienation is an inherent
attribute of the property itself. 6 5 The individual
perpetuates himself through the institution of succession.
In economic statics, the economic actor accepts as legi-
timate the responsibility resulting from the application
of the individualistic principle to economic activity moved
by the pursuance of private interest: the juridical insti-
tution of bankruptcy proceedings shows, empirically, that
the principle is still considered legitimate. But, as in
economic statics personal interest was applied to immediate
64. Peritch, LesConceptionj Socialesdang le Droit
de Succession "Ab Intestat" Academies des Sciences Morales
et Bolitiques, Pris, May-3une, 1935, p. 428.
6 5W. R. Vance, "Alienation of Property," Encyclopaedia
of Social Sciences, ed. Edwin R. A. Seligman, Macmillan
Co., 1948, Vol. 1, pp. 639-641.
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needs, in economic dynamics it takes the less definite form
of anxiety over the future, of need for security, or of
expectation regarding the realization of possibilities.
This forces the individual to take account of the actions
of others, or, in our own terms, it introduces subjective
dependence in the atomistic working of the system. As in
economic statics private property gives rise to division
of labor and exchange, in economic dynamics it gives rise
to the business enterprise, and credit, and also money as
a holder of rights on future values.66 As long as it is a
matter for the economic actor to obtain a profit from a
production for which there is already a demand in the
market, as it was the case with the medieval artisan, i.e.,
as long as the conditions of production were validly eon-.
sidered as constants in the static system, there was no
need for the producer to forecast a future consumption in
a probable market. The entrepreneur appeared, between the
artisan and the consumer, to fill up this coordinating and
forecasting function. Then, later on, within the business
enterprise itself, the entrepreneur becomes the owner, a
business man, and entrepreneurship ceases to be a gift, a
"charismatic" endowment, and becomes a function, a
660n the function of the entrepreneur see Marcel Porte,
3nteprneus pndPro Lt Iniztrie]a, 1901; .Toseph A.
Schumpeter, "Der Unternebmer," in the Handw~rterbneh der
Staatewissenschaftenl, lena, 1928, Vol. 1III; 3. Schwiedland,
Zur Soziologie des Unternehmers, Leipzig, 1933.
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routinized, administrative affair. The place of the entre-
preneur, as the owner, is taken over by the management, an
indistinct body of men presided by an executive equally
indistinguishable in the bureaucratic organization of the
enterprise. But where the role of the entrepreneur has
lost in importance as a dynamic factor in the capitalistic
system bank credit has maintained its former preponderance.
As money is a symbol of a property right over a thing,
credit is a symbol of a symbol, and the thing itself over
which the transaction is based may very well never come to
existence: rights are created, are transmitted, and are
cancelled without consideration for the object to which
they refer. 6 7 Thus, individual responsibility, private
and perpetual property, personal interests, profits and
gains, determine in the economic range of social action the
establishment and maintenance of two basic capitalistic
institutions: the business enterprise, and bank credit.
This, again, is a matter of distributive justice. It is
a matter of justice that the individual who is the prime
mover of the economic system get all its profits and ad-
vantages. However, and once more, any obstacle to the
proper function of the system blocks its normal performance.
6 70n the role of credit in capitalism see Jacques
Rueff, L'Ordre Social, Librairie de Mdicis, Paris, 1948;
R. S. Hawtrey, Currency and Credit, Longmans, Green and
Co., London, 1950; 5. Haberler, Properity and Depression,
United Nations, Lake Success, 1946, chap. 2.
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Some of these obstacles are exogenous1 and some endogenous.
The exogenous obstacles are social, historical, ideological.
or utopian in character, As for the endogenous obstacles
they are many, and we shall limit ourselves to point out a
few of the more important ones: (a) there is no perfect
accord between the individual consumer living in the present,
statically, and the individual producer living in the future,
dynamically; (b) individual initiatives are uncoordinated
in production: it is easy to demonstrate that inefficient
producers must disappear, but in reality they continue to
fight for their survival as producers, and may very well
succeed in doing so; (c) the impact of innovations is also
uncoordinated; the institution of patent rights refers to
an obsolete economic reality, and is quite incoherent in the
modern framework of full employment policy; (d) decreasing
costs resulting from technological economies of mass pro-
duction invite coalitions to market control by restriction
of output,
18. State non-interventionism promoted a concentration
of wealth that a growing dispersion of political power could
not tolerate. On the other hand the increasing intensity
of the so called "capitalistic crises' pressed legislatures
for social control of industry. Antitrust action appeared
as a compromise which would satisfy the community without
damaging too much the basic principles of capitalism. The
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term "effective competition" was coined to mean a dynamic
market situation68 wnIch, once it is given a certain accepted
standard of behavior based on some preconceived principles
of social purpose, is characterized by a solution of the
conflict between a government's attempt at obtaining the
nighest gain for the community or for a group within the com-
munity that its administration can enforce without being
overthrown by revolution or defeat at the polls, and the
highest gain that private business can realize without being
punished by law. Thus, in most capitalistic countries,
governments were bound by political and social necessity to
curb the tactics of those upon whom the economic system was
based. Antitrust legislation resulted in a paradoxical com-
promise. Competition in law means free competition and
designates a standard of ethical value,69 it is a normative
concept of economic policy which, as a future .and desired
state of affairs must differ from what is, in fact, the case.
On the other hand, competition in economics means pure or
impure competition and describes deductively formulated market
68J. 4. Clark, "Towards a Concept of Workable Competition,
in Readings in the Social Control of Industry, Philadelphia,
1947, pp. 452-475.
69k, A. Adelman, "Effective Competition and the Antitrust
Laws," in Harvard Law Review, September, 1948, p. 1289.
E. 8. MasonV'konopoly in Law and Economics, in Readings in
the Social Control of Industry, Philadelphia, 1947, pp.
25-47.
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situations under certain postulated conditions, they are
terms of positive economic theory whereas free competition
is already a statement of ends, which, in order to serve as
a standard of evaluation, must hold for the judge as well as
for the defendant, In order to justify antitrust legisla-
tion oapitalistic governments had to refer to the advantages
of a market situation which obliged governments to enact
antitrust laws, i.e., they attempted at remedying the evils
of free capitalistic enterprise by depriving it of some of
its freedom. The juridio prop of the 'rule of reason' did
not solve the dilemma: reasonable economic behavior for the
judge is not identical with rational economic behavior for
the monopolist. The identification of reasonableness with
rationality resulted in that no monopolist is to be condemned
by judicial action simply because he is what he o to be,
19, Having, thus, illustrated to the extent that such
a digression may be permissible within the narrow scope of
this thesis the structure of social action as a hierarchically
arranged system of political and economic actions, each one
of which manifests itself by means of normative, positive,
and technological acts, we must now turn our attention to
the precise formulation of the social action as a funotion,
as well as of its variables, and the general and special
conditions for maxima, This formulation is of capital import-
ance in this study, since it will relate the structure of
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social action as it has been developed to this point, to
the concept of national economic action as an element in
the system of international economic action, which is
the objective of this thesis.
20." Formal characterization of the social action
function. We define social action function as a relation
which for each individual organization of specific norms,
states a corresponding social order of norms for individual
70
behavior. This general definition will be extensively
qualified later in this thesis, but for our purposes now
this is sufficient. As indicated by the formulations (32)
and (33), this correspondence may be represented in matric
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notation as foflows
70For a similar concept see Kenneth J. Arrow, "A Diffi-
culty in the Concept of Social Welfare", Journal of Political
Economy, August 1950, vol. LVIII, n. 4, p. 335 and passim;
idem,iSocial Choice and Individual Values, Cowles Commission
Monograph 12, John Wiley, New York, 1951, ch. III. This con-
cept resembles that of social welfare function, but it is not
identical with it, nor is it an useless duplication of a well
defined and accepted concept in the economic theory of welfa-
re. The differences will be made exDlicit in the last part
of this study.
7 1 George B. Dantzig, "Programming of Interdependent Acti-
vities - II Mathematical Model" Econometrica, July-October
1949; idem, Programming in a Linear Structure, United States
Air Force, February 21948; Wassily W.Leontlef, "Computational
Problems Arising in Connection with Economic Analysis of Inter
Industrial Relationships", Proceedings of a Sympfsium on Lare
Scale Digital Computers, .Harvard University fees, Cambridge,
Mass., 1948.
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the following assumptions;
there is a set G, identical to the set G in formu-
lation (32a, 32b), consisting in a set of norma-
tive actions of a collective agent z, any one of
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Which,A h1,..., z, is in its turn a set
of normative acts, a(1)nor,...,a(1)nor- These
normative acts, a(K)nor. K=1,..., n, develop them-
selves through discrete non-normative actions,
Ann1 .e. - nny. The magnitudes of these inter-
mediary, non-normative actions may be specified
either as continuous over the time involved, or
am discrete time periods, this latter alternative
being the one that is adopted here. These sched-
ules of non-normative actions, Ank. k19.-, !
are intermediary stages or states of affairs, or
merely sections of the social action function,
through which a collective actor or an agent moves
from one initial state of affairs or situation to
some specifically defined objective as a final
set of ultimate ends,
b) Any one of these normative acts, a(K)nor, K01,...,
n, consists, as in formulation (33), of possible
specific norms for action, Sn(l)j(l),...,
sn(n)p(n), any one of which, sn(K)p(K). K"I'-*-'
n, j=1,..., a, is the normative actor K's ordering
of norms of behavior, ie., his normative organisa-
tion for action. These individual ordering of
norms of behavior are assumed to be the elements
of the partition L~h. h-I,..., a, which is the
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legitimate social, political, and economic order
under which the action in question, Anorh. takes
place (III,0,7,13). The partition ghh includes
all these socially imposed, economic and political
constraints placed over the individual ordering
of norms of behavior.
c) Out of Sn(K)j(K), K=1,..., n, j=1,,.., u, the
normative actor K chooses the specific norm,
sn(K), with the guidance of which he will pursue
the particular act, a(K)nor. in which he is engaged
at the moment of the action Anorhe It is also
assumed that these various sn(l),..., an(n) consist
in particularized plans to carry out the selection
of means when the occasion for this selection
comes up along the means-end sequence linking the
initial situation, bh, to the ultimate end, Eh
These means and ends will generically consist of
"commodities," resources, goods and services,
leisure, money funds, stocks and savings, etc.,
that is to say, "utilities," objects of desire,
d) Each normative act, a(K)nor. j=l..., n, has a
characteristic flow of commodities, which is cumu-
lative at each non-normative action, Annk., k=l,.. v,
and additive between any two consecutive non-
normative actions. These utilities or commodities
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are measured in terms of quantities of each
commodity type used, produced, or consumed, which
are functions of the magnitude of the nona-
normative action through which they flow towards
the ultimate end. The action is social because
the participants are interdependent in their norma-
tive acts, a(l)nor....- a(n)nor, because -they share
a limited amount of commodity, as means or inter-
mediary ends,
e) At each non-normative action, Annk, li.--, Y
the flow of commodities is characterized by an
1 2 Vinput0coefficient M I.01 (1K-Mj#4mg(1K46...,2 Vlo3
m(nc)l m(nKk3 9..., m(nK)j, where a denotes means;
1,.., n, denotes the number of normative partioi-
pant actors K. the first symbol between the pa-
renthesis indicating the $owner* of the means.
and the second symbol the origin of the means;
o denotes the conditions where the actor is
Onature," or the result of exogenous activities
flowing into the action Anora~ at the moment of
its initiation as a datum of its situation.
f) Within each non-normative action, Annlk, there are
implicit transformation curves changing means
into intermediary or final ends. Those are pro-
duction functions which may be characterized by
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coefficients of flow of any commodity i=l,..., r.
kThe first subscript in each argument m(K)ji of the
production function denotes the type of the means,
j=1,..., s; and the second subscript, 1=1,..., r,
tne commodity to which it is applied. If the
means are taken to be input coefficients, the
resulting e I will of course denote the unit of
output, or output coefficient, at the non-normative
action Annk' k'I,--, v.
g) Between two consecutive non-normative actions,
Annk, Annk + 1, there are the supply schedules of
any commodity i=,..., r, as an intermediary end,
e(K)i, and the demand schedules for imputs,
M(K)j , 1=1,..., s denoting the kind of the
imput needed, and K=l,,,, n denoting the actor
demanding it to apply in his own production funo-
tions. The technological problem involved in any
action is to determine that course of action,
plan or program, which will most fully accomplish
the predetermined objectives (maximization of
ultimate ends) without exceeding or infringing
stated limitations (minimization of means or re-
sources). Thus, the configuration (34a and 34b)
takes place of a large system of simultaneous
equations developed dynamically along time. It
72John von Neumann, "A Model of General Economic Equilib-
rium," Review of Economic Studies, vol. 13 (1), n. 33,
1945-46, pp. 1-W.
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is assumed, of course, that the participants know
precisely what they want.
21. In summary, this normative social action, Anorh'
h-I,..,, z, is defined by the ultimate social objective at
which it aims as a normative action, hence the selection of
k
means m(KjJ, by any actor K=1,.,, n, at any intermediary
non-normative action, among! possible means, j-1,..., a,
are made to depend on the maximization of a social action
function, and at a minimization of means to reach that end.
As a program, the contemplated action consists in a set of
legal norms guaranteeing the legitimacy of a structure of
prices, for in BNh a legitimate price establishing mechanism
(whatever it may be) is also included among the socio-
juridical conditions of action.3 In these circumstances
it does not seem at all unrealistic to assume that the actors,
before 'contracting" for action, have eliminated all possible
"psychological' hesitation, or 'political" conflict remaining
to be settled. In other words, for such an ideal type of
social action as formulated above, Anorh, it is assumed that
the integration of individual ends is complete, although it
may be disagreement and division of opinion about values in-
volved in some other possible action which is not the par-
ticular action contemplated in formulation (54).
73"A legal norm is the legal stipulation of a sanction,'
Hans Kelsen, gp.Cit., pp. 45 ff.
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22. Is such a social action possible? Is it possible
to translate individual ordering of values into a social
order? We have met this question already under the name of
"utilitarian dilemma": individual preferences when atom-
istically brought together in social action tend to break
down into permanent, Hobbesian conflict, and, then, the only
way to introduce order, or equilibrium, in the system, is
by subjecting the social action to the authority of an outside
agency, i.e., by dictatorial imposition. This may be illus-
74trated by the well known *paradox of voting": if individual
A prefers x to j, and y to z, and therefore x to z; if B
prefers j to s, and z to x, and therefore x to x; if C prefers
z to x, and x to x, and therefore z to y; then a majority
prefers x to i, and a majority prefers y to z, and a majority
prefers z to x: so that the method for passing from indi-
vidual to collective decisions (voting) fails to satisfy the
conditions of rationality. Any social order, then would be
either imposed or dictatorial: either the individual chooses
freely, and the action breaks down into conflict, or he does
not choose freely, and there will be order, but the individ-
ual is not choosing at all, and the order is dictatorial.
The way out of this dilemma is to assume, as we did in this
study, that the individual organization of specific norms of
74Kenneth J. Arrow, gop.cit., passim.
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behavior must satisfy certain requirements in order to be
capable of translation into a social order. This conforms
literally with Barone declaring that the ultimate value
Judgments that will make a 'social welfare function' deter-
minate are set in accordance with some ethical preference,
or, as Pareto says, d'accord avec la normse qu'il plaira
d'adopter.'
23. The general assumptions may be summarised in two
headings: (a) political: there must be a socially accepted
order of "distributive Justice' in any given social action
structure; this refers to value judgments; and (b) econoaic:
if everybody is at least as well off, and one person is
better off in one social state of affairs than at another,
then the first social state is better than the second; this
is a matter of taste, Politically it is impossible to allo-
cate coercive power in such a way that the gain of one par-
ticipant be not the loss of another; there may be, then, a
maximum of social utility for the collectivity as a whole,
but not for each individual simultaneously. Economically
it is possible to increase individual utility to each member
of the collectivity, but a maximum cannot be reached as long
as individual utilities cannot be compared and added to-
75
5Vilfredo Pareto, Traitd de Sociologie G~ndrale,
op. cit., pp. 2128-9.
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24. In closing this section on the theory and structure
of social action we shall like to outline the substance of
what is to come in the remainder of this work, We intend
to apply this structure of social action to the international
economic action of countries engaged in trade and in capital
transactions. This will be divided into two more sections,
In the next section we shall apply the structure of social
action as above outlined to the building of a model describ-
ing the international channels of propagation of business
cycles in an international capitalistic system. That is to
say, we shall analyze the international economic order in
terms of a few socio-politico-economic variables, in order
to deduce from their behavior a set of norms for international
economic action. In the last section we shall intellectually
experiment with these norms, within the context of delib-
erate organization, in order to see whether there is a
theoretical possibility of successful application of these
norms to contemporary international economic situation,
20a
IV. THE POSITIVE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL EYJNOMI.C ORDER
A. Characterization of a typical national economy
1. Retrospect and perspective. In the preceding section
we have detailed a conception of the structure of sooial
action underlying national economic systems. Although we
have not specifically dealt with the central subject of this
thesis, i.e., international economic action, we expect to
have been able to expound the sociological background on which
a positive as well as normative theory of international econ-
omic order and organization may now be distinguished and anal-
yzed. By defining national economies as the collective agents
of international economic action, we shall now attempt to
analyze the international pattern of economic relations as
it emerges from the observation that the trading world is
neither one universal economic unit of decision nor a con-
glomeration of closed action systems, but a complex inter-
action of economic relationships between individuals and
groups living within the political boundaries of different,
and sometimes antagonistic, institutional environments.1 Our
G. Haberler, Proserit adDpesion, op. cit.,
p. 406; R. F. Harrod, Internationa Soonomios, Pitman Pub-
lishing Co., N. Ye, 1947, pp. 6-9.
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aim in so doir is rigorously to prove the central theme of
this thesis that it is riot possible to derive, either stati-
cally or dynamically, a unique and stable equilibrium position
for an economic system, unless a set of ethically conceived,
politically determined, and juridically implemented ultimate
ends is given, such that it is possible to say that the eco-
nomic system tends to their fulfilment as the objectives of
its economic action, The current tendency to base economic
welfare propositions on purely economic considerations is
meaningless and self-contradictory, since these judgments
must be based on a consensus of the community with respect
to soclio-ethical norms,
2. We have already attempted to demarcate the three dis-
tinct but interrelated domains of a plausible social action
function by interpreting social action as being conceptually
passive of visualization at three different levels of activ-
ity.' At tne most general level of social action coercive
power is politically distributed in accordance with ethical
value judgments which appraise thie quality of the ultimate
social ends themselves, The social action function, which
2Kenneth J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values,
Cowles Comission Monograph 12, University of Chicago,
John Wiley, New York, 1951, passim.
Hla Myint, Theories of Welfare Economics, Harvard
University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1948, pp. 229-235.
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is understood initially to be entirely general in character,
has its form determined by the specific decisions on ends that
are introduced into the analysis at this ethical level. Given
these decisions, the social action function is transformed
into an ordinal scale of values for the economic valuation of
alternative use of resources. 4 Thus, a capitalist free-
enterprise economy is only possible in a society which does
not loathe acquisitive behavior, or does not repeal the laws
of an automatic market system as inefficient, cruel, or im-
moral. The question, for instance, of whether and to what
extent consumers are to be "sovereign" with respect to saving
and investment, education, health csre, etc., where the indi-
vidual choice may run against the social interest, and other
questions of allocation of collective activity, such as
police protection, the use of public utilities, etc., are
decided at this ethical level of social activity. 6  ,
3. At the next level of generality, social action is
determined by the distribution of income which has already
been politically prescribed and juridically maintained at the
ethical level. This income distribution and subjectively
4K. Polanyl, The Great Transformation, Rinehart, New York,
1944, passim.
5M. Dobb, Political Economy and Capitalism,. International
Publishers, New York, 1940, pp. 298-9, 311-12; 0. Lange,
"On the Economic Theory of Socialism" in On the Economic Theory
of Socialism, ed. B. Li ppincott, University of Minnesota
Press, Minneapolis, 1948, pp. 90 ff.
6L. H. Bobbins, on. cit., ch. VT.
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given taste considerations determine exchange and division
of labor, which are specifically concerned with the quanti-
tative measurement of success in achieving the ends dictated
at the ethical level. From this point of view the definition
of economic theory as the study of scarce means with alterna-
tive uses is at the same time too broad and too narrow, for
different patterns of income distribution are incommensurable
and their evaluation depends on a set of principles which, as
an ordering of ultimate ends for social action, are ethically
estaulished and not logically or empirically deducible from
7
utility calculation. On the other hand, it is necessary
tnat there ye agreement, or consent, or legal enforcement, on
the principles according to which incomes are to be distrib-
uted, in order that, then, the optimum economic allocation
of resources be formulated in terms of this scale of values.
As individual consciousness is intentional so every economic
act implies motivation, and every economic system a direction
towards more or less definite objectives. If the ethically
given scale of values were completely detailed, and if a
precise computation of initially given technical and physical
resources were available, the purely economic problem of allo-
cation of these resources among alternative uses would be
theoretically solved, but only then, also, would the series
7lbid., loc. cit.; Philip H. Wicketeed, The Common Sense
of Political Economy. Routledge, London, 1933. Vol. I,
pp. 155-157.
1 1 T. C. Koopmans, Activity Analysis of Production and Allo-
cation, John Wiley, New York, 1051, (forthcoming), passim,
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of conditions be sufficient in number to determine the amount
8of goods and services to be allocated to every different use.
4. Finally, the third and last level of social action is
concerned with these physical and technological possibilities
of production, and then consideration of allocation of produc-
tive power will be symmetrical with and dependent for det-er-
mination upon the allocation of purchasing power at the ex-
change level, and of coercive power at the political level,
At this third level the economic problem is based upon physical
laws as premises, but never as conclusions, since economic
laws, as contrasted with purely physical laws, imply human
action rather than simply the physical processes by which
production is carried on.9 In other words, economic produc-
tion, as a social phenomenon, exhibits a hierarchical character,
or frame of reference, within which the economic agent behaves
rationally, and there may usually be a whole hierarchy of
10
such frames of order, among which the choice of adoption
of the appropriate norm lies always in the upper strata of
social action, As we shall see in detail the optimum condi-w
11tions of production determine a locus of "efficient points"
Ilbid., and idem, T"Interpersonal Comparison of Utility,"
Economic Journal, December 1938) vol. XLVIII, pp. 635-41,
9
J. N. Keynes, The Scogptand Method of Political Econowx,
Macomillan , L ondon , flTpp . 8-3.
0John von Neumann, The General Theory of Automata, as
discussed by H. A. Simon, Econometrica, vo1~. 19, January
1951, p. 72.
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but the problem is not determinate until there is the addition
to the technology of exchange activities at certain relative
prices. Thus, it is possible for markets fulfilling the pro-
duction requisites of perfect competition never to lead per se
to a stable allocation of resources, but to oscillate perpetu-
ally, as the "cobweb theorem" provides an appropriate example.
5. Besides this three-layer structure there are, as we
have seen, problems of organization as well as of order, i.e.,
normative and positive problems at each one of these three
levels of social action. Thus, the political problem of dis-,
tribution of coercive power is normative and organizational,
whereas tne juristic problem of application of these political
decisions is positive and legal. The economic problem of
distribution of income is a welfare normative problem of
organization of exchange, whereas monetary and banking prob-
lems are purely technical and positive, And even the tech-
nological problem of production may be normative and organi-
zational if it still admits choice and decision as to what
goods shall be produced, and how should they be produced
among different alternative solutions and possibilities. On
tte other hand, production may simply be guided by positive
criteria of efficiency once the normative decisions at the
upper levels have been reached and thereafter taken as given.
6. Havi~ng in mind these sociological considerations,
which summarize what nas been already stated about the theory
and structure of social action, we shall, in the remaining
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two sections of this thesis, exclusively deal with order and
organization of national and international economic action
at the exchange and technological levels of economic activity,
In this section we shall be concerned with the static and
dynamic determination of the necessary and sufficient condi-
tions for an uniquely given optimum and stable equilibrium
of production and exchange in a national as well as in an
international economic system, We shall try to demonstrate
that sufficient conditions for such an uniquely given stable
equilibrium can only be deduced if a stable political and
juridical structure is assumed to exist. This analysis will
proceed in two stages. In the first stage we shall attempt
at a characterization of a typical national economy, and, in
the second stage, we shall try to mesh national economies
thus defined into an international economic system. The
analysis shall be positive in the sense that only frameworks
of order, not of organization, shall be considered. These
will form the subject matter of the last section of this
dissertation. By order we mean that the aim of the analysis
conducted in this section is to determine in what sense, if
at all, perfect competition should be considered a framework
for an international economic system, and in what sense there
may be conflict between the requirements of a perfectly com-
petitive international economic order and the interests of
12
national groups. We aim here, precisely, at examining in
12Lionel Robbins, Economic Planningand International
Order, Macmillan, London, 1938, ch. XI.
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which way there may be conflict between, for instance, a
policy of maintaining an international balance in order to
achieve international stability, as against achieving domestic
prosperity and stability.1 Starting with the extreme hypothe-
sis of a spaceless, timeless, closed economy embracing a
typical national economic region, and then by meshing inter-
nationally these national economies into an economic system,
we shall try to describe, in each case, very simple models
working under optimum conditions of production and exchange.
After a static analysis these models will be dynamized, and
new conditions will be deduced to fit cyclical patterns.
This section, therefore, must of necessity be abstract and
schematic, For brevity as well as exhaustiveness, it may often
be presented in mathematical terms, which, however, we cannot
choose otherwise than very elementary, but we shall be care-
ful to translate in words all conclusions and considerations,
so that the trend of reasoning be not swamped in the pure
formalism of symbols,
7. A fundamental mathematical proposition of analysis.
A typical economic system is said to be expressible, in most
general terms, by a set of simultaneous equations describing
the structural functional interrelationships among variables
and parameters, defined as endogenous and exogenous variables.
it is a matter of convenience wnich variables shall be
1 3National and International Measures for Full Employment,
L.ake Success, New York, December 1949, p. 28.
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considered endogenous and which shall be classified as exo-
genous. Here we shall adopt the criterion of classifying
them in accordance with the region of the social action funcU-
tion upon which our attention is for the moment concentrated.
If, for instance, we are focusing upon exchange relation-
ships we shall consider both political as well as technologi-
cal forces as exogenous, and prices, profits, rents, interest,
etc., as endogenous, But if we are considering production
relationships exclusively we may consider prices as given
parameters, and output, employment, engineering technical
14data as unknown variables. Given, therefore, m exogenous
variables or parameters a, and n><m endogenous or unknown
variables i, the mathematical model of the economic system
will consist, if determined, of n independent structural or
equilibrium equations, equal in number to that of the endo-
genous variables in the system, as follows:
Ty(yi,...,oyn; a1 ,..., a.) = 0 i = 1,..., n (35)
where these implicit functions are transformation functions,
utility possibility functions, marginal productivity equations,
demand equations of consumer behavior, equations of inventory
fluctuations, etc., the exogenous variables or parameters,
the a's, being technical coefficients of input, retention,
14T. C. Koopmans, "When is an Equation System Complete
for Statistical Purposes?" in Statistical Inference in
Pxnamic Economic Models, Cowles Commission Monographil0,
John Wiley, New York, 1950, pp3 393-99.
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and output, social welfare coefficients, demand elasticities,
15
marginal propensities, etc. If omniscience were assumed
all possible implications contained in (35) would be instantly
known. The economic system would then be understood as analo-
gous to a tautological Leibnizian theodicy, where, by fault-
less deductive reasoning, we would be able to grind out of
the equilibrium system exactly those implications already in-
cluded in its structure, and the system would then be totally
explained. Short of omniscience, the equilibrium system.(35)
is bare and formal as long as we do not introduce, as work-
ing hypotheses, some specific operational relationships sup-
posedly holding between the endogenous unknown variables and
the explicit parameters, These hypotheses may be formulated
in the reduced form:
yi= y am) i = 1'-., n (36)
whose public validity may presumably be checked, by episte-
mological correlation, against the empirical observation of
economic reality. By means of this set of working hypo-
theses (36), the equilibrium conditions (35) may plausibly
be assumed to hold within a certain environment and of
certain data. In the absence of complete quantitative infor-
15L R. Klein, Economic Fluctuations in the United States,
1921-1941, Cowles Commission Monograph 11, John Wiley,
New York, 1950, p. 4; Jan Tinbergen, "Econometric Business
Cycle Research," Review of Economic Studies, vol, VII,
1940, reprinted in Reaig nBsns yl hoy
Blakiston, Philadelphia, 1944, pp. 63-6,
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mation concerning (35), it is, then, supposed as empirically
valid and operationally meaningful to express the unknown
variables as functions of the explicit parameters, thereby
placing immediately observable qualitative restrictions, such
as those implied by the concept of diminishing marginal pro-
ductivities or utilities, upon the responses of the equilibrium
system (35) to parametric changes.16
8. For the moment we are interested in determining the
extreme necessary and sufficient conditions of equilibrium
for functions given implicitly, such as those in (35), when
they define any one variable as function of the parameters,
as in (36). The philosophical implications of and objections
to the adoption of these fundamental mathematical proposi-
tions have already been expounded to some extent in section
17(I) of this thesis. Now we seek, specifically, to find
these necessary and sufficient conditions for an extreme
value df any Ti in (35), defined as a function with continu-
ous partial derivatives in a certain region, whenever sub-
sidiary conditions of the form (36) are imposed upon the
admissible values on the n endogenous variables yj. If the
n + m endogenous and exogenous variables in (35) are inter-
related between themselves by n independent and differentiable
16Paul A. Samnuelson, Foundations of Economic Analysis,
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass,, 1948, oh. II.
1 7 Arthur F. Bentley, Linguistic Analysis of Mathematics,
Principia Press, Bloomington, Indiana, 1932, oh. XIII.
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equations (36), then the various T only depend upon the m
independent, exogenous variables or parameters. Abstracting
discontinuities, all the values of these m exogenous variables
bringing Ti to an extreme position will reduce its total
differential to zero.i On the other hand, the equations
(36) can be differentiated totally, so that the following
system of n + I equations may be written:
PTdy+ 
... +rdyn + yjdai + .. * + Td =
dal+ ... + dam = dy
&Lda1 + ... + dam = dyn
By substituting the last n equations into the first, the in-
crements of the dependent variables, dy1 ,.,,, dyn, can be
eliminated-, The resulting equation, valid for each Ti,
+ Ti+n +9T)da + 0..
+ , +Y + o+ 
-dam =0f a. a. so
for all the m arbitrary increments in a,,.., am, can be de-
veloped into m equations of the form
PT' SS T n PTI
-+ + fa ,+ =0 j= 1, , 1M
which, together with the n equations of the set (36), will
constitute a system of n + in simultaneous equations sufficient
1 8 0h.-J. de La Vallde Poussin, Cours d'Analyse Infinitd-
siinale, Dover, New York, 1946, vol. 1, pp. 151-3.
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in number to determine the n + m exogenous as well as endo-
genous variables in (35). At equilibrium the numerical values
of the partial derivatives 3Ti/Jyk, for k=l,..., n, will be
determined, In general, this results in extrema between loci
of restraint and contour loci so familiar in economic theory,
The necessary first order conditions for a constrained maximum
or aiinimum may be written as follows:
Ti
YTiwa
9. In addition to these necessa conditions upon first
order partial derivatives, there are sufficient conditions on
the second partial derivatives, The meaning of these second-
ary conditions, requiring the definiteness of certain quadratic
forms, will not be dealt here in detail, since this would
19
lead us much too far afield, To obtain sufficient conditions
we write:
19Paul A. Samuelson, p, cit., appendix A, section IV,
pp. 365 ff.; R. G. D. Allen Mathematical Analysis for Econo-
mists, Macmillan, London, 1947, pp. 498-500; J. R. Hicks,
Value and Capital, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1946, mathematical
appendix, pp. 303-5; 8. Barnard and J. M. Child, Advanced
ALge&Sa, Macmillan, London, 1939, oh. II; R. Courant,
Differential and Integral Calculus, Interacience, New York,
1947, vol. II, appendix to oh. III, pp. 204-9; W, L, Orum and
Joseph A. Schumpeter, Rudimentary Mathematics for Economists
and Statisticians, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1946, footnote 2,
p. 178; William F. Osgood, Advanced Calculus, Macmillan,
New York, 1937, oh, VII, especially pp. 177-80,
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&T1 d2y _2T 2 32T'2
-1 + )y2 dy21 + dy 2
2
)2TI
+ 2 dy1dy2+ ... + . = d2 Ti
0y 2
which must be a negative definite quadratic form for all in-
crements d yj satisfying
d 2a+ Ida2 + ida22 *-
Pal 2 aaa 2 a2
+ 2 21 daida2 + ... +..= d2yi
pa 18a2 .
10. An alternative to the above treatment is provided
by the method of the so-called Lagragean multipliers.20 There
is, in fact, some loss of symmetry in the outlined procedure,
since endogenous and exogenous variables are not treated alike,
The Lagrangean method consists of multiplying the n last
equations in (IV,A,8) above by undetermined constants
A1, X2 ' .- ' ',An, thus
20QCh.-J.de La Valle Poussin, op, cit., vol. 1, pp. 152-3;
R. G, D, Allen, op. cit., pp. 366-7; R. Courant, op. cit.,
vol, II, pp, 190-9; William± F. Osgood, o2 cit4. pp. 180-5;
Paul A. Samuelson, op. cit,, appendix A. section III, p, 363;
as for the various economic interpretations of Lagrangean
wultipliers, ibid., pp. 37, 66 ff., 98, 131, 166, 192, 231,
and W. L, Crum and Joseph A. Schumpeter, op. cit., pp.
129-33, and in welfare economics, Enrico Barone, "The Ministry
of Production in the Collectivist State," in Celleotivist
E conomic Planning, Routledge , London, 1947, p. 233, and
Paul A. Samnuelson, p, cit., p. 231, and H., Hotelling, "The
General Welfare in Relation to Problems of Taxation and of
Railway and Utility Rates,." Econometrica, vol, VI, 1938,
pp . 242-269 .
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AT dy+ST )T STi
+ ... +3  dyn + a1  + dam = 0
-N1 y1 + A1  LYdaj + +.. . X$ dam
4nd~n +An da + .. n. +4n da = 0
Then we add these equations, term by term, getting
(Ti-1 ) dy 1 + ... + pAn)d7n +
+ ( +4A+ -- da +.
+ + A + . 4).+dam = 0
Then we pretend to maximize this function treating all the
variables as if they were independent, and treating the n
arbitrary multiplicative factors as undetermined constants.
Equating to zero the coefficients of the various differ-
entials, we obtain n + m equations, which, together with (36)
will comprise a set of m + 2n equations sufficient in number
to determine the values of the m + n variables and of the
n unknown multipliers. The system of equations formed with
the coefficients equated to zero is identical with a linear
expression of the general form
tf + 1F + \ 2F2 +X3gF3 +XA4 F4 + -- +Xkn n(38)
in which we consider the i's and a's as independent variables
and the N's as constants. This expression (38) is also
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very convenient for consideration of the sufficient condi-
tions depending on the sign of dTI when (35) is written
explicitly as a function of Ti. In virtue of (36) we have
Ti=9, and d2 T = d2x. After the necessary substitutions
an expression will be found whose properties will permit us
to discuss the sign of d2 T starting from an immediate elimi-
nation of the various second order differentials, This is
about all we need as a mathematical foundation to consider
the economic problems that follow.
11. General equilibrium in a closed economy. Suppose a
spaceless, timeless, closed economic system, consisting of
a very large but finite set of instantaneous economic acts.
This pure mechanism, from which even human beings are ab-
stracted, may be conceived as a frictionless action system,
such as tending to the maximization or minimization of a
given amount of energy. As there is no entropy in that
system, at each possible cross section of its path the inflow
of energy potential is equal to its outflow. This simplest
of all possible *economic" models may be expressed by the
following trivial identity:
S(Y)= 0D(Y) (39)
where S denotes supply or production; D, demand or consump-
tion, and Y, the energy potential supplied and- demanded,
But, going a small step ahead, suppose now that this energy
is identified, in economic terms, with a "circular flow'21
Asin Schumpeter.
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of cowodities Y, thus
Sh(Y.... Yr) = Dh(Y,..., hYr)=l,*-, r (40)
where there are r unknown variables, denoting groups of
22
commodities, and whose values emerge as a solution of the
set of r relationships specifying the hypothetical economic
system, But, again, all sorts of physical and organic con-
straints may be placed as conditions upon the situation ex-
pressed in the equilibrium system (40). Let, for instance,
the economic system consist of n products or goods X, and m
productive factors or services!. Then, the system (40) may
alternatively be specialized into (a) the 'classical" expres-
sion of equilibrium:
si (X... Xn) - D 1 ,..., i) = 0 i = 1,..., n (41)
where the Xi, i=1,..., n, are the unknown endogenous variables,
and the Vj, jzl,.., m, the parametric exogenous variables;
or (b) into a "Keynesian" counterpart of (41):
s3(v0...., Vm) DJ('---, Xn) = 0 J =-1,..., m (42)
where, conversely, the V.! are the unknown variables; and the
Xi, the parameters. Both systems (41) as well as (42) may
be presented as implicit functions like (35), constrained
by side relation of the explicit form of (06).
12. Equilibrium here means simply that the values of
the variables are determined by the set of conditions and
I 22 leaning, always, goods and services.
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nothing else. The systems (41) and (42) together imply a
general equilibrium system like (40), and involve n + m
variables for n + a equations, the parameters, then, being
taken as data referring to such non-economic matters as tastes,
technology, governmental and institutional framework, etc.23
Thus, a general equilibrium system may be inspected (a) from
the production side of the economy, by taking productive
factors as parameters, i.e., "classically":
TI(X 1 ,..., Xn; --- 'V . (m) = 0i = ,..., n (43)
which are explained (1) by n explicit production functions of
the general form:
Xi(Vii , V12',. Vm) = Xi i = 1.-.., n (44)
where the first subscript of the arguments indicates the prod-
uct "row", and the second subscript, the factor "column" 2 4
in the matrix of production conditions restricting the gen-
erality of (43) to a specific technological environment, and
in such way that Vij means that a certain amount of the jth
factor is applied to the production of the ith good; and
(2) by m full employment equations of the form:
V =Vig + V2j + ... + Vnj 3 = 1,..., i (45)
23R. Frisch, "On the Notion of Equilibrium and Disequilib-
rium," Review of Economic Studies, vol. III, 1936, pp. 100-5;
J* Tinbergen, "Annual Survey: Suggestions on Quantitative
Business Cycle Theory," Economnetrica, vol. III, 1935,
pp . 241-308.
24.C. Aitken, Determinants and Matrices, Oliver and
Boyd, London, 1949, p. 4.
expressing the parametric relationships in (44), and where
the same notation regarding subscripts applies in relation
to the Jth factor column.
13. As long as equations (43) are assumed to be symmetri-
cal, they can be reversed. As it is heuristically convenient
also to consider products as parameters and productive serv-
ices as unknown variables, let us interpret the equilibrium
system now as (b) a set of "Keynesian" transformation functions:
T3(Vit*... ym; X1 ,..., Xn) = 0 j = 1,..., m (46)
which are explained (1) by m employment functions 2 5
v t(X31 , j2' Xn-V j =l,...,i M (47)
where the employment of the jth factor is a function of the-
demand for products, and where the first subscript indicates
the employed factor "row", and the second subscript the line
of employment "column" in the matrix of employment conditionB
constraining (46), such that means the prospective or
final demand for the ith product necessary for the employment
of the jth factor in the ith production line; and (2) by n
inputation equations:
ki=Xl± + Ni+ *.. + Xmi i 1,le--- n (48)
expressing a parametric relationship in (4?), and where the
same convention regarding "rows" and "columns" applies to the
ith product column.
25As suggested in W. Leontief, "Structural Matrices of
National Economies," Econometrica, vol, 17, supplement,
July 1949, p. 278.
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14. These sets of equations (44-5) and (47-8) specialize
the sets (43) and (46), which in their turn are reformula-
tions of (41) and (42), further developing (40) and (39).
They are sufficient in number to determine the values of the
n + m variables, and they form the core of a general equilib-
rium system expressing the transformation of factors into
products and products into factors, in two coincident phases
of production and consumption, or supply and demand. The
sets (43) and (46) can be aggregated into two simple im-
plicit equations by equating to zero the summed squares of
the n implicit equations in (43), and the m in (46). This
practice, although evidently convenient, effaces the fact
that goods (services) divide up into two or more groups such
that no productive service (product) is employed (consumed)
by more than one group. In a national economy there are at
least as many such independent transformation functions as
there are possibilities of partial equilibrium within non-
competing product or factor groups. However, for simplicity,
we shall, for the moment, adopt the first alternative, by
assuming that the conclusions resulting from the general
equilibrium analysis apply, under ceteris paribus hypothesis,
to each partial equilibrium sub-system. We must also now
emphasize that the basic assumption underlying the genera
equilibrium system expressed in (43) and (46), and their
side relations, is that of a maximizing energy operating in
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a purely physical world and realizing along its circular
path the fundamental equalization of the real value of the
marginal product and the real value of the marginal factor
inputation, or the marginal value product and the value of the
26
marginal product.
27
15. This may be translated in mathematical terms. By
differentiating (44) and (47) we write, for (44),
)y i+ ...0+ dVim dXi i =1,..., n (49)
and, for (47),
;Xii + ... +$-dXjn = dVj j = 1 m (50)jl jn
We multiply both sides of (49) by the price of the ith product,
fl, and both sides of (50) by the Jth factor price w.
Denote the value of the marginal productivity of any jth
factor in any ith production line as the value of the jth
factor's share in the increment of the ith product:
pixi w (51)
DVii
Denote, moreover, the marginal value of the ith product as
26George J. Stigler, The Theory of Price, Macmillan,
New York, 194?, p. 244; J. Robinson, The Economics of Imperfect
Competition, Macmillan, London, 1933, ohs. 8-12, and 14;
E. Chamberlin, The Theory of Monopolistic Competition, Harvard
University Press,.Cambridge, Mass., pp. 178 ft., 188 ft.,
215 ff.; H. F. Kahn, "Some Notes on Ideal Output", Economic
Journal, vol. XLV, 1933, pp..1-5,
27J. H. Hicks, The Theory _of Wages, Peter Smith, New York,
1948, appendix, pp.^236-9; a. Triff in, Monopolistic Competition
and General Equilibrium Theory, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, Mass., 1947, pp. 110-2.
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the marginal cost of employing an increment of any jth factor
in the ith production line:
wj V i (52)
We get, for (49) and (50), respectively,
wjdVij =pdX (53)
and
n
YpidXj = wjdV (54)
implying a constant product-price factor-wage rate, or, in
Marshallian terms, that the "marginal utility" of money is
constant, if we wish to interpret (53) and (54) this way,
But it would not be too difficult to reformulate these ex-
pressions in terms of partial elasticities of product or
factor substitution. As a linear approximation we may assume
that (44) and (47) are homogeneous of the first degree, and
applying Euler's theorem28 (53) and (54) become, respectively,
m
ZwjVij = pixi(55)J=1
28George J. Stigler, Production and Distribution Theories,
Macmillan, New York, 1949, ch. XII; Philip H. Wicksteed,
Co-ordination of the Laws of Distribution, London School of
Economics and Political Science, London, 1932, pp. 8-10;
K. Wicksell, Lectures on Political Economx, op. cit., vol. 1,
pp. 178 ff.; Leon Walras, "Note saur la Refutation de Ia
Theorie Anglaise du Fermage do M4. Wicketeed," republished as
an appendix to the third edition of Walras' Elements, 1896,
and omitted in subsequent editions; Etienne Antonelli,
L'Economie Pure dui Capitalisme, Marcel Riviere, Paris, 1939,
for L. Walras' correspondence with Enrico Barone on the
marginal productivity theory of distribution.
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and
n-
Pij i =w V (56)
These formulations, however,, restrict the validity of (53)
and (54) to cases where factor supply and product demand are
perfectly elastic, and there are constant returns to scale
in all lines of production, as well as linear shapes in factor
employment functions,
16, The necessary as well as sufficient conditions for
equilibrium of this simple model can now be stated. First
we have to minimize real costs of production subject to the
technological restrictions of the production functions. The
necessary condition is that (53) vanish subject to (49) being
zero. Using direct or undetermined multiplier methods as
outlined above (IV,A,8-10), the necessary condition takes
the form
i = 1,--., n (57)
$vl 9 2  DVim
Then, we have to maximize employment of factors subject to
the distribution restrictions of the employment functions.
The necessary condition is that (54) vanish subject to (50)
being zero, that is,
If L1= 1,..., a (58)
Dx 2 n
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There are m - equations in (57) and n - 1 in (58), but
these sets each one of which together-with their side rela-
tions are sufficient to determine: (a) the equilibrium em-
ployments of the factors in terms of given output and the
given prices of the factors expressed as marginal produc-
tivities of these factors in the various lines of production;
and (b) the equilibrium consumption of the products in terms
of given input and the given prices of the products expressed
as marginal costs of the factors in the various lines of
production. The sufficient conditions, in both cases, refer
to the second order differentials of (49) and (50) being
negative definite quadratic forms as in (IV,A,9), With these
introductory remarks regarding some important properties of
general equilibrium systems we shall now turn to the deter-
mination of the optimum, necessary as well as sufficient,
conditions of production and exchange in a simplified micro-
static model of a typical national economic system,
17. The optimumproduction conditions, In order to
derive the optimum conditions of production in this simple
model we must either maximize (43) subject to the boundary
conditions (44) and (45), or, in an equivalent way, to mini-
mize (46) subject to the side relations (47) and (48), i.e.,
either maximize "national product" or minimize its dual
"national expenditure." 
-If we can specify arbitrarily all
but one output (input), we can maximize (minimize) the
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remaining one. This may be derived either by direct methods
or by using Lagrangean multipliers. Each method has its
own peculiar conveniences and disadvantages. With n side
relations (44), we seek to maximize (43) involving _n+M
unknown variables and parameters constrained by technological
relationships of the production functions (44). Following
the steps indicated in (IVA,8) the necessary condition for
a maximum follows:
i ,n p
"Xl V n1  9 i
STi X1
D Xn Dy11  9 lm
We arrive at this result by the direct method not only with
a loss of mathematical elegance in the treatment of the un-
known and parametric variables but also with some loss of
insight into the working of the economic system formalistioally
expressed in mathematical terms. This can be remedied by
using the method of the undetermined multipliers. We follow
now the steps described in (IV,A,10). The following Lagran-
gean multiplier expression may be written in extenso:
-l ~ i + .. +1- Xn) da n + . .
LIXI {.dr3. + -.-. +~X 9X dVnj (60)
j=1 13 j=1 ~n
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If we compare the role of these various Xi, 1=1,..., n, with
that of the various pj, i=L,.., n, in (IV,A, 15-16) we shall
readily see that these undetermined multipliers may be inter-
preted here simply as market prices for products taken as
29
parametric constants. They are, in fact, the expression
of marginal costs, and the Lagrangean expression (60) may in
its turn be interpreted as the formulation of the national
economyts "national output." By disposing the n arbitrary
factors in such a way as to make the coefficients of the
n differentials dX, i=,..., n, vanish, thus
Ti (61)
clearly exhibiting the marginal cost character of these X,
we see that, in (60), there will remain only arbitrary dif-
ferentials, and if, then, the other coefficients also vanish,
(60) yields the same set of equations as in (59). Note more-
orer that the same procedure may be applied to the minimiza-
tion of (46) subjectto (47) and (48). The Lagrangean multi-
pliers will, this time be passive of interpretation as factor
prices equal to the various factors' marginal value produc-
2 9 Enrico Barone, "The Ministry of Production in the Col-
lectivist State" in Collectivist Economic Planning, op. cit.,
appendix A, pp. 253 ff.; H. Hotelling, op. cit., loc, cit.;
Paul A. Samuelson, Foundations of Economic Analysis, op. cit.,
p. 231; Melvin W. Heder, Studies in the Theory of Welfare
Economics, Columbia University Press, New York, 1949, cha. II;
Abram (Burk) Bergson, "A Reformulation of Certain Aspects of
Welfare Economics," Q~atryJunlo conomics, February
1938, pp. 313-4; Oscar Lange, "On the EconomicThelory of
Socialism" in OnteEooi hoyo oils, University
of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis. Minn., pp. 67-72.
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tivities. The alternative set of necessary conditions could
then be expressed as follows:
T m i A
in X11 X1
which, according to (51) and (52), may alternatively be re-
formulated as follows:
bV1 byi1  Pnl
- ~~ ~(65)
DVm b?1  bVnm
which, together with (59) define a locus of minimax "efficient
points" along which the model economy's "national output"
maxima coincides with a path of "national expenditure'
30
minima.
18. This, now, may be translated back to words. The
necessary first order conditions for an extreme value of (43)
and (46) constrained by (44-5) and (47-8) may be stated as
follows: (a) productive factors will be correctly allocated
among production activities when the ratio of any factor's
30T. C. Koopmans, "A Mathematical Model of Production,"
Econometrica, vol. 1?, January 1949, p. 74.
31Paul A. Samuelson, Op. cit., pp. 232-3.
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marginal physical productivities in producing any two goods
is the same as that of any other factor in the same two lines
of production, the common ratio of proportionality being
equal to the reciprocal of the marginal cost of one good ex-
pressed in terms of the other, displaced, good; (b) products
will be correctly imputed to factors when the ratio of any
two factor's marginal value productivities in producing the
same good is the same as that of these two factors in any
other line of production, the common ratio of proportionality
being equal to the reciprocal of the marginal revenue of
one factor expressed in terms of the other, displaced, factor,
19. These are merely necessary conditions for a regular
relative constrained extreme value of (43) and (46), but
now the question arises whether and when the "generalized
locus of efficient points" implied in (59), (62) or (63)
yields true extreme values of (43) and (46), or simply sta-
tionary ones. In addition, therefore, to these first
order necessary conditions second order sufficient conditions
on the second partial derivatives must be sought. The pro-
cedural steps have already been indicated in (IV,A,9). Such
sufficient conditions say that in order for the generalized
locus of efficient points to give relative maximum (minimum)
values of Ti (or T ) they must satisfy the necessary con-
ditions, and, moreover, d T must be a negative definite
2Ibid., appendix A, pp. 364-5; R. Courant, op. cit.,
vol. II, appendix to chi. III, pp. 204 ff,
I
quadratic form for all increments d2X1 . Substituting, one
by one, each d Xj, i=,..., n, in the expanded expression
for d2TI, there will be a relative maximum value of Ti if
the resulting quadratic form is negative definite, i.e., if
the determinant formed from the coefficients in d2Tt bordered
with the partial derivatives for the marginal productivities,
and all its principal minors, are alternatively positive and
negative. For Tj to be at a minimum the sufficient second
order condition is that its quadratic form be positive defi-
nite as shown by these determinantal properties. These same
conclusions would, of course, have been reached by using
Lagrangean multipliers instead of direct methods. In sum-
mary, it will be only in exceptional cases in which (44) and
(47) are homogeneous of the first degree that the generalized
locus of efficient points, determined by (59), (62) or (65),
will contain in its path the extreme values of (43) and
(46). It is only under constant returns to scale assump-
tion, or, at least, in absence of decreasing costs, that it
is possible to find the optimum conditions of production as
of fixed prices, for only under constant returns to scale
will prices, wages, marginal value productivities, costs,
and revenues be kept in line, and competition be the way
automatically to determine the optimum productive position
for the economy. Having thus apparently exhausted the
50For a graphical demonstration by means of an Edgeworth-
Bowley-Lerner box diagram, in the two-product two-factor
case see W. F. Stolper and Paul A. Samuelson, "Protection and
Real Wages," Review of Economic Studies, vol. IX, 1941,
pp. 58-74.
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principal theoretical implications for production of this
first approximation static model, we now turn to the deter-
mination of the optimum exchange conditions,
20, The optimum conditions of exchange. In dealing ex-
clusively with the optimum conditions of production at the
technological level of the social action function it has. been
possible to abstract human beings from the economic model,
and speak, we hope meaningfully, exclusively in terms of a
maximizing energy potential not very dissimilar from certain
54thermodynamic concepts of analysis. This procedure,
however, cannot be maintained beyond the limits of a purely
technological economy. The existence of human beings happens
to be mandatory at the economic realm of exchange. Let,
then, the economic system consist not only of n products X,
and m factors V, but also of s individuals U, who are assumed
to be completely identifiable with their personal and sup-
posedly invariant indifference-preference subjective maps.
Let us, for convenience, lump together in r commodities Y,
as in (40), the n goods X and the m services V. The amount
of commodities owned, temporarily controlled, chosen for
consumption, or bought by each individual can be written with
a superscript denoting its owner, or controlling agent, and
L. Amnoroso, Lezioni di Economia Matematica, Laterza,
Bologna, 1921 pp. 460-72; Franqois Moch, Sur l'tvolution
des Syst~mes Lconomiques" in X Crisis, October-December 1953,
January-February 1954.
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a subscript denoting the commodity type. Then, Y, k=1,.., a;
a=l,..., r=l,..., n, n + 1,.., n + m. With these notations
in mind, we may set up the following transformation function
characterizing the social action function along its exchange
domain:
Tk(Ul,..., U8 ; Yi,,.., Yr) = 0(64)
which is explained (1) by a utility functions of the form
Uk(Yk1 ,Yka ) * k k = 1,..., s (65)
and (2) by r national product equations
hIh + Y2h +..+ Y8h h = 1,,.., r (66)
expressing the parametric relationship existing in- (64).
21. In a purely technological economy the assumption
of marginal analysis applicability implied that factors of
production should be regarded as being indifferent between
different uses. Otherwise, there would be no meaning in
transformation functions. Analogously, it is assumed now
that commodities and services consumed or provided by any one
individual in no way differ from those consumed or provided
by another, and also, in order to deduce meaningful marginal
conditions that a given type of productive service may be
used indifferently in a number of uses., Thus, the implicit
relationship (64) is interpreted as meaning that there is a
priori in any economic system a number of possibilities for
3Abram (Burk) Bergson. op. cit., pp. 310-2.
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transforming particular configurations of commodities into
individual preferences for specific social states of affairs
exhibited by this particular distribution of economic re-
sources. Of course, there will be as many transformation
functions as there are individuals in the system. These con-
ceivable transformation functions Tk, k=l,..., s, although
forming a system, will for the moment be regarded as a single
representative transformation function carrying a superscript
to differentiate from the previous T and Tj. This aggrega-
tion will be relaxed later.
22. We must now maximize (64) after arbitrary specification
of all unknown variables, U , for all individuals but one, and
subject to the restriction imposed by the utility function
(65) and the constraint (66) that there be fixed totals of
all goods and services in the economy.36 As the only ethical
judgment underlying the maximization of (43) and (46) was
that more of any one output other goods and services being
constant, is desirable, and, similarly, that less input for
the same amount of output is desirable, in analogous form it
may now be plausibly assumed that only if all individuals
are made better (worse) off can we definitely state that a
36 Paul A. Samuelson, op. cit., pp. 236-7; Kenneth J. Arrow,
"A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare," Journal of
Political Economi , vol. LVIII, August 1950, n. 4, p. 333;
0. Lange, "The Foundation of Welfare Economics," Econometrica,
vol. X, 1942, pp. 215-28.
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given movement of commodities is good (bad). Moreover, the
transformation function (64) implies other less evident
assumptions, such as, for instance, that in this hypothetical
economic system the well-being of individuals, i.e., the
satisfaction of individual preferences as to a certain com-
37
bination of goods and services is to count. And it is
perhaps convenient to stress that, following a modern trend,
the notion of- utility is here taken as ordinal instead of
cardinal, that is, that the individual Uk, k=1,..., s, cannot
be made identical or even comparable on the basis of their
personal indifference-preference maps, and that, therefore,
individual utilities cannot be added either in the same
person and much less collectively. However, the assumption
of rational choice is upheld, i.e., of the transitivity of
either preference or rejection in regard to some collection
of goods, For simplicity, moreover, we assume in this
Abram Bergson, "Socialist Economics," in A Survey of
Contemporary Economics, Blakiston, Philadelphia, 1948,
pp. 414 ff.; Theo Suranyi-Unger, Private Enterprise and
Governmental Planning, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1950, appendix
to part II, pp. 327-8; Vilfredo Pareto, Manuel d'Economie
PolitiquVe, Marcel Giard, Paris, 1927, pp. 661-2.
38I. H. D. Little, A Critique of Welfare Economics,
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1950, ch. II; R. T. Norris, Trhe
Tneorytof Consumer's Demand, Yale University Press, New Haven,
1941, oh. 3; Paul A, Samuelson, "A Note on the Pure Theory
of Consumer's Behavior, " Economica, February 1938, vol. V,
pp. 61-2.
256
first approximation that the infinitesimal approach yields
meaningful conditions for an extreme value of various functions,
altnough we cannot deny that, with the aid of some other tool
of analysis, such as the topological theory of convex sets,
a more realistic perception of the economic system may in
general be realized. It is perhaps advisable to insist that,
for the moment, we shall simply assume that the familiar
indifference curve is a sort of behavior line placed as a
frontier between preferences and rejections as revealed by
an infinite number of behavior statements of individuals
Uk k-l,,,*, s, concerning their future economic conduct.
Tnerefore, in this typical national economy under considera-
tion it is implicitly supposed that eacri individual citizen
behaves in the way in wnich he declared he would behave, so
that all types of bluffing are abstracted from the picture,
and also that, for each individual, this infinite number of
ex-ante declarations of intention are known by every other
individual in the system. This is, we agree, a very strict
assumption, to say the least, but, we hope, justifiable on
grounds of simplicity and generality of analysis.
23, Indeed, apropos of this last assumption, we should
like to point out tnat the "realistic," normative, sociologi-
cal, and institutional theory of economic behavior, as im-
plied, for instance, in the modern theory of production and
allocation known as "linear programming" or "activity
237
analysis," is nothing else but a special case of the "pure,"
positive, classical, and marginal theory of economic behavior.
Smooth indifference surfaces, even in hyper-space, are extreme
cases of polyhedral ones, and our excuse for not considering
special cases at this stage is that any such consideration,
though, in principle, making the theory appear more realistic,
would in practice only lead to no general conclusions, fail-
ing thereby to justify its adoption, Moreover, had we at-
tempted to include specific economic behavior in our analy-
sis,.many other peculiarities of conduct, perhaps more con-
siderable than the knowledge of particular shapes of indiffer-
ence curves or surfaces, would claim admission to the array
of arguments in (64), such as random disturbances, weather
changes, sunspots, wars, revolutions, warts on Cromwell's
nose, etc. For the sake of Bimplification and generalization
these elements, however important they may be, were thor-
oughly abstracted, Thus, the transformation function (64),
expressing the social action function in its purely economic
domain of exchange is supposed to consist exclusively of
commodities, taken as parameters, and individual utilities
as unknown variables, Unlike the transformation functions
(43) and (46) expressing the social action function at the
technological level of production, the transformation function
(64) does not admit a symmetrical reversion, as long as pre-
cise assumptions are not made concerning its political and
I Juridical superstructure,
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24. With these numerous qualifications in mind we shall
now try to determine the pure exchange conditions for an
optimum distribution of the national product in the simple
model of a typical economic system. We must, therefore,
maximize (64), where the national "basket" of goods and serv-
ices, Yh' is the parametric aggregate, and the various Uk
the unknown variaoles, subject to the side relations (65)
and (66), Using Lagrangean multipliers or direct methods,
the first order necessary conditions for a maximum take the
form69
____ 
DU
. 9ys(67)
r . r6
or, alternatively, by subdividing commodities into goods and
services, and considering services as negative goods:
=...=. 1 _ ,g=l,..., n (68)
Pul SUsD X 1 X E
39Paul A. Samuelson, Foundations of Economic Analysis,
op._cit., p. 237 and footnote 33; Jacob L. Mosak, General
Eguilibrium Theory in International Trade, Principia Press,
Bloomington, Indiana, Cowles Commission Monograph n. 7, 1944,
pp. 5-8; J. R. Hicks, Value and Capital, op, cit., appendix
pp. 305-6; idem, "Foundations of Welfare Economics," Economic
Journal, vol. XLIX, December 1939, pp. 696-712; Melvin W.
Reder, Studiesn teTeryo efreEconomics, op. cit.,
oh. II.
bv%
Du5
jh=l,.. ., m (69)
or, combining (68) and (69), considering (67):
PU5
9
IU5
Dx
j]=1,,.., mn
1=1,..., n
(70)
where only marginal ratios of substitution for the same
individual are ever involved, no common ratio of proportion-
ality between individual utilities being postulated, due to
the absence of specific assumptions on interpersonal utility
comparison,
25. These first order necessary conditions can be stated
40
in words as follows; goods and services will be correctly
40Paul A. Samuelson, pmcit,,Iloc, cit.; I. M, D. Little,
op. cit., pp. 121-7; or graphically in F. Y. Edgeworth,
Mathematical Psychics, C. Kegan Paul, London, 1881, pp. 20.1;
idem, Papers Relating to Political Economy, Macmillan,
London, 1925, vol. II, pp. 306-7, 315-9; A. L. Bowley, The
Mathematical Groundwork of Economics,.Clarendon Press,
Oxford, 1924, p. 9; W. Leontief,'The Pure Theory of Guaran-
teed Annual Wage Contract," Journal of Political Economy,
February 1946, pp. 76-9.
and
'U'
PV1
a
8TU1
PU'
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allocated among individuals when (a) the marginal rate of
substitution between any two goods is the same for every in-
dividual who consumes them both; (b) the marginal rate of
substitution between any two services is the same for every
individual who supplies them both; (c) the marginal rate of
substitution between providing more (less) of any service
and obtaining more (less) of any good is the same for every
individual who provides that service in exchange for that
good. There is a "locus of contract points" satisfying these
necessary exchange conditions.
26. Combining now these optima given by (59), (62), and
(67) tne full first order conditions of equilibrium which
must hold for an optimum position of production and consump-
41
tion or exchange may be mathematically expressed as follows;
9U ST' 3X6
j. &Xi 9 g
- --= (71)
DXxk X DEVi
and
9Uk ST3  c9XI
V 1V3  (72)
DU 9T3  A
O~kh h ih
4tPaul A. Samuelson, op.cit., p. 239; A. P. Lerner, "The
Concept of Monopoly and the Measurement of Monopoly Power,N
Review of Economic Studies , June 1934, vol. I, pp. 157-75.
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or, combining (71) and (72):
Uik TJ
bk
Vk. V 3X l
where k=l,..., 8; i,g=l,,..., n; h, j=l,..., in.
27. If by individual we mean now in lato sensu, not only
physical persons but also collective economic agents
(Wirtschaftssubjekt), -as households and business firms; if
we take account of the restrictions imposed upon the systems
by equations (45) and (48); if it is assumed that every
factor is used in every production line, and something is
produced of every good; and, finally , if marginal properties
are not denied cy indivisioilities, then, the conditions
(71-5) can be expressed in words as follows: commodities will
be correctly allocated in production and consumption when
(a) there is a common marginal rate of substitution between
any two goods for every individual who consumes or uses
them both, the commion proportionality ratio being equal to
the ratio at which one of these goods can be transformed
into the other by transferring any factor from the production
of one good to that of the other;.(b) there is a common
marginal rate of substitution between any two productive
services for every individual who provides or produces them
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both, the common proportionality ratio being equal to the
ratio at which one of these services can be replaced by the
other in the production of the same amount of output; (c)
there is a common marginal rate of substitution between
supplying more of any productive service and enjoying more
consumption or use of any good for every individual who
supplies that service and consumes or uses that good, or,
alternatively, between enjoying wore leisure and enduring
less conswption or use of any good for every individual who
enjoys that leisure and suffers its consequent scarcity,
the common ratio of proportionality in both cases being equal
to tne m4reinal (value) productivity of the factor in the
production of this good, or to the reciprocal of the ratio
at wnioh consuming more of that good results in an increased.
supply of the factor in question. These conditions can be
restated in terms of costs by saying that, under the constant
returns to scale assumption, wnen it is possible to derive
consistent second order sufficIent conditions for an extreme
value, the total cost incurred in the production of the
optimum output must be at a minimum and, then, price must
be equal, and not merely proportional to marginal cost 5
This rule is perfectly general and holds regardless whether
42
there are "profits" or "losses.' Note, however, that no
42.P. Lerner, "Economic Theory and Socialist Economy,"
Review of Economic Studies, October 1934, vol. II, pp. 51-61;
idem, "Statics and Dynamics in Socialist Economics," Economic
(continued)
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matter how we express these joint supply-demand, production-
consumption necessary conditions of an optimum position of
equilibrium, we must observe that we have not yet been provided
with a unique solution for the system, either along the locus
of efficient production or on the locus of exchange contracts.
In (71-3) we are still short of s - I equations, and these
can only be supplied on the basis of a further assumption
concerning the exact form of the social action function, which
can only be defined in terms of a set of ethical values,
politically determined, and juridically implemented. Thus,
we hope to have briefly but exhaustively demonstrated the
central theme of this thesis, i.e., that propositions of
economic organization, based exclusively on economic consider-
ations of production and consumption, do not provide a unique,
optimum equilibrium position for a national or an international
economic system.
28. Optimum conditions of general equilibrium of a
national economy. It has been the central theme of this dis-
sertation that, in society, no optimum position can ever be
deliberately attained and maintained by the free play of
automatic, purely mechanistic economic forces. As this is
Journal, June 1937, vol. XLVII, pp. 253-70; idem, Economic
of Control, Macmillan, New York, 1947, pp. 72-8; S. F. M.
Durbin, 'Economic Calculus in a Planned Economy," Economic
Journal, December 1936, vol. XLVI, pp. 676-90; B. H. Coase,
"The Marginal Cost Controversy," Economaica, August 1946,
vol. XIII, pp. 167-82.
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a theorem, and not an axiom, in the theory of social action
here outlined, we have tried to demonstrate its consistency
and adequacy by philosophical and sociological reasoning. In
concentrating our attention now on economics this theorem
has acquired an expected acuteness in the question of deter-
mining whether and in what sense perfect competition theo-
retically realizes the optima of production and allocation.
We have so far tried rigorously to demonstrate that, under
certain rigorous assumptions regarding the shape of production
urctions, perfect competition realizes equilibrium at an
infinity of positions, but that it is not possible to deduce
which is the optimum point of equilibrium if we are not pro-
vided with more than atonistically competitive markets to
build upon. This is only as it should be, for the sense of
what is good or bad is a value orientation which can only be
given from outside any scientific system. In order, there-
fore, to determine, unambiguously, the theoretical character-
istics of the optimum position of production and allocation
in a mincrostatic general equilibrium economic model, we
need a set of ethical judgments expressing, in terms of
good and bad, the intentions, objectives, or ends of social
action of our hypothetical national economy. This set of
ethical judgments, defining what commodities shall be pro-
duced and in what quantities, how shall they be produced and
for whom are they to be produced4 will provide a scale by
45Paul A. Samuelson, Economics: an Introductory Analysis,
McGraw-Hill, New York, 1948, pp. 12-a; George J. Stigler,
The Theory of Price, gp._cit., pp. 32-5; Frank H. Knight,
"Social Economic Organization" in Syllabus for the Second-Year
Course in the Social Sciences, University of Chicago Press.
Chicago, 1933, pp. 130-?.
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wnich to evaluate, in economic terms products and factors,
satisfactions and efforts, as a system of rewards and penal-
44
ties, We have called this scale of values, this hier-
archical frame of reference concerning ends, the order of
social action.
29. Before any nistorical or cultural determination of
such order for a certain society there is, conceivably, a
number of alternative possibilities for social integration.
Suppose that there had been, for our economic model, _z
alternative possibilities for the existential realization of
tais order W. Aprioristically, therefore, we can express
this in a transformation possibility function as follows:
P(w1'- E; U11..., U6; -r) = 0 (74)
Once a society is nationally organized this social order
becomes politically explicit, by imposition or consent, and
thereafter it will be juridically assured through legal im-
plementation and police coercion as the sovereign authority
of the state. This constitutionally reduces the possibilities
for social existence expressed in (40), to a social action
function of the form
We(U11 +--, Us; Yk,..., Yr =e (75)
whlich defines the economic system in terms of action as con-
sisting essentially of (a) a situation, amounting to a set
44J. M. Clark, "Distribution" in Encyclopaedia of Social
Sciences, op, cit., vol, 5, pp. 167-73.
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of constraining physical conditions as well as of a set of
means given as an initial factor endowment; (b) an objective,
consisting of a set of ends arranged in order of importance,
and whose realization is to be maximized, as well as of a
set of norms conducive to the realization of these ends.
These elements, as we have already seen (II,0,7), are entirely
general in character, since they are synthetic a priori cate-
45
gories of intentional consciousness, but as such they are
entirely formal, acquirin% specificity only when certain
assumptions are expressed concerning the functional relation-
snips existinL between them. We proceed to make these as-
sumptions and relationships explicit for the microstatic
general equilibrium system we are trying to characterize,
30. The first basic assumption concerns the political
structure of social action in a typical nationally integrated
economic system. This assumes that tne state allocates, on
legal and institutional basis, to the economic agents, ie.,
paysical as well as juridical persons, control or coercive
power over a certain amount of commodities, i.e., goods and
services, The state thereby assures to tnese economic agents
a given real income, expressed in abstract purchasing power,
and equal to their receipts from selling goo.ds or services
4F. von iiayek, "Thae Facts of Social Sciences," Ethics,
October 1945, pp. 11-5; Paul A. Sweezy, The Tneory of CapI-
talistQevelopmnent, Oxford University Press, New York, 1942,
pp. 4-5,
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they own or control. This is a purely definitional budget
identity, and it is no equilibrium assumption in strict sense,
for it holds independently of whether the economic system is
in equilibrium or not. Nevertheless, it is absolutely neces-
sary to make equilibrium determinate by giving an economic
meaning to resource scarcities, and providing demand and sup-
ply curves with the appropriate slopes. Properly interpreted,
moreover, this political assumption implies that the model
has been provided with a fiscal system to be managed by the
government in a great number of ways all of which have in
common the fact that they define particular configurations
of commodities to oe assigned to the economic agents under a
given political state of affairs. Next to this political
assumption there is the second basic subjective assumption
concerning the maximization of satisfaction or income and
the minimization of effort or expenditure. This is the sub-
Jective assumption concerning purchasing power allocation
which is characteristic of the exchange level of the social
action function, The total market supply of goods and serv-
ices being assumed as fix'ed, at each period of time, the
economic agents maximize utility given their tastes and their
real incomes asa publicly sanctioned control over certain
amounts of goods and services; and minimize disutility1
given also tastes and real incomes, by selling their produc-
tive services to the highest bidder, In both cases the
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econoamic agent aotin% as demander of goods or as supplier of
services necessitates the fulfilllent of a third assumption
in wnicn ne is supposed to act as supplier of goods and
demander of services, This third level concerns, as we have
already seen, with the structure of production as the tech-
nological 'activity of the social action function. There,
the tonal supply of goods and services is variable, and econ-
oic aents maximize real revenue 4iven the physical conditions
of production and tne social conditions of ownership or con-
trol over certain amount of commodities. Rational behavior
assures maximization of returns over costs, or the realiza-
tion of a certain collection of commodities at a preassigned
future date,
31. All tnis can be expressed mathematically as a
specialization of the social action function (75). A typical
national economy is conceived as a set of economic decisions
or activities, obeying norms of economic behavior which is
limited by political, psychological, and technical restraints.
Tiese decisions are executed Oy a individuals U controlling
r commodities Y k=1,...s, , which can ue subdivIded into
n goods x 1 :, i=l,..., n, and mn productive factors V
j=l,..., m. The social action function may then be reformu-
lated as follows:
V 5 ,,.., Vam) = e (76)
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which is explained by the reduced forms (a) ns production
functions:
Xki(V l...$ im) = 1X i = 1,..., n (77)
and (b) ms employment functions;
Vk3(X 1,..., tjn) =
where k = 1,..., s. Restraining (77) and (78) there is the
full employment or full resource appropriation equation:
Y Yh IX1 + V = k X + fV(79)
Z2. From (76) and its reduced forms (77) and (78) with
their constraint (79) we can extract the necessary first
order conditions of final equilibrium of the microstatic
system we are considering. Following, once more, the steps
outlined in (IV,A,8-lO), and using Lagrangean multipliers
or direct methods, we will be able to set these conditions
in compact form. These will provide us with the still missing
a - 1 relationships necessary for the determination of the
unique optimum position of production and consunption in a
national economic model, Considering productive factors as
parameters, i.e., seeing the system from its side of produc-
tion the necessary first order conditions for an optimum
equilibrium position take the form
.- -__ J = l,..., in (80)
w5  3x 1 k tI tnij
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whereas, from the slue of efriployment the equilibrium condi-
tions appear as follows:
SV DX k SyWk
l 9mi, ___ i = 1,..., n (81)
SWE 9vk1 ~g
Wk e 5Xk k
Dvk
in both these sets the following identities hold
we wge Uk
-pg=--(82)
OV Du k pVk
and
YWe '0we u k
$xk U WkDxk Uk Dw
3&. These conditions may be translated in words as fol-
46lows:46 a. tLhe optimum position of equilibrium (a) the marginal
46Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics, Macmillan,
8th ed., 1947, ap.endix, note XIV, pp. 546-52; A. C. Pigou,
The Economics of Welfare, Macmillan, 4th ed., 1946, pp. 131-43;
Paul A. Samuelson, op. cit., p. 246; A. P. Lerner, "Economic
Theory and Socialist Economics," Review of Economic Studies,
vol. II, October 1934; Abram (Burk) Bergson, op. cit.,
pp. 316-7; Ivelvin W. Reder, op, cit., pp. 35-6; N. Kaldor,
"Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal Compari-
Sons of Utility," EconomicJournal, vol. 49, September 1939,
pp. 549-52; idem, MA ComamenY eview of Economic Studies'
T . Scitoveky , "A Not e on Wel far e Proposit ions in E conomics, "
Review ofEconomic Studies, vol. 9, Novewber 1941, pp. 77-88,
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social utility (disutility) of the same good (service) must
be equal for each individual; (b) the marginal rate of sub--
stitution between increments in social utility (disutility)
produced by marginal increments of two types of product
(factor) must be equal for every individual who consumes or
uses these products (factors); (c) each factor of production
must be allocated among different possible uses so that its
indirect, derived marginal social utility be equal in every
use, and each product must be distributed among factors so
that the compensation thus provided be equal to the marginal
social disutility of providing the factors; (d) the marginal
social utility of a good produced by a marginal shift of
factors from one production line to another must be equal
to the marginal social disutility causalby this adjustment.
The essential assumption for these conditions to hold is
that (82) and (83) be true identities, a requirement that is
satisfied whenever (76) is ordinally well-defined, i.e.,
that it is unequivocal whether one configuration of the
economic system is "better" or "worse" than any other or
"indifferent" and that these relationships are transitive,
If this assumption is granted as valid, then the sets (80)
and (81) define a complete microstatic general equilibrium
s y stern.
33. Full characterization of general equilibrium. Besides
yielding the final conditionS for an optimum and unique
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equilibrium of production, allocation and consumption, the
sets (76-9) provide us with the essentials for the microstatic
description of the structure of our ideal type national econ-
47
oy. The notatIon convention shall be as follows:
a) The economy consists of Uk, k=l,..., n, economic
agents, i.e., individuals, households, business
firms, the government, and other countries, the
last two classes ceing for the moment abstracted,
Households and business firms control an aggregate
of Vj, j=1,,.., m, factors of production, and
produce X, i=l,..., n, finished goods. Denote by
Yh, h=l,..., r=1,..., n, n + 1,..., m, the economy's
"national product" couted on the basis of some
neutral standard of acount as a certain amount of
commodities of no particular description. This
national product has acqairea economic meaning
tnrough having been initially distributed among the
4? For alternative formulatior.s see Bertil Ohlin, Inter-
reLional and International Trade, Harvard University Press,
Cawhridge, Mass., 1933, appendix I; Gustave Cassel, Traitd
d'Zconowie Politique, G.i'rd, Paris, l Z129 , vol. I1 oh. XVI;
Leon Walras, AorDgtdesteme:ts__4'zcoxosie Politique Pure,
Pin PP, Paris, 1933, pp. 202-12; Vilfredo Pareto, Manuel
dt'tconoiie Poltique, Giard, Pars, is27, appendix, passim,
but especially pp. 605-3; Henry Schultz, "Marginal Productivity
and the General Pricing Prccess," Journal of Political Economy,
vol. 37, n 5 October 1929, pp. bUo-b5; M. Brodaky and
P. Rocher, L conomieFolitiqu &itnem~atiqu~e, Pichon, Paris1
1949, po. 263-361; J. Rt. HiCAs, Value andqCapltal, oc, cit.,
appendix to oh, 3, pp. 323-5.
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participants in the national economic action,
This distribution of the "national product" among
the participant "citizens" is proceeded in accord-
ance with a certain well-defined social scale of
values, We, The initial endowment of each econ-
omic agent is denoted by Ykh, k=ls.,a;
h=l,..., r, and the zero subscript, the initial,
or pre-temporal period of timeless, static action.
b) Let, moreover, Xki and Vk denote the breakdown
of Y h, respectively, into the amount of goods,
Xi, i=l,..., n, and services, Vj, j=1,,.., ,
produced, owned, or temporarily controlled by the
individual or collective agent Uk, k=l,..., s.
This notation, however, shall not imply that each
economic agent produces and consumes, or uses some
quantity of every type of good and service, but
that the pattern of control over commodities is
otherwise unspecified, comprising loosely all
intermediate patterns between private monopoly
and communal ownership. This means that patterns
must differ between themselves qualitatively as
well as quantitatively but not so much as to lead
to fewness in producing commodities, and providing
services as well as in consuming commodities and
employing productive factors,
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k
a ) Let, finally, 2 , and V .. denote, resnectively ,
the amiount of any good 4 whose final demand by
individual Uk will result in an investment of the
5th factor V in its lJne of production; and the
amount of any factor Vj invested in the ith produc-
tion line X cy tne kth individual U. This notation
should be understood as comprIsing the case of
factors used by their owncrs and of products con-
sumed by their producers, as well as the case when
productive services are >:.su.:ed instead of being
employed in tie production fiiLsed goods as
well as of finished &os ctoD:-suaed cy plowed
48
cac& to the productlon :f ot:.er finnhed goods.
This aeans, essentlalt , that a 1viLCgrade of
productive service, no i-ttcr w .Jiute its classi-
fication shall ue, £ a Le .ve~ >fferently in a
number of uses, in such wm t e sucscripts
siall be interpreted as mea:.I, alreAd an exten-
sive amount o acreati i a rra ies as well
as of product, types.
See,for a simpler notation, 0 La:- e, 'The zl.ce or
Interest in t he Theory of Prociction ," nCIew C :Ortlc
Studies, vol. III, I935-36, pp. 159-22; V. £ceilr,
"Elements of Capital Theory,' Ecor2i}ca, >' ,>, pp.
314-22.
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34. The assumptions shall be as follows:
a) Let us assume the basic conditions for perfect
competition. The number of participants in the
national economic action, either as producers or
consumers, is so breat as to make the influence
of an individual or collective economic agent
negligible over demand for and supply of both
factors and products. There is free movement of
factors and products entering or leaving produc-
ing and consuming units of action, such that
there is no spatial, temporal, or social discrimi-
nation between commodities, and, furthermore,
there are no economies or diseconomies of produc-
tion as well as consumption, and the supplies of
productive services are positive, at least one
productive service entering into the production
of each good.
b) Let product prices be equal to marginal costs and
factor prices to their mar&inal value productivi-
ties, computed in real terms, and let products be
function of ne production functions off the form
(??), Let, moreover, factors be function of ins
employment functions of the form (78). This two
sets of equations exhaust the technological level
of social action, Let there be, also, se subjective
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utility functions of the form (65) at the exchange
level of social action, being se utility functions
for each social state of affairs We, e=1,..., z.
If we assume that one such state of affairs is
given at the political level of social action, We,
then, the number of utility functions in the system
will be reduced to s, and we shall get a total of
49
s(n + m +1) independent equations for s(n + m + 1)
unknown variables, the XkI, the V k, the Uk, and
We) forming, therefore, a determinate, logically
closed system at the o periocd of time, which, but
for simplicity lf notation should be carried
throughout in sub-subscript,
c) Let us, finally, assume that this system is struc-
turally described in infinitesimal terms by the
following set of marginal coefficients supposed
constant throughout the o time period:
e= e (84)
wnich is to be called the marginal social utilitj
K. Schlesinger, "iber die Produktionsgleichungen der
konomischen Wertlehre," in Ergebniss eines Mathematischen
Kolloquins, VIII 1933-34, pp. 10-11, and the article by A. Wald,
her die eindeutige positive Losbarkeit der neuen Produktions-
gleichungen," ibid., loc. cit., pp. 12-18.
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coefficient denoting the marginal increment of
social utility per purchasing power or "numeraire"
unit with respect to the kth individual, and
stating simply that if all individuals except any
kth individual remain in positions which are in-
different to them, and if the kth individual moves
to a position which is preferable to him, then
the coefficient indicates, per money unit worth,
the increase in social utility of the present
social state of affairs over the preceding social
state of affairs, The marginal social utility of
commodity Xk10, being the ith good X to the kth
individual U, at the o period of time, shall be
denoted by
swe ek = Wk. Pio (85)
where pio is the price of the ith commodity X at
the o "timeless" time period, The marginal social
disutility of service VkJO, being the jth produc-
tive factor V provided by the kth individual U,
at the o period of time, shall be denoted by
vWe ek .- w- (86)
to kYkW
50 Abraw (Burk) Bergson. 9,Op. cit., pp. 314, 331-2, where
tnis coefficient is interpreted as Marshall's "rmarginal
utility of money,"
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where w 0 is the price of the jth factor V at the o
static time period, Let us have, furthermore,
DVkj0
which is to be called the variable technical output
coefficient51 and denoting the marginal increment
of tne ith product, belonging or controlled by the
kth individual, at the o initial period, and due
to a marginal increase in the employment of the
Jth factor in the ith production line by the kth
employer at the same static period of time. Also,
Skok (88)
-f ki oo
Xk ji0
which is to be called the variable technical input
coefficient and denoting the marginal increment
in the employment of the jth factor by the kth
5 1 Vilfredo Pareto, op.cit., appendix, pp. 605-8;
N. Georgescu-Roe6en, "Fixed Coefficients of Production and
Marbinal Productivity," Review of Economic Studies, vol. 3,
October 1935, pp. 40-9; idem, "Leontief's System in the
Light of Recent Results," Review of Economics and Statistics,
vol, 32, August 1950, pp. 214-22.
52W. Leontief, Wstructural Matrices of National Economies,
Econoametrica, vol. 17, supplement, July 1949, p. 278.
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employer at time o caused by the increment in the
final demand for the ith product, in the production
of which the jth factor concurs, as expected by
the kth producer, Two identities (82) and (83)
obtain, may be introduced now for the sake of com-
pleteness of notation. They are (a)
buko k (89)
which is an (ordinal) utilityindex, or the (cardinal)
expression, for an arbitrary numbering system for
preferences and indifferences, of the kth individ-
ual's utility index with respect to the ith good;
and (b)
UkJ 
(90)
bybJ
being an (ordinal) disutilityindex of the kth in-
dividual with respect to the jth productive service,
and where a minus sign is attached for convenience,
d) In an equilibrium position of production and con-
sumption the following relationships must emerge
among these various coefficients:
PJr% nk 110 =Wi0  (91)
and
w~pt 2 (92)
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as in (51) and (b2), and as long as it is assumed
that factors are indifferent between different uses,
and products, being, homogeneous, are assumed to be
indifferent to different consumers or users, In
equations (89) and (90), the W's, which were pres-
ent in all terms, have been divided out.
$5* Witi these assumptions and notation convention in
ahind, the general equilibrium of the system is defined, unam-
biguously, by the following sets of equations:
a) sn product-supply equations obtained by total dif-
ferentiation of tne an production functions:
TTkn dVkiO + . -.. +Tim dVkim0  dX0 (
or, uultiplying tnroughout by pi and using (89),
widVIl +.,. +w dVk: i pdX0jo (93B)
o F 0 doXLo
b) sm factor-demand equations obtained by total dif-
ferentiation of the am employment functions:
pnkji.0 dXk + . +Pkjn 0 dXjn= dVk (94A)
or, multiplyin% throughout by wj and using (90),
P1 dX 3  + ,.. + Pn dX Jn = w30 dVk J(943)
o o
c) sm product-demand equations obtained by total dif-
ferentiation of the utility functions considering
factors as parameters:
o)kle dXk10 + ... 4\kn dXkn0 = U (95A)
261
or, explicitly,
X jI = Dk0 (plo''''' Pn0 ;W 1 ''--' m'W ) (95B)
d) sn factor-supply equations obtained by total dif-
ferentiation of the utility functions considering
products as parameters:
k 41l 0 dVj +. km.o dXrm= 0 (96A)
or, explicitly,
V k.j =S k (pl ,. niE -. 9B
O 0o io
We have got so far 2s(m + n) equations to determine
2s(m + n) unknowns, i.e., the supply and demand for
factors, and the supply and demand for products.
Apparently, therefore, the system is determinate.
However, any one equation follows from the others.
Any one equation may, then, be dependent, But we
have, in fact, one equation missing, and this is
the social action equation;
e) After differentiation equation (76) yields:
alej0dU,+.. e+tssodUs0 = dWe (95)
which is to be maximized, i.e., dWe= 0, subject to
the technological, psychological, and political
constraints of the system.
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36. These functions may be arranged so as to represent
a "panel" of the "cell" or act of the national economic action
in microstatic equilibrium, as follows:
(96)
S+ +
uso (x(%0$etx o s10  V ... , 5
V k=((xkV1 1 t .vk1  ,
vkmjxl j,...0x k no)=V k M
It 9 I
xonoA 4VknlO- 
-'k ) Xkno
This is a development of (76) using (77) and (78). Similar
arrangements could be made by differentiating the functions
and using any of the alternative formulations mentioned in
(IV,a,35) above. Product and factor prices as well as the
various coefficients could then be included, and (96) could
then be interpreted as a cross section view of this model
economy's "national income" or "national product" formulated
in gross terms. One of these possible alternative arrange-
sents is particularly helpful to indicate how to solve prob-
lems of aggregation which we are going to face later in this
dissertation, The n goods X may be classified into consumption
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goods, 0, and investment goods, I, The m productive services
V may be aggregated into capital, K, and labor, L. The panel
(96) may, then, be written:
(97)
U10 (0o,Il 1 ,1KK0 K' )=K
u5  (cs 0 ; K a ,iAL )r0
0 0 K(OK 10 K0
Y0 L(C 1 0 )LK 0
Y4L (00L ' 10 )= LY
L L
0C 
= (KOC , LOC ) p0
0 ID = (K5 , L8 ) P0I I OI  IP
After government has redistributed income, by means of
taxation, rationing, etc., and in accordance with some ethi-
cal criteria, politically established and juridically im-
plemented, the anticipated final demand for C and I calls
to the market K and L which are, then, invested or employed
in the consumaption goods and the investment goods industries,
Starting from gross expenditure the "flow" of payments and
credits leads to gross product, then, by distribution of
r evenue , to gr ossa inc ome and f inally , af ter dir ecot t axation
or governmental appropriation, to gross receipts. The final
bill of goods available to any one individual in the form
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of gross receipts obviously do not have to equal his gross
expenditures. But, for the nation as a whole, gross national
expenditure is the same as gross national receipts. As a
necessary result of the system of accounting, the savings
shown by those agents whose gross receipts exceed their gross
expenditures are exactly offset by the dissavings of all other
agents whose gross expenditures exceed their gross receipts.
Any of the s individuals may be among the savers or dissavers.
Since gross receipts or gross expenditures add up to the mar-
ket value of goods and services, the funds which originate
with the savers and the funds which are supplied to the dis-
savers are generated and absorbed in the production process
itself. This is the reason why in the "timeless" time perio4
o no net savings appear for they are equal to net investment.
All this, of course, could be expressed by means of the
familiar Keynesian equations connecting consumption and in-
vestment to income and postulating an identity of savings
53
to investment.
37. We hope to have conclusively demonstrated that no
economic system can by itself discover its own optimum posi-
tion of equilibrium of production and allocation. This is,
indeed, as it should be. The economic system must be pro-
vided with a political structure which will determine the
53Paul Bosehan, National Income, Kelley, New York, 1950,
p. 15; Harold H. Somers, 'A Theory of Income Distribution,'
Journal of Political Econom , vol. LVIII, December 1950,
pp. 523-41; Alvin H. Hansen. "The Robertsonian and Swedish
Systems of Period Analysis,' Review of Economics and Sta-
tistics, February 1950, pp. 24-9
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sense in which an equilibrium position shall be considered
a standard of excellence. But only under the rigorous
assumption of constant returns to scale, as applicable to
the whole economy, do the second order sufficient conditions
for an extreme value of the social action function W coin-
cide with those conditions bringing a true maximum to that
function. If we relax this assumption of linearity and
homogeneity of production nowhere else in microstatics shall
we find the conditions under which the attained optimum,
where and when discovered and conquered, shall be maintained
as a stable position. Under decreasing costs the scale of
values or the system of imputations politically provided may
be discredited by another system of imputations, which,
already contained in the first system, dominates it because
some participants in the economic action will have separately
greater gains under this new system than under the old one,
54
and can, by acting together, enforce it. In other words,
the general conditions of stable equilibrium can only be
55
found in a theory of dynamics. Having deduced the condi-
tions for an optimum position of equilibrium of production,
54J. Marschak, "Neumann's and Morgenstern's New Approach
to Static Economics," Journal of Political Economy, vol. 54,
October 1946, pp. 100-5.
Paul A. Samuelson, "The Stability of Equilibrium, I
and II," Econometrica, vol, 9, 1941, pp. 97-120; ibid., vol,
10, 1942, ppTT1-2; idem, "Dynamic, Statics, and the Sta-
tionary State," Review of Economic Statistics, February 1943,
pp . 58-68.
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allocation, and consumption, we shall now consider (a) how,
in a general way, the rates of change of any unknown variable
with respect to any parameter may be computed from a set of
equilibrium equations; (b) how the general conditions of
stable equilibrium can be deduced under the assumption of
stationary state.
38. A mathematical proposition concerning displacement
of equilibrium. We have already seen in (IVA,8) above how,
in a general way, the necessary first order conditions for
constrained maxima or minima can be deduced, after a series
of differentiations and substitutions, from a system of
simultaneous equations involving only first order partial
derivatives, Since these are linear equations, their solu--
tion for non-singular cases is not very difficult to find,
Let us find these solution values for a general equilibrium
system like (96)., We follow, once more, the steps outlined
in (IV,A,8). We may take either factors or products as
parameters, ard, then, either products or factors as unknown
variables. Let us take (a) factors as parameters and prod-
uOts as unknown variables'. We differentiate, in (96), any
kth individual U's utility function Uko, with respect to
any jth factor V's departure from the equilibrium position.
We get
D9Uko k + .. +<9Uko kduk jk O kl1,..., a
dXX1 -dn o ~ dj
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Then we differentiate, with respect to the jth factor V,
the n production functions of the kth individual producer.
We get
adVi = dX 1 ,..., n
Substituting the last n equations into the first, the incre-
ments of the dependent variables can be eliminated. The
resulting equation valid for each Uk is of the form
Uko &xk10  &Uko DXkno Uko
dx ik n0  nj+ 3vk =
this is a system of ns linear equations with constant marginal
productivity coefficients in ne unknowns. The solution may
be represented in determinantal form5 6
n
Y.101 otquDX 1=1 okj
Taking (b) products as parameters and factors as unknown
variables, and following the same procedure outlined above
and in (IV,A,6), we find the solution of the resulting equa-
tions obtained by differentiating any kth individual U's
utility function U e with respect to any ith product X's
departure from the equilibrium position, to be of the form
, G D, Allen, osp cit., pp. 482-5; Paul A. Samuelson,
Foundations of Economic Analysis, pcit., pp. 14, 30, 259;
Ragnar Friech, "On the Notion of Equilibrium and Disequi-
librium," Review of Economic Studies, vol. III, 1935-36,
pp. 100-6.
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yi =19xS Jikj Li
With these results in mind, we turn again to economics,
39, The stability of equilibrium in the stationary-state.
We wish now explicitly to introduce time into the economic
system in order to observe the behavior of its social action
function, in its three domains, when inputs and outputs
vary in magnitude, either at a constant rate of change, as
above expressed, or in a periodically repetitive way, or when
these variations at different points of time are an irremov-
able or essential part of the economic system. We have already
studied the system as static, and we are now going to develop
it as stationary, leading thereby to its treatment as dy-
namic.57 In order to go from the previous static pattern
to a stationary one we must cut the circular flow of commiod-
ities expressed in (39), and more elaborately in (96) and
(97), into a time vector having an origin and a magnitude.
Thus, the formulation (39) becomes:
S(Y)t-n ND. t (98)
57W. Leontief, "Recent Developments in-the Study of Inter-
industrial Relationships," American Economic Review) vol. 39,
supplement, May 1949, pp. 2W0-I.
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Let us call the state of affairs, S(Y)t-n, at the beginning
of the causal concatenation the initial situation of the
system, where t-n=o, and let us call the state of affairs
at some future point in time, S(Y)t+n, the final objective
or target of the system, where t+n= t, so that we get, instead
of (98) the following formulation
S(Y)0  D(Y)t.,v S(Y)-v D(Y)t-v-..1E -'(Y)t-iLD(Y)t (99)
We have explicitly substituted (99) by (98) in order once
more to stress our theme that no social or economic system
is possible on a mechanistic basis, In (98) we have cut the
static circularity of (39) into a time segment having two
loose ends, but once the closed system became open the number
of available relationships of supply and demand became in-
sufficient to determine uniquely the magnitude of the unknown
58
variables. This means that human volition must be intro-
duced into the hitherto purely mechanistic model, to pre-
scribe magnitudes to some variables and by endowing them with
a parametric character to determine the magnitudes of all
the other variables on the basis of the still available
equations, Exactly as a microstatic system cannot yield the
58 W. Leontief, op, cit., loc, cit.; Ph. Le Corbeiller,
*Les Systemes Auto-entretenus et les Oscillations de
Relaxation," Econometrica, vol. 1, July 1933, pp. 328-32;
Ragnar Frisch, "Propagation Problems and Impulse Problems
in Dynamic Economics," in Economic Essays in Honour of
Gustav Cassel, Allen and Unwin, London, 1933, pp. l71-.205,
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conditions for optimum equilibrium until an exogenous politi-
cal structure is supposed to constrain it, so a stationary
system cannot find its level of stable equilibrium until
intentionality of human agency concerning the objective or
target is supposed to direct that system towards its future
and desirable objective. Human volition introduces dis-.
satisfaction with the results of purely physical, and mechani-
cal processes, i.e., a will, a deliberateness, an intentional
consciousness to seduce reality to fit human desires, This
also mathematically transmutes the space-time segment of
action (98) into the vector (99), by providing it with a
direction of vision, and thereby endowing it with an origin
as well as with an orientation, In the terminology adopted
in this thesis the vectorial presentation (99) subdivides
the situation, conceptually1 into uncontrollable conditions,
i.e., distinguishes in the situation an exogenously given,
original and primary set of inputs, and controllable means.
The conditions will be understood as flowing into the system
during the undetermined "timeless" time period preceding the
moment of inception of action at o, The means, on the other
hand, will be understood as the endogenous variables, flow-
ing throughout the system from the initiation of action at
o to its prescribed target at t, Moreover, the orientation
of action veotorially provided by the free decision of the
hypothetical individual or collective agent regarding the
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objective of the action, further qualifies that oblective
as a future, desirable state of affairs, consisting of a
final supply of goods and services facing a final demand at
t to be called the ultimate end or target of action, as well
as a set of specific norms of behavior for selecting the
appropriate means in the supply-demand chain of relationships
linking the situation to the objective.
40, The economic action characterizing the system
described in (99) in terms of supply and demand may be ex-
pressed as follows:
we(Ult,..., Us' Ul ,..., U 1,,..,., Ut-v,.., (100)
ust-v; U ',..., Us ' l ''''' r e
which is a dynamic version of (75), and where e is the pos-
sible social action function (IV,A,29) among z potentialities
for social integration, and comprises a duration of action
of V regressive time lags starting from the initial situation
at time o; and where Yho, h=l,.., r, is the initial factor
and resource endowment which has initially been provided to
the national economy, and where any
Utkt-pp1; xk )=U1lt.Prtkt. = 1,..., ,t (101
and any
y hl =X *. + xk + V + ... + vk(
for k=l,..., 8; h=l,..., r, meaning that each economic
102)
)
- 91
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agent at each period of time, including the initial period,
is provided with a certain amount of commodities over which
he is supposed to have politically determined and juridically
implemented control power. Thus, (100) may be expressed in
axiomatic form as follows:
a) there is a set of economic acts, consisting in a
chain of demand and supply relationships, pro-
ceeding through time period lags from an initial
configuration of given conditions and available
means, to a final desired state of affairs de-
fined as an ultimate configuration of real income
imputations given as ends for the national
economic action;
b) this concatenation of economic acts of production
and consumption is bounded by a set of specific
norms of behavior which are accepted as an ex-
pression of legitimate order by the economic
actors collectively involved in action as if
they were a perfectly integrated individual econ-
omic agent.
This normativeness of objective conceptually exhausts the
deliberate, freely volitional, human side of the picture, as
thoroughly as the introduction of time and space conceptually
exhausts the physical, purely mechanistic aspects of economic
phenomena. The objective of an economic action, conceived
27Z
as an ultimate end and an adopted set of norms, is the
cultural element of impulse which, in general terms, may be
translated into a specific political, juridical, as well as
philosophical superstructure constraining a particular
economic system, The situation of an economic action, in its
turn, provides the physical and temporal network for trans-
mission of impulses, and which may be qualified as inputs,
59
outputs, stocks and flows per unit time. A price structure,
the juridical institution of private property and free enter-
prise, of individual economic responsibility and consumer's
sovereignty, etc., are particular instances and specific
elaborations of this fundamental framework of social action,
which, as already pointed out, corresponds to the structure
of discursive action and to familiar categories of the human
mind, It is upon this general conceptual foundation that
we assume every economic system, from the most primitive to
the most elaborate, as passive of complete characterization
by description (a) of its situation, that is, the conditions
of its performance as well as the means at its disposal; and
59For a presentation of these same concepts in econome-
tric terms see Jan Tinbergen and J. J. Polak, The Dynamics
of Business Cycles, University of Chicago Press, 1950,
ch, 23; Jan Tinbergen, "Econometric Business Cycle Research,"
Review of Economic Studies, vol. 7, 1940, pp. 73-90, re-
printed in Readings in Business Cycle Theory,,Blakiston,
Philadelphia, 1944, pp. 61-89; Erik Lindiahl, ttudes sur la
Thieorie de la Monnaie et du Capital, Librairie de Medicis,
Paris, sd. pp, 17t-65.
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(b) of the exogenously given norms of economic conduct as
well as the socially desired future state of affairs as the
objective for action, We shall demarcate these elements and
the conditions for their equilibrium, at the three levels of
social action, in the simple stationary model the characteri-
zation of which is here attempted.
41. The optimum conditions of stable equilibrium of
firms and households. In order to study the stability of
stationary equilibrium of production and consumption, we shall
aggregate the s economic agents U into an unspecified number
of business firms and households, And, in order to present
a unified theory of households and business firms we shall
assume that these collective economic agents are as much
concerned about the structure of their assets as about the
size of their economic gains. We assume, precisely, that
similarly to individuals, both households as well as business
firms, and even national governments, for that matter, have
preference scales according to which they choose, as if they
were individuals, among different and alternatively possible
types of assets and profits.60 The remainder of this section
H. Makower and J. Marschak, "Assets, Prices and Mone-
tary Theory," Economica, August 1958, vol. V, pp. 271-82;
A. G. Hart, "Risk, Uncertainty, and the Unprofitability of
Compounding Probabilities," in Studies in Mathematical
Economics and Econometrics, University of Chicago Press,
Chicago, 1942,~ pp. 1TO ';M, Kalecki, "The Principle of In-
creasing Risk," Economica, vol. IV, November 1957, pp. 440 ff,
275
will be devoted to the description of the behavior of these
econoaic agents in a closed national economy as well as within
an international economic system,
42. The utilit maximization theoryof the firm, In
order to derive, firstly, the optimum conditions of inter-
temporal production and allocation of commodities, assuming
a stationary state and the balahce sheet-asset behavior of
61
business firms, we shall formulate the firm's planned or
anticipated utility function as follows:
uft(xfit'Itv% s9t xfit-l' v t-'t 1, tj*... , Xt-V(103)
V ,S fg ; X10 V ) = U
which could, of course, be formulated in terms of a flow
function of timie, and where f stands for any firm, f=l,.., s;
the XI, 1=1,..., n, and the V31 j=1,..., m, as well as the
5g, g=l,..., n, 1,..., m, denoting, respectively, products
or outputs, productive factors or inputs, and stocks or sav-
ings of these commodities when retained longer than one period
of time. These are planned quantities as long as the period
in which they are anticipated to occur has not been reached.
6Kenneth E. Boulding, A Reconstruction of Economics,
John Wiley, New York, 1950, ohs. 6, 8 and 10; Lawrence R. Klein,
Economic Fluctuations in the United States, 1921-1941,
op, cit., pp. 27-32; Joseph Schumnpeter, Das Wesen und der
Hauptinhalt der theoretisohen Nationalokonomie, Duniken and
Humblot, Leipzig, 1908, ch, 32, pp. 626 ft.
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At the end of each period, however, the realized amounts of
goods and services, and inventories will be equal to the
algebraic sum of the planned and the unplanned quantities.
This utility function for the firm (103) is to be understood
as a vector function whose components are the various com-
modity configurations at each period of time. It expresses,
looking forward to the future from the standpoint of any
period of time, except the last, the entrepreneur's or
management's opinion as to the best course of intended action
evaluated on the basis of what happened in the past; and,
looking backwards to the past, it expresses the entrepreneur's
or the management's knowledge as of the extent to which its
past anticipations had been realized. The firm starts its
action from an initial situation of liquid asset computation:
Yfxho= X f 0---, Xfn0Vf1 '--' j(104)
oo o 3 ~o -
which may be expressed, as in (102), as a summation in terms
of some common unit of reckoning, but which expresses a con-
figuration of commodity ownership, or control. The firm
possesses a plan of its activities along its economic hori-
zon,62 determining its policy and aiming at a future asset
62Jan Tinbergen, "The Notion of Horizon and Expectancy
in Dynamic Economics," Econometrica, vol, 1, 1933, p 247 f.,
G. Tintner, "The Maximization of Utility over Time, ibid.,
vol0 6, 1938, pp. 154 If.; J. Marsohak, "Money and thfl7Theory
of Assets," ibid., vol. 6, October 1938, pp. 311-25;
A. 0. Hart "Anticipations, Uncertainty and Dynamic Planning,'
in Studies in Business Administration, vol. II, no, 1,
University of Chicago Press, 1940; L. A. Metzler, "Factors
Governing the Length of Inventory Cycles," Review of Economic
Studies, vol. 29, 1947, pp. 1-15.
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objective or target. This may be expressed, from any period
of time, as a future and expected sequence of stocks and
flows, inputs and outputs, retentions and releases, along a
concatenation of "locks' connecting the situation to the
final end.
The norm of behavior for the firm is assumed to be
that of its management's trying to maximize the realization
of its intentions as expressed in the utility function (10),
and subject to (a) nv technological restraints of the produc-
tion functions:
Xit-lpt( V f.11t-p.- - V-- imtI.) = 1 t.(105)
where 1=1,.., n, and p=l,.., v; (b) to mv exchange restraints
of the employment functions:
£ £ f f
V jt-p(X ji%,,.,1 X Jn ) = V it-p (106)
where j=l,,.., m, and p=l,..., v; (c) to nv product flow re-
straints of the inventory planning functions:
S it-p(s5lt.p''' imt-p ft-p(107)
together with Cd) my factor flow restraints of the savings
planning functions:
t-p 0 jl-p''' '' jt--pt-p(108)
43. Following the steps outlined in (IV,A,8-1l0), and
using direct methods or Lagrangean multipliers, the necessary
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f irst order conditions for an optimum position of equilibrium
will easily be obtained. Here, again, rather restrict as-
sumptions concerning linearity and homogeneity of (105-8)
are required to guarantee obtention of second order suffi-.
cient conditions for an extreme value of (103) that will in
fact coincide with a true extreme value of that function.
If, moreover, it is assumed that the entrepreneur plans under
certainty all unplanned amounts will, of course, disappear.
Then, the initial asset situation being given, and the target
asset configuration being precisely known, the solution of
the problem will be determinate in general. Adding two flow
coefficients to those mentioned in (IV,A,34,c), namely
S it-p k
&kijt.pp,.(109)
meaning the coefficient of product flow, being positive when
stocks accumulate and negative when they are depleted, The
technical output coefficient (87) minus this marginal coeffi-
cient of product flow yields the net marginal productivitj
coefficient. Coefficient (109) is to be interpreted as the
rate of output accumulation or depletion of the ith product
due to the engagement or release of the jth factor at the t-p
time period. And
D=t§-itip-p (110)
t-p3 i
meaning the coefficient of factor flow, being positive when
there are savings or unemployment and negative when there
are dissavings, or depreciation of plant and equipment. The
technical input coefficient (8) minus this marginal coeffi-
cient of factor flow is equal to the net marginal depreciation
coefficient. Coefficient (110) is to be interpreted as the
rate between a decrease or an increase in employment of the
jth factor due to a deliberate increase or decrease in the
ith output planned for the t-p period of time, With these
new elements , we are now in a position mathematically to state
the necessary first order conditions for an optimum entrepre-
neurial planning, as follows:
SM ia r fi t -. ... Twfijv . dV iJt( 1p
tt-bxift..&q io4WV-
and
kuft
pUt fJi Pfjit.._, 
... Pfjit. dXjit- (112)
DVfJt~q
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and, also,
a8 it-p ;fijat-v R't-v-1i . ' i - dS t-p (113)bu8 t-
Dwwft a
and, finally,
DU ft fji t- VqSJIt-v-1 ''' il t-q t-q
t-q
other combinations between these four sets not being written
in full,
44, This may be repeated, with loss of compactness, in
words. These are the necessary first order conditions for
entrepreneurial planning or the optimum allocation of initial
investment expenditures on goods and services along the pro-
duction horizon of the enterprise. It is assumed that the
entrepreneur adopts exclusively a norm of efficiency in the
technical performance of economically striving to attain a
predetermined asset target: he does not try to influence
prices by means of extra-market63 operations. Moreover, it
is assumed that the entrepreneur plans, by intelligent use
of past experience, the distribution over time of the means
and resources whose availability he anticipates at certain
future time period. These conditions for an optimum
63E, Ronald Walker, From Economic Theory to Policy,
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1947, ohs, 5 and 6.
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equilibrium position are quite independent of the assumption
of constant prices, ie,, constant marginal productivities
and real returns to scale. This is necessary, not with
regard to the isolated firm, but in order to maintain the
constant cost assumption in order to maintain empirically
intact the phenomenon of competitive equilibrium over the
whole economy. Under these circumstances, the entrepreneur
will correctly plan the production and allocation of goods
and services for a maximum stream of anticipated incomes,
and maximum attainment of a final commodity configuration,
when:64 (a) the marginal rate of substitution between any
two planned outputs for any two time periods is equal to the
ratio of their discounted expected marginal real costs;
(b) the marginal rate of substitution of any two planned
inputs of any two time periods is equal to the ratio of
their discounted expected marginal real revenue productivi-
ties; (c) the marginal rate of substitution of any two
planned inventories for any two time periods is equal to the
ratio of their discounted expected marginal real storage
costs; (d) the marginal rate of substitution of any two
planned savings for any two time periods is equal to the
64 JJacob L, Mosak, p,_cit. p. 138; Sune Carlson,
A Study on the Pure Theory of Production, P. S. King, London,
1939, pp. 118-25; Erik Lindahl, "The Concept of Income" in
Economic Sssays in Honour of GustavCassel, op, cit.,
p. 400,
282
ratio of their foregone discounted expected marginal real
efficiencies; (e) the marginal rate of transformation of a
planned input (output) of any time period into a planned
output (input) of any time period is equal to the ratio of
their discounted expected marginal real revenue productivities
(costs) to their discounted expected marginal real costs
(revenue productivities); (f) the marginal rate of transforma-
tion of a planned input (output) of any time period into a
planned stock of any other period is equal to the ratio of
their discounted expected marginal real revenue productivi-
ties (costs) to the discounted expected marginal real storage
costs; (g) the marginal rate of transformation of a planned
stock of any period into a planned input (output) of any
other period is equal to the ratio of their discounted
expected marginal real storage costs to the discounted ex-
pected marginal revenue productivity of the input (marginal
cost of the output).
45. These conditions may be stated in a variety of
alternative formulations. Under the assumption of perfect
competitive equilibrium, the market supply price of any
factor is assumed to be equal to the demand price for it.6 5
This is evident by inspection of the system in (IV,Aa5),
65J. M. Keynes, The General Theory of Employment,
Interest and Money, Harcourt Brace, New York, 19a6, oh, 11;
Irving Fisher, The Theory of Interest, Macmillan, New York,
1930, oh. VII, pp. 150-77.
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and we take it as a consistent conclusion. Since the supply
price of any factor, at any period of time, is, then, supposed
to be equal to the sum of its prospective yields discounted
by its current marginal revenue productivity; and, since its
demand price, at any period, is supposed to be equal to the
same sum discounted at the current factor price, then, neces-
sarily, at any period of time, and under the familiar condi-
tions of perfect competition, the marginal revenue product
of the factor must be equal to its current market price,
This tautology may be restated in various ways, but mainly
as a translation of the Keynesian principle that, in static
or stationary equilibrium, the marginal efficiency of capital
must be equal to the rate of interest, or that the marginal
productivity of labor must be equal to the current wage rate,
under constant returns to scale, which is, then, a condition
sine qua non for perfect competition. Or, again, all this
may be stated in terms of "circular flow" where the costs
of every firm exactly equal to its receipts; profit oppor-
tunities are non-existent, and there is no involuntary un-
employment of resources, Thus, in the sets of equations
(lll-4), the various output coefficients may be regarded
either as current or realized marginal revenue productivities;
the various input coefficients, as the current realized fac-
tor prices; and the various flow coefficients as the price
of correct foresight, or planning skill exactly matching
284
anticipation to realization, As we have already assumed the
initial tie period as a base period1 and there, necessarily,
since the system is in static equilibrium, the TVs. will be
equal to the reciprocal of the 9's, and either the iT's or
the 9's being then equal to unity, we can now formally in-
terpret all the other iT's for subsequent periods as the
anticipated marginal revenue productivity of all the factors
in all lines of production; the P's as the expected replace-
ment costs of the factors in all lines of production at any
time period except period o; and, finally, the various Q'S
and( 's, which do not exist at the base period, by definition,
as the time rate of accumulation of any asset, destined to
be used at a predetermined period of time for output as well
as input adjustments. When, for instance, the productive
factor is new capital or newly employed labor the output
coefficients will be the discount rate anticipated at a cer-
tain future date for expenditure loans on capital or labor;
and the input coefficients will be the interest or the wage
rate to prevail at that time. Of course, when anticipations
are realized the input coefficient of a certain period will
be equal to the input flow coefficient at that time, and the
output coefficient will be equal to the output flow coeffi-
cient then. This says, simply, that at any period investment
must equal saving, and production must equal stocks or inven-
66
tories, in absolute terms,
66J, H. Hicks, Value and Capital, p.jcit., pp. 185-6;
R. G. D. Allen, op, cit., pp. 232-4; Frank H. Knight,
(continued)
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46. The utilty maximization theory of the household.
After this rather lengthy treatment of entrepreneurial plan-
ning, the theory of the economic behavior of households may
be briefly summarized, In a rather unfamiliar way we shall
assumae that households are, like business firms, interested
in maintaining the best possible balance sheet or structure
of assets, In other, more familiar words, this restates in
real terms the Keynesian principle of liquidity preference.
Households decide, on the basis of their income, either to
spend or to save today, and, on the basis of the market rate
of interest level, to hold their accumulated savings in form
of either money or securities, and, on the basis of the
market wage rate level, whether to supply more labor to em-
ployers or to impute their labor to themselves, in the isola-
tion, for instance, of the family farming. In short, house-
holds decide, on the basis of business firms' demand for
factors, whether to supply the factors they possess or con-
trol, or to impute to themselves the product of these factors;
and, on the basis of business firms' supply of product,
waether to demand these products of industry, or to refrain
"Interest" in Encjclopaedia of Social Sciences, op, cit.,pp. 131-43; Knut Wicksell, Lectures on Political Economy,
Routledge, London, 1946, vol. 1, pp.158,~167,T11784074
W* S. Jevons, The Theory of Political Economy, Macmillan,
London, 1911, p. 230; F. A, Hayek, Prices and Production,
Routledge, London, 1931, p. 37; 0. Lange, "The Place of Inter-
est in the Theory of Production," Review of Economic Studies,
vol. III, 1935-36, pp. 152-92.
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from demanding them. The households' decisions are,
therefore, the exact counterpart of the business firms' deci-
sions: firms supply products and demand factors; households
supply factors and demand products, Thus, the set of equa-
tions denoting the decisions of the households in our model
national economy, exactly matches the form of the utility
function (103), except that the X's denote now the intended
demand for consumption or use of the ith product at the pth
period of time before the final date t; the V's denote the
intended supply of the jth factor owned or controlled by the
household at the t-p period of time; and the various S's
denote the household's intended or planned holding of the
gth commodity, good or factor, at the same future date.
This product-demand factor-supply commodity-saving plan is
decided at the o time period, but the same observation
regarding planned as well as unplanned amounts could be re-
peated here. The household is not necessarily assumed to
plan under certainty, and it will, if planning intelligently,
6 7 Heinrich von Stackelberg, Grundlagen der Theoretischen
Volkswirtschaftslehre,op. cit., pt. III, pp. 105-81;
W. S. Jevons, op, cit,, chs. 5, 6 and 7; Vilfredo Pareto,
"Economie Mathematique," in Encycloy4die des Sciences
Mathematiques, Plon, Paris, 1911, vol. I, pt. 4, pp. 626 ff,;
Lawrence R, Klein, op, cit. pp. 46-50; Kenneth E. Boulding,
2p.scit., pp. 151-4; Harold T. Davis, The Theory of Econo-
metrics, Principia Press, Bloomington, Indiana, 1941, ch. 8,
especially pp. 170-6; Hans Staehle, "Family Budgets,"
Econometrica, vol9 0, 1905, pp. 106-18,
modify its plan along its consumption horizon whenever its
anticipations are not realized,
47, Similarly with (103) this unwritten utility function
for households could also be construed in functional form,
but in order to simplify the analysis we have chosen to ex-
press it with independent variables as discreet functions
of time. The boundary conditions may, again, be expressed
in exactly the same form as (105-,8), but they must be re-
interpreted to fit the meaning adequate to the economic
behavior of households. The production functions (105) which,
in the theory of the firm were product supply functions of
productive factors regarded as parameters, now become, in
the theory of the household, nv consumption functions express-
ing the household's intended demand for the ith consumption
good X at the future date t-p as a function of the antici-
pated employment of the jth factors V, j=L,..., m, owned or
controlled by the household in all lines of production in
which these factors are used. This is a microview of the
Keynesian principle that consumption is a function of income.
Moreover, the exchange restraints (106) which, in the theory
of the firm, were factor-demand functions of final demand
for the various products, now become, in the theory of the
household, my factor supply functions expressing the house-
hold's intended supply of the Jth factor V at a future date
t-p as a function of the anticipated compensation that these
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factors will be expected to receive from business firms in
all linesof production in which they are employed. Finally,
the stock-saving policy restraints (107-8), which, in the
theory of the firm where inventory-savings functions of the
firm's expectations regarding the probability of its income
to remain stable, now become, in the theory of the household
the v(m + n) liquidity preference functions expressing the
household's intention to retain unused or to use itself a
portion of its own endowment of commodities, i.e., goods and
services until the time period t-p, as resulting from its
expectations regarding the real value of these goods and
services at that future date, After the differentiations
and substitutions outlined in (IV,A,8-10) the necessary first
order conditions for a maximum of the household's utility
function will assume the same form as (111-4). But, again,
these optimum conditions must be reinterpreted to fit the
meaning adequate to the economic behavior of households,
The optimum conditions of inter-temporal equilibrium of the
68household may be stated in words as follows: households
681, M. D. Little, A Critique of Welfare Economics,
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1950.pp. 137-8; A. Lerner, Economics
of Control, Macmillan, New York, 1947, chs.a and 3;
J, R. Hicks, Value and Capital, op cit., p. 205, cns. XI-
XIII; F. A, Lutz, "The Structure of Interest Rates,"
Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 53, no, 1, November
l1940, pp. 38-83, reprinted in Readngs in the Theorysof
Income Distribution, Blakiston,IPhiladelphia, 1946)
pp. 499-529.
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correctly plan their demand for conswnption goods, and their
supply of productive factors, as well as the change in their
wealth holdings along a stream of income possibilities when:
(a) tne marginal rate of substitution between consuming two
goods at any two time periods is equal to the ratio of their
anticipated discounted marginal real costs (prices); (b) the
marginal rate of substitution between providing any two
services at any two dates is equal to the ratio of their
anticipated discounted marginal real value productivities
(factor prices); (c) the marginal rate of substitution between
folding any two forms of wealth to any two time periods is
equal to the ratio of their anticipated discounted prices in
real terms; (d) the marginal rate of substitution between
real wealth or "cash" balances at deflated prices and any
other form of holding purchasing power such as any given bond
or share, at any two dates is the same for every household
which possesses these forms of wealth; (e) the marginal rate
of transformation between any good, service, or security of
any date into the same good, service, or security at any
future date must be equal to the ratio of their discounted
expected marginal storage, obsolescence, depreciation, or
employment opportunity costs.
48. Both these conditions for the equilibrium of house-
holds as well as the formerly deduced (IV,A,44) conditions
for the equilibrium of business firms are merely necessary
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conditions, not sufficient ones. If commodity prices, wage,
interest, and discount rates are not given as constants, and
if there is the possibility of unexpected changes in tech-
nology and tastes, the second order conditions for an extreme
value of the utility functions may not coincide with the
sufficient conditions for a true extreme of these functions
for the firm as well as for the household, If there are
external or internal economies of production and consumption
the above stated theoretical conditions will be purely formal
or else negative, It can be shown, and it has already been
shown in the static case, that this can be avoided by intro-
ducing into the analysis a set of normative constraints pro-
vided by a social action function of the dynamic form (100)
expressing the economic policy decisions of a national
government. Guided by political criteria, juridically im-
plemented, the national government intervenes in the private
economy so as to modify, in a predetermined way, by taxation,
expropriation, etc., the initial real income configurations
over which firms and households will have control power dur-
ing the course of the national economic action, generally a
fiscal year. We must now fit the utility functions of firms
and households into the social action function (100) in
order to derive the stability conditions of stationary equi-
librium of our typical national economy.
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49, The stability conditions of stationary real national
income equilibrium. In the stationary model econowy so far
described we have not yet introduced specific assumptions
concerning less than full employment of resources nor about
tne eventual partial investment of disposable savings, We
have merely tried to show how and why retentions and releases
of goods and services appear within the system as brought up
by the independent decisions of firms and households acting
on the basis of expectations and intelligent application of
past experience. Whenever these decisions are geared to
complementary intentions of action, receipts will be turned
into income which will be fully and regularly expended gen-
erating an equal volume of aggregate demand which will main-
tain the circulation steady and undiminished. If saving is
necessary to provide capital goods, it will be invested
witinthe period, the "circular flow" panels (96) and (97)
not reflecting the appearance and disappearance of such instan-
taneous savings. It is easy to see, however, that in an
uncontrolled economy the decisions to save will only by
chance match the decisions to invest, since they will, then,
be independent of each other, and even when made by the same
individual they will nevertheless be made in different,
sometimes opposite, institutional and psychological environ-
ments such as those of households and firms, Governments,
for instance, may and often do adopt contradictory policies
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regarding revenues and expenditures. This will be the case
in an economy not affected by outside influences, We must
now search for the factors explaining why at times certain
national community is unable to secure full utilitzation of
its resources, or why and in which way, if government activi-
ties and foreign influences are abstracted, the interactions
of the decisions to save and the decisions to invest are
heuristically sufficient to provide a valid explanation of
the eventual fluctuations in income and employment within a
closed national economic system,
50. We have already seen (IV,A,29,40) that, before being
historically and culturally given, a hypothetical national
economy may a piori be conceived as passive of a number of
possibilities for social integration, one of which may appear
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as feasible. Let us re-write (74) as follows:
P(W1,..., Wz W0 ) =0 (115)
where the various social states of affairs V,.., W. are the
various possible ways of social integration within the limits
imposed by given, uncontrollable social conditions WO, One
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Paul A. Samuelson, "Evaluation of Real National Income,"
in Oxford Economic Papers, Clarendon Press, Oxford, vol. 2,
n. 1, January 1950, pp, 1-21, but especially pp. 18-9; idem,
Foundations of Economic Analysis, op. cit., pp. 244-5;
A. C.jPigou, Economics of Welfare, oZcit., pt, 1, chs, 2,
3, 85,and 6; 1- 4. It Attle"'Tei Va.uation of Social Income1, "
Economaioa, February 1949, pp. 11-29; idem, A Oritique of
Welfare Economics, op _cit., ch, 12.
of these various possible social states appears as politically
feasible and juridically implementable. This feasible social
action function, already formulated in (100), may be compactly
restated here as follows:
We(U.it,0 9ut ; U1 ,..., U5 ) =We (116)
where We denotes a specific feasible national economic action
function consisting of a v-"year plan," t-p, p=1,..., v, all
indications or random disturbances being omitted; and where
every
U k(X i ,..., X nto t'---'V kmt'-..,..., X k tova (1 )
xk kk kk
nt-p'6 t -- nt-p' 1 t-p--- t-p' It-p
*933pS5 jfl I...t..u X too-$.*X V $*Sol mmt-p o,..,ktno' 1k M
meaning that the feasible social action function is a function
of the utility levels of the various firms and households
integrating the national society the exact numerical form of
these utility functions being arbitrary, no importance attach-
ing to the curvature properties of this locus. The (ordinal)
utility levels of firms and households are function of the
particular configuration of commodities owned or controlled
by the economic agent at the end of each time period. Let
us assume, as formerly, that the initial bill of goods and
services was admitted into the causal system under considera-
tion at the time period o immediately preceding the first
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time period, t-v, of the time lag of v periods, t-p.
p=l,..., v. In (117), as previously, the X's are goods, the
V's are productive services, the 6's are factor savings, and
the S's are product stocks. These arguments are explained
as follows:
XitP(vii ,.., vit, 1 5  ~'---> s ) = x (118)
t VIlt-pt-pt-ptimtpp I
being the ny vector components of the production function
of time extending from o to t, and from which the superscripts
denoting ownership have been omitted since this already refers
to aggregative production of the ith output, We have also
vit-p1(Xjl ,.., X n ~cil *---) ~jn
t- tpt-p t-p t-p
being the my vector components of the employment function of
time extending similarly from o to t, and from which, again,
superscripts denoting the employer of the factor has been
omitted for it refers to aggregative employment of the jth
input. We differentiate totally (117-119), and replacing
the partial derivatives by the -input, output and flow co~"
efficients (87-8, 109-10), we get a vectorial expression7 0
7 Activity Analysis of Production and Allocation, ed.
Tjalling C. Koopmans, Cowles Commission Monograph 15, John Wiley
New York, 1951, (forthcoming), passim; George B. Dantzig,
Programming in a Linear Structure, U. S. Air Force, February
1948; idem, "Programming of Interdependent Activities - II
Mathematical Model," Econometrica, vol. 17, July-October 1949,
no 3, 4; TJalling C, Koopmans, "Utility Analysis of Decisions
Affecting Future Well-.Being," Econometrica, vol, 18, no, 1,
January 1950, p. 174; Lawrence H. Klein, "Stock and Flow
Analysis in Economics"; idem, "Stock and Flow Anlyfis:
Further Comment," ibid., vol, 18, May 1950, pp. 236 ff., 246
f f., and comment by William Feilner and Harold M4. Somers,
ibid., lo, 2 4it.
for (117) as a stream of "national income" configurations
of the form71
S nl 8 n a n M kS + U V + U I ZI Jit-- (120)
E =1k=1J= k=1 i=1 j=1
-- kIt-V dX j ItVO, -(1kT 
-vt- x
k~1 j=1 1=1
k Sv ± ± k k kX dVrijt1v + ... +P t-l t-1)dX ji -
SM n k k k 6 n k41 3 zi(ITijtr 1~ kij i)dV kiljt-1It+
k=l 3=1 -1= 11 i
+ ± ±vkjt
k=1 J=1
This may be reformulated in general linear approximation
terms, as follows:
A0 + avAt., + .. , + aAt-1 = At (121)
or in matrix notation, or in a block diagram, a flow chart,
72
etc. Using Eulerrs theorem the differentials in (120)
may be replaced by discrete quantities, and the model then
becomes a discrete model, where product and factor prices
7t Solomon Lefschetz, Introduction to To ologg, Princeton
University Press, Princeton, 1949, pp. 38 -4 0 .
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F. Machlup, International Trade and National Income
Multiplier, Blakiston, Philadelphia, 1943, passim; J. M. Clark,
The Economaics of Planning Public Works, Washington, D. 0.,
1935; J. M. Keynes, The Means to Prosperity, Harcourt Brace,
New York, 19.33; Paul A. Samnuelson, 1 Dynamio Process Analysis,"
in A Survey of Contemporary Economics, Blakiston, Philadelphia,
1948, pp. 564-7.
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will be constant since they are expressions of marginal value
productivities and costs, Each vector component in (120-1)
may be called an unit act of a national economic action func-
tion, where t=0 denotes the time period at the initial
situation; t-v to t-Kl, the time periods along the chain of
supply-demand or stock-flow relationships linking the situa-
tion to the desired, future, final demand configuration; and
t, the final time period at which the economyts objective,
target, or ultimate end for that segment of action is attained.
The set of technical input, output, and flow coefficients
may be considered as fixed, or may be understood as a finite
set of alternatively possible linear ratios or, again, may
simply be conceived, as we did here, as first order partial
derivatives denoting marginal concepts, and, as long as the
various functions (118-9) are conceived to be homogeneous
of the first degree, having second order partial derivatives
with vanishing determinants, We may aggregate the various
coefficients in (120) to compress that formulation into (121),
thus
AP=( -law-IT+ C)(122)
which, of course, is equal to unity at the o time periodso,
at which the economy may be conceptually defined as a computa-
tion of commodities available to firms and households, which
are distributed in accordance with the ethical criteria guid-
ing the political structure of action. Thus the "national
income" flow may be expressed as an economic action system
based on linear utility maximization functions for firms and
households, And it may be vizualized as consisting in a
flow, through time, and a series of "locks," or temporary
retentions, or stocks, from the state of affairs at the
initial situation to a desired, future state of affairs at
the objective, and which may be conceived as a bill of goods
and services supplied for final demand at the end of the time
period t. It is assumed that this bill of goods and services
could never be attained by simply allowing the natural
mechanistic trends of the situation to run their own course
without active intervention by deliberate, normative human
agency. The objective of the economy is to maximize the
realization of the target national asset at a predetermined
time t. This must be achieved in accordance with the im-
peratives of some legitimate social order, or publicly ac-
cepted specific norms of economic behavior, so that the social
objective be maximized. This objective may be either that
of a free enterprise economy as that of a regimented one.
This analysis is perfectly general. Even a price system
was abstracted. The only value judgment that we have intro-
duced was to hypostatize that the economic system works in
obedience to an integrated volitional political agency, the
specific economic norms of which may simply be conceived as
297
298
a rule, or a set of rules, generally embodied in a fiscal
policy wherever private ownership over means of production
is allowed, or as a rationing system when this is not the
case, and expressing that net real revenue:
V a M n - I j t P Q k ij t .P ) d k k -* x 1 Zpm1 kzeki= =kiJ)dkjt Max. (12 )
and net real expenditures be
El E En ZI ki &k k
p=l k=l i= j=l - in,(124)
These two normative restrictions (123-4) make determinate an
otherwise underdeterminate dynamic system, exactly as, in
statics, the optimum equilibrium position was not defined
until a political structure were not being assumed to exist
as an optimum equilibrium determining organism.
51, From equation (120--1) we may derive the familiar ex--
pression of the national income multiplier. From elemen-
tary algebra we know that a series of the type (121), where
the first term is Ao and the common ratio is a, sum up over
its v terms as
SV =a1-aV
1-a
73G. Haberler, Pros end Dpression, op, cit,, pp.
456-7; Paul A. Samuelson, "Simple Mathematics oficome
Determination" in Income , EmomandPublicPolicy,
Norton, New York, ppR368 . G. D. Allen, Mathematical
Analysis for Economist8, op.3ci., pp. 448-9,
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If a is numerically less than unity, the expression aV becomes
smaller and tends to zero as v increases indefinitely. The
geometric series is convergent summing to infinity
k a (125)
1-a
provided that a is numerically less than one, In other cases
the series is not convergent and the sum of v terms either
tends to infinity or oscillates. Assuming that a is numeri-
cally less than unity we have for a multiplier of (120-1)
the expression
dX AO
--M = (126)
dV 1 -9- QG+T
a formulation which may be interpreted as meaning an increase
(decrease) of real national income with reference to the kth
individual U becoming more (less) satisfied without any other
individual becoming less (more) satisfied, Only in this case
it is possible unambiguously to state, whenever income dis"-
tribution has remained the same, that an increase in national
74
income means an increase in real national income.
52. The formulation (120) is perfectly general. However,
similarly to our procedure in (97), it may be expressed as
a flow chart, and in terms of investment goods, I, consumption
.W. Hedier, Studies in the Theortof Welfare Economics)
opsit., pp. 14-5,
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goods, C, exports, X, and imports, M, savings of productive
factors, 8, and stocks of finished goods, B. The convention
regarding subscripts adopted in (97) will be repeated here.
As only one time period will be considered, the time period
t-p, the superscript. characterizing it will be abstracted,
The flow chart is as follows.
(127)
U1 (I 1 ,C ,X t 18, K ,L 1 ,1 4,1 B ) 0
+ + + + + + E; + S +a
U (IS ,CS , X8 Se KS ,L8  ,M ,B ) 0
Y (I , C X ,8 )= K
YK (K C GK' K K
Y (I , ,X ,5 )= LL L L L L
Y M (I M .0 1 4 3 X .S 1
Y (I , C ,X ,5 )= BB B B B B
P I(KL ,M , B
PC(KC ,LC ,MC ,B0  N= C
PX (KXLXMX ,iBXN) X
P 8 (KSL 8 ,MSB 5B N S
This system (1S7) could be expressed by means of the familiar
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set of Keynesian functions adapted for sequence analysis,
7 A. P. Lerner, "Some Swedish Stepping Stones in Economic
Theory," Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science,
November 190q.50 .Sihe, PoesAayiii!ui-
librium Analysis," Econometrica, January 1942, pp. 26-38,
Its multiplier could be expressed in the same form as (126),
and can be written as an equation of Y as a function of X
and a constant term, as follows:
Y X+0-C 0  (128)
l-c+m - C + m
where c is the marginal propensity to consume, and m the
marginal propensity to import. This formulation (128) could
be expanded to take care of various technical coefficients.
If this were done we would see that the algebraic sum of all
technical coefficients must be less than unity, and also,
that the output coefficient must be equal to the input coeffi-
cient after deduction of the coefficients of flow, and these,
in their turn must exactly offset the rates of depreciation
and depletion of plant and equipment, Moreover, the rate
of investment should keep in pace with the rate of-population
growth, in order that the system could be kept at a stationary
plateau. For a constant trend of growth (decay) the coeffi-
cients of accumulation (use or consumption) should be greater
than the coefficients of use or consumption (accumulation).
53. Full characterization of a typical national economy0
To this point our analysis has proceeded on the assumption
that the hypothetical national economic system is either
static or stationary. We shall now relax this assumption and
postulate, dynamically, that, henceforth, the value taken at
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any given moment of time by any variable of the system is
determined partly or wholly by the values taken by that
variable and/or other variables (given the parameters and the
functional form of the system) at some moment or moments of
76
time in the past. On this dynamic basis we shall define a
national economic system as that which consists of the econ-
omic interaction of four units of economic decisions compris-
in6 the national economy; (a) households, (b) business firms,
(c) government, and (d) the rest of the world. Broadly speak-
ing a national economic system consists of a set of economic
decisions, activities or acts, which are constrained by social,
political, juridical, and cultural norms of behavior, The
market value of these decisions is the national output of
goods and services which, at a certain period of time, sum
up to the gross national product. This becomes available
for purchases by or distribution to the four collective econ-
omic agents, on the basis that is determined by the economic
organization of the national economy, The gross national
expenditure of this national economy in a certain period of
time is equal to the sum of its four economic agents' gross
incomes. The difference between gross income and gross
M, Kalecki, "A Macro-Dynamic Theory of Business Cycles,"
Econometrica, 1935, pp. 327-44; idem, "A Theory of the
Business Cycle," Review of Economic Studies, February 1937;
ideal, Esasin the Theory of Economic Fluctuations, Allen
and Unwtn, 19.39, oh. V/,
receipts consists of direct taxes paid to government by busi-
ness firms and by households. Starting at the beginning of
a certain period, from the gross receipts out of the immedi-
ately preceding period, there will be a gross expenditure
for consumption and investment, the flow of commodities lead-*
ing to gross product, and from this by distribution of reve-
nue, to gross income, and finally, after direct taxation to
gross receipts. It is assumed that the national economic
action here typified is oriented towards the fulfillment of a
certain pre-established program consisting of a final bill of
goods and services set as a production and consumption target,
and described, in terms of commodity configurations per unit
of time period. This national economic program may not neces-
sarily coincide with other national economic programs, and
by economic sovereignty is here meant the authority of a
national government to implement the economic program that
it finds appropriate to the maximum satisfaction of national
needs. We shall not try to determine the origins and founda-
tion of this public conviction, which may have been attained.
either by democratic voting or by decree of dictatorship.
We shall, however, insist, once more, that the definition of
policy objectives is the essential element for the maximiza-
tion of a social action function characterizing a national
economy independently of any specific social action structure.
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54. All this may be expressed in the familiar terms of
Keynesian theory of national income determination. Let there
be an international economic community set consisting of
(K) = (1),..., (IM), subsets each one of which denotes a
national economy. Each national economy is compounded by four
collective economic agents, g, h. f and w, standing, respec-
tively, for government, households, business firms, and the
rest of the world. Let there be a set of specific norms of
behavior orevailinr politically and juridically over the
national economy of country (K), and consisting of four sub-
sets of specific norms of behavior to which government, house-
holds, business firms, and the rest of the world obey in
their interaction within (K). The specific norms of behavior
of the rest of the world must coincide, where they interact
peacefully with those accepted within country (K), with those
norms therein accepted, in order that there be economic Inter-
course across national boundaries, The net national product
of a country, or the real value of its national income, at
any time, may be conceived as thoroughly exhausted by a com-
putation of a bill of goods and services belonging, or under
the control, of the residents of that country, After deduct-
ing capital consumption allowances, the current net national
product, Y, is the algebraic summation of current real expend-
itures (a) for personal consumption of households and institu-
tions; (b) for net investment of business firms on producers'
equipment, plant, farms, and for new private residential and
institutional construction as well as net addition to inven-
tories; (c) for net governmental deficit or surplus, and (d)
for net transactions with foreign countries. Call these,
respectively, C, I, D, F. Then,
Y =C C+ I + D + F (129)
an identity which is an indeterminate system. In order to
make it determinate we shall assume that
C=cY + Ca; I=1Y + Ia; D=G - R, where G=Ga, and R=rY + Ra,
and F=X - M, where X=Xa, and M=mY + Ma. (130)
Substituting these equations (130) into (129) we get the
following expression which is a determinate system, being one
equation to determine one unknown variable, Y, as a function
of given parameters, the c's, the i's, the t's, and the mts,
and of constant autonomous factors, Ca, Ia, Ta, Xa, and Ma:
Y=cY + Ca + iY + Ia +Ga - (rY + Ra) + Xa- (mY + Ma) (131)
where the parameters denote "propensities" to consume, invest,
tax, and import; and the constant factors autonomous consump-
tion, investment, governmental spending, change in taxation
rates, and importation. This expression (131) could be made
somewhat more complete by addition of business savings, B, or
net change in inventories, which had been aggregated to net
investment; and also by adding net investment in new housing,
H, so that (129) becomes:
Y=C +1I+ B + H + D + F (132)
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which, for the sake of determinacy, must be supplemented by
two additional hypotheses explaining the newly introduced
variables:
B=bY + Ba, and H-hY + Ha (133)
meaning, respectively, that net change in inventories is a
given linear function of income of business firms, the factor
of proportionality being the marginal propensity to stock,
which is a flow coefficient, and an autonomous factor ex-
pressing business expectations; and that investment in con-
struction is a function of current income, and an autonomous
factor expressing the stock of past construction. With these
two additions, and aggregating expenditures for consumption
and investment, as real expenditures for domestic and foreign
goods and services, we may state the net national product of
country (K) as follows:
Y=E(Y-R(Y) - B(Y) -. M(Y)) + Ca + Ia + Ba + Ha + Ga+ (134)
+Ra +*Xa
i.e., the net national product, or real national income of a
country (K), at any period of time, is equal to the total
amount of expenditures, expressed in real terms, on goods and
services, for consumption and investment, both of domestic
as well as foreign origin, plus the expenditures made by
foreign countries on goods and services exported ,from the
national economy (K). These total expenditures are a func-
tion of disposable income and an agrregative term which may
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be called domestic autonomous expenditures, i.e., expenditures
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not "caused' by disposable income. This equation (134) is
another way of expressing the net national income at each
time period in the flow chart (127). It is also a specific
instance of the general equilibrium system vectorially repre-
sented in (120). It says, simply, that at any time, in a
hypothetical national economy in static or stationary equi-
librium, the supply of goods and services is equal to the
effective demand for them, or, in more roundabout words, that,
in real terms, balance is achieved at a level at which effec-
tive demand is adequate to provide full employment of pro-
ductive resources. This, of course, is a drastic simplifica-.
tion of reality, since, in money terms, balance can be achieved
at less than full employment. When there are unemployed
resources of all kinds available at prevailing prices, an
increase in effective demand expressed in money, i.e., an
autonomous, purposive, and sustained unbalanced movement ex-
panding aggregate demand, a corresponding increase in produc-
tion and employment will normally result. If resources are
scarce, or immobile, or when sellers of goods and services
77Pau1 A. Samuelson, "Simple Mathematics of Income
Determination," in Income, Emp 10jment, and Public Policyj,
op.cit, lc.cit.; S. A. Radice, A Dynamic cheme for the
British Trade Cycle, l929-193?," Econometrica, vol. 7,
January 1939, pp. 47-56; Colin Clark, WA System of Equations
Explaining the U. S. Trade Cycle, 1921-1941," ibid., vol.
17, 1949, pp. 210-225.
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speculate on the expectation of higher prices, an increase in
output and employment will result, partly, in an inflationary
gap between the national income expressed in market prices
and real national income expressed as a bill of goods and
services available at a certain date. If balance is achieved
at full employment, and if, from then on, the economy remains
stationary, equilibrium will be forever undisturbed at full
employment. For the maintenance of such a state the require-
ments are formidable. There shall be no change in the rate
of population growth or decrease. Consumers' tastes shall
not vary, and the necessary amount of net investment shall
not change. Moreover, the foreign balance must be kept in
equilibrium. There shall be no credit inflation or deflation,
but the supply of money and credit must be kept syntonized
to the trend rate of increase or decrease in demand due to
institutional changes. There must also be no governmental
disturbances affecting the equilibrium of tne economy. Savings
must be precisely timed to induced and net investment. Pro-
duction functions must be homogeneous of the first degree,
and there shall not be increasin returns to scale. Major
wars and major institutional changes must be abstracted.
Factors must be paid in accordance with their marginal value
productivities, and marginal revenue shall equal marginal cost
all over the economy. Each participant in the economy must
be rational in the sense of possessing a transitive ordering
dY dY.dY.Y Y_ dY dY
Aln ATn AIe sAU 1f1fl. Af un
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giving the income response to a change in any of the autono-
mous factors. This shows to what extent effective demand is
inherently unstable even at full employment, Even when time
lags are abstracted, the "static multiplier" shows how an
autonomous expansion or contraction of expenditures at home
and abroad diffuses throughout the national economy in a
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of preferences, and he must, moreover, take prices as para-
meters, and make his decisions in isolation without taking
account of its influence upon others and vice-versa, Finally,
coercion, domination, alliance, tolerance, etc,, shall be
ruled out of the picture.
55. Displacement of equilibrium. Only in intellectual
experiment are these requirements to be coincidentally ful-
filled. We have already sketched (IV,A,38) a general method
to determine the behavior of the system in response to a change
in any of its autonomous factors. We have seen also (IV,A,
51) that, once the system is simplified to manageable propor-
tions, the complicate determinantal expression in (IV,A,38)
assumes the familiar form of an income multiplier (125-6).
By expressing (132) in implicit form, and differentiating
totally the result, it may be seen that the effect upon income
of a change in the autonomous factors assumes the following
"static multiplier" expression:
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cumulative and self-reinforcing fashion. But the knowledge
of the national system of transmission of fluctuations of
effective demand, and of the nature of the disturbing forces,
provided by the multiplier is not sufficient to determine
the amplitude and duration of a particular cyclical movement,
and the actual factors responsible for the turning points,
especially their timing, For this, the multiplier must be
interrelated with the "accelerator." In order to present
this interrelation in outline we shall introduce time lags,
first one, and then more than one, in equations (130), includ-
ing in the final expression of the multiplier the time lagged
formulations for housing and inventory investments. More-
over, as we shall speak of exports and imports, we must at
this point abandon once for all the assumption of isolation
of our model national economy.
B. A dynamic international economic system
1. National fluctuations in production and employment,
Tne general expression (132) explains national output without
a time reference. Making this reference explicit, expression
(132) may be reformulated as follows;
t t + I + Bt + Hit + Dt + Ft (136)
where the money value of national income deflated by the
price level of butput is seen as a summation of real consump-
tion expenditures of households, real gross investment -ex-
penditures of business firms for producers' durable equipment,
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net real inventory expenditures, and expenditures on private
construction, governmental net surplus or deficit as result-
ing from deducting the net algebraic sum of business taxes
as well as net personal taxes or withdrawals from govern-
mental expenditures on goods and services, and, finally, the
net foreign balance of visible and invisible transactions,
all these comprising current expenditures at time period t.
So long as we deflate both investment and saving by the same
price index of output in general, we shall have real invest-
ment equal to real savings, In order to make the system
(136) determinate as well as dynamic, we shall assume the
following set of hypotheses:
CtsoYt-li+Ca; Itsit--+Ia; B =bYt 1 +Ba; H =hYt +Ha;
Dt=Gt - Rt =Ga - Rt where Rt=rYt 1,+Ra; and, finally,
F Xt - Mt (137)
or, in words; (a) real consumption expenditures, at any
period of time t, depends, in a known way, upon the real net
national product of the previous period, the marginal pro-
pensity to consume, and autonomous changes in consumption
induced, for instance, by expected changes in prices; no
account is taken of the effect of a possible reluctance tb
78J. R. Hicks, A Contribution ot the Theory of the Trade
Cycle, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1950, pp. 12-13
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revise consumption standards downward;9 (b) gross invest-
ment, at time period t, depends, in a known way, upon the
national income of the previous period; induced investment
is assumed to be at least in the short run a rising function
of disposable income; gross investment also depends upon the
marginal propensity to invest at that period, and on autono-
mous changes in investment;80 (c) the same linear relation-
ships apply to housing and inventory expenditures; (d) it is
assumed that government expenditure is an autonomous factor
in the deficit; however, net business and personal tax col-
lection is not considered a policy parameter, but it is
assumed as depending, in a known way, on the national income
of the previous period, and a constant, legislated, tax rate
schedule; (e) the foreign balance consists of the difference
between receipts from imports and expenditures for imports.
In this last equation
Xt Xt PXZXa (138)
Pm
where Px is the export price index; pm, the import price
index; for simplicity, the volume of exports (xc) at time t
7 9 F. Modigliani, "Fluctuations in the Saving-Income
Ratio," in Studies in Income and Wealth, National Bureau of
Economic Research, New York, 1946, vol. XI.
80Wolfgang Stolper, "The Volume of Foreign Trade and the
Level of Income," Quarterly Journal of Economics) vol. 61,
1947, pp. 285-.310,
times the terms of trade (px/pm) comprises a foreign autono-
mous factor, Xa. This simplification is not strictly justi-
fiable as far as some components of dividends payable to
foreigners are concerned5 There will also be reflex influ-
ences of income on exports via the effect of domestic imports
on income and imports abroad. Moreover, it does not reflect
any effect on national income resulting from a change in the
volume of imports in response to a change in the relative
cost of imports. It also assumes zero substitution elasticity
between imports and domestic production. As for exports:
Mt= Mot + Mit + MXt rmYt 1 +Ma (159)
where
McGt=rOCt.; Mi =M wC XM +,Xtr; m=m+ a, + m (140)
t ImSE%1; MI =1% X a t t
i.e., imports at time t is a given function of income in the
previous period, the marginal propensity to import, and autono-
mous imports, or imports not induced by a change in income;
imports may be broken down into imports for the production of
domestic consumption goods (Mc) imports for the production of
producers t goods (MI), and imports for the production of goods
for exports (M.), the mts being their marginal propensities
to imports;81 with a slight notation modification this corre-
sponds to what has already been said about imports in the
flow chart (127).
01 . Chang, l nternat ional C omparison o f t he Demand
for Exports," Review of Economic Statistics, vol. 3, n. 54,
1945-46 , pp. 205-10.
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2. Using now equations (137-9) in (136) we get
Yt=cYtA+ iYt--.l+ bYt 1+ hYt- rYt.--mYt-l+ Ca + Ia + Ba +
Ha +. Ga + Xa - Ra - Ma (141)
which, at the equilibrium level, where, by definition,
Yt= Yt1 = t-2--- becomes:
Ye=cY e + iY e + bY e+ hY -rYe -mYe + Ca+ Ia+Ba+Ha+
Ga + Xe - Ra - Ma (142)
where Ye denotes the equilibrium level of national output,
and Xe the equilibrium level of exports, and whence
XYe_..Xe.+Ca+ Ia +Ba+Ha + Ga - Ra -xMa
1-c-i-b- h + r + m 1-c-i-b- h + r + m
(143)
an expression similar to (128) and from which the properties
of the "static foreign trade multiplier" can be derived, 8 2
The notation may be simplified at this point:
ye= + Ya; the multiplier being K= - (144)d + m d + m'
may for convenience be divided into (a) a foreign part govern-
ing exports, and a domestic part. Subtracting (142) from
(141) we get
Yt Ye=c(Yt-Ye) + i(Yt-1- Y) + b(Ytr1- Ye) + h(Yt r- Ye) -
- r(Ytl- Ye) - m(Yt.- Ye) + Xa - Xe (145)
2F. Maclilup, International Trade and the National Income
Multiplier, op. cit., pp. 78-9; J. J. Polak and T, 0. 7Chang,
An International Economic System, International Monetary Fund,
Washington, D, C., mimeographed copy, p. 10.
a difference equation which may be repeated for any value
of t, as follows:
Y t Y e=0(y1 t.-S Ye) + i1 (Y_- Ye) + b'(Yt 1- Ye) +
+ h'(Yt-l~ Ye) rl(Yt-1- Ye) -m 1 (Yt-- Ye) + Xa - Xe
= c(Yt-2- Ye) + i2(t-2 ~ e) + b (Yt 2 ~ Ye) +
+Ih2 (t-~Ye) - r2 (t-2 Ye) 2- (Yt-2 0 e) + Xa - X =
.= chY0  - Ye) + it(Yo - Ye) + bt(Y0  Ye) +
+ ht(YO- Ye) - rt(YO 
- Ye) - mt(YO 
- Ye) + Xa Xe
(146)
which reformulates in terms of difference equations the dif-
ferential expression (120), and which means that if a hypo-
thetical national economy starts from an initially given
configuration of goods and services, Yo, its national income
at any future time t is determined, provided that the level
of exports stays invariant:
Yt= Ye + t(y0 o - Ye) + it(Yo Ye) + bt(Yo Ye) + ht(Y0 - y) -
- rt(Y0 a- Ye ) - mt(Yo Ye ) + Xa - Xe (147)
Assuming that Xa=Xe, the following conclusions regarding the
behavior of the system may be drawn: (a) if, also, Yo=Ye,
then the national income remains at the equilibrium level
indefinitely; (b) if Yo*Ye, and d + m >0, then the national
JR. Hicks, op. cit., p. 171; W. S. Milne, Numerical
Calculus, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1949,
oh. XI.
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income will damp down to equilibrium; (c) if Yo0 Ye' and
d + m<0, then the system will be unstable and explosive,
The condition that d + m O is the general condition for the
stability of equilibrium (IV,A,51).
3. So much for a system with a lag of one period. Let
84
us now assume a uniform lag of more than one period,
Consumption now depends in part on the income of the preced-
ing period, and this relationship recedes in time for the
past t-v periods, thus
Ct=clYtl+ c2 Yt-2+ 0,. + cvyt-v+ Ca (148)
or, in a generalized form specified for national economy
(K) = (1),..., (M), at any time period t-p, p=1,..., v:
C(K)tw c(K)PY(K)t + Ca(K)t (149)
where c(K)P is the marginal propensity to consume prevailing
in national economy (K) at the t-p, p=1,..., v, period of
time preceding the final time period t. As for investment
we have:
It=i1 (Yj10- Yt-2) + i2 (Yt-2 t-3 + ...
+ ipi(Yt-p+1 it-p) + Ia (150)
84J. R. Hicks, op.cit., loc. cit.; J. S. Duesenberry,
Income, Saving and the_ Theory of Consumer Behavior, Harvard
University Press, Cambridge, Mass., chs. V and VI;
L. A, Mettler, "Three Lags in the Current Flow of Income,"
in IcmEm loyment and Public Policy, Norton, New York,
1948, pp.1-52; G. Katona, "Effect of Income Changes on the
Rate of Saving,H Review of Economics and Statistics, May 1949,
pp. 95-103.
or, in a generalized form, specified for country (K) =
(1),..., (M), at the pth time period before the final time
period at t, p=l,,,,, v:
I(K)t= v (K) Y(K) Y(K)t-p-l + Ia(K)t (151)
p=1
where the "acceleration coefficient," i(K)P, is our former
input coefficient when the productive factor is capital, and
is here expressed in terms of the effect on investment of
changes in output as a whole, rather than, as it is more
usual, in terms of the effects of changes in consumption only,
Compare, for instance, equation (151) with any employment
function above-mentioned. This autonomous investment, Ia(K),
is here expressed also in real terms, i.e., deflated by the
cost of living index, since this will be valid even if au-
tonomous investment is "caused" by foreign investment. Note
that autonomous investment, i.e., investment not caused by
a change in output, is particularly important in certain
institutional structures. In industrially developed countries,
public investment as well as investment which occurs in
response to innovations, and much of the so-called "long
range" investment can be regarded as autonomous, But in
8 5 Bertil Ohlin, TheProblem of Employment Stabilization,
Columbia University Press, New York, 1949, pp. 117-8;
Erik Lundberg, Studiem in the Theory of Economic_ Exansion,
P. 8. King, London, 1937, p. 243 n.
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countries with little domestic saving, or misdirected sav-
ing, and no capital market, such as is the case in indus-
trially backward economies, autonomous investment acquires an
international rble. In such cases, willingness to lend in
the lending country partly depends on economic conditions
in the borrowing country, and to this extent foreign invest*-
ment is an endogenous factor in the borrowing country's
economic system. But generally, the conditions for lending
in the lending country appear as predominant. In this thesis,
therefore, foreign investment will always be considered as
much of an exogenous factor in the receiving countryt econ-
omy as is its exports. For simplicity we shall assume that
the proceeds of foreign investment are used to finance
imports, though not necessarily originating in the lending
country, and that, as such, a foreign investment is not
essentially or formally different from exports.86
4. Using equations (149) and (151) in the simplest ex-
pression for the national product, Y=C + I, we get
Y(K)t= c(K) Y(K)t-p+ Ca(K)t +
p=1
+ i(K) (Y(K)t-p- Y(K)t-p-1 + Ia(K) (152)
P=1 P
J. J. Polak, "Balance of Payments Problems of Countries
Reconstructing with the Help of Foreign Loans," Quarterly
Journal of Economics, vol. LVIII, 1943, p. 214; J, R. Hicks,
op, cit., p. 58, footnote 1, and appendix to oh. V, pp.
182-4; E. A. Radice, op. cit., pp. 47-56.
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This is a rather basic equation for what follows. But we
should not be entirely satisfied with this result, which is
partial, as long as we are aiming at obtaining the "law" of
behavior of the relative deviation between output at any
point in time and output at the equilibrium level. The
simplest situation is when Ia(K)=O and all the Y's are equal
so that I(K)=O, and if, moreover, Oa(K)=O, then Y(K)taQ.
If, however, Ca(K) $ 0, then
Y (K),= Ca(K) (153)
1 - c(K)
as in the Keynesian 'static multiplier.' But when output is
not stationary, two alternatives must be considered: (a) the
scale expanding economy without autonomous investment, and
(b) the scale expanding economy with autonomous investment,
Because of the underlying assumption of a generalized con-
stant returns to scale, which has not been relaxed, and assum-
ing that there are no autonomous investment or autonomous
consumption, i.e., that Ia(K)=ra(k)=O, we obtain the economic
situation already exemplified in the panels (96) and (97),
except that now it is explicitly assumed that output grow
at a constant rate, such that if
Y(K) =1, then Y(K)t= 1 +,\ ,(14
where N is the national economy's scale rate of growth.
With reference to Y(K)4, the national income at t may be ex-
pressed as
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Y(K) = Y(K)e(l + \ )t
hence
Yt-f Yt-p-1e(1 + N)tP Ye(l + )tPl XYe(1 + )
(155)
Substituting (155) into (152) we obtain:
Y(K)e(l + \ )t= Y(K)e 10(K)P(1 + )t9 +
p=1
+ NY(K) 1(K)P(1 + \)t-P-(
p=l(156)
Rejecting, as economically inexpressive, the possible solu-
tion Y(K)e=0, and dividing through by Ye(1 + \ ) we get:87
1+ X )v1c(K) (1 + )V'-p + 1(K)(1 + \X)V-p
p=l p p (157)
showing that, if the equation has any real and positive roots*
the system remains in equilibrium at a progressive rate of
growth when N is equal to any of these roots. Assuming, now,
that Ia(K)=0, that Ca(K)=Q, and that Ia(K) + Ca(K) is a mul-
tiple of (1 + X )t, and introducing the first two terms in
(156), and dividing through by Ye(l + \ )t-P we get that
87J. R. Hicks, op, cit., p. 182; R. F. Harrod, Towards a
Dynamio Economics, Macmillan, London, 1948, pp. 77 ff.
88. Jordan, Calculus of Finite Differences, Chelsea,
New York, 1950, pp 545-54; W. E. Milne, op~. cit., pp.
324-8; L. M. Milne-Thompson, The Calculus of Finite Dittfer-
ences, Macmillan, London, 1933, pp. 234-7,
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(1 + /\a= c(K)(1 + x)VP+Xz1(K)(1 + 0 v-p-l +
p=1 p=1
+ Ia(K)e + Ca(K)e (1 +\)v (158)
Y(K)e
or
Ia(K)e + Ca(K)e
Y(K) =(159)
1- c(K)p(1 + \ )P- \ Ei(K)( + A )P 1
p=1 p=1
where the "dynamic" multiplier may be expressed as follows:
K(K)= -(160)
1 -E (K) (1 + ) - ji(K) (1 +
p=1 p=1
The equation (158) or (159) gives the moving equilibrium; the
equation (152) together with the auxiliary equation (157)
give the deviations from equilibrium; these equations may
give the general solution, or its properties, of equation
(152), We shall not attempt to present here the rigorous
demonstration of this solution, but we shall attempt to out-
line its properties.
5. The multiplier (160) shows directly, as well as by
implication, that domestic and foreign investment, either
public or private, including investment in plant and equip-
ment, business inventories and residential construction, as
well as exports and granted loans are the primary factors
responsible for cyclical fluctuations. These investment
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fluctuations are both induced and autonomous8 The induced
investment, unless it results from an increase in output,
which itself results from an autonomous investment adjusted
to the trend of growth of the economy, would not tend to
maintain itself in time, even when after the hump is over
autonomous investment reverts to its equilibrium position.89
The acceleration in the increase in the stock of capital
equipment will then be greater than the rate of increase in
investment opportunities. The decline in the rate of profit,
and a consequent reduction in the rate of capital outlays,
reduces total income and intensifies the reduction in the
rate of investment. The configuration of this upward path
of divergence from equilibrium may be oscillatory or that of
a steady rise. It may or may not reach the ceiling at which
the economy is producing an output which is the maximum
obtainable with the available resources. Beyond this point
the economy tends to engage itself into balance of payments
difficulties, and, internally, into inflationary trends.
But as far as the analysis is conducted in real terms, a
cumulative downward spiral must, then, be initiated, since
it is conceptually impossible for output to expand at a
faster rate than the normal rate of expansion at which autono-
89National and international Measures for Full Emp10y-
ment, UntdNtos ake Success, New York, December 149,
pp . 22-26 ,
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mous investment fell after its burst, a normal expansion
which is disguised by the continued expansion, even at a
decreasing rate, of induced investment. Figuratively speak-
ing, the economy is, then, like a rocket which rises in its
trajectory as long as its initial momentum lasts, and in
spite of the gravitational pull towards the earth which has
90
never ceased to be effective. In the case of a national
economy this vertex of trajectory is the full employment of
its available productive resources, Induced investment by
itself is not sufficient to maintain the economy at this
apex for more than perhaps two or three time periods.
Henceforth, the subsequent contraction may or may not be
rapid, but in any case it will not proceed indefinitely but
will come somewhere to a halt. After the upper turning point
is passed induced investment will be zero, since output will
be decreasing, and autonomous investment is reduced below
its normal level. Then, the multiplier effect takes over,
and the economy noses towards its equilibrium level, which
it pierces, since, when- reaching it, the cumulative effects
of the rise is more than offset by the cumulative effects
90Report on International Investment and Financing
Facilities, Council of F.A.0., June 1949, p. 15,
9J. H, Hicks, loc. cit., and also G. Haberler, Pros-
perity and Depression, p. _cit., pp. 368-9; H. F. Harrod,
The Trade Cycle, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1936, p. 165,
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of the fall, and presumably, at the equilibrium level,
investment will have not yet reached its minimum limit.
Besides there are other breaks, such as disinvestment and
dissaving, and, above all, there are the effect of long-
planned public works, unemployment compensation payments,
and a fall in imports relatively to exports, which together
or separately may damp down the slump from its downward path,
and bring the contraction to a halt, The rook bottom of
slump equilibrium cannot be pierced through, it may perhaps
not even be reached, except assymptotically after an infi-
nite time. If the process of the multiplier is convergent
(IV,A,51) there will be a moment at which the economy cannot
dive any further and noses up, its horizontal stabilizer
parallel to the normal trend of autonomous investment. Thus
recovery is initiated. The duration of this cyclical process
depends on the building up and the service life of capital
goods. The former determines the moment at which investment
overtakes investment opportunities, while the latter affects
the rate at which an excess supply of equipment with refer-
ence to its possible minimum will liquidate itself, These
fluctuations not only tend to become synchronized between
industries of one individual country, but they also tend to
spread internationally by means of trade and capital move-
ments. To the consideration of these factors we must now
turn.
a25
6, Exports, imports_, and national income fluctuations.
We now consider imports and exports in relation to these
fluctuations, Denote by M(JK)t the imports of country (K)
from country (J), at period of time t, and by M(K)t the total
volume of imports of country (K) during the same period of
t ime . We must, .-then, have
M()t 1M(JK)t = s(J)u(JK),7 m(JK)PY(K)t-p +
(Jal) p i l)(J=1
+ Ma(JK) X( ) X(JK) (161)
where($K) (1),..., (M) denote the number of countries
involved in international economic transactions, and psl,...,
v, the number of time periods which we are considering t-p,
a multi-period lag. The coefficient e(J) denote the marginal
relative importance, or marginal share, of country (J) in ~
world trade; this coefficient is assumed to be constant over
the time period lag under study. The other coefficient,
u(JK), denote the degree of economic, political, and cul-
tural affinity, or geographic proximity or accessibility
between country (K) and country (J). The symbol m(JK) sig--
nifies tne marginal propensity of country (K) to import from
any other country (J). According to equations (139) and
(140) this marginal propensity to import may be broken down
into a marginal propensity to import goods for consumption,
a marginal propensity to import investment goods, and a
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marginal propensity to import goods for the production of
exports, in such way that
m(JK)=s(J).u(JK). (m(JK)c + m(JK)i + m(JK) (162)
Allowance shall be made now for a possible competition between
imported goods and home produced goods. This shall be con-
sidered as an explantion of "autonomous" imports, Ma(JK)t, an
expression designating a change in import not due to a change
in income;
Ma(JK)t=Ke.mb -- + ma(JK)t (JK)=(1),..., (M)
m (K)t(163)
where autonomous imports are conceptually subdivided into
two parts; (a) that which expresses the effect of price
changes as manifested by the mean elasticity of substitution
between domestic and foreign products, e, times the average
value of imports, m, and the ratio of foreign to domestic
prices; and (b) a properly speaking autonomous imports, ma,
denoting the average propensity to import, or the level of
the "import function" curve. This formula may not be satis-
factory when quantitative or exchange restrictions are im-
posed on imports, since, then, fluctuations in income can no
longer be reflected in changes in the quantities imported.92
9 2 J. J, Polak and T. C. Chang, op. cit., pp. 20 ff.;
D. H. Robertson, "Mr. Clark and the Foreign Trade Multiplier,"
Economic Journal, vol. XLIX, June 1939, p. 354; G. Haberler,
op. cit., pp.74A1-7s.
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In other words, changes in the marginal propensity to import
from a time period to another are to be considered unsystem-
atic, and also changes in ma do not obey a *law" implicit in
the national economic system, but must itself be a sort of
policy parameter, a conceivable "autarky trend" or "tendency."
Having these considerations in mind, we should facilitate
statistical approximations, we shall adopt equation (161) as
a sufficiently reliable explanation of the volume of imports
of the national economy (K) in time period t, over a multi-
period time lag t-p, and in absence of quantitative restric-
tions imposed during this time span.
7. A symmetrical expression to (161) may be obtained
for the volume of exports of country (K). The imports of (K),
as described in (161), are, of course, identical to the ex-
ports of any country (J) with which (K) has international
economic contact, since what (K) imports from (J) is identi-
cal to what (J) exports to (K). But, now, the exports of
(K) are assumed to constitute an exogenous factor from the
point of view of economy (K). They must, therefore, be ex-
pressed as imports from (K) of any (J), (J#K)=(1),.... (M),
as follows:
X(K;=x(KJ)t= s(x).u(KJ).7 jm(KJ)Y(J)t., +
(J=1L) psi (J=1)
+ Ka(KJ)t=M(J)tr M(KJ)t (164)
( J=1)
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where the same notation convention used in (161) applies,
including that referring to the marginal propensities to
import. But as far as any country (K) is considered, exports
as well as foreign loans are to be considered a "foreign exo-
genous factor," thus:
X(K)t((xt + xa) ) -Xa(K)(165)
PM (K)t
where X(K)t stands for the volume of exports of national
economy (K) at time t, xt denoting the volume of exports pro-
perly speaking, xa denoting the volume of exports necessary
to create a foreign balance equal to the amount of any possibly
granted loan; px and p. being, respectively, the price index
number of exports, and that of imports referring to country
(K) at time period t. This expression constitutes the for-
eign factor which, as far as economy (K) is concerned is to
be understood as exogenous, Xa(K)t.
8. We have, on purpose, delayed consideration of the
three other items included in equation (136) along with cur-
rent consumption, current investment, and the foreign balance,
namely, new private construction, Ht, the governmental defi-
cit or surplus, Dt, and business savings, Bt. We shall now
give brief attention to these expenditures. Extended over
a multi-period lag the deficit equation in (137) becomes,
for the economy (K):
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v
D(K)t=Zr(K) Y(K) + Ga(K)t + Ra(K)t (166)
p=1
The generalized equation for new private construction becomes:
v
H(K)t=Zh(K) Y(K) + Ha(K) (167)
tp t-p aaKt
and the generalized expression for business savings becomes:
V
B(K)t=pI1b(K)I Y(K)t-p - Y(K) + Ba(K)t (168)
These last three equations (166-8) were presented here only
for the sake of completeness in the description of national
expenditures for goods and services included in the national
output at any period of time. They refer to real values and
should be deflated by the cost of living index before sta-
tistical application. Moreover, they explain data that
should be kept in mind when dealing with international trade
relation of any national economy. The amount of national
stocks is narrowly correlated to the problem of location of
sources of supply, and with economic space as well as time,
For simplicity, however, we shall keep out of account in
what follows the governmental surplus or deficit, new private
construction, and business savings.
9. Including into the basic equation (152) exports and
imports, the net national product of country (K) at time
period t may be written as follows:
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V V/
Y(K)tr c(K)PY(K)t-p + Ca(K)  + i1(K)P(Y(K)t..P
- Y(K)t....pl) + Ia(K)t + e(K).u(KJ).7 m(KJ)PY(J)t-p +
p=l (J=1)
+ Ma(KJ)t - s(J).u(JK). m(JK)pY(K)t-p - Ma(JK)t
P=1 (j=1)
(169)
which is obtained simply by inserting'into equation (152) the
equations (164) and (161) for exports from and imports into
country (K). Equation (169) is a "final equation" where the
national income variable, Y(K)t, for any (K) at any t is
explained by a set of constant coefficients and lags repre-
senting the structure of the national economy model, and a
set of unsystematic terms denoting autonomous factors.
There are (M) such equations, one for each country, in the
international economic system we are at present considering,
and a complete set for each period of time, and there are v
such time periods in the lag t-p for p=1,..., v. These equa-
tions will be sufficient, given prices and exchange rates,
to determine the level of income in each country for each
time period, Omitting constant terms and all the exogenous
variables, the endogenous variables of an international eco-
nomic system may be written as follows;
X(T)t=±4(T)t= ( (J)) = X(K)t (J/xKM)),..., (x)
(Jml) (K=l)
(170)
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which means that, at any time t, the volume of world trade
(T)t, in terms of imports, is identical to the volume of
world trade, in terms of exports. This generalizes the system
of transmission of national impulses internationally,
10. A model for an international economic system,
National economies, typified in this description mesh into an
international economic system93 through the media of inter-
national trade, international capital movements and other
international transactions. If countries are not obliged to
participate in these transactions, and if the maximization
principle is upheld in international trade as within a closed
national economy, then we are obliged to conclude that some
gains accrue to the various individual participants in an
international economic action. We may say, more precisely,
that if all the optimum conditions of production and exchange
9 ;Bertil, Ohlin, Interregional and International Trade,
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1939, appendix A;
L. A. Metzler, "A Multiple-Region Theory of Income and
Trade," Econometrica, vol, 18, no. 4, October 1950, pp. 329-
354; J. S. Chipman, *The Multi--Sector Multiplier," ibid.
loc. cit., pp. 355-374; H. M. Goodwin, "The Multiplier as
Matrix," Economic Journal, vol. 59, December 1949, pp. 537-
555; J. J. Polak and T. 0. Chang, op.c4t., passim; and from
a slight different angle see L. A. Met zler, fAYMulItiple-
Country Theory of Income Transfers,Journal of Political
Econom ,vol. LIX, no. 1, February 1951, pp. 14-29, especially
pp. 1-24; idem, "Underemployment Equilibrium in International
Trade," Econometrica. vol. 10, April 1942, pp. 97-112; idem,
"The Transfer Problem Reconsidered," Journal of Political
E conomy , vol. L, June 1942. pp. 397-414.
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are satisfied in a certain country, then no other constella-
tion of goods and services would suffice to make everyone
as well off as they, in fact, are. The gainers by a movement
away from the production aggregate would not be able to over-
compensate the losers, But, in accordance with the maximisa-
tion principle, trade and factor movements will take place
whenever, after barriers being removed, the world prices
are not identical with prices in the hitherto isolated coun-
try. And then, if we assume that all the optimum conditions
are again satisfied, it once more follows that no other col-
lection of goods which could be obtained by production or
exchange would suffice to make everyone as well off as in
the post-trade equilibrium position. If the distribution
of real income is no worse after than before trade, and if
among these collections of goods and services which can be
obtained after trade is the configuration of commodities
available in the pre-trade equilibrium, then we again must
conclude that welfare can be said to have increased, i.e.,
that the post-trade national economic position is "better"
94
than the pre-trade position. All that is required to
9 Lloyd A. Metzler, "The Theory of International Trade,"
in Survey of Contemporary Economics, op, cit., pp. 233-6;
Paul A. Samuelson, "The Gains from International Trade,"
Wolfgang F.Stolper and Paul A. Samuelson, "Protection and
Real Wages," Tibor de Scitovszky, "A Reconsideration of the
Theory of Tariffs," Readings in the Theory of International
Trade, Blakiston, Philadelphia, 1949,~ pp. 239 ft., pp. 333
ff., pp. 558 ff.; I. k. D. Little, op. oit., pp. 229-31.
guarantee a gain from international trade is that (a) the
distribution of real income be not deteriorated, and that
(b) the comparative world prices be out of line with com-
parative real revenues and costs in the home country. This
reasoning, however, is not complete, and may not be valid
when more than one country is engaged in trade. Then, for
all countries to gain from trade it is further required to
assume that all the optimum conditions of production and ex-
change be satisfied in every participant country, so that
transformation rates be equal to comparative real costs and
revenues or, then, that after trade production be unaltered,
so that the problem becomes merely one of exchange. If,
now, we assume universal full-employment, and the absence of
increasing returns to scale, then, and only then, free trade
would maximize a world social action function, since it
results in the fulfillment of all the optimum conditions of
production and exchange throughout the world. But once this
universally optimum position is reached, any individual
country or group of countries, if economically strong enough
to implement a nonconforming behavior without retaliation
from other countries, would be able to gain more by a re-
strictive policy, just as an individual monopolist may so
gain, than by simply conforming to the general ultra-nationally
imposed norm, The undeterminacy of the whole problem is,
once more, brought sharply to focus, As in the case of a
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closed national economy it is not possible to derive, either
statically or dynamically, a unique and stable optimum equi-
librium position for an international eoonomic system, unless
a set of ethically conceived, politically determined, and
juridically implemented ultimate ends is given, such that it
is possible to say that the international economy tends to
their fulfillment as the objectives of international economic
action (IV,A,1).
11. In the absence of this universally agreed and ob-
served set of norms of economic behavior, economic fluctuations
occurring within each national economy will be internationally
propagated through the network of the economic interrelations
existing between individuals and groups across national
boundaries. The objective of this section is theoretically
to approach this international economic system, directly and
as a whole. We aim at developing, briefly but exhaustively,
the necessary as well as the sufficient conditions for inter-
national economic stability at an optimum position of equi-
librium, Throughout this study we have tried to demonstrate
its fundamental theme that no uniquely given, stable and
optimum position of equilibrium is possible for an economic
system unless there is a consensus among the participant
economic agents about the ultimate ends of the economic action
system. Since this consciously conducted, concerted, delib-
erate collective action aiming at a well defined objective
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has never been attained internationally, we must in this
section confine our attention to the description of displace-
ment of equilibrium, or to the international economic action
path of disequilibrium, leaving to the last part of this
thesis the determination of the conditions of equilibrium
in a dynamic international economy. Here we assume that an
international economic order can be positively described by
means of a world trade multiplier, whereas the description
of the equilibrium conditions is essentially organizational
and normative, and cannot prescind from considerations regard-
ing an international consensus with respect to socio-ethical
norms. For a positive description of the international
economic order we need only to uphold the maximization prin-
ciple as the universally accepted norm of economic action,
i.e., by maintaining the assumption of constant returns to
scale as applicable to the national production and employment
functions of every country concerned, we shall assume that
each participant country endeavors to maximize its gains
from trade at the same time that it tries to minimize the
expenditures necessitated by the acquisition of these gains;
Moreover, we assume that countries possess the essential
ingredients of national economic systems as previously de-
scribed, such as an active population, a configuration of
available commodities as an original endowment of goods and
services, as well as political independence, i.e., in juristic
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terms, national sovereignty. The international economic
action, as formerly the national economic action at the
technological and the exchange levels, will be visualized
as flowing through time and an economic space, although prob-
lems of location will not be directly treated, all commodities
being conceived as produced, and all costs of production as
computed, after inclusion of tne physical transportation of
commodities to their users or consumers as well as transporta-
tion costs, The national sovereignty assumption simply means
that nations will be assumed to be entitled to freedom of
economic decisions, the political problem of the national
allocation of coercive power being understood as satisfacto-
rily solved, by imposition or consent within each national
economy. It is, moreover, assumed that there exists a set
of tacit norms of economic behavior prevailing internation-
ally as an unwritten code or "law of nations," and refer-
ring to such matters as, for instance, the legitimacy of
certain particular institutional structures of national econ-
omic organization. In other words, each country, besides
being entitled to political sovereignty as regarding its
capacity to make national economic decisions and policies,
is also supposed to be entitled to particular ideological
and cultural patterns, i.e.. of specific national social
action functions not strictly conforming to some universally
valid ethical foundation. This is, for the moment, all that
337
we need as a general hypothetical framework for a positive
theory of international economic order.
12. Our first step now is to divide the national output,
of any country (K)=(1),..., (m), at any period of time t,
Y(K)t. into two parts: (a) a domestic part, which will enter
as an aggregate in the international economic system, and
comprises the sum of all expenditures on domestically pro-
duced goods and available services, to be denoted by the
symibol E(K)t, and given as a linear function of the national
output of the previous time period; and (b) a foreign part,
comprising the national economy's receipts from exports and
expenditures on imports of goods and services, i.e., its
foreign balance. Thus the general equation (169) may be re-
formulated as follows:
Y(K) =E(K)- M(K)t + X(K)t (171)
where the domestic part is a function of output of the pre-
vious time period
V
E(K)t E(K) Y(K)tPg_1 (172)
and the foreign part is, in its turn, subdivided into: (a)
the sum of all imports of country (K) from all other countries
(J) given as a function aof the national output of country
(K) in the immediately previous time period, thus
v (M)
M(K)t= LIZ (JK) (Y(K)t-p- 1\ (73
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and (b) the sum of all exports from country (K) to all other
countries (J) given as a function of the national output of
each country (J) in the immediately preceding period of time,
t hus
v )
X(K)t= M(KJ)P (Y(J)tp- 1 ) (174)
p=l (J=l)
With these equations (171-4) it is possible to represent the
international economy in terms of imports of all participant
countries from all other participant countries, or as a flow
of commodities, i.e., goods and services, in a fashion identi-
cal to the one we have used to formulate in (120) and (127)
the flow of commodities in a national economic system. As
in the flow chart (127), the flow chart representing a dy-
namic international economic system would also be open at
both ends, that is, (a) at the initiation of the international
economic action, where the world supply of goods and services
is assumed to have been historically distributed among the
various countries
Y(T)o= Y(l)0 + Y(2)0 + .. + Y(M) (175)
and (b) at the ultimate end of the international economic
action, where the national bill of goods and services avail-
able at the end of time period t faces a final world demand,
Y(T)t. By deflating all participant countries' money value
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of their national income data into real value, and by
assuming that, however many variables the full system describ-
ing the world economy may possess, this system can always be
represented by linear relations, we may write the final equa-
tion resulting from a general system of linear difference
equations describing each national economy in the international
economic system. After the elimination of all variables
except one, the final equation representing a dynamic inter-
national economic action emerges as follows:
Y(T)o + a(T)vY(T)t-v + . + a(T)1Y(T)t-1= Y(T)t (176)
which is a vectorial expression similar to (121), and where
Y(T), is an exogenous variable at time o; Y(T)t", p=l,..,, v,
the world income in real terms at time period t-p; and any
a(T) , including a(T), which is assumed to be equal to unity,
being a constant coefficient at the pth time period before
the final time period at t. If these coefficients are suoh
that, there exists an equilibrium value of Y(T)t, named
Y(T)e, for any value of Y(T) 0 except zero, this equilibrium
value for the international economic action (176) could be
9 5Using the Laspeyre price index to test increases, and
the Paasche index to test decreases in real national
incomes, as recommended in I. M. D. Little, A Oritique of
Welfare Economics, p, cit., p. 217; idem, "The Valuation of
the Social Income," Economica, February 1949, pp. 11-26;
Paul A. Samuelson, "Evaluation of Real National Income,"
Oxford Economic Papers, vol. 2, January 1950, pp. 1-21 and
appendix, pp. 22 ft,
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expressed as follows:
Y(T)
Y (T) =(...0(177)
1 - a(T) 
- a(T)2 
.. - a(T)(
and the "multiplier" of the system, with respect to Y(T)e,
will be:96
1K (T 1(178)
1 a(T)1 - a(T)2 - ... -a(T)
which is the most general expression of the dynamic "law" of
the world income determination. If autonomuos factors are
maintained constant leeway will be provided for the "hidden
law" of the world income mechanism to reach equilibrium and
to stay there without being disturbed. But this general
formulation (178) could be written in terms of the national
outputs of the various economically interrelated countries,
13. The international reflection ratio. Each term in
both sides of (176), including the initial one, may be ex-
plained as a summation or aggregation of the outputs of all
the participant national economies, thus
t (M)
Y(T)tp= ___) a(K)pY(K)t-.T(179)
p=o (K=1)
96J. J. Polak and T. C. Chang, op cit., p. 12;
Marshall K. Woods and George B. Dantzig7-Programming of
Interdependent Activities - I. General Discussion,"
Econometrica, vol. 17, July-October 1949; George B. Dantzig,
"Programming of Interdependent Activities - II. Mat ematica1
Model," Econometrica, loc. cit.; Paul A. SamnuelsonS"Dynamic
Process Analysis," in A Survef of Contemporary Soonomics,
op, cit., pp. 577-81.
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where a(K) = 1, and each
Y(K)tp= a(K)t-p + I(K)t-p - M(K)t-p + X(K)t (180)
or, using (171) as well as (172-4),
Y(K)t-p= E(K)t-p - I(K)tp + X(K)t-p (181)
which is the same as
Y(K)t .=pZE(K) QY(K)t-pi>' c. M(JK) pY(K)t.p.) +
p=l p=1 (J=l)
+ 3 F K(KJ) Y(J)(182)
p=1 (J=1)
or, using (169) for consumption, investment and imports, and
(165) for exports, we get
Y(K)t- Vc(K) Y(K) + V (K) Y(K)_ -Y(K)t-p-1 +p=p=1tp
v (M)
+ Ca(K)t + Ia(K)t - s(K),u(JK )Z m(JK)PY(K) 
_p
p=1 (J=1)
- Ma(JK)t + Xa(K)t (183)
an expression which, using the breakdowns in (162-5), could
be further expanded to finer details, but which, as it is,
fits our purposes. Recalling the basic assumption of constant
returns to scale as prevailing throughout the national econ-
omy (K). and that, therefore, output increases at a constant
rate in relation to inputs, A , such that A(K) denotes the
trend of growth of (K), it can be shown, by the same procedure
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used to determine (159), that, when foreign transactions
are included in the national output of any country (K), the
equilibrium level of this national output may be expressed
as follows:
(184)
Ia(KE +Ca(K)e - Ma(JK)e +
V W-p v__1 
-P-1V1-\ c(K ) 1+A(K )) -X I(K )p 1+N(K) +
P=1 p=l p=1
+ Ma(K)e
LZ m(JK) 1+(K)(ml)("J=1)
an expression which could be notationally compressed.
Denoting the "marginal propensity not to spend" of (K) as
-P v-1_p-i
1 - c(K)1+ A(K) - XLi(K)(1+X(K))= '(K) (185)
p=1 p=1
and the "marginal propensity to import" of (K) as
m(JK )(1 + X (K))= (K ) (186)
we get a conveniently simple expression for the "dynamic
multiplier" out of (184):
K(K) = 1 (187)
((K) +p(K)
In order now to obtain the relation between the foreign fac-
tor, xa(K)e , at the equilibrium level, and the equilibrium
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level of imports, that is, the reaction path of the national
economy (K) to impulses from abroad, we may reformulate the
equation (75) as subdivisible into a domestic part Yd(K)e'
and a foreign part, Yf(K)e, as follows:
Y(K)e= Xa(K)e + Ia(K) 8 + Ca(K)e - Ma(JK)e (188)
fl(K) +V(K) r (K) + 9(K)
Y(K)e= * + Yd(K)e (189)
r(K) + P(K)
According to (136) imports at the equilibrium level may be
expressed as follows:
M(K)e= P(K),Y(K)e (190)
Substituting (189) into (190); omitting Yd(K)e, and assuming
that the national economy starts from the equilibrium level
Y(K)e(= 1 +(K))- (191)
we get
M(K)e= P (K) Yj(K)e (192)
"r (K) +(K)
and writing
9 (K)= () -(193)
r(K) +})(K)
we obtain the international reflection ratio showing the
intensity with which the national economy (K) reflects back
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into the rest of the world impulses it receives from abroad.
The ratio (9 1, according to IA 0. The two values, f =1,
and C=o, are both critical values for the stability of the
national economy (K). If b'=0, the multiplier would be
infinite but for the fact that part of the domestic impulse
is transmitted to foreign countries through imports: the
national economy (K) is stable because other economies, with
which it is connected, are stable. If (f=1, the country
sends oack to the rest of the world, with equal intensity,
any shock it receives from abroad: it contracts or expands
imports with the saue intensity that its exports have been
contracted or expanded. It is, finally, because 'fc4 in a
sufficient number of national economies that the international
economic system is stable as a whole,
14. The world economy multiplier, We have now all the
theoretical elements we need to combine the relationships
concerning individual national economies into an expression
denoting the world output multiplier. Assume that, for all
(K) (1),..., (M). the affinity coefficient s(JK) = 1.
Then, according to (164), the volume of exports of economy
(K) at the equilibrium level where Y(K)t= Y(K)t.,2= -- will
be
(M)
X(K)e= s(K) ZIM(KJ)S (194)
(J=l)
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where s(K) denotes, as we have already indicated, the im-
portance or shaQre of the national economy (K) in world trade
(IV,B,6), Since, for the world as a whole, the total volume
of imports is identical to the total volume of exports, the
equation (194) may be reformulated as follows:
S(K)e s(K) CX(T)e -)M(K)e) (195)
Using (192) and (193), and making Yc(K)e= X(K)e by assuming
that there is no foreign lending at the equilibrium level,
then (195) may be written
X(K)e= 1 a(K)( X(T)e =(K),X(T)e (196)
for
s(K)= 8 ( ) (197)
I +f(K).s(K)
where Y(K) may be called "marginal propensity of the rest
of the world to import from the national economy (K)." This
is the first of three equations from which we intend to
derive a multi-national multiplier. The second equation may
easily be obtained from the foreign part of equation (188),
by assauming again tha t Yrg(K )e= X(K )e. A ccor dingly , we wr i te:
Y (K)e= X(K )5  (198)
~(K) + 9 (K)
The third and last equation is simply (190), With 9as de-
fined in (193), and Y as defined in (197), equation (192)
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may be reformulated as follows:
M(K)e= (K). V(K).X(T)e + A(K) (199)
where A(K) is the total effect upon imports of all exogenous
variables which have been omitted from (196), (198), and
(190). Finally, from (170), we obtain
(M)
A(K)
M(T) (K=1) X(T)e (200)
1 - z (K). *(K)
(K=1)
97
the systematic part of which is the multi-national multiplier:
K(T)=1(201)
(M)
1 -'f (K). (K)
(K=1)
This multiplier will be damped since its denominator seems
tpriori to be less than unity, It synthetizes the propaga-
tion system. The impulses are summed up in A(K) of equation
(200). They may be classified into two types of impulses or
"shocks"; (a) those that add to the importation of one coun-
try without simultaneously reducing the importation of
970. Lange, "The Theory of the Multiplier," Econometrica,
vol. 2, July-October 1943, pp. 227-245; W. Leontief,
"Output,, Employment, Consumption, and Investment," and
"Exports, Imports, Domestic Output, and Employment," re-
spectively, in uartrlyJournal of Economics, vol. 58,
February 1944, jpp.K29-3l4, and vol ~aTehb~~rary 1946,
pp . 171-193.
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another country; and (b) those which add to the imports of
one country while reducing the importation of one or more
other countries. The net effect of these two types of
"shocks" need not be zero,
15, Properties of the international trade multiplier.
Starting from an international economy in equilibrium, where
the marginal real value of goods and services exported by
any country at any period of time is exactly balanced by the
marginal real value of goods and services imported, any one
or both of two types of parametric shifts will cause this
equilibrium to be displaced: (a) technological changes
affecting the production level of the international economic
action function; and (b) psychological changes affecting
this function of international economic action at its ex-
change level. These parameters of shift have been called
autonomous factors of displacement of equilibrium. The first
type of shift, affecting production at its technological
level is caused by changes in the various technical output,
input, and flow coefficients, which are, for any country
(K), the 9 (K), the T0(K), the &(K), and the q (K),
Since these coefficients should carry subscripts denoting
not only specific productive factors but also lines of pro-
duction as well as the time period of production, it will
be easily inaagined, even for a couple of countries, how
ephemeral will be a state of equilibrium based upon their
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permanence. The second type of shift is even more evasive
for it affects the equilibrium of exchange through changes
in the indifference-.preference surfaces of individuals and
integrated groups. These marginal utility indices are, for
any national economy (K), the &J (K), and the \) (K), which
carry superscripts indicating the particular individual or
integrated group to whom they belong as well as subscripts
denoting goods, services, and a time period of use or consump-
tion. Furthermore, the marginal social utility coefficient,
W(K), refers to changes in the real national income, which
is of extremely doubtful detection, if we wish to maintain
that individual utilities are not comparable. All we can
hope to do in these circumstances is, by aggregation and
linear approxiation, to predict, on the basis of statistical
observation, what will be the sign of certain variables when
subject to well-defined conditions. Thus, for instance, if
the assumption of maximizing behavior is upheld, the equi-
librium values of the variables can be regarded as solutions
of an extremum problem, and then, regardless of the number
of variables, it is often possible, by determining the sign
of special determinantal forms, to define the qualitative
behavior of the solution values in respect to changes of
8 98
8Pau1 A. Samuelson, Foundations of Economic Analysis,
op, cit., p. 21; J, .L. Mosakc, General-Equilibrium Theory in
(continued)
by considering parameters which supposedly cause only one
of the various equilibrium equations to shift. These are
autonomous factors such as Ia(K), Ca(K), Ga(K), Ra(K), Ma(K),
Xa(K), Ba(K), Ha(K), s(K), and u(K), as well as changes in
the terms of trade and other price ratios. Whenever exchange
and quantitative restrictions are introduced we should also
consider the shifts in the average and marginal propensities
to import due to these restrictions, But this is still too
broad a problem for one to consider who does not aim at
purely formal answers, and who has in mind exclusively inter-
national econoraic situations. If we, nevertheless, insist
upon the usefulness of such investigations, we must still
commit ourselves to the simplifying assumption that the
international repercussions of all such disturbances have
many common features, and that it would be needlessly repe-
titious to consider each of them separately. Maintaining,
therefore, our assumption of constant returns to scale, and
the overall linearity of production and employment functions,
we shall restrict our attention to the short-run and to the
domestic investment aspects of the problem,
16, We shall assume that the most important autonomous
factor in the short run is either a change in private
International Trade, op. cit., pp, 49-51; L. A. Metzler,
"~tability of Multiple Markets: the Hicks Conditions,"
Econometrica, vol. 13, October 1945, pp. 277-92. A. C, Aitken,
Determinants and Matrices, op. cit., pp, 74-75.
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investment not induced by a change in output, or a change
in the magnitude of governmental investment expenditures.
These factors, which are supposed immediately to affect the
level of imports, may have been primarily caused by a great
variety of motives, such as changes in business expectations,
as a result, for instance, of changed political conditions,
new discoveries and inventions, expenditures for military
preparedness, changes in the structure of interest rates,
governmental policies affecting credit, labor, prices in
general, tariffs, etc., as well as by every type of foreign
influence affecting exports. Changes in the level of domestic
investment, whether public or private, caused by domestic
as well as foreign factors, domestically affect the level of
production and employment, and, through a consequent displace-
ment of equilibrium in the balance of payments, exert a di-
rect influence on the balance of international transactions.
The intensity of this reflection is given by means of equa-
tion (193). Generally the reaction path is that, whenever
country (K) experiences a reduction in its exports, the
incomes of its export industries will fall, and this, bring-
ing about a reduction in demand for the products of its other
industries, will cause a fall in production, and a fall in
its demand for imports. Depending on (K)'s reflection ratio
the national economy will poise again in equilibrium at a
lower level of economic activity, or its imports will not be
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reduced by the full extent of the fall in exports leaving a
residual disequilibrium in its balance of payments on current
account.99 We have already noted (IV,B,13) that the sta-
bility of the international economic system rests upon the
empirical fact that the reflection ratio is less than unity
in a sufficient number of countries, since, then, the mar-
ginal propensity not to spend will be greater than zero in
the national income multipliers of these same countries. If
this were not so, there would be no floor for effective demand
to fall as well as no ceiling for it to rise, the whole sys-
tem being explosive upwards and downwards. As this is evi-
dently not the case what frequently happens is that whenever
country (K) let its effective demand fall this creates a
favorable balance in its foreign transactions, since the
other countries will not reciprocate (K)'s out in its imports
from them with an offsetting out in their imports from (K),
Contrariwise, if (K) increases its level of employment, by
means of private or public investments, this creates an
import surplus for (K), since, then, other countries will
not normally raise tneir imports from (K) at the same rate
that (K) increased its imports from these countries. This,
however, is the general case, for, whenever it is applied
99 Hi. C. Wallich, "United Nations Report on Full Employ-
ment," American Economic Review, vol. 11, December 1950,
pp. 876-83; The Problem of Economic Instability, aCommittee
Report, American Economic Review, vol, 11, September 1950,
pp. 532-4.
352
to specific instances, the problem loses much of its sharp-
ness. We see, in (200), that much depends upon the marginal
propensity of the rest of the world to import from (K),
given in (197), which, of course, depends upon the importance
or share of (K) in world trade. Unimportant countries, for
instance, may permit their effective demand and employment
to fall, or pursue deflationist policies without exerting
a perceptible influence in the rest of the world, and, at
the same time they will, by so doing, augment their own
international financial strength, Conversely, unimportant
countries would not affect the level of activity in the rest
of the world in a ponderable way by running into balance of
payments difficulties for the sake of fidelity to pledges
with other members of an international society which do-
not care for them, On the other hand rich and large countries,
tending as they do to export a smaller proportion of their
total production than less well developed countries, will
be less exposed than less important countries by fluctuations
in effective demand from abroad, but their decisions to lead
policies of external strength and internal economic weakness,
or vice versa, will affect many, This is the reason why
small countries tend politically to favor restriction and
bilateralism while large and important countries tend to
favor free trade and multilateralism; the first have much
to gain through a restrictionism which does not provoke
retaliation, whereas the latter have at least nothing to
lose by favoring multilateral schemes,
17. The international trade multiplier expressed in
equation (201) yieldsother suggestions. We see, for instance,
that an international consensus on the pursuit of policies
aiming at economic prosperity and stability is consistent
with an equally international consensus on the desirability
of effective competition and free trade only if there is a
tacit understanding to violate the freedom of trade whenever
the eftort oi some countries to pursue full employment poli-
cies are being frustrated by the failure of other countries
in this policy or in that of avoiding inflationary tendencies.
This is a world trade multiplier and not a world output
multiplier4  By itself, and in a negative way, the expres-
sion (200) suggests that there may be a fall in, world trade
not followed or caused by a proportional fall in world
income, and only by going through the reflection ratio down
to its real roots into the national income of each partici-
pant country, it is possible to see in a theoretical light
the intuitive limits to restriction imposed by the uneven
distribution of resources and the obvious advantages of
international division of labor, This exploration of the
hidden implications of tne multiplier (201) suggests,
moreover, that bilateral systems can only succeed if they
include all the major trading nations, whose position in the
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coalition must then be one of leadership while, for less
important nations the political r6le will simply be one of
adaptation. This distribution of roles, in accordance with
the reflection ratio, should be made in accordance with
(a) the particular country relative share in the world trade;
and (b) its income elasticity of demand for imports from
other countries.
18. Import restrictions are the next important category
of autonomous shocks, all in the downward direction, in the
volume of world trade. Here, however, the effects are -less
clear cut as long as only individual countries are concerned,
since an iaiport restriction which is not followed by re-
taliation may in fact increase a country's national income
at a given level of imports, than actually to restrict the
volume of imports itself, We may say that the net effect of
such restrictions would bear a ratio of 1 - f to the original
restriction. Finally, changes in export and import prices
constitute autonomous influences for the particular country
that is affected by the change in demand resulting from them.
Thus, as far as any one specific national economy is con-
cerned they constitute important influences in the level of
national demand. The net result seems to depend rather
closely on the precise values of the kfre for the countries
concerned, Given, therefore, the multiplier transmission
system, and these various autonomous impulses, the primary
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cause for fluctuations in effective demand may be most
generally imputed to the uneven distribution of economic
resources throughout the world. According to any country
(K)'s reflection ratio, (K)'s degree of exposure and trans-
missibility of fluctuations in effective demand, the f (K),
depends upon its marginal propensity not to spend income,
the b (K), and upon its marginal propensity to import, the
(K), which, in their turn, depend upon the c(K), the
i(K), and the m(K). That is, specifically, (K)'s international
reflection ratio depends: (a) upon the particular phase of
the cycle during which the national output computation takes
place, i.e., upon the relative deviation of net national
product from its equilibrium level; (b) on the types of goods
to be imported and exported, i.e., on the mc, the mi, and the
m ; (c) on the elasticity of substitution of imports for
domestic goods, i.e., on the Ma(K) which includes foreign
investient; (d) on the income elasticity of demand for im-
ports, and,.finally, (e) on the income elasticity of demand
for (K)'s exports of other countries4
19. The effect of transport costs is to localize and
delay the speed of transmission of fluctuations, and tariffs,
in this case, will tend not so much to localize but also to
orient fluctuations, since they confine demand to particular
sources of supply not necessarily near4 To the extent that
tariffs tend to reflect in the price ratio in (163) they
are susceptible of explanation as for their influence upon
imports by formulation (163). Assuming no retaliation, a
reduction of imports due to a tariff may, if exports are
unaffected, influence favorably foreign and domestic reserves
for investment in the protected industry. As tariffs differ
from transport costs in that they can be altered by legisla-
tion it is conceivable a countercyclical tariff policy, 1 0 0
A country threatened by deflation abroad or at home should
then raise its tariffs in order to avoid a depression, and
pursue the opposite policy in case of inflation, Attention,
however, should be directed on the consequences of such a
policy, which are not so clear cut as they appear at first
sight, since much depends upon the other countries reflection
ratio, If this policy is advisable for a single unimportant
country, or unimportant group of countries, retaliation and
the simultaneous pursuance by all nations of such a policy
should render it unadvisable for an important country or group
of important countries, since, then, specialization and
international division of labor will cause that the demand
for domestic products not to raise to the same extent as the
demand for imports falls, Conversely, in the upswing, a
simultaneous, tariff reduction will increase the expansionary
impulse to each country,
boo& Haberler, op, cit., ch, 12; Hans Neisser, Some Inter-
national Aspects of Business Cycles, Blakiston, Philadelphia,
1936, ch, 5,
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20, Tre effects of quantitative import restrictions,
nowever, may not reflect in the price ratio in (163). These
restrictions affect Doth the level and the slope of the im-
port functions.
21. Tne influence of foreign investment, that is, of the
uneven distribution of capital among nations, and its imper-
fect mobility across national boundaries, is by far the most
important autonomous influence in the propagation or circum-
101
scription of business fluctuations. Perfect mobility of
capital, and complete immobility of goods would apparently
cause the international economic system to be completely un-
stable, As far as the rate of interest has an effect upon
business cycles, and to the extent that the imposition or
removal of restrictions on capital movements will tend to
reduce or raise the rate of interest in the capital exporting
country, and to raise or reduce it in the capital importing
country, a certain immcbility of capital will tend to damp
down local booms and depressions, since with perfect mobility
a local inflation would feed on credit drawn from all over
the world, and the rate of interest will then raise much less
quickly than it would were only local funds available, and
1 0 1han-Kwei-Fong, Business Cycles and the International
Balance of Payments: An Application of Period Analysis to the
International MoneyMechanism, unpublished Ph.D, thesis filed
at Harvard University, 1941; Svend Laursen, International
Prpagation of Business 9ycles, unpublished Ph.D. thesis filed
at Harvard University, 1941,
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a local depression would be aggravated, since funds cannot
leave the country and this would tend to depress the rate of
interest and retard the chances and speed of revival. How-
ever, when goods move also, an active foreign balance in
current transactions may furnish the fuel that is denied by
capital immobility. Moreover, some of the inflationary fuel
may come out of hoards, or, in case of a depression, go into
hoards, thereby aggravating the inflation although capital
102
be immobile.
22. We may summarize the properties of the reflection
ratio and the international trade multiplier. Starting from
equilibrium the balance of international transactions is
primarily affected by changes in the levels of production and
employment, Seeing these changes exclusively from an inter-
national point of view, we may say that fluctuations in the
levels of production and employment are caused by autonomous
deviations of domestic as well as foreign investment from
their equilibrium level. These deviations, in their turn,
may be caused by various national and international impulses
and "shocks," which, once exerted, tend to propagate through-
out the syptem in a systematic way. If all countries had the
10 2Albert Aftalion, "Lee Variations Cycliques Irregulires
dans lee Relations Internationales," Revue d'Economie Politi-
guye, vol. 47, 1933, pp. 273-91; A. H. Hansen, International
Capital Movements and the Stabilization of Employment,
Principia Press, Bloomington, Indiana, 1933 pp. 192-205.
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same relative importance in international trade; if tastes
and cultural differences were non-existent or at least com-
parable; if resources as well as initial real incomes in
goods and services were evenly if not equally distributed
among all participant countries; and if their reflection ratios
and their marginal propensities not to spend income were such
that any uountryts reduction (increase) in its effective
demand for imports of all other countries would be suffi-
cient to reduce (increase) its exports by the same rate as
its iamports, simultaneously, equilibrium would be stable,
and its path perfectly stationary, no deviations from it
oeing possiole. In reality, any country's reduction (increase)
in its effective demand for imports will not be sufficient to
reduce (increase) its exports by the same rate, and this
means that, from the point of view now of a single country,
the pursuance of full employment policies spells balance of
payments difficulties, whereas a policy of equilibrium in the
balance of payments attract domestic unemployment and a fall
in effective demand. From the viewpoint of any single coun-
try, the policy leading to internal economic weakness may
lead to external financial strength, and vice versa, whereas,
for the world as a whole, equilibrium may be compromised not
only by the failure of some countries to pursue full employ-
ment policies, but also by the failure of others to avoid
1 03
inflationary tendencies domestically. If the alternative
lNational and International Measures for Full Emploj-
ment, op cit., pp. 26-33.
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is rejected, by assumption, that nations should, en disespoir
de cause, tend to isolate themselves from each other, since
a world of autarkies would only be possible with a very great
fall in world output, then, there is no other alternative for
a universally valid economic policy than full employment and
international economic collaboration. To the discussion of
the validity of full employment policy as a universal, politi-
cally determined and juridically implemented norm of inter-
national economic behavior we must now turn, but before doing
so, we would like to retrace the thread of argument of this
thesis to this stage of its development, as well as briefly
to summarize the gains we hope to have so far been able to
acquire.
23, Sumiaryofpargument and .partial conclusions. The
objective of this thesis, upon which we have insisted often
enough, and the formulation of which we have again and again
restated from many different angles of inquiry, is rigorously
to demonstrate that an economic system, whether regional,
national, or international, cannot prescind, for meaningful
and determinate solutions, from the theoretical constraints
imposed upon its working by socio-ethical value judgments.
This does not seem to us a useless or idle investigation,
If certain economic theorists feel emancipated enough from
all that is irreparably human in them to persist in pursuing,
under any circumstances whatever, the strange exercise of
361
abstracting everything that is significant in a system of
economic organization by assimilating it to a pure mechanism,
good luck to them. Those who can only conceive their pro-
fessional life to be not merely a means of gaining a living
but also of experiencing more deeply and of establishing more
fully a mode of existence which they want to be human, such
people no longer have the right to pretend to say anything
meaningful, or to achieve any real penetration into an econ-
omic reality out of which they have excluded those conceptions
which the participants have of it, how they experience their
tensions therein, and how they react to tensions so conceived.
As we include ourselves among the latter and not among the
former we definitely consider the central theme of this dis-
sertation, however unsuccessfully its validity may have been
demonstrated thus far, to be a timely, real, and important
subject for theoretical and practical consideration. But as
the humanistic approach to economic problems that it necessi-
tates is, as far as we can remember, thoroughly unfamiliar
to the intellectual climate of classes in economics we have
been able to frequent in this country, we felt obliged to
start this study from its remotest metaphysical roots by plac-
ing its conceptual structure entirely upon the idealistic
foundation which axiomatically affirms the intentionality of
human-consciousness, With the orientation provided by this
methodological decision we have attempted to develop a
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theoretical analysis of social action at political, economic,
and technological levels of activity, by expressing these
relationships as a function of an initially given configura-
tion of goods and services, and the rational choices of
individuals and groups. It was mathematically verified, for
a closed national economy, that on the basis of purely econ-
omic considerations alone it is impossible to derive,
either statically or dynamically, an optimum. uniquely given
position or path of equilibrium of production and exchange,
and that only after a specific assumption is made about a
politically determined and juridically implemented social
orderin of individual preferences it becomes formally pos-
sible to derive extreme values for the social action function.
The demonstration was extended to an international economic
system, where, by means of the theory of the multiplier, it
was possible to trace a reaction path or an international
economic contract locus of positions ranging from a situation,
defined in space and in time, where all the gains from trade
are enjoyed by one country, through some sort of compromise
position, to one in which another country has all the advan-
tage, In the forthcoming and last part of this thesis we
propose to state in a precise form the normative assumptions
required for the derivation of the conditions of maximum
international economic welfare. In order not to be tediously
repetitious We shall strongly rely upon the mathematical
techniques and formal conclusions derived in this section in
reference to a closed national economy.
V. THE NORMATIVE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION
A, Basic norms for an international economic organization.
1, National planning and international eccnomic relations.
We have already seen that, either in the structure of social
action or in a national economy, a norm of behavior is an
essential element of the system. In a national economy the
norm of economic behavior is called an ideology. A certain
national economic ideology may be defined as a description of
social state of affairs, which, in their turn, are supposed
to be a complete description of the amount of each type of
commodity in the hands of each individual, the amount of
productive service to be supplied by each individual, the
amount of each productive resource invested in each type
of productive activity, as well as the initial endowment of
goods and services existing in the community at the beginning
of the national economic action, or naticnal planning period,
under observation. We have already studied, in detail, how
such an action system works in a closed economy, and how it
is defined, staticallyand dynamically, by a oolitical and
juridical superstructure acting as a constraint or boundary
of the national economic action. We have called this rela-
tionshio a social action function. We have, moreover,
assumed that this social action function describes some sort
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of well-being of the different individuals in the system,
i.e., the social action function is such that the social
ordering of individual oreferences responds positively to
alterations in individual values, or at least not negatively,
A national economic ideology is such social ordering, and it
is, along with the national legal, political, and ethical
ideologies, the necessary product of the prevailing, and
accepted as legitimate, national normative social philosophy
itself a product of the cultural and historical environ-4
ment. Theoretically, the social situation of a national
unit is that of general equilibrium, at each period of time,
and of dialectical circulation through time, Its descrip.
tion has already been attempted in various ways,, and it
consists, in nuce, as we have already seen, in a circular
determination and interpenetration of ohysical and cultural,
environmental elements. The social order, resulting as a
solution or set of imputations, from the social action, is
then acceoted by those living under it. This acceptance is
brought up by social integration, habit, custom, reasonable
conduct, legal coercion, religious devotion, etc., as
determined by historical, cultural, and physical circumm-.
stances. These circumstances, however, being different
between.different countries, fashion national social philos-
ophies from compatibility to incompatibility, in a way that
1FS.C. Northrop, The Logic of the Sciences and the
Humanities, op. cit., p. 339; Talcott Parsons, The Structure
of Social Action, opi. pp. 278-88
national economic ideologies must also differ between them-
selves, from country to country, making national economic
policies seldom complementary within an international econ-
omic order, These differences and incompatibilities tend
to be preserved by the institution of national sovereignty,
which, internally, is the supreme coercive authority pre**
serving the individuality of a national economic, social,
historical, and cultural organization, and which, inter-
nationally, is not subject to an effective and adequate
2
coercive legal norm.
2. In the modern world national economic policies
take the form of national planning, Nations resort to
planning precisely because they are more interdependent,
and more vulnerable to the foreign effects of political
conflicts and economic maladjustments abroad, But in order
to be effectively enforceable by a national authority, econo-e
omic planning must conform with the national economic system
of norms of behavior, i.e,, the prevailing national economic
ideology, which is, as we have pointed above, a necessary
product of local conditions molding the adopted and ac-
cented national normative social philosophy. Because these
conditions are not identical in each country the various
national economic plans, though agreeing with the national
ideological sentiment, may not coincide or agree internationally.
Ageneral reference, Hans Kelsen, gg. cit., pp 328 ff.
365
366
In fact, as we have already seen, they may even be contraf-
dictory, and since each country tends to identify its own
actual facts of economic organization with a criterion of
truth and goodness in international economic affairs, con-*
flicts may arise between countries pursuing, in all sincerity,
what each one, as a collectivity, judges to be the goal of
sound international economic action. Because they are dis-
similar nations disagree as to the appropriate norms for the
selection of means to attain what each individual country
understands the international economic objective should be.
Because they are inter-dependent, nations are brought to-
gether, and they clash because they are sovereign. In these
circumstances, a conceivable international economic action
function admits, at best, a dual locus of equilibrium points
of efficiency and contract, but it is impossible, as long as
national ideological preferences are not ordered in accord%-*
ance with some internationally accepted criteria, to maxi.-o
mize that function and decide which of its points of equi-
librium is the optimum equilibrium point of production and
exchange in the international economic system. The modern
world lacks universally accepted international institutions
such as the balance-of-power system, the international gold
a
standard, the self-regulating market, and the liberal state,
3Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation, op. cit., ch.l,
and sources therein mentioned, pp. 259-94.
which tended mechanistically to erase the underlying human
deliberateness in international affairs, and to make the
international system determinate, The international effort
towards peace has tried to replace these mechanical norms
of behavior, such as the self-regulating market or the bal-W
ance-of-power system, typically used throughout the nine-
teenth century to make international economic and political
decisions, by voting systems consisting of single individuals,
or small representative groups gathered in international pol-
itical and economic agencies destined to reestablish order,
peace, and stability in international diplomatic relations,
as well as trade And finance. These agencies and leagues,
in trying to reolace instinctive decisions of a multitude
of individuals acting anonymously in perfect markets, by the
rational and deliberate decisions of a small number of car&
telized agents or governmentally appointed officers, have
4
fallen into naradoxical situations, and have been prevented
by their own particular social organizations, which they are
supposed to represent, from enforcing and implementing,
4
The familiar "paradox of voting" has already been men-
tioned: let A, , and C be three alternatives, and 1, 2,
and 3, the three individuals; 1 prefers A to B and B to C,
and therefore A to C; 2 prefers B to C and C to A, and there-.*
fore B to A; and 3 prefers C to A and A to B, and therefore
C to B; a majority prefers A to B, and a majority orefers B
to C; if the community is to be regarded as behaving ration-
ally, A must be oreferred to C, but in fact a majority also
prefers C to A; see Kenneth J, Arrow, Social Choice and
Individual Values, p, cit., p. 3, and footnote 3, for a
pertinent exa mole; and another instance is provided by the
so-called "majority question" referring to the recent elec-
tion of Pres. Getulio Vargas in Brazil.
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internally as well as internationally, crucial recommendations
of these agencies, either because they are, or they seem to
be, antagonistic to national economic ideologies, or because
they are not supported by an international legitimate auth.
ority disposing of coercive power and legal sanctions over
non-conforming member governments.
3. The work and the failure of these agencies have
evidenced the validity of a notion which has been intuitively
clear since at least Plato's Gorgias, and this is that no
order, in mathematics and in the nervous system as well as
in human societies, is ever possible without an ordering of
5its terms, i.e., without a tacit or explicit organization.,
Hobbes had already demonstrated, and Locke had for a century
obscured the logic of his demonstration, that no social
order can possibly emerge from the competitive and utili-
tarian exertions of atomistically isolated individuals, and,
moreover, that this is not an emoirically valid description
of existent human societies. Since chaos and disequilibrium
are not a permanent social experience, the peace and tramna
quility prevailing in the liberal state could not possibly
result from an order without organization. Much to the con-
trary. The liberal state was nothing else than a capital-
istic institution subject to such an organization in which
5Alfred Korzybski, Science and Sanity. Institute of
General Semantics, Lakeville, Conn., 1948, part IV, oh. XII.
7
A. H. Hansen, Business Cycles and National Income,
Norton, New York, 1951, p,4.
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the great majority of the people had no political express"
ion at all, and so could conveniently be placed under ad
hoc ceterts paribus assumptions without perceptible influs-0
6
ence over theoretical results., Owing to well known his-
torical polarizations, in the description of which we shall
not enter here, these peocle became politically dangerous,
and conservative governments were obliged, when notiactually
subverted by social revolutions, to help them effectively
and permanently, and since their orivations were due, in the
economic sphere, to defects in income distribution, to re-
plan national economies. It is, for instance, a conclusion
of very recent date that the stabilization of a self-regu-
lating market economy requires something more than merely
structural adjustments: it requires a deliberate and posi-
tive antI-cyclical program. The trouble, however, is that
economic planning undertaken by a national government, as
its inherent right of sovereignty, for the benefit of its
own people or of special groups within it, inevitably re-
sults in disturbing the self-adjusting, mechanistic, almost
celestially perfect, competitive international economic
harmony which economic theorists, with the possible excep-
tion of Wickeell and Launhardt, have advocated without
6,Stark, The Ideal Foundations of Economic Thought3
9outledge, London, 1948, pp. 149-209,
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rigorous proof as being the pptimal result of atomistic
comoetition, specialization, and international division of
labor. Hobbes reasoning regarding the determinateness of
social equilibrium in a national state has only during the
last ten years being explicitly applied to the determination
of an optimum position of equilibrium of production and
exchange in an international economy.9 In the complete
destitution of an internationally accepted, unified body
of economic theory establishing and applying criteria of
10
propriety to international economic policies, the existing
international economic agencies frequently relapse into mere
academicism when trying to conciliate the necessity of na-
tional governments to implement policies of full employ-
ment which depend either on the help of other governments,
or may oppose with their actions the achievement of full
employment by other governments) increasing thereby the probo-
ability of international economic frictions which these
agencies were created to prevent, Meanwhile, uncoordinated
by international economic agencies, liberal economic poli-
cies lead to instability, economic vulnerability, and avoid-
ance to face unescapable social, national, and international,
8
Paul A. Samuelson, Foundations of Economic Analysis, on.
cit., pp. 203-5.
9
Without probably knowing it Prof. Samuelson has been
pioneering in this field since his "Welfare Economics and
International Trade", American Economic Review, vol. 28,
1938, pp.261-6, but nothing similar is available for
international law.
~The failure of the ITO to provide such a general theory
is at least symptomatic.
problems of the modern world, whereas controlled economic
policies, recognizing the unescapable federal organization
and aotion which it involves) invites economic isolationism,
a fall in the national standard of living) or a fall in the
living standards abroad, bureaucracy and contralization,
economio nationalism, and increased possibility of organized
retaliation and international economic war.
4. The dilemma above sketched will admit no possible
solution, if we do not assume that nations prefer stability
of demand at full employment to stability at less than
adequate levels of demand, or even to instability. But an
international cycle policy by itself would not be suff i-
oient, since this would be at its best a simple structural
adjustment between national economies which cannot function
together in a unified and smooth way, But this would be,
of course, a tremendous stride ahead from the state of
affairs presently existing, which, in its turn, is already
a progress towards coordination over the state of affairs
prevailing in the interwar period. If the assumption is
maintained that an international full employment policy is
internationally acceptable and implementable by member
governments, along with the counterpart of this assumption
that member governments are by now convinced that a na-
tional full employment objective cannot be properly
achieved within an uncoordinated international economic
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order, then, there seems to be a theoretical possibility
for the development of an international economic policy to
be pursued within a deliberate international economic
organization of national objectives. Then, it thus-appears to
exist a way of scientifically verifying, independently of
the peculiarities of national economic ideologiess the
correctness and applicability of national and international
measures leading to the common goal. This assumption
closes the international social system, and makes it deter-
minate. The normative international economic theory which
would serve as a theoretical basis for the verification of
the correctness of these measures, and in reference to
which nations pursuing separate national economic policies
would agree to adapt their national economic behavior,
would have to conform with the following basic require-
ments;
a) Such a normative international economic theory
shall not be based exclusively upon the
assumptions of a particular national economic
ideology of a group or even of the majority
of the participant nations, This will avoid
the domination of one type of ideology within
the organization, and its consequent trans-
formation into a league of some nations against
opponent member nations, or outsiders,
b) It should be broad enough to be internally
applicable by major, but conflicting, insti-
tutions and social doctrines sponsored by
nations as characteristic of their cultural
and historical individuality, as well as by
nations at different stages of economic de-
velopment along similar ideological lines.
It seems possible theoretically to provide
such a common doctrine provided that it Is
constructed upon all-inclusive, fundamental
assumptions,
c) Finally, this normative international economic
model should be verifiable by epistemological
correlation with the international economic
reality, i.e., its correctness should be
ascertainable by test against measurable
economic data, in order to provide a functional
policy depending on forecasting and antici-
pation rather than in remedial action, It
seems that there is some evidence pointing
toward the existence of such a deductively
formulated, experimentally verifiable economic
theory.
5, National and international policies for full em-
ployment, We have already tried compactly to express in
374
a world trade multiplier the way fluctuations in effective
demand tend internationally to spread. In industrially
advanced countries the autonomous impulse seems to be
domestic investment, both private as well as governmental,
whereas in industrially underdeveloped countries the
dynamic factor is usually a fall in foreign demand for the
exportable production of these countries, manifesting
itself in a fall of export prices, or a reduction in the
volume of exports, or both, 1 The mechanism of propaga-
tion is rather simple. Investment expansion in industrial
countries raises domestic income, and the volume of imports
in these countries. As a result the exports of the raw
material and luxury goods exporting countries start to
rise, and this has a magnified effect upon the national
income of these countries, raising their imports of manu-
factured goods, and sending back to its source the impulse
leading to the initial expansion. Similarly, contraoting
impulses spread out from advanced industrial countries
return to reinforce the original decline.12 We have also
tried to express in a reflection ratio the influence that
a country economically exerts upon other countries. These
tools of analysis are drastic simplifications of the way
1t oo tbltyi h otWr World, Delegation
on Economic Depressions, League of Nations, Part II, 1945,
pp. 89 ff1,
1 2A, H. Hansen, op. cit., pp. 596-7,
an international economic system really works 4 Their
major drawback resides in that they are purely formal.
Far from being the core of the analysis itself these ex--
pressions are aggregative statements of a variety of
analyzable facts. Nevertheless, these were concepts about
the meaning of which there is substantial amount of agree-
ment, so that they were ripe for application to policy
recommendations designed (a) to maintain high and stable
levels of employment in large industrial countries; (b)
to stabilize the prices of primary products in order to
porteot the export values of the primary producing
countries; (c) to promote a high and stable level of
international investment destined to raise the productivity
of underdeveloped areas; and, finally, (d) to help
countries meet their balance of payments difficulties
without precluding the conduct of full employment policies
by other countries. These international measures were
coupled with at least one recommendation regarding the
avoidance of inflationary or deflationary developments by
way of a continuous adjustment of factor prices, es-
pecially wages, to changes in factor productivities.13 It
se'emed that, provided there is coordination in timing and
direction, and not necessarily uniformity in pattern,
1 3 As in the Chapultepec conference which was prepara-
tory to the San Francisco assembly,
between national economic policies it would be possible
effectively and adequately (a) to direct the flow of inter-
national investment to raise the productivity of countries
in need of reconstruction and development; (b) to promote
exchange stability by means of short-term lending fa-
cilities designed to strengthen the position of countries
in need of international monetary reserves; (c) to improve
the diet of people everywhere and increase the volume of
food production., while at the same time avoiding surpluses
in certain areas; and, finally, (d) to promote the optimum
international division of labor based upon the maximum
development of resources throughout the world, It is well
known which international economic agencies were created
or proposed on the basis of these terms of reference.
6. Adequate domestic stabilization of investment and
consumption. These agencies have issued recommendations
to member governments concerning the appropriate national
as well as international measures for' full employment. We
shall briefly review the recommendations concerning
national full employment policies. Two norms were rew-
peadedly suggested for member governments to follow in
their efforts to achieve and maintain a sufficient effective
demand, Firstly, domestic investment should be stabilized,
private investment should be stabilized through fiscal
and monetary measures, and public investment should
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counterbalance private investment, Secondly, consumer de-
mand should be stimulated and stabilized through fiscal
policy measures, and sometimes by means of private controls
aiming at a more even income distribution. The production
controlling norm was based on the income multiplier theory,
and the consumption controlling norm on the acceleration
principle. That these norms would be necessary to conduct
the economy to a target effective demand no one questioned,
the real problem being whether they would be adequate
and applicable to the various types of national economic
systems composing the international economy. Under
socialism, for instance, investment irregularities may
result from the intricate process of project dovetailing.
In mixed, private enterprise economies subject to govern-
mental controls, on the other hand, directly imposed
allocations tend to be of practical effectiveness only
when investment demand is expessive in relation to supply.
Moreover, in orthodox private enterprise economies under
a free price mechanism the stablization of private in-
vestment is only possible by placing upper limits to
interest rates and credit expansion, no such indirect
control being available in a downward movement. To at-
tempt, in these economies, to influence the timing and
direction of private investment by means of penalties and
rewards would require a very complex tax-subsidy
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legislation and administration even if it were possible
for that government to obtain complete information re-
garding the investment plans of individual firms.
Furthermore, it would be necessary for the government
socially to evaluate each private investment project on
the basis of some politically determined criteria, and
this course of action would eventually be contradictory
to the private enterprise orthodoxy prevailing in that
national economic system. The stabilization of consumer
demand is achieved by rationing, price manipulation, and
other devices of central consumption planning and economic
control in socialist economies, whereas in private enter-
prise economies this is usually attempted by means of
governmental expenditure programs and by changes in the
level and structure of taxation affecting the purchasing
power of consumers. In industrially developed countries
possessing the necessary statistical means, and pro-
gressive tax structures as well as flexible tax legislation
this would be moderately feasible, as a preventive measure,
since, even in these countries, the knowledge of economic
forecasting is still primitive, whereas in industrially
underdeveloped countries the implementation of such con-~
sumption controlling norm would simply be impossible.
Both these norms for achieving a stable and adequate level
of effective demand depend heavily upon member governments
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satisfactorily solving the tremendous political problem of
determining a target or objective for full employment, and
then of implementing such a decision by means of counter-
cyclical measures appropriate to come into effect in antici-
pation of the events they are designed to prevent. Infla-
tion or inflationary pressures generally appearing at the
threshold of full employment, can only be avoided by a
precise timing in the cessation of the stimulation of effec-
tive demand as well as by a close understanding between
government, labor unions, farming groups, trade associations,
monopolies and cartels. Moreover, this planned prevention
of anticipated turning points in effective demand, which is
so difficult to achieve -domestically, would be impossible,
in the absence of narrow international cooperation, for
countries whose economic stability depends on the volume or
value of exports. Such countries, which in general are
politically, economically, and technically incapable of
defending themselves from the effects of depressions gener-
ated elsewhere, have been urged to maintain employment in the
export industries in spite of a fall in foreign demand, or to
provide alternative opportunities for factors released by
the slump in these industries, and, moreover, that these
opportunities be not far from the place where these slumped
industries are located, so that productive factors be moved
to their former occupations as soon as foreign demand revives.
I Since these recommendations are as unimplementable in
A
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underdeveloped countries as, for instance, in industrially
advanced countries, an automatic device must be employed
for starting or stopping the compensatory mechanism regu-
lating the governmental investment expenditures counter-
vailing private investment, The current theory of public
investment has furnished an economic rationalization for
the manipulation of a strictly political weapon which is
so adequate to the circumstances of modern industrial
countries that no government will relinquish its use for
the sake of an automatic device based on an employment
signal which, after all, may turn out to be as false as
that provided by the gold reserve ratio in the interwar
period, Tnus, both on theoretical and practical grounds,
the conclusion emerges that national full employment
policies depend much more on the qgualitative character-
istics of national economic systems than a guantitative
analysis based on the aggregates of investment, saving, and
consumption, instead of upon the determinants of such ag-
gregates, such as the price-cost structure, competitive
conditions, etc,, would lead one to believe. Towards
such a qualitative, microscopic analysis this thesis has
been directed since its initial statement, But before
turning our attention to this final task of theoretically
characterizing a model for an international economic
welfare system, we must briefly survey the measures that
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have been recommended for conducting an international full
employment policy.14
7, Recommendations concerning an International counter-
cyclical policy. These recommendations rest on three main
theoretical conceptions: a multilateral trade structure,
an assured international flow of long-term capital, and
provision for meeting trade deficits of countries whose
exports are hurt by depressions abroad. The maintenance
of over-all international equilibrium without which no
multilateral trade structure is possible will require an
international declaration of intention as to the general
policies of countries with respect to the ways in which
they intend to reestablish balance in their international
transactions, Countries should make known to one another
their "maps of indifference and preference," or their
"strategies" relative to the international economic po-
lioies they intend to pursue, so that it be possible,
through consultation, to harmonize such policies. This
recommendation is almost revolutionary in its replacement
of the free market meohanism making international economic
decisions by the general system of voting that has been
used to make political decisions, It is symptomatic of
the modern ascendence of democratic methods over the
1 4 For the content in the last and in the following
paragraph see National and International Measures for Full
Employment, o9. cit, pp. 33-69,
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political methods of historical conservatism which pre-
vailed throughout the nineteenth and in the first decade
of the twentieth century, namely, the primacy of the
intellectualistic methods attempting solely through thought,
discussion, and organization to master the irrational realm
in politics which cannot be managed by administration. 1 5
Thus, the multilateral trade structure is to arise from
the cooperative projection and reconciliation of the
anticipated trade structures of individual countries.
Here, again, reconciliation is only possible when common
grounds are found for solution by agreement and not by
necessity, pressure, or domination, and this is only possi-
ble if there is a body of theory capable of containing
stable solations of antagonistic tensions, The second
major requirement for the establishment of a sound basis
for international economic relations is the creation of
conditions under which the flow of international invest-
ment could be stabilized over substantial periods of time,
and this is to be achieved on announcements by potential
leader countries of the expected level of their intended
capital export availabilities over a period of a few years,
any short-falls below these targets being met by public
1 5Karl M4annheim, Ideology and.Utopia) op, cit., pp.
104-50; F. H. Knight, "Human Nature and World Democracy,'
in Freedom and Reform, Harper, New York, 1947, pp. 308-10.
383
funds. This recommendation, granted the obvious advantages
of a reasonably steady international flow of capital, faces
very great political, purely economic, and technical obsta-
ales from the part of the lending as well as the borrowing
countries, The chief obstacle in the lending country is
that it must have enormous foreign exchange reserves and
a very strong balance of payments, Moreover, the loan
would have to be granted almost by an act of faith very
difficult to achieve collectively through governmental
action, This will make for the intermediary international
economic agency all the more difficult to employ and di-
vide up the accruing resources so as to ensure economically
sound investment. For the side of the receiving country
the chief obstacle is its probable lack of ability to use
investment, and to plead for loans on tne basis of projects
which are only feasible if it shifts over to total or
partial forms of control, requiring for success at least
a substantial knowledge and experience in overall economic
planning.16 The third major requirement for an interna-.
tional full employment policy concerns measures to
assure stability in international trade, and this could
presumably be obtained by a scheme requiring a country
whose imports fall because of failure to maintain full
Facilities) Council of FAO, Sixth Session, 13-25 June
1949, Paris, France, pp. 28-32.
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employment at home to make available to the affected ex-
porting countries an amount of its currency equal to the
drop of their exports. This requirement is strongly
reminiscent of the so-called compensation principle in
welfare economics, the international economic aspects of
which we shall discuss later in this thesis. Similarly
one may ask whetner this scheme, despite its safeguards,
would not interfere with the export incentives of deficit
countries, if we assume as solved the administrative
difficulties that it will entail, and as bearable the
heavy burden it will place upon the paying country. Fi-
nally, we may question the advisability of promoting full
employment to the role of international norm of economic
behavior, and inquire just how much is unemployment an
actual danger in an economic world boosted to its infla-
tion point by universal military preparations. Even if we
do not push the question to its limbo of irrelevancy, it
seems that an effort should be made to appraise full em-
ployment in face of other equally respectable objectives
such as high output, fair distribution of income, personal
freedom, economic growth, etc., of which full employment
is complementary only to a certain point4 It is to the
appraisal of more broad and more inclusive policy frame-
work that we shall turn our attention now.
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B. A model for an international economic welfare system
1, Characterization of fundamental assumptions. In
what follows we shall explicitly assume that nations,
unanimously, and whatever may be their particular national
ideology, are willing to strive to attain and maintain
full employment of world resources, 1 7 and we assume,
furthermore, and perhaps unrealistically, that national
states are willing, at this stage of social evolution, not
only to maximize world wealth, but also to maximize na-
tional welfare by a more adequate distribution of income,
We are convinced that by so doing we are not taking leave
of the economic level of social action and entering into
the ethical level of adequacy ofivalue judgments. It
seems that there is no scientifically grounded ethics,
but we are not going so far, We are simply saying that
the problem of ensuring stability of demand by full em-
ployment measures inevitably merges into the higher problem
of ensuring an adeQuate level of demand at full employment.
It formal terms we assume, again perhaps too unrealistically,
that national governments know with a fairly high degree
of precision the objectives of the national economies they
are running, as a future state of affairs consisting not
17Tthere are two possible sets of findings when welfare
problems of international trade are discussed, one from
the world's point of view, and one from that of the indi-
vidual nation; see T. deScitovszky, "A Reconsideration of
the Theory of Tariffs,' Review of Economic Studies, vol,
IX, Summer 1942) pp. 89-110.
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only of a certain prescribed bill of goods and services,
but also of a certain prescribed configuration of distri-
bution of these commodities. As it is a political problem
to determine how this pattern of distribution is accepted
as legitimate by the different economic classes integrating
a national society, so that its prescription by the estab-w
lished public authority does not involve inevitable
subversion, so long as we do not leave the economic level
of social action we must assume that this problem of alo-
location of coercive power has been domestically solved.
In other words, by full employment of resources we mean,
broadly, a state of affairs in which there is free choice
of employment, and general public agreement as to the
particular constellation of goods and services to be sup%-
plied in the future, which is manifested by its meeting
its most adequate and effective demand at that future
date, and also that this promotion and maintenance of full
employment are to be pursued through measures appropriate
to each country's political and social institutions, In
other words, again, each cititen's preferences are to
count provided these preferences are sanctioned by the
society in which they are intended to be satisfied. Again,
we are not concerned here with the way by which this social
integration was achieved, whether it was brought up to
existence by tradition, imitation, coercions persuasion,
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social conditioning or fashion. All that we must assume
is that national governments, to the extent that they
represent integrated national communities, accept as inter-
nationally valid the pursuance of economic development and
social progress, and of higher standards of living at
stable price levels as specific expressions of the general
objective of full employment. Finally, we assume that
national governments do their best to avoid conflict with
the full employment policies of other countries, and, in
so doing, they are willing to subordinate their national
sovereign autonomy to the general desire for economic
peace and stability, in order that all countries may ob-
tain the benefits of a stable and expanding world
economy. Thus, if governments are assumed to be willing
to strive as well as capable-to promote and maintain full
employment within the national economies for the smooth
working of which they are supposed to be politically
responsible; and if it is also assumed that governments
are aware that the success or failure of their national
full employment policies depend upon the mutual interde-
pendence of their economic decisions, it is not
contradictory, or inconsistent, to assume that nations, by
acting collectively, as an integrated international society,
may achieve a stable, peaceful, and expanding world
economy of which they may benefit, In summary, once the
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objectives of an international economic system are given,
and once a set of norms of behavior is agreed upon as
basic and internationally applicable, and once it is known
the conditions or the environment of the proposed inter-
national action, as well as the available means conducive
to the prescribed end, the underdetermined, open and
dynamic international economic system may be driven by
maximization of a characteristic function in a direction
that meets the objectives of a stable and adequate inter-
national demand at full employment of world resources,
Thus, when these assumptions are properly stated they
define a relationship not essentially dissimilar from a
social action function in a closed national economy.
2. Definition of an international economic action
function. We shall maintain here the identification of
rationality with maximization, and then the central
problem in this section is to derive a social maximum
for an international economy from the social action
functions describing national desires, 1 8  And here, as
before, the viewpoint is taken that the measurability of
1%ere, as before, we shall borrow heavily from Paul
A, Samuelson, Foundations of Economic Analysis, op ,,cit.,
ch. 8; Abram (Burk) Bergson, "A Reformulation...," o2
ci.; M. W. Reder, Studies in the Theory of Welfare
Economics, op. cil., oh, I; I. M4. D, Little, A Critique
of Welfare Economics, op,. cit., oh, 15; Kenneth J. Arrow,
Social Choice and Individual Values, op. cit., ohs, 1, 2,
and 3.
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individual utility, and of national satisfaction derived
from pursuing nationally adequate norms of behavior, as
well as interpersonal or international comparison of
utilities have no meaning. 1 9  We have already seen that
it is possible to establish an orderin of social states
which is based on the ordinal indifference maps of indi-
viduals, and now we propose to extend this analysis to a
functional relationship involving an ordering of the policy
preferences of national states based upon the ordering of
social states prevailing in these economies 0 2 0  The
analogy need not be elaborated nor the well-known contro-o
versy around measurability and interpersonal comparability
of utility be recited here. But again we must confine this
study to well-behaved participants, and abstract the
strategical aspect of the international economic game,
i.e., the interpretation of the postulate that the inter-
national action function must be maximized is simply that
national governments must behave in the way in which its
representatives declared it would behave: maximizing
utility internationally means telling the truth diplo-
matically. No consideration shall be given to the enjoyment
1 9 N. Kaldor, 'Welfare Propositions...,' op._cit., pp.
549-52,
2%H Zassenhaus, "Uber die 8konomisohe Theorie der
Planwirschaft,W Zeitschrift fftr Nationalakonomie, vol,
5, 1934, pp. 507-32,
of playing and winning the economic and political game,
nor to possibly profitable rational misrepresentations of
tastes and values by action. Moreover, we shall take as
data the national values which must not be altered by the
process of policy making itself, Finally, we assume that
national societies are rational, meaning, precisely, that
the national society is integrated in such a way that
policies are ordered in a consistent way, i.e., transi-
tively: if policy A is preferred to B, and B to C, then A
is preferred to C,20 and that any two alternative policies,
either nationally or internationally, are comparable on
the basis of some agreed criterion, and that, on the
basis of this adopted criterion, they may be evaluated,
This criterion is, in the national economy, the politically
determined and juridically implemented set of norms of
economic behavior, and., internationally, this criterion
shall be by assumption the general norm of full employment.
The set of indifference curves denoting the ordering of
social states, in a national economy, as well as that set
of indifference curves denoting the rational ordering of
national policies in an international economic action
function, must conform with the familiar conditions ordi-
narily defining indifference maps, namely, conditions
ATarsky, Introduction to Logic, Oxford University
Press, New York, 1941, p. 94.
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regarding transitivity, integrability, convexity in rela-
tion to an origin, mutual non-intersection among curves,
and diminishing marginal rates of substitution, These
properties of indifference curves are self-evident from
the interpretations placed upon definitions, and we shall
not attempt here to review the various infinitesimal as
well as topological proofs that have been advanced in their
theoretical support. 2 2
3. An international economic action function as above
described is susceptible of mathematical formulation, Let
the following implicit expression represent such a
function:
P(T1 1 ..., Th; TO) = o (202)
which is a possibility function denoting a set of mutually
exclusive alternatives, 1,..., h, for international
economic integration bounded by a set of conditions To.
Among these various alternatively possible international
economic policies, one is found to be feasible, since its
validity has met with a substantial amount of international
22See for proof of these various properties, J. Ville,
"Sur lea Conditions d'Existence d'une Ophdlimit4 Totale et
d'un Indice du Niveau des Prix," Annales de l'Universitd
de Lyon, section 4, vol. 3, no. 9, 1946, pp. 32-9; Vilfredo
Pareto, Manuel d'Economie Politigue, op. cit., pp. 546-69;
N. Georgescu-Roegen, "The Pure Theory of Consumer's Be-
Havior," Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 50, August
1936, pp. 545-93; K. WV. Rotschild, 'The Meaning of
Rationality, .a Note on Prof. Lange's Article," Review of
Economic Studies, vol9 14, no, 1, 1946-47,
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agreement. This feasible international economic action
function may be expressed as follows:
T&(W1 ,..., Wk; WO) = Tg (203)
which is the static formulation of the feasible alternative
for international economic integration, Tg, as an explicit
function of the 1,..., K social states of affairs denoting
the structure of the social action in the K national
economies participating in the international economic
action Tg, also bounded by uncontrollable conditions pre-
vailing nationally, W0, This expression (203) may be
reformulated in dynamic terms as follows:
T&(Wlt-r'''' WKt.-r1PIIISPS3 4lt'''' WKt( K0 ''''' KO
= Tg (204)
where each social state of affairs in any of the K partici-
pant national economies is conceived as computed or
Wphotographed" at the end of each of r lags in the time
period t. These various social states of affairs, either
statically or dynamically visualized, may be defined by
social action functions of the form
WH(Ui,..., US; Uo) =H (205)
which explicitly describes the social action function for
national economy H = 1,,,q K in terms of the levels of
well being of the s individuals U participating in the
national economic action W4H, bounded by uncontrollable
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conditions, Uo, referring to the national endowment of goods
and services, This again may be dynamically reformulated
WHt*-q Uit-v,..., Ust-y'- -- '- -- 0* 1 **0-, Us
U 0 ,..,, Uo) =WHt-qq = 1..., r (206)
where v may be greater, less, or equal to r, the simpler
alternative being that it is equal, so that the period of
time for the national economic action has as many lags as
the planned international economic action. The definition
of these various U's within each national economy, the
various operations that may be performed upon them, as well
as the optimum conditions of production and allocation
that either statically or dynamically may be deduced from
these operations, hav fie subject of the previous section
of this thesis, and we shall not repeat them here. In-
serting in (203) or (204) these various W's, and their U's
with their X's, Vs, S's, and c5's, an expression would be
attained, not necessarily simple, which) in functional or
in vectorial terms, would synthetize a system of equilibrium
equations upon which the mathematical operations described
in (Iv,A,8) could be performed resulting in by now familiar
expressions defining the marginal properties of the
optimum position of equilibrium of production and exchange
in an international economic welfare system. Although
these operations have been performed to test the correctness
of the forthooming conclusions, we shall not transcribe
them here in extenso, since they would uselessly duplicate
the exact form of the conditions derived in the previous
section.
4. However, before stating in literary form these
marginal conditions23 of optimum equilibrium of production
and allocation in an international economy, we would like
to redefine, precisely, the concept of international
economic action function, as well as to reformulate, un-
ambiguously, the various conditions we wish to impose upon
this function, By an international economic action
function we mean a process, rule, or system of choice
which, for each set of national ideological orderings
W 1 ,..., WK for individual utility orderings U1 ,..., U5 for
alternative social states concerning ownership or control
over X1 1 ..., Xn goods and V1 ,..., Vm services, determines
a corresponding international organisation of national
economic imputations, T. The conditions we wish to impose
upon this function are as follows: (a) it is a monotonic
increasing function of the national social action W's,
i.e., it responds positively to alterations in national
values, or at least not negatively: only if all countries
2 As in J. R. Hicks, "The Foundations of Welfare
Economics," Economic Journal, vol. 49, December 1939, pp.
692-712; 0. Lange, "The Determinateness of the Utility
Function," Review of Economic Studies, vol. 1, June 1954,
pp. 218-25,
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are made better (worse) off can we definitely state that
a given international proposal is good (bad); (b) it is
independent of alternatives not included in the initial
conditions Wo, which, by the definition of the concept of
situation will be considered as irrelevant to the proper
conduct of the proposed international economic action
named as Tg: this places everything else outside the
general equilibrium system denoted by the international
economio action function under oeterie paribus for the
duration of the action; (c) it is not to be imposed upon
the national sovereignty of the participant countries,
i.e., by force or coercion exerted by the international
organization, its public validity being derived from the
logical consistency of its theoretical structure after
epistemological correlation with empirical data; the
social action, internationally conducted, must not be
dictatorial. These conditions restate the basico conditions
for an international economic organization mentioned above
(V,B,4,a,b,o) and at the introductory section of this
thesis, and they apply to international trade the custo-
mary conditions constraining social welfare functions.
5. Static conditions for optimum international pro-
duction and consumption. The most general way of stating
the static first order necessary conditions for the
characterization of an optimum position of production and
consumption in an international economic system is as fol-
lows: if it is maintained that national welfare increases
(decreases) whenever one or more individual participants
in that national economic action become more (less) satis-'
fled, i.e., is put onto a higher (lower) indifference surface,
without any other individual or individuals becoming less
(more) satisfied, i.e., being put onto a lower (higher) in-
difference surface, then, the optimum position of production
and consumption is internationally attained whenever (a)
the marginal national welfare increase due to each import
of a good or a service and the marginal national welfare
decrease due to an export of a good or a service is the same
with respect to each national economy in the international
community; and (b) the marginal national welfare increase
due to the importation of goods or services acquired with
a marginal increment of exports of goods And services is
equal to the marginal national welfare decrease due to that
increment of exports within each national economy in the
international community; finally, (c) the marginal national
welfare increase due to the shift of a marginal unit of a
good or a productive factor away from exports into domestic
consumption or use is equal to the marginal national wel-
fare decrease caused by this adjustment upon the level of
imports of goods or services within each national economy
in the international community.
I
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6. Reversing our customary procedure we may reformu-
late these general conditions for a position of optimum
international production and exchange in mathematical terms
as follows: if Tg in (203) varies continuously with the
W's, and if WH in (205) varies continuously with the U's,
and if the U's are in any national economy implicit func-
tions of social states consisting of a bill of goods and
services under the ownership or control of an individual,
thus
uk(x ,..., x.o; V1 ,..., V ) 0 (207)
then, we may write as a general condition for a maximum that,
subject to physical and psychological constraints,
dTg= 0 (208)
Using (203), (205), (207) and (208), the conditions above
(VA,5) take the forms:
9T9 hP (209)
-k
SX(H)
where X(H) k refers to the quantity of commodity X. owned or
controlled by the kth individual in the Hth national economy,
C) being the utility index to deflate the price p1 to real
terms of marginal costs;
STg k__ = H)- (210)
&V(H) 3
where V(W) refers to the quantity of the jth productive
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factor V owned or controlled by the kth individual in the
Hth national economy, the coefficient being the utility
index to deflate the price w3 to real terms of marginal value
productivities; moreover, as we have already seen when study-
ing the general equilibrium conditions in a closed economy,
P kik =kw,(211)
V(H) ij
where to the previous designation of a technical output co-
effloienttrlwas now added the notation of the specific
national economy H; and, finally,
Wj = Pi (212)
bX() ji
the coefficient u), which was present in all terms in
(211-2), having been divided out, The cost of the shift may,
then, be easily calculated in terms of displaced real mar-
ginal value productivities.
7. These general conditions may be restated and devel-
oped in a number of ways. They may, for instanoe, be re-
formulated in words as follows: consumption goods and pro-
ductive factors will be correctly allocated internationally
whenever (a) the marginal social rate of substitution between
any two imports is the same for every country which imports
them both; (b) the marginal social rate of transformation
between any two exports is the same within any two countries
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exporting them both; (c) the marginal social rate of trans-
formation between any factor and any product for export is
the same for any two countries having the factor and export-
ing the product; (d) the marginal social rate of substitution
between any two factors must be the same for any two coun-
tries using both to produce the same product for export;
(e) the marginal social rate of substitution between any
two imports for any country importing them both must be equal
to the marginal social rate of transformation between them.
8. These conditions, which, upon inspection, could be
easily reduced to a simple equality between marginal cost
and marginal revenue, in the same way that similar conditions
were reduced to this equality when the general equilibrium
conditions were discussed in the previous section, may be
reduced again to a simple rule applicable to international
trade. This is as follows: in any national economy goods
and services should be imported from abroad up to the point
where (a) the marginal cost of production abroad, plus the
marginal cost of transport and other marginal costs of
importing is equal to the marginal cost of production at
home, i.e., the price of the factor equals the value of the
marginal product, provided we count as a factor the foreign
currency- that pays for the goods acquired abroad, or,
again, the domestic money worth of foreign currency pur-
chases an amount of foreign goods that can be sold at home
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for their price abroad plus transport costs and other
transport charges; and where (b) the marginal efficiency
of investment expenditures in the factor importing country
is equal to the marginal efficiency of investment expendi-
tures for the same factor in the factor exporting country,
i.e., the marginal value product and the value of the mar-
ginal product are equal in both countries, this being appli-
cable to whatever type of factor may move across international
barriers, specific problems of international trade arising
because a complete freedom of movement of goods or services
do not exist in the real world due to physical as well as
more artificial impediments to the international movement of
commodities. An appropriate restriction of imports and ex-
ports below these optimum points can benefit a country while
imposing a loss on the foreigner whose extent cannot be
computed. If this invites retaliation, however, the common
24
loss seems to be unambiguously determinable,
9. Stationary conditions of moving equilibrium. These
various conditions of international equilibrium refer to a
given moment of time. But as we have already seen national
economies may plan inter-.temporally their national income
and expenditure, either by predetermining a stream of output
targets with various time patterns of factor inputs, or,
AP. Lerner, Economics of Control, op cit., oh. 26.
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conversely, working along a dual planning by having various
time patterns of outputs with a given input stream of factor
services. As both goods and services may be imported as
well as exported, a national economy may try to organize
its foreign trade upon these norms of national economic be-
havior. Treating imports or exports of a product or factor
at different moments of time as the imports or exports of
different products or factors,25 the problem of the optimum
allocation of international production and consumption
through stationary time trends become a special case of
static allocation of imports and exports where the formerly
derived first order conditions of optimum equilibrium apply
without modification. However, one qualification must be
made, and this is that, since the various configurations
of goods and services are planned configurations, or future
projections of present anticipations regarding prices and
physical productivities, the inter-temporal resource allo-
cation must include a complete discounting to present
values of all future expected real or money values. To
the previous five static conditions mentioned in (VE,7) we
must add two more stationary conditions as the following:
when there is no risk or uncertainty regarding future situa-
tions, the optimum position of resource control by
2J. L. Mosak, General Equilibrium Theory in Inter-
national Trade, op.. cit., ch. 9.
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borrowing and lending is reached whenever (a) the marginal
rate of substitution between two planned international com-
modity control transfers at any two dates is equal, for every
two countries, to the ratio of their discounted expected
prices expressed in terms of marginal costs for products
and marginal productivities for productive factors; and (b)
the marginal rate of transformation of a planned export of
any date into a planned import of any date is equal, for
every country in the international community, to the ratio
of their discounted expected prices expressed in terms of
marginal costs for products and marginal productivities for
productive factors, These two stationary conditions are
expressed on the assumption of an international token
money the exchange rates of which between countries reflect
the technological conditions of production and the psycho-
logical conditions of exchange prevailing within these
26
various national economies.
10, Again we must stress that these seven conditions
for an optimum position of international production and
allocation are necessary on first order partial derivatives:
26The adaptation of these conditions to an international
economy subdivided into sovereign currency regions and
interconnected by flexible exchanges would be easy. All
that is necessary is to introduce these various kinds of
money as commodity specie subject to the constraint of
budget equations. The analysis in real terms is inclusive
enough for our purposes here.
they are not sufficient conditions for an extreme value
of the international economic action function. Only by
accident would these conditions coinoide with the values
of the unknowns at a true extreme of (203) or (204): only
by accident would the national economic action function
be at a maximum instead of at a minimum or rather at an
inflexion point. If the correct secondary maximum condi-
tions were written out in full, it would be seen that they
would simply require that all indifference Surfaces, in
the neighborhood of the position where the first order
conditions are verified, be less concave to the origin
than the possibility-transformation surfaces between the
same products and for all countries engaged in trade. 2 7
But even if the second order maximum conditions are also
verified, this will again not be both necessary and
sufficient to guarantee a true maximum of the interna-
tional economic action function, The total conditions
require that it be impossible to increase one output,
other outputs and all inputs being constant, or decrease
one input, other inputs and all outputs being oonstant,
provided the international and the various national income
distributions do not change during this process of ad-
Justment to a more desirable situation. These total
27For a diagrammatical presentation see Wolfgang F.
8tolper and Paul A. Samuelson 'Protection and Real Wages,'
op, cit., p. 348, and in a slightly different approach,
Wassily W. Leontief, "The Use of Indifference Curves in
the Analysis of Foreign Trade."
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conditions which require that the second order differential
expressions stating the sufficient conditions be negative
definite quadratic forms in the various differentials of
the unknown variables, could be restated as follows: if
the international economic action function is at a maximum,
then it must be impossible to increase it further by in-
creasing one output, not necessarily for export, in any
participant country, or by producing an output not other-
wise produce; or by decreasing one input, not necessarily
imported, in any participant country, or by not employing
an input not otherwise employed, assuming that in both
cases all other variables are maintained constant, and
the distribution of the goods and services available
throughout the world and fully controlled by the residents
of all countries be maintained invariable. Only when the
world economy is assumed to be static or stationary, and
when the distribution of the world income is supposed to
be constant as well as when the marginal, second order
and total conditions are satisfied, it is rigorously proper
to state that perfect competition in international trade
achieves a position of optimum equilibrium of production
and consumption in the international economic system.
11. Perfect competition as an ideal of internationl
economic organization, In spite of its evident epistemo-
logical inadequacy when referred to empirical economic
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reality, perfect competition has been advocated by economic
theorists as the national and international ideal-type
economic order. Impressed by important advances in
scientific thought in the natural sciences, economic
theorists of Walrasian stature tried to prove that perfect
competition provides not only a situation of structural
equilibrium in the economic system but also that it repre-
sents an optimum position of production and exobange.
Their deterministic and positive philosophical bias pre-
vented them to perceive the absolute necessity of
normative, organizational assumptions to make possible
the determination of the sense or direction according to
which the working of the economic system should be socially
evaluated, Wioksell seems to have been the first economio
theorist who successfully although implicitly demonstrated
that perfect competition is optimal only when the distri-
bution of income is appropriate.28 It was Pareto, however,
who, starting from sociological considerations, qualified
the appropriateness of perfect competition, regardless of
income distribution and of interpersonal comparison of
individual utility, as applicable only to define the
optimum equilibrium position for the community as a whole,
provided there should be no possible movement away from
28Knut Wicksell, Lectures on Political Economy, £Pga
Jcit., vol. I, pp. 72-8a.
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this point which would make everybody better off. 2 9 But
Pareto failed to show that such an optimum position is not
necessarily a unique point, and it was left for Barone to
point out that, once perfect competition is assumed, with
prices being taken as fixed parameters, a point of maximum
efficiency is derivable from production conditions alone,u0
Barone, however, did not go into the fact that a change
in production will necessarily modify the initially given
exchange situation. The definition of the optimum allo-.
cation involves the formulation of a scale of values, on
the basis of which the alternative uses of resources are
to be evaluated, and all this various writers left in
doubt the question of the number and nature of the deol
sions on ends required to formulate this needed scale of
values. It was only thirty years lateral that the question
was squarely faced of knowing the value judgments involved
in the definition of the criteria of optimum allocation,
and it was verified, precisely, that there are ethical
values implicit even in the choice of the different mathe-
matical forms of the social utility function in terms of
the individual utilities. The gist of these various
2 9 Vilfredo Pareto, Manuel d'Economie Politigue, gp,
cit., ch. VI.
3%E, Barone, "The Ministry of Production...," op. cit.,
passig.
31Abram (Burk) Bergson, "A Reformulation...,' op. cit.,
pas sir.
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investigations was to conclude that under perfect competi-
tion the marginal and the second order conditions of
optimum allocation will be satisfied, but that the concept
of perfect competition is, in its essence, an ethical
concept. This is even more so, since, when the production
functions in the economy are not all of the constant
returns to scale variety, the competitive order must, if
at all, be realized by means of deliberate political and
juridical organization of the decreasing cost as well as
the increasing cost industries.
12. As soon as it is carefully defined, it becomes
evident that strictu senso perfect competition is un-
attainable, for it requires not only that any one buyer
(seller) buys (sells) only an infinitesimal part of the
total amount of any one commodity bought (sold) during
any given period, but also that every commodity is
infinitesimally divisible and infinitely mobile, and
that every participant in the economio action is granted
complete information about the outcome of all anterior
economic acts having a bearing upon his intended act4
As the marginal first order conditions for an optimum
position of production and allocation do not involve all
the procerties of perfect competition, it has been sug-
gested3 2 that) either nationally or internationally, it
32J, R. Hicks, "Foundations of Welfare Economics,"
Economic Journal, December 1939, vol. XLIX, pp. 696-712.
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is only sufficient that the less stringent conditions of
pure competition be realized in order that the optimum
position be attainable, It needs only that every indi-
vidual and firm buy or sell such a small part of the
total amount of any commodity that the effect of purchases
or sales on the price is negligible and is hence ignored,
and that the price of any commodity be the same to all
buyers and sellers, in order that the optimum equilibrium
position be realizable exclusively on principles that are
in some sense positive or scientific and needing no
normative or ethical decisions on the objectives of the
economic action for its full and unambiguous derivation.
We have already demonstrated 3 3 that this is not true0
Either the social action function referring to a national
economy or the international economic action function
depend for their value on the technological variables
concerning production as well as on the psychological
variables concerning exchange, but their shape is only
determined when specific decisions regarding the ordering
of the various U's in the social action function and the
various W's in the international economic action function
are explicitly introduced into the analysis. Given these
3 Ntathematically and fully with respect to the social
action function, and in a summarized way with respect to
the international economic action function, but the
latter demonstration could be amplified to a desired ex-
tent simply by following the steps of the former
demonstration.
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decisions both functions are transformed into scales of
values for the evaluation of alternative uses of national
or world resources, If perfect competition is unattain-
able, and if pure competition is insufficient per se to
determine maximum international economic welfare, what
minimum set of ethical norms should be agreed upon before
nations attempt to derive the optimum conditions for an
adequate and effective international economic organization?
13. Minimum universal ethics for maximum international
welfare, We have already seen, in the methodological part
of this thesis, that natural science consists of research
into sense experience, motivated and guided by a working
hypothesis, leading, through logical inference to the
formulation of an explanatory theory, and resulting in
appropriate technological action. No working hypothesis
means no intention, no motive for research, no reason for
making one experiment rather than another, no way of
bringing sense or order into the observed facts, Con-&
trariwise, too much working hypothesis means finding
only what you already know to be there and ignoring the-
rest, it means going about forcing things to become the
signs of one's word patterns, when one ought to be adapt-
ing one's word pattern to become the signs of things.
In trying to determine the minimum set of universally
acceptable ethical norms for maximum international
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economic welfare how much of a working hypothesis do we
need? From karshall and Pigou we gather that the only value
judgment involved in welfare maximization is the ethical
decision to maximize welfare, But once this decision is
assumed as taken, other perspectives unfold themselves, and
if it is not the task of the economic theorist to deduce or
verify these implications, it is a legitimate exercise of
economic analysis to examine the consequences of assigning
rationality or equal sensitivity to consumers, or perfect
discriminatory power to monopolists, and so on. Feeling,
in the type of economic analysis we have been taught, the
absolute necessity of making explicit the role of value
judgments we sensed as tacitly and implicitly theorized into
the very texture of arguments presented as scientific, we
found it useful to introduce from the very beginning the
concept of a social action function for the complete defini--
tion of which we were obliged to go as far afield as to
dEal directly with unfamiliar metaphysical concepts. In
defining this function we found that it has three distinct
domains, perfectly identifiable in a national economy: at
the technological level this social action function depends
Atbram (Burk) Bergeon, 'Socialist Economics," op., cit.,
pp. 416-?; Paul A, Samuelson, Foundations of Economic
Analysis, op. cit, , pp. 219-20; M. Dobb,~ Usconomic Theory
and the Problems of a Socialist Economy, " Economic Journal,
December 1933, vol. XLIII, pp. 588-98; R. F. K~ahn, "some
Notes on Ideal Output,W Economic Journal, March 1935,
vol. XLV, pp. 1-35.
upon a certain endowment of goods and services; at the ex-
change level, upon individual preferences and indifferences;
and, finally, it is given a form, at the ethical level, by
means of politically determined and juridically implemented
decisions on ends. In trying to extend this concept to an
international economic system we found that, although in the
past there had been an international conformity to certain
rules of the game as developed, it is true, in the City of
London, there had been in the present nothing like universal
agreement on any one of the various codes of economic be-
havior proposed by the various international economic agen-
cies since those created under the patronage and care of the
League of Nations. It is true that all these modern prow-
posals were, without exception, based exclusively upon purely
economic considerations, in this residing, in our view,
their fundamental weakness. In extending the concept of
social action function to an international economy, we found
it essential to assume that there actually exists universal
consensus regarding a set of restraints we wished to impose
upon a feasible international economic action function) in
order to specialize its form as well as the nature of its
variables and boundaries. These constraints, which we have
already outlined above (V,B,4), will now be formally
35
Order,L Macmilan, Lonidon 98 .n
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developed, not merely as the essential foundation for an
ideal model of perfect competition in international trade,
but as a social and ethical basis for a politically determi-
nable and juridically implementable legal norm defining a
possibly both effective and adequate international economic
56
organization. These constraints are concerned with the
problem of choice of an internationally valid economic
ideology, the necessity of positive correlation between
international and national economic values, the independence
of irrelevant alternatives for international economic organi-
zation, the maintenance of national economic sovereignty in
relation to the realization of national preferences, and the
avoidance of economic hegemony, domination, vassalage and
servitude. These conditions will be stated as follows;
a) The choice of an international economic
ideolojs. As a function of all the economic
magnitudes of an international economic system,
the international economic action function
(203-4) is supposed to characterize some ethical
belief concerning a functional hierarchy of
36 Although it may appear contrariwise, we are not trying
to innovate anything in a path so well beaten by phenome-
nological philosophy, Austrian jurisprudence, and the so-
called "new welfare economics.' We are only restating Prof.
Bergson in terms of Prof. Samuelson and Prof. Arrow, when
Prof. Bergson himself avowedly descends from Pareto and
Barone, and unavowedly, perhaps. from Prof, Parsons and Prof.
Friedrich, and, through them, from Kant and Hegel,
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proposed national economic policies or possible
social action functions of the participant
national economies. We only require that this
belief exhibit the properties of a stable solu-
37
tion, i.e., that no national economic policy
contained in the international economic action
function is dominated by a national economic
policy contained in the international economic
action function, and that every national economic
policy not contained in the international econ-
omic action function is dominated by some
national economic policy contained in the inter-
national economic action function, The national
economic policy WF is said to dominate national
economic policy WG, F#Gs1,...K, if a participant
country or a group of participant countries have
separately greater gains in WF than in WG and
can, by acting together enforce WF i.e., get for
themselves a combined gain at least equal to that
provided in W7, This definition of a stable
solution is more general than the familiar one
37John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, Theory of
Games and Economic Behavior, .o.cit., p. 40; J. Marschak,
'Neumann"s and Morgensternis... op i. pp. 97-115;
L. Hurwic:, "The Theory of Economic Behavior,N American Econ-
omic Review, vol. 35, 1945, pp. 909-25.
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based exclusively on transitivity for it not
only covers cases already mentioned (VA,2) as
"voting paradoxes" but also provides an excellent
theoretical springboard for considerations of
cyclical social evolution within a plausible
dynamic politics. Note that this basic require-
ment for a 8table international economic ideology
will take care even of those international econ-
omic policies of a Platonic, surannd kind as that
proposed by Prof. Maritain and his Neo-Thomists
as well as that of strict hedonic flavor justi-
fying more liberal, laissez-faire leanings, as
well as government by 61ite, secular or religious.
This broadness, however, does not mean that the
international economic ideology is an hetero-
geneous mixture of eclectic doctrines, for the
stability requirement places a real restriction
upon the condition to which the international
economic action function is subjected. This is
to be understood that there are some national
ideological preferences which are not admissible
into a stable international ordering of national
ideological preferences. Thus, for instance,
political anarchism, national or international,
the doctrine of absolute national or individual
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sovereignty, the myth of a perfectly atomistic
and competitive market, in national or inter-
national economic systems, are incompatible with
collective rationality.38
b) Positive association of international and
national values. The international economic
action function (203-4) is supposed to be such
that its ordering of national ideological prefer-
ences responds positively to alterations in
national ideological values, or at least not
negatively. Expressed mathematically, and per-
haps now somewhat misleadingly, this condition
requires that the international economic action
function be a monotonic increasing function of
the national ideological preferences; if an
economic measure leads a country to fulfil its
economic policy objectives more fully than before,
without this resulting in hampering any other
country from attaining their own economic aims,
~
58ThiS is another way of formulating the central theme-
of this thesis, which is, once more, that purely atomistlo,
mechanistic, individualistic assumptions cannot lead to a
well-defined social welfare function. This has been often
referred to as the "utilitarian paradox,' For the implica-
tions of utilitarian economics see I. M, D2. Little, A
Critique of Welfare Economics, op,~ cit., ohs. I and 2.
then the international economic action function
must increase in value; there will be a decrease
in its value whenever one or more countries become
less ideologically satisfied without any other
countries becoming more ideologically satisfied,
i.e., being placed in a higher indifference sur-
face referring to a set of alternative policy
measures. This is a generalization of what has
been said above (V,B,l) concerning possible con-
flict between national and international measures
for full employment. This condition, together
with those that will follow, are already implicitly
contained in the condition concerning a stable
solution to the problem of choice of an inter-
national economic ideology.
c) Independence from irrelevant alternatives for
organization, The chosen international economic
action function (203-4) must be independent from
the existence of possible alternatives for inter-
national economic organization outside the in-
itially given set of possible alternatives, be-
cause, if all possible alternatives were con-
sidered, the final choice of an international
economic action function could very well be based
upon fortuitous but probable circumstances which,
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nevertheless, could never manifest themselves in
reality, such as wars, revolutions, administration
landslides, etc. This condition is simply a
development of the second requirement for a stable
solution mentioned above (V,B,15,a): the inter-
national economic policy which is chosen as a
solution for the problem of international economic
organization must establish an order of preference
among the initially given set of national econ-
omic policies such that none of these national
forms of economic organization are discredited or
upset by standards of behavior not included
within the limits of the accepted standards,
d) National sovereignty in relation to accepted
preferences, The international economic action
function (203-4) must not be such as to prevent
any participant country from implementing a
national economic policy which does not dominate
or upset any other national economic policy, and
is not dominated by any other national policy.
In other words, an international economic ideol-
ogy must not be chosen such as to prevent any
participant country from conducting an accepted
norm of economic behavior, the criterion of
acceptance being exclusively that of not
418
compromising the stability of the international
economic system, as defined in (V,B,13,a), This
condition, once more, is a development of a con-
dition logically implicit in the basic requirement
for a stable international economic ideology, and
expressing in nuce that the national economic
policies comprised by the stable international
ideological solution are precisely those policies
which are undominated by other policies contained
in the stable solution.39 This rigorously ex-
presses the axiom in international law that a
treaty making power which does not possess sover-
eign authority has no capacity to negotiate and
conclude international compacts, but at the same
time that this capacity limits the exercise of
sovereign power by a politically independent
nation. It expresses, moreover, the circularity
contained in the so-called "doctrine of the
original agreement," according to which a state,
by an original agreement, may consent to the
future operation upon itself by majority vote of
international authority, and even coercion, and
uJohn von Neumann and Oskar M4orgenstern, p.pcit.,
pp. 38-41; Oskar Morgenstern, Limits of Economics, Hodge,
London, 1937, ohs. V, VI, and VII.
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going so far as voluntarily to surrender its
entire sovereignty without violating the doo-
40
trine of sovereignty,
e) Exclusion of solution by domination and servi-
tude. The international economic action function
(203-4) must not be dictatorial or imperative in
any other way except that it requires that the
stability of its proposed ideological solution
must be fulfilled. This condition expresses the
requirement that the international economic
organization must have sovereign authority over
other alternative forms of international economic
organization existing outside the limits of its
original ethical decision concerning the objeo-
tives of the proposed international economic
action. It is the aspect of the international
normative economic system seen as if from outside
in the totality of its unified action. It means
that international organization is broader than
international government in relation to the
member nations , and includes immediate and com-
pletely voluntary cooperation among nations, just
Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law arnd State, op. cit.,
part II, oh. VI; R. G. Hawtrey, Economic Aspects of Sover-
eignty, Longmans, Green, London, 1930, chs, 1 and 5,
as socialization in the individual state proceeds
not only by state control and legal coercion but
also by strictly voluntary cooperation among
individuals.41
14. We have now imposed, formally and explicitly, five
apparently reasonable conditions upon the shape of an inter-
national economic action function. These conditions are,
of course, value judgments. They reflect preoccupations
which are themselves a result of a specific historical en-
vironment, Being, therefore, subjective in this sense, they
can be questioned by wfoever does not accept the fundamental
ethical assumption upon which these value judgments are based,
i.e., that nations prefer, at the present stage of their
international economic and historical unfolding, to achieve
stability of demand at full employment to stability at less
tnan adequate levels of demand, or even to instability
(V,A,4). A full employment program is here explicitly as-
sumed to be the chosen international economic ideology. In
fact, there has been no other normative proposal to meet
such an unanimity of consensus as to its validity, and the
difficulty of its implementation has resulted exclusively
from the fact that this implementation has been attempted on
the fragile basis of economic considerations alone. These
41Pitman B. Potter, "International organization." in
Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences, op. cit., vol. 8, pp. l77-8
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considerations stem either from a marginalist tradition or
from Keynesian analysis, Marginalist considerations impose
on individual tastes only those restrictions that are implied
by individualistic assumptions, and, in this case, if there
is more than one commodity, no unique point of optimum equi-
librium is derivable as long as further restrictions of a
social kind are not imposed upon the individualistic ones,
Keynesian analysis is manageable and elegant but even more
formal taan infinitesimal marginalism, since it does not
commit its users precisely to state their fundamental beliefs
concerning the nature of the forces underlying summary con-
cepts, and causes thea to become satisfied with a symbolical
aggregation that completely clouds price-cost relations,
special situations in particular industries or geographic
42
areas, monopolistic practices, and the like,
15. Real national income distribution and international
economic welfare, Thus, problems of real income distribution,
which are at once political and social more than simply eco-
nomic, because, if measurability of individual utility is
4 2 J. M. Clark, "Separate Concurring Statement," in
National and International Measures for Full Employment,
op.cit.s pp. 100-4; William Fellner, Competition Among the
Few, Knopf, New York, 1949, pp. 1-15; D. G. Johnson, "High
Cost of Food, a Suggested Solution," Journal of Political
Economy, vol. LVI, 1948, pp. 54-7; E. Ronald Walker, From
Economic Theory to Policy, o i. ch. V; R. F. Harrod,
S1 cope and Method in Econornios,E conomic Journal, September
1938, pp. 383-412.
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avoided as meaningless, they will nationally involve further
decisions on ends, and which, internationally, tend to mani-
fest themselves as a polyglot confusion of national price-
wage structures, competition, incentives, liquidity, tech-
nology, etc., are doubly avoided firstly by the macroanalyste
under allegation of convenience, and secondly by the purely
theoretical marginalists by lack of agreement upon what
really happens in the economic realm transcending aggregates.
This exclusion has been in fact a matter of more than mere
convenience, for it springs1 indeed, from a very deep stream
of individualistic thought pervading the whole body of clas-
sical economics. The passing away of an entire social system
erected upon more or less subconscious checks and counter-
checks left economic theorists and social scientists with a
vain hope that an effective, or pure, if not perfect, com-
petitive market behavior would be sufficient to achieve the
realization of those social and ethical norms which form so
inherently a part of the value system of individual human
beings. This view, which may be found at the core of all
the currently accepted types of economic analysis, except
orthodox socialism, simply abstracts what we have called in
this thesis the political level of economic action, and by
so doing theoretically implies that all individual partici-
pants in an economic system have the same value schema,
although not perhaps identical or similar taste patterns.
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This is the only way of attaching any sensible meaning to a
collectively accepted ordering of different possible con-
figurations of real income distributions in any given situa-
tion. Granting that collective indifference curves based on
communal or national taste patterns do not have much scien-
tific support, economists have almost unanimously4 assumed
that individuals do have identical value systems at any
given instant of time. This assumption which is anthropolo-
gically maintainable for a culturally integrated group, and
which is perhaps still grantable, although on much softer
grounds, for a national state which is not passing through
a period of overt social revolution, becomes almost posi-
tively false when the question is internationally to compare
national orderings of different possible welfare distribu-
tions. Here, again, an international decision on ends is
absolutely necessary to make the problem yield to a unique
solution. Only in a closely integrated community of nations
it is possible to speak about the distribution of the real
income o.f the world as consistent with the various national
income distributions. Only if it is assumed that all ethical
483
An exception: Paul A. Samuelson, Foundations of Econ-
omic Analysis, op. cit., p. 225; idem, "Evaluation..,"
ogp.,.git., pp. 1-21; W.l J. Baumol "Community Indifference,"
Review of Economic Studies, vol. XIV, 194?- PP. 44-48;
F. H. Knight, "The Planful Act: The Possibilities and
Limitations of Collective Rationality," in Freedom and Reforg
Harper, New York, 194?, pp. 546-65; A. Ammon, Grundzuge der
theoretisohen Nationaldkonomie, Franoke, Bern, 1948, ch. 4.
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philosophies that exist throughout the world at a certain
period of time conform with the maximization principle in-
volved in the utilitarian philosophy of Jeremy Bentham, it
is possible rigorously to affirm that international trade
involves a potential, if not an actual, economic gain to all
participating countries: if trade is opened between countries
and due to the doctrine of comparative advantage, each coun-
try, if it chooses to do so, can obtain more of every oommodi-
ty while performing less of every productive service, and
this represents an improvement in welfare. So, the tradi-
tional question of the determination of the gains from inter-
national trade depends, from the point of view of each par-
ticipating country, on the nationally accepted ethical value
schema, and, from the point of view of the world, on the
degree of compatibility existing between the Weltanschauungen
of the various countries involved in international economic
action.
16. Closure of the conceptual system of thesis. This
conception of international economic action closes the theo-
retical system expounded in this thesis. Starting from a
description of mental action as developing through various
distinct levels of consciousness, which may be classified
roughly as transcendental, rational, and intuitional, we
have described the structure of social action, at its ra-
tional level, as consisting of three domains of a social
action function, namely, ethical, economic and technological.
Then, national economic action was described as conforming
with this structure of social action, and these national
economic systems were combined into an international eco-
nomic action function, A positive-normative method was
adopted, and all main premises, postulates. and theoretical
conclusions were discussed and demonstrated as far as the
scope of this thesis permitted us to go in our investigation.
Individual values were interpreted as transcendentally
given, at the ethical level, and there as politically de-
termined and juridically implemented, whereas tastes were
interpreted as rationally ordered at the level of pure eco-
nomic exchange. A series of coefficients of production
were seen as constraining the national or international
social action function at its technological level, acting in
the system as the parametrio variables. Constrained between
the limits imposed by the political decisions on ends, at
the ethical level, and by technological conditions, at the
level of production, the outcome of the social action under-
taken in a national economy is imputed or distributed as
real national income to the participants, varying, whenever
these individuals "count," according to their individual
tastes. Thus, for a given set of individual economic
agents as defined by their taste preferences and indiffer-
ences, and a given social, political, and cultural
425
426
environment, there is a given distribution of purchasing
power as defined by an exogenously given set of decisions
on the ends of the proposed economic action; then exchange
under perfectly competitive conditions proceeds until an
optimum and uniquely given position of equilibrium is
reached. We have seen in detail how this final outcome is
determined. When this national economic action is conceived
as developing throught time, various conclusions may be
reached regarding displacement and restablishment of equi-
librium, stationary, and cyclical behavior, etc. If these
national economies are then conceived as meshing into an
international economy, we have seen that no unique optimum
point of exchange equilibrium is determinable as long as an
international economic ideology is not assumed as a rule
selecting national economic policies, and ordering then in
accordance with a certain scale of ethical values, as the
nationally stated choices for certain configurations of real
national income distribution from a given collection of
alternative allocations of goods and services as a function
of the tastes of the participating economic agents.
17. Axiomatic summary of thesis. The equilibrium equa-
tions describing the international economic organization
system proposed in thils thesis may be brought together under
axiomatic form. Two sets of such equations have been con-
sidered, according to whether we have or have not included
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a time variable. And there are two ways for mathematically
including into the analysis -the dimensionality of time:
the functional method of the calculus of variations, and
the numerical method of the calculus of finite differences,
We have adopted throughout the second of these two methods.
The dynamic system, when describing economic action by means
of a sequence of finite periods, is simply a stream of dis-
crete static visualizations of cross sections, In the sum-
mary here attempted, we shall firstly present the general,
static aspect of a cross section, and then we shall visual-
ize the system as flowing through a multi-lag sequence of
time periods. The static system is as follows:
a) There is, without a time reference, a finite
set (P) of l,...,h ideological possibilities for
international economic integration (T), The
finite set (P) is circumscribed by unspecified
ethical, economic, and technological boundaries
(TO). Among the various Tk, k=1,-..,h, one is
found, by unanimity, to be a doctrinal function
without specific content (Tg) but establishing
definite logical relations between 1,...,K,
finite subsets (W) in (P), and also bounded by
specific ethical, economic, and technological
restraints (t0), where the various Wg, H=1,...,K,
are national statements of economic policy
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preferences. The functional translation of this
axiomatic formulation has already been given
above in (202) and (203),
b) The chosen international economic ideology, Tg,
is defined by the following definite relation it
establishes among the subsets WH, =l,'--,K, in
(P): no W contained in Tg is dominated by a WH
in Tg; every Wz not contained in Tg is dominated
by some Wg contained in Tg; therefore, the subsets
in T9 are precisely those subsets which are undomi-
nated by subsets in Tg. This expresses the sta-
bility requirement for the internationally adopted
ideology of full employment as explained at
length in (V,B,13), and exhausts the axiomatic
content of an international economic organization
as we propose to define in this thesis.
c) There is, without a time reference, and for each
participating national economy, a finite set
(We9) H=l,...,K, e=l,...,s, of ideological pos-
sibilities for national economic integration,
circumscribed by ethical, economnic, and tech-
nological boundaries, one of which is found, by
voting in democratic countries, and by imposition
in dictatorships, to be a feasible social action
function, which is also a doctrinal function,
without specific content, This chosen social
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action function e in national economy H, i.e.,Ie
W 8H, establishes, by one way or another, an
ordering of social preference unambiguously defin-
ing of a subsets in WEH of individual preferences
U. This has been expressed in (205).
d) As the proper conduct of an international full
employment policy necessitates that there be
stability within each participating national econ-
omy, the WeH is defined for such a requirement
where its elements are the Uhi h=l,...,s, and
comprising physical as juridical persons, such
as individuals, business firms, households, the
government with its various branches, and the
rest of the world. These have been called the
individual and collective economic agents of the
national economic action WeH, which is a complex
of activities or economic acts one for each
period of time, like moves in a game.
e) There is, without a time reference, within each
participating national economy, and for each
participating economic agent, a finite set CUh)'
h=l,..,,s, of taste patterns referring to the
consumption of n goods X, and the provision of
m services V. A certain configuration of goods
and services owned or controlled by a certain
I
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individual is circumscribed by political and
jurical constraints at the ethical level; by psy-
chological and budget constraint at the exchange
level; and by physical constraints at the tech-
nological level of production, such that each
Xhi and each Vh is the outcome, respectively,
of a production relation between services Th
and of an employment relation between the various
goods Xhji, where h=l,...,s; i=l,...,n; j=1,...,m.
These relations have been thoroughly described
previously in this thesis and there is no need
of repeating them in this summary,
18. Generalizing the behavior of this static system
along a time dimension, a dynamic system is deducible, as
follows;
a) There is, as holding during a multi-lag period
of time, a finite set (P) of l,...,h ideological
possibilities for international economic inte-
gration (T), and bounded by initially given ethi-
cal, economic, and technological conditions (TO).
Among the various Tg, g=1,...,h, one is chosen
as an international economic norm for action,
defining relationships to be observed with re-
spect to the various WH, H=l,...,K, during the
course of the intended action carrying the system
4Z1
from an initially given state of affairs towards
an anticipated state of affairs at a certain
point in the future. If the system is stationary,
the stability requirement based upon an intransi-
tive domination must hold along the course of
the intended action. If the system is cyclical,
the domination relationships between the various
national economic ideologies, W1 ,..., WH' corre-
spond to the various ways in which these can un-
stabilize, or upset, each other. The functional
translation of this axiomatic formulation is
expressed in (204),
b) There is, as holding during a period of time of
r lags, and for each participating national
economy, a finite set (WeHt-)t H=1,...,K,
t-q
e=l,...,z, q=l,...,r, of ideological possibilities
for national economic policy integration, one of
wnich is found as feasible, a realizable plan-
ning of national economic action during the pre-
scribed period of time. It expresses a norm for
carrying the national economy from an initial
situation to a final end, target, or objective,
If the adopted norm is a certain national economic
policy for full employment, this social action
function presumably describes a series of measures
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leading to full employment. It may or may not
fulfil the requirement for stability: if it ful-
fils such requirement the national economy will
be maintained in a stationary state; if not,
there will be cyclical fluctuations within the
individual inputations contained in W EH .
c) There is, as holding during the period of time
of v lags, for vK> r, and for each individual or
collective participant Uh, h=1,...,s, a finite
set (Uht-p)' p=l,...,v, of taste patterns refer-
ring to the consumption of n goods X, and of m
services V. at the end of each time period p=1,
...,v. A certain configuration of goods and
services owned or controlled by a certain indi-
vidual is determined at the time period preced-
ing the period of time t-v, Given taste patterns
and parametric coefficients of production a final
outcome is uniquely determined as a target bill
of goods and services expressing a social state
of affairs for the hth individual, At each
period of time there will be Xhjt-p production
functions, and employment functions in-
volving relationships between, respectively,
ijtpand Xhamt- as thoroughly described in
the preceding section of this work. All these
relationships, however, are seen from the initial
period of time and always refer to an anticipated
relationship in the future, causing the appear-
ance in the system of coefficients of retentions
of flow, under form of stocks, inventories, and
savings or hoards,
19. This summary, in axiomatic form, completes the
description of an international economic organization as a
normative system. This system could have been expressed in
determinantal, matric, or vectorial form. By making the
time variable change continuously the system could have
been expressed in integral form. Or, by means of tree-
diagrams and flow charts, a tableau economique could have
been devised to expound an international economic system.
By specifying certain commodities as consumption goods,
investment goods, savings, stocks, imports and exports, etc.,
a Keynesian visualization could have been obtained on the
basis of aggregates. By deducing families of interregional
and international multipliers, the whole system could have
been expressed as a network of impulse and propagation
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adaptable to electro-analog representations, and permit-
ting the inclusion of space in a more conspicuous manner,
4Stephen Enke, "Equilibrium among Sgatially Separated
Markets: Solution by Electric Analogue, Econometrica,
vol. 19, no. 1, January 1951.
Finally, by relaxing the assumption of linearity non-linear
cycle models could have been developed. For the sake of
uniformity, however, we chose to repeat the form, but, of
course, not the content, of our social system model when
dealing with a closed national economic system, and also
when describing the model for a positive as well as a norma-
tive international economic systems. Our last task is to
appraise this theoretical model as an instrument for policy.
C. Foundations for an international economic welfare policy
1. International economic optima in practice. It might
seem that a section on policy is out of place in a theo-
retical work. This would be the case if the theory of inter-
national economic organization were pure theory, and, if we
have succeeded in conveying to the mind of the reader the
central proposition of this thesis, it should by now be clear
that this it never exclusively is, for we have argued that
it is a calculus with an ethical interpretation. Policy
recommendations when referring to a normative theory always
requires political changes. We shall not discuss these
changes here, but limit ourselves, given the scale of values
we have proposed in (V,B,13), to the definition in these
terms of the conditions for optimum allocation, and to the
description of the main obstacles that we perceive to the
attainment of such an equilibrium position. The following
analysis will be in its most part static, although we shall
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attempt at dynamizing it for we believe that a consideration
of dynamic factors will serve to make one cautious concern-
ing the application of static criteria to a dynamic world.
We shall, then, for the moment assume that the national
value schemas, and the individual taste patterns as well
as the technical coefficients are constant all over the world.
In the general equilibrium system thus resulting the condi-
tions derived from the given ends will be the equations
sufficient in number to determine the unknowns which are
the amounts of each and every good and service allocated
to each and every use. It has been already mathematically
shown how, in these circumstances, the characteristics of
an optimum position of production and allocation can be de-
rived, and when are they necessary, sufficient, or both.
From the conditions previously derived the more interesting
optimum requirements may be formulated as follows: for
maximum international economic welfare,
a) optimum position of exchange equilibrium will
be internationally reached whenever the marginal
rate of substitution between any two goods, or
any two services, or between a good and a service,
as well as vice-versa, is the same for every
individual who consumes both goods, or provides
both services, or consumes the good and provides
the service, as well as vice-versa; and
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b) optimum position of production equilibrium will
be internationally reached whenever the marginal
rate of substitution (transformation) between
any two products, or any two factors, or between
any factor and any product, as well as vice-
versa, is equal to the ratio of their marginal
costs in case of products, or their marginal
productivities in case of factors, or of the
marginal productivity of any factor in terms of
the marginal cost of its product, as well as
vice-versa.
2. This is the most compressed way a general equilibrium
system may be described, By replacing such general de-
nominations as goods, services, factors, products, marginal
costs, marginal value productivities, individuals, etc.,
by narrower qualificatives such as imports, exports, con-
sumption goods, investment goods, prices, wages, households,
industries, government, foreign countries, etc., this brief
description could be developed ad infinitum et nauseam.
One can, if one chooses, set up a logical system, using
only symbols, and without giving them any real meaning.
But,the moment this purely logical construction is expressed
in words, the system is ipso facto interpreted or restricted
by the resultant propositions. An international economic
welfare system is one such Interpretation, and we have
437
described this system both as an order as well as an organi-
zation, both as a positive as well as a normative system.
So long as its welfare character is maintained, and the
analysis is restricted to its positive aspect, we have demon-
strated that an optimum unique position is indeterminate,
We must introduce assumptions concerning decisions on ends
to make the system determinate from a welfarep oint of view.
This is only as intuitively it should be, An optimum must
be defined in which way it is optimum to be recognized as
such, and, identically, welfare cannot be defined directly
in terms of content for it is a concept by postulation in
need of hypotheses to be understandable. Given the neces-
sary norms, or the ethical decisions on ends, welfare is
that which varies with its indicator: if the objective of
the economic action is to maximize individual satisfaction
(minimize individual dissatisfaction), welfare is that which
increases (decreases) whenever one or more individuals
become more (less) satisfied without any other individuals
becoming less (more) satisfied; similarly, if the objective
of the economic action is to maximize output (minimize
input), welfare increases (decreases) whenever one output
increases (decreases) other outputs and inputs being con-
stant, or when less (more) of any input is spent for the
same amounts of all other inputs and outputs.4 These norms
45.W. Reder, Studiles in the Theory of Welfare Econ-
omics, op. cit., pp. 14-47; Paul A. Samuelson, Foundations
of Economic Analjsis, op. cit., p. 230.
438
define what is sometimes called the justice of a specific
46
economic system. Given these norms, the determination of
the policies to be undertaken in accordance with them is a
strictly scientific enterprise, When, for instance, the
empirical economic system to be normatively regulated admits
technologically and psychologically, the existence of econ-
omies and diseconomies of scale in production as well as in
consumption, the social justice of a general equilibrium
system can only be redressed by periodical and deliberate
redistributions of real income, conducted in accordance with
the ethical criteria which happens to be politically deter-
mined and juridically implemented in the economy in question.
Given these criteria, whatever they may be, according to
which incomes are to be redistributed, the marginal social
utility per unit of purchasing power for different partici-
pating individuals is necessarily the same in the light of
these criteria after the redistribution is realized.47 This
is as logically valid for a national economy as for an
international economy.
3. International application of thecompensation pr in-
ciple. Defining a successful national economic policy as a
46E, Antonelli, L'Ezonomie Pure d~u Capitalisme, op, 2it.,
p. 77.
47
Abram Bergeon, "Socialist Economics," In A Survey of
Contemporary Economics, pp._cit., p. 418,
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series of economic measures leading to a national increase
in welfare, as above stated, we may apply this concept to an
international economy. We may say that international econ-
omic welfare increases whenever a country is able success-
fully to conduct a national economic policy without prevent-
ing any other country at least from maintaining invariant
its level of national economic welfare. In an interdependent
economic world, however, there are very few national econ-
omic policy measures that will not involve injury to some
individual located abroad, and, strictu senso, this will
be sufficient for welfare to decrease abroad as a result of
a policy measure implemented at home. This would reduce
to sterility the national (international) applicability of
economic welfare policies if it were totally impossible
for national states (international economic agencies) to
achieve the socially (internationally) agreed ethical
desiderata by means of a system of lump-sum taxes and boun-
48
ties. In the event of a displacement from the optimum
equilibrium position, i.e., whenever the amount of any
product (factor) produced (spent) deviates from its equi-
lIbrium amount, a compensating tax (bounty) would be that
amount of abstract purchasing power or real income in form
of commodities which, when taken from (paid to) a given
4814. W. Reder, op. cit., ch. I, especially pp. 14-l?,
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individual, leaves him on the (same) indifference surface
he would have been on had the displacement from the optimum
equilibrium not occurred. This theorem, called compensation
principle,49 is greatly important for social policy in a
planned or free enterprise national or international economy,
With the aid of this concept, which is certainly not debat-
able except perhaps on a philosophy of systematically deny-
ing people whatever they want, we can now ascertain how any
given real income variation will affect the economic welfare
of a national or international community. Thus, precisely,
a national income variation will increase, decrease or leave
welfare unaffected according to whether the algebraic sum
of the compensating taxes and bounties, levied on all affected
persons, is positive, negative or zero. As applied to an
international economic organization, this principle could
be stated as follows: if an international economic agency
could collect enough revenue from those countries whose
economic welfare increased due to real national income
variation, without making any of them worse off than they
49 Asformulated by Vilfredo Pareto, Manuel d'iconomie
Politique, op, cit., pp. 354-65, 617-57; E. Barone, The
Ministry of Production... " op. _cit., pp. 245-90;
A. P. Lerner, "The Concept of Monopoly... "op. cit.,
pp. 162-5; H. Hotelling, "The General Welfare in Relation.,..
opp cit., pp. 248-56; 0. Lange, "The Foundations... " op, cit.,
pp. 213-18; for a different formulation see N. Kaldor,
"Welfare Propositions... " op. cit., pp. 549-52.
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would have been had the welfare increase not occurred, in
order to compensate fully those countries harmed by the varia-
tion abroad, leaving them as well off as they would have been
in the absence of such variation, and retain a surplus, it
could by distributing this surplus, increase world welfare.
4. This principle is as general as the concept of welfare
itself. All that it requires for application is, in the case
of a national economy, that individual taste patterns be
ordered in accordance with collectively accepted value schemas,
and, in the case of an international economy, that national
policy preferences be ordered in accordance with inter-
nationally agreed economic ideologies. The principle ao-
quires specificity whenever a particular national or inter-
national value schema is ethically given. Thus, for instance,
it must be qualified in various ways if the adopted inter-
national economic ideology is based upon a postulate of struc-
tural stability as that described in (VB,13) above. In this
case, the compensation principle could be reformulated as
50
follows: economic welfare will be increased, decreased or
left unchanged by a given real income variation depending upon
(a) whether the algebraic sum of all compensating taxes and
bounties is positive1 negative or zero, and (b) the potential
losers could not profitably bribe the potential gainers to
prevent economic welfare from changing. Real income should
50I. 1. D. Little, op. cit., appendix, pp. 273-5.
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be redistributed in such a way as to conform to the imputa-
tion of a stacle solution as defined in (V,B,13a) above.
Internationally, the compensation principle should be applied
in accordance with the five requisites enumerated in
(V,Ba,b,c,d,e) above. But these are requisites that the
compensation principle must observe at the ethical level of
the international doctrinal function or of the social action
function. Many other obstacles must be overcome in order
that compensatory payments be correctly made at the exchange
and at the technological levels of national or international
economIc action. The remainder of this thesis will be dedi-
cated to a brief discussion of these various obstacles,
from a static as well as from a dynamic point of view.
5. Variable, asymetrical returns to scale. The optimum
conditions of international production and exchange, sum-
marized. in (V,C,l,ab), may be restated in terms of costs
and value productivities as follows: price of product must
equal marginal cost, and price of factor must equal marginal
value productivity. This is the marginal litany of text-
books. Both conditions will be necessary as well as suffi-
cient only when the economy is one of constant returns to
scale, This very special case may not prevail in economic
reality, due to fixed factors, and indivisibilities of fac-
tors and products, causing average total cost curve to de-
cline for a wide range of output variations, with marginal
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cost below average cost. However, for the attainment of
the optimum position, the rule is that price must equal mar-
ginal cost; it must not be merely proportional to marginal
51
cost; it must be equal to it, Identically, in an inter-
national economy, assuming that the adopted decisions on
ends are those mentioned in (V,B,a,b,c,d,e), from which anal-
ysis establishes the optimum conditions (V,Cl,a,b), the
same rule must apply, and we have already seen in (V,B,7)
how it does apply whenever international trade is assumed to
be perfectly competitive. This it never is, and, as we have
already seen (V,B,12), it never can Le. In the hypothesis
that an international economic agency succeeds in persuading
all member governments to compel each firm in all industries
situated within the limits of their political authority to
produce that output which makes price equal to marginal cost,
at least theoretically two results will emerge: (a) socially
important increasing cost industries might have to be subsi-
dized in order to survive; and (b) socially important de-
creasing cost industries might lose the stimulus to large
52
scale research which only they can afford, And assuming
that national governments are persuaded effectively and
adequately to enforce equalization of factor prices to
51E. F. M4. Durbin, "Economic Calculus.., ", op. cit.,
pp. 676-690; R., H. Coase, "The Marginal Cost Controversy,"
op i. pp. 169-182.
520. Lange, "On the Economic Theory... ", op. cit.,
pp. 65-72.
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marginal value productivities, or to keep factor price dif-
ferentials in correspondence with differences in marginal
value productivities this would cause two effects: (a) the
breakdown of the ethical assumption of freedom of choice as
allowed to households in respect of both the work they do and
the goods they consume; and (b) strict governmental control
with respect to the time preference of households in relation
to the rate of investment.53 If, then, at the initiation of
the international action prices and wages are arbitrary, it
can be shown, on the basis of well known theoretical argu-
ments, that the resulting equilibrium prices, wages and
interest rates will determine the aggregate demand for and
supply of each and every sort of goods and services on the
part of all households and production units within all national
economies participating in the international economic
54
action. The evident national as well as international
obstacles to this kind of concerted action are at the present
time very great and even unsurmountable. However, it is not
utopian, or visionary, in the sense that this would be im-
possible of achievement under any circumstance whatever,
the realization in the empirical economic world of the
53 Ibid, loc. cit.
54Ibid., pp. 72-98; F. M. Taylor, "The Guidance of Pro-
duction.,. ", op. cit., pp. 39-55; H. D. Dickinson, "Price
Formation in a Socialist Economy," Economic Journal,
December 1933, vol. XLIII, pp. 237-50.
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organizational features outlined above. None of the results
already pointed of an international implementation of a com-
petitive solution for conditions relating to income distri-
bution, the rate of investment, and variable costs, espe-
cially decreasing costs, are absolutely unavoidable. Its
possibility resides, ultimately, in the possibility of making
social choices between alternatively possible ethical deoi-
sions on ends. It is true that any national or international
economic plan must be feasible, in order to be both effec-
tive and adequate, and any one slightly acquainted with the
primitive status of economic observations, even in statisti-
cally minded countries, will readily agree that such a pro-
6 ram of coordinated competition for an international economic
55
organization is impossible under present circumstances.
And if we add to these technical obstacles in obtaining
accurate economic information relating to production and
consumption in a national as well as in an international
economy the difficulties already pointed of translating in-
dividual values into social choices, and these into inter-
national agreement, we shall see that the objective of in-
creasing world welfare by deliberate action is, indeed,
utopian and visionary.
55, orgenstern, On the Accuracy of Economic Observa-
tions, op, cit., oh. V.
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6. Further obstacles to maximum international economic
welfare. In economies in which production and consumption
are not expressible by means of linear and homogeneous equa-
tions , the administrative implementation of the compensation
principle would require perfect discriminatory powers from
the controlling authority. The national government or the
international agency should be able, in order correctly to
apply a system of lump-sum taxes and subsidies, at the same
time that it observes the current distributive notions
derivable from the ideal model of perfect competition, to
set its allowances according to individual or national situa-
tions which are partially the result of individual or national
56
actions and decisions. Ideally, the international or
national managers would have to know the potentialities of
every member country or citizen, or then to be able to change
nationally accepted ethical value schemas or individual
taste patterns, in order not to violate the conventional
nations of social justice when making compensatory payments
or levying compensatory withdrawal., nationally as well as
internationally. Curiously enough the conduct of such a
compensation program seems to be more feasible in an inter-
national than in a national economy, for, while in a national
economy this would at least require that everybody manifest
5Paul A, Samuelson, op_. cit,., pp. 247-8.
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his truthful and accurate economic intentions, in an inter-
national economic organization this would require honest
declaration of policy from member governments, i.e., inter-
national exposure of their intended national economic plan-
ning. Nevertheless, the empirical fact of economies and
diseconomies of production,57 and similar phenomena regard-
ing consumption5 8 will be a very serious obstacle to the
sensible application of the compensation principle, either
nationally or internationally,
7. Another obstacle to the national or international
attainment of a maximum and stable welfare position is lack
of complete information regarding all data of importance
and influence upon the outcome of an intended national or
individual action. Economic agents, individual or collec-
tive) do not have complete information about the configura-
tion of the system of action in which they participate.
The success of advertising is partly due to this absence
of complete information, since, if information must be
provided as to the location of business, the commodities
offered, and the prices charged, selling activities in
general only succeed in increasing the demand for a product
because buyers do not know with precision the true qualities
M W. Reder, op. cit., ch, V,
GTintner, "A Note on Welfare Economics,"
Econometrica, January 1946, pp. 69-78,
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of the product. If advertising does not change tastes
accordingly, then, there will be a decrease in welfare, or
at least an impediment to the attainment of a maximum posi-
tion. Another instance in which maximum welfare may not be
reached due to the existence of incomplete information re-
6 arding all relevant past data is provided by the uncertainty
of the individual or collective economic agent about to take
an economic decision, The various problems arising in
international trade under flexible exchange rates belong
very much to this category. In policy-making at the national
level this is evident in the uncertainty of the authorities
about the effects of a certain measure the results of which
would only be determinate under laboratory conditions where
there exists a narrow correlation between the probability
of occurrence and the actual effect that supervenes in
reality. In the consumption planning of households as in
59
the production planning of business firms uncertainty and
A
risk play a well-known role. As the proper conduct of a
national or international compensation policy depends upon
the probability of potentiality realization of production
and consumption, rather than upon performance, the necessity
of complete information is evident when the issue is that
of maximizing welfare.
"J. R. Hicks, Value and Capital, op, cit., part IV,
ch. SV; J. L. Mosak, General Equilibrium Theory in Inter-
national Trade, part II, che. VI and VII.
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8. Still further obstacles may be pointed out even if
it is assumed that every member government, as well as the
international agency itself, possesses the best economic
talent, that there is a certain theoretical if not ethical
consensus between outstanding economists, and that govern-
ments are willing and able to follow their advice. One of
these obstacles is accurately to test, from an international
point of view, tne success of the various national economic
policies. The obvious test would be to measure the real
gains that each country is able to obtain from international
trade4 60 Assuming that the index-number problem that is
involved in such evaluations has been satisfactorily solved,61
it remains to be decided how is it possible to maintain the
exports and imports of goods and services which, although
not economically profitable, are socially desirable. This
conspicuously refers to international long-term capital
movements. International friction may result from attempts
at governmental control in such cases, even if we wish to
abstract the full-fledged international study of price and
60 L.A. Metzler, "The Theory of International Trade,"
in A Survey of Contemporary Economics, op. cit., pp. 233b-6.
61"In a democratic community, with universal suffrage,
income distribution will tend to move in a favorable
direction in the eyes of most people. The use of the
Laspeyre index is then indicated. Those who believe that,
in a capitalist community, income distribution must always
be changing unfavorably, however it changes, should always
use the Paasche price index," in I. M. D. Little, op. cit.,
p. 217.
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wage structures, leading to the ideal equalization of product
price to marginal cost, and factor price to marginal value
productivity over the entire economic world. Another obsta-
cle stemming from ignorance is that due to errors in fore-
casts of national governments regarding estimates of future
market conditions in deciding upon the optimum rate of
domestic investment, and imports, These errors presumably
would be the greater the more dynamic the national economy
about the conditions in which the forecast was originally
made. The avoidance of such errors could perhaps be
achieved by the international economic agency carrying a
comprehensive information service for the benefit of every
member government. Curious questions of international law
may be involved in the creation of such a purely informative
62
agency. Moreover, rigidities of prices and wages in
response to changes in supply and demand, and prices and
wages standardization for broad categories of goods and
services entering into international relationship may con-
stitute permanent obstacles to the proper functioning of an
international economic organization.63 Last but not least
tnere are the obstacles emerging from transition problems
628. J, Rubin, "The Judicial Review Problem in the
International Trade Organization," Harvard Law Review,
vol. 63, no. 1, November 1949, pp. 97-8, and footnote 28,
63M. W. Reder, op. cit., ch. XIII; I. 14. D. Little,
op. it.,p. 2, footnote 1; Paul A. Samuelson, pp. cit.,
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appearing during the passage from a market economy to a
controlled economy in international trade,
9. International economic welfare in a dynamic world.
So far, this study of international welfare economics has
proceeded within the limits of a static analysis of the prop-
erties of equilibrium positions. We now propose briefly
but exhaustively to generalize, in words, the applications
of the dynamic theory sketched in the previous section of
this thesis to problems of welfare and real income distri-
bution in an international economy. Specifically, our task
now is to trace the time path of the optimum equilibrium
position of production and allocation when welfare increases
(V,C,2), The conclusions will be applicable to a closed
national economy as well as to an integrated international
64
economic system. Dynamically speaking, welfare will be
at a maximum along a time path of a multi-lag period when-
ever the present value of a stream of compensating taxes
(and bounties) that could be derived from changing the course
of the system would be negative, no matter what other course
was adopted. Of course, a corollary of this definition is
that at each moment along the time path all the marginal
first and second order, and total conditions must be satisfied,
64J. Marsohak, "Identity and Stability in Economics:
A Survey," Econometrica, January 1942, pp. 61-74; J. IUlmo,
"Recherches sur l'Equilibre Economnique," Annales de'Institut
Henri Poincare, vol. VIII, pp. 1-62.
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However, this is not to be understood as referring exclu-
sively to a stationary time path. Stationariness is only a
special case, which, incidentally, is covered by this defi-
nition. Another case that we have in mind is typically
dynamic, and this is tne case when, if only for technological
reasons, the economic system cannot instantaneously eliminate
all excess demands and excess prices. The functional ex-
pression of all this has been already written in (204),
where the international economic action function is expressed
in terms of the social action functions of the participating
countries, which, in their turn are expressed in (206) in
terms of the utility functions of the participating individ-
ual or collective economic agents. These, in their turn,
are functions of the goods and services owned or controlled
by each of these economic agents, so that, ultima analyyi,
goods and services at each moment of time are treated as
commodity configurations which producers and consumers com-
bine and anticipate so as to satisfy, in a perfect competi-
tion model, the optiaum conditions of equilibrium. But in
order to do this successfully firms and households must make
perfectly accurate forecasts of all relevant data on the
basis of complete Information regarding the past behavior
of the system, In order to make the model more realistic
it will be recalled that we introduced some retention co-
efficients denoting unplanned savings or dissavings, stocks,
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inventories, disinvestments, surpluses, scarcities, etc.
Introducing these coefficients in the welfare system we may
be able to generalize the definition of a dynamic welfare
path simply by qualifying that, although the equilibrium
position towards which the system may tend is welfare maxi-
mizing, the time path of the system, leading to that posi-
tion of equilibrium, may not be so. A number of interesting
implications concerning full employment as an international
economic polizy may be derived from this suggestion.
10. We shall now briefly examine this conclusion in one
simple model, which, however, synthetizes most other more
complicated dynamic patterns.65 Let us assume, for simplici-
ty, that there is a possibility of computing the real income
of the world8 Since tnis computation would require the ex-
plicit statement of a set of universally valid ethical deci-
sions on the ends of international economic action, which
results at a certain point in the future in a certain con-
figuration of goods and services called the real income of
the world at that date, let us suppose that there is such
an international agreement. The objective of that proposed
international economic action is to hit, at a predetermined
future moment, a given world real income target located at
6R, M4. Goodwin, "The Nonlinear Accelerator and the
Persistence of Business Cycles," Econometrica, vol. 19, no. 1,
January 1951, pp. 1-17; 3. R. Hicks, A Contribution to the
Theory of the Trade Cycle, op i. pp. 147-151; N. S.
Buchanan, "A Reconsideration of the Cobweb Theorem,"
Journal of Political Econojy, February 1939, pp. 67-81.
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the intersection of a supply schedule and a demand schedule
which defines the optimum point of world welfare maximiza-
tion. We must now suppose that the international economy
is starting from a point which does not coincide with this
point of long-run equilibrium, and, in order to make a long
story short, let us suppose that a conceivable world income
multiplier is set in such a way that the change in the rate
of supply per unit of time is an increasing function of the
difference between the initially given world real income and
real income at the target. As supply increases, this dis-
crepancy of course will be reduced, and this will cause
supply to increase at a decreasing rate, the difference
between world real income in the short-run moving equilibrium
and real income at the prescribed long-run target approaching
zero, assymptotically. Figuratively speaking, this is a
problem in external ballistics, the world real income taking
66
the place of the projected missile. So far, the argument
presupposes that the participating countries can correctly
forecast the increased world output that will result from
the discrepancy between actual and long-run world real income
equilibrium. It presupposes, as we have indicated above,
that there is a fixed multiplier coefficient, a linear
6 60r in servo systems as in The Theory of Servomechanisms,
ed. H, M4. James, N. B3. Nichols, R. S. Phillips, McGraw-Hill,
New York, 1947, I. M., Getting, "Servo Systems."
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structural relation, which is supposed to be non-explosive,
leading eventually to the disappearance of the initial
impulse.
11. We shall relax this restrictive assumption of
linearity by introducing the more realistic assumption that
there exists a general tendency among the controlling authori-
ties of the participating national economies to underestimate
(overestimate) the increase (decrease) in world output, and
that there is a tendency for each country to produce an
output greater (smaller) than that which maximizes national
welfare in the short-run, as defined above (V,,9). Whereas
formerly world investment was maintained at a desired rela-
tion with world output, now during the course of the con-
templated international economic action there is either too
much or too little capital stock, so that the world real
income fluctuates about its long-run equilibrium level,
Thus, the question is restricted to the determination of the
general ways by which these fluctuations could be made con-
vergent to the real income target hitting it at the pre-
scribed moment, Precisely, under the assumption of non-
linearity, it is now supposed that the objective of the
international economic action is to maximize welfare by per-
fectly adjusting capital to output throughout the world,
thereby maintaining international full employment, On the
basis of this objective, the international economic agency
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issues the following recomiendations: (a) national govern-
ments must adopt, in accordance with their specific national
ideologies, compensation rules based on systems of taxes and
tounties most adequate to meet the political, economic, and
technological situation in each country; (b) this will serve
as a welfare indicator, since, dynamically speaking, national
welfare will be at a maximum whenever the present value of
a stream of compensating tax-bounty payments is negative
for every alternative redistribution of real national income;
(c) whenever welfare is maximized in each and every partici-
pating country, world welfare will, a fortiori, be at a
maximum, and then the international system of penalties and
rewards that, also as a system of taxes and bounties, the
international economic agency imposes upon each member govern-
ment as a scale of policy behavior, would indicate a negative
value for any other alternative international economic
organization; (d) world welfare will be increased, decreased
or left unchanged by a given international economic re-
organization whenever the algebraic sum of all compensating
taxes and bounties collected or paid to member countries
in accordance with the universally adopted scale of national
economic policies is positive, negative or zero, If the
adopted international economic policy is that of achieving
optimum distribution of income at full employment in each
participating country, the international economic agency
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will issue the following basic rule for national anti-
cyclical policy: national governments must calculate
the necessary domestic investment stream for maintaining
full employment at a maximum level of welfare: if at any
moment during the course of the planned national economic
action actual capital equals planned capital, no adjustment
is necessary and capital is simply maintained with zero
net investment; if the stock of capital is insufficient,
the rate of investment proceeds at capacity, and if it is
in excess, it is retired by scrapping at a given rate,
12. This international economic policy model, although
extremely oversimplified, does illustrate the international
economy we had in mind when, in the previous section, we
attempted at deducing a world trade multiplier,' Once
provoked by an output deficiency modern industrial econ-
omies start up and continue until the capital scarcity
is removed, and then go down until they remove the exi-a
cess capacity with which they started downward, In terms
of demand for and supply of output, this scheme could be
easily adapted to agricultural fluctuations of the cobweb
6?
variety and be made to fit the conditions in underdeveloped
6 .,Ezekiel, "The Cobweb Theorem", Quarterly Journal
of Economics, vol4 LII, 1938, p, 272; W. Leontief, 'Verto-
6erte Angebotsanpassung und partielles Gleichgewicht",
Zeiscrit frNtoaonoi, vol, V9 part 5, December
1934, pp. 670-76; Paul A. Sar ielson, "Dnai Process Analysis",
in A Survey of Contemporary Economics, op, cit., pp. 368-74;
n. Mv. Goodwin, _opuoit., pp. 4--7; R., W. Reder, op i. p. 169
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countries. As such, the model is completely general,
since the final result is independent of the initial con-
ditions, oscillations maintain themselves as long as un-
certainty of policy from the part of the national governments
or the natIonal economic agency is assumed to exist, and,
finally, no lags are introduced, the mechanism operating
by its own inherent dynamic contradiction as long as it
remains unorganized. Its mathematics are extremely simple,
for, if the Keynesian equations are given:
I = kY (213)
C = aY + b (214)
Y =c +R K = dK/dT (215)
and the recommendation of the international economic agency
concerning domestic investment are symbolically expressed
as
K' I>K
IK=SI=K(216)
KL IKK
where K is the stcck of capital existing in the national
economy; I is the planned investment, proportional to
real national income or output; C is consumption; Y is
national income or output; and a, b, and k are constants.
Now, if K is net investment, Kr is net investment at cap-
acity and K" is the rate of investment scrapping, and if we
combine (213-6), the "multiplier" of the system will be
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obtained as follows:
I = K + - b (217)
1-a 1-a
By assuming a steady rate of growth in the desired amount
of capital, a crude allowance for technological progress
and research could be made. Other asperities could be
softened by developing the multiplier or by introducing
investment lags. As these developments have already been
undertaken in the previous section of this thesis, such
considerations here would be either repetitive here of
static welfare criteria as applied to a dynamic world.
Concluding these remarks we may say that policies that
statically promise increase in welfare are probably sound
on a dynamic setting, whereas transition policies should
perhaps not be judged by welfare criteria,
13, Two economic ideologies: full employment, and
optimum distribution, In very general terms it may be
said tha.t free enterprise national economies tend to
emphasize in ther economic policies the attainment and
maintenance of full employment of resources, whereas social-
ist national economies tend to concentrate their economic
policy upon the problem of optimum allocation of resources.
By method and intention what goes under the name of
Keynesian economics is only incidentally connected with
welfare economics, although, paradoxically, that which is
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known as "welfare state" is much more readily associated
with the theory of employment than with the theory of dis-
tribution, It is our intention to end this study with some
observations concerning the necessity of welding the inter-
stices between these two pieces of economic analysis in
order eventually to develop an inclusive value theory to
serve as a foundation for both specific changes as well as
for aggregate magnitudes. This lack of common doctrine is,
in our view, the chief obstacle for world-wide multilateral
agreement on the appropriate policies to attain and main-
tain full employment. A pertinent example of this lack of
theoretical ligaments is the vagueness surrounding the
very concept of full employment, which necessitates to be
reinterpreted according to whether the country in question
is economically backward or industrially developed. As
underdeveloped areas are rich areas in the eyes of some,
whereas industrially plethoric nations are inhabited by
relatively poor individuals on the standards of others,
confusions and misunderstandings may result when the issue
is simply to impose an import control over a luxury, or
to increase impossible flows of private investment inter-.*
nationally. Even in the hypothesis that comprehensive and
multilateral agreement on unified policies for full employ-
mnent is impossible of achievement at present, the lack of
a coherent body of economic theory may cause trouble when
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schemes must be introduced which would permit single
countries to maintain full employment in spite of fluc-
tuations in effective demand elsewhere, Many a national
policy for full employment may be precluded by ineffective
anti-trust legislation, lack of coordination between unions
and management, or between the industrial sector and the
agricultural sector of the economy5 The sad state of
affairs prevailing over the economics of fewness, in spite
of the towering mountain of books, monographs, etc., dealing
with this subject, is truly symptomatic of a will to ignore
through meticulous application.. now is it possible, under
these circumstances to safeguard the planning of the ex-*
change of goods between countries as well as the internal
policy of each of these constituent units of an inter-
national economy? Minimum cooperation in this field would
require at least that no country should use foreign trade
policy in order to provide internal employment, but what
countries and just how many have the necessary political
foundation to enforce this agreement when a major depression
is threatening? And how many have the necessary economic
knowledge to evaluate beforehand the repercussions of a
change in their foreign economic policy to achieve export
surpluses or a mitigation of adverse balances?
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14. It is more than doubtful that the five requirements
set out in this essay (V,B,13) will ever be fulfilled an
economic world constituted by politically sovereign nations,
In the first place these are rational requirements, and the
benavior of sovereignty is far from being always consis-a
tently rational. For instance, if cyclical fluctuations
give rise to international economic isolationism, surplus
countries, whose probable depression is likely to be miti-
gated, will adhere to a conscious policy of regionalism,
although, rationally, no greater disadvantage would accrue
to tnem from an opposite policy. On the other hand, a
socialist country will refrain, on rational grounds, to
strengthen a capitalist economy for fear of subsequent
reaction, and in so doing the socialist government is
acting exactly as it supposes that the capitalist govern-
ment will act in the same emergency. Free enterprise
economies will reject, also on rational grounds, any attempts
at economic reform, in order not to lose thus the "char-
ismatic" force of their immaculate examtle. Free enter-
prise economies, moreover, being in general politically
democratic, will only adopt an effective full employment
policy under protest that this will strengthen the role of
the central bovernment in detriment of those who are econ-
omically strongest.
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15. Failing satisfactory world-wide agreement
between countries pursuing full employment policies and
countries pursuing optimum distributional schemes, and
since unplanned multilateralism is unlikely to compensate
with gains the losses arising from the recurrence of fluc..
tuations, countries will tend either to isolationism with
greater mutilations of international division of labor or
to a conscious policy of block regionalism. A rule, then,
may be formulated: the larger is the block the smaller will
be the loss from foregoing the potential increase in wel-
fare to be derived from international specialization of
economic effort. Small and poor countries will very likely
be the most vocal opponents of unplanned multilateralism,
and they will tend to form coalitions to face the highly
imperfect character of international markets for manufaco-*
tures. The absorption of these blocks into the theory of
international economic organization here developed is not
intrinsically difficult, since all that is necessary, if
these blocks are integrated and stable, will be to take
them as national economies, and if they are not integrated
to treat them in accordance with the methods of partial
equilibrium. By comparing a large block with a large and
rich country, the same conclusions regarding the spread
of adjustment to any adverse balance, or the degree of
protection against economic aggressions or probability of
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retaliation could be theoretically worked out always in
accordance with our basic norm for stable solutions (V,B,13,a),
The relationships between blocks is not also a problem that
could not be dealt with the aid of a structure of action
similar to or identical with that which has teen the object
of this study. In this sense, the theory that has been pre-
sented here is an attempt at developing a general theory of
action on the basis of which the consolidation of the social
sciences may, perhaps, through hopeful eyes, be dimly per-
ceived,
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